thedrifter
04-10-03, 06:29 AM
04-09-2003
Spectacular Rescue Mission Had Deep Roots
By R.J. Thomas
The spectacular success of the combined special operations force (SOF) rescue mission that freed U.S. Army Pfc. Jessica Lynch in southern Iraq on Apr. 2, 2003, demonstrated the significant improvement in SOF capabilities in the U.S. military since the creation of the multi-service U.S. Special Operations Command 16 years ago.
That progress has not come without major growing pains. Prior to the disastrous 1980 Iran rescue mission to save Americans held hostage in Iran, and subsequent congressional measures that created SOCCOM as a truly multi-service command in 1987, SOF units were barely tolerated stepchildren of the uniformed services, which vied for SOF missions primarily as a means of increasing personnel, assets and budgets.
They also largely ignored one another when it came to the critical tasks of planning and training for various, complex SOF mission capabilities.
For example, the Navy and its SEAL Teams chose to exchange long-range reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering techniques with the Australian and British Special Air Service and Royal Marines, and not the U.S. Army or Marine Corps. The SEALs also opted to work with German combat swimmers rather than other American units to exchange underwater attack techniques (we tried the French too, but mostly they wanted to drink wine and eat cheese).
The SEAL Teams also linked up with U.S. Marine Corps Force Recon to practice naval gunfire support (NGFS) and artillery – ignoring U.S. Air Force specialists in this area, and borrowed heavily from the Marines to develop their own sniper training while again ignoring the U.S. Army. The SEALs sought air insertion platform assistance from the Air Force SOF community with its MC-130 and HH-53 assets. Meanwhile, they developed their own forward air control training with naval air strike forces – and not the Air Force.
Throughout all the efforts at conducting joint SOF missions prior to the formation of USSOCOM in 1987, it was apparent that SOF troops in the field could function well together once on the ground, but differences in mission planning methods and requirements led to a response that was too cumbersome and slow. As a result, the U.S. military lacked the greatest advantage that SOF now brings to the battlefield – lightning-fast response precision strikes.
There have been largely unpublicized successes enjoyed by combined SOF units in Afghanistan against the Taliban, and in the pre-attack and early of the war in Iraq that will probably not be fully revealed for years – largely to protect “sources and methods” of unconventional warfighting.
Sketchy outlines of these missions have emerged in news reporting, including the quick takedown of the Iraqi oil fields, the isolation of Iraqi military bases in western Iraq, the unconventional war being fought with the Kurds and 173 Airborne Brigade in northern Iraq, and unconfirmed accounts of SOF reconnaissance teams in Baghdad itself long before conventional units arrived. These are all indicators that USSOCOM and its joint special operations command planners have achieved a true synergy based on effective inter-service cooperation and training.
Moreover, the fact that we USSOCCOM has had SOF units from several allied countries working in concert in Iraq – Great Britain, Australia and others – is a positive indicator for employment of SOF in future operations including the ongoing campaign against al Qaeda terrorists.
The efficiency of the rescue mission that retrieved Pfc. Lynch from an Iraqi hospital, despite several unexpected complications, further validated the importance of joint SOF planning and training.
News reports of the rescue operation revealed that the Marines mounted a sizable diversionary attack to draw off the Iraqi defenders. For the rescue itself, Army aviation provided helicopters for the insertion and extraction parts of the operation and the Air Force provided air cover from any hostile armor that might have responded. For the raid on the hospital itself, a force of U.S. Army Rangers set up an effective perimeter around the site, while Navy SEALs made the actual recovery of Pfc. Lynch and the remains of a number of American soldiers who had been killed in the ambush of their unit.
The rapid and effective take-down of the hospital stands in sharp contrast to the ill-managed rescue mission of 23 years earlier in Iran, when the various service components did not even practice the mission with one another in full before deploying to the staging point.
We should all be proud, not only of the heroic conduct of the SOF team members who rescued Pfc. Lynch, but of the military and congressional leaders who successfully forged USSOCOM into being and set the stage for this remarkable military capability.
R.J. Thomas is a Contributing Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at win70shooter@hotmail.com.
Sempers,
Roger
Spectacular Rescue Mission Had Deep Roots
By R.J. Thomas
The spectacular success of the combined special operations force (SOF) rescue mission that freed U.S. Army Pfc. Jessica Lynch in southern Iraq on Apr. 2, 2003, demonstrated the significant improvement in SOF capabilities in the U.S. military since the creation of the multi-service U.S. Special Operations Command 16 years ago.
That progress has not come without major growing pains. Prior to the disastrous 1980 Iran rescue mission to save Americans held hostage in Iran, and subsequent congressional measures that created SOCCOM as a truly multi-service command in 1987, SOF units were barely tolerated stepchildren of the uniformed services, which vied for SOF missions primarily as a means of increasing personnel, assets and budgets.
They also largely ignored one another when it came to the critical tasks of planning and training for various, complex SOF mission capabilities.
For example, the Navy and its SEAL Teams chose to exchange long-range reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering techniques with the Australian and British Special Air Service and Royal Marines, and not the U.S. Army or Marine Corps. The SEALs also opted to work with German combat swimmers rather than other American units to exchange underwater attack techniques (we tried the French too, but mostly they wanted to drink wine and eat cheese).
The SEAL Teams also linked up with U.S. Marine Corps Force Recon to practice naval gunfire support (NGFS) and artillery – ignoring U.S. Air Force specialists in this area, and borrowed heavily from the Marines to develop their own sniper training while again ignoring the U.S. Army. The SEALs sought air insertion platform assistance from the Air Force SOF community with its MC-130 and HH-53 assets. Meanwhile, they developed their own forward air control training with naval air strike forces – and not the Air Force.
Throughout all the efforts at conducting joint SOF missions prior to the formation of USSOCOM in 1987, it was apparent that SOF troops in the field could function well together once on the ground, but differences in mission planning methods and requirements led to a response that was too cumbersome and slow. As a result, the U.S. military lacked the greatest advantage that SOF now brings to the battlefield – lightning-fast response precision strikes.
There have been largely unpublicized successes enjoyed by combined SOF units in Afghanistan against the Taliban, and in the pre-attack and early of the war in Iraq that will probably not be fully revealed for years – largely to protect “sources and methods” of unconventional warfighting.
Sketchy outlines of these missions have emerged in news reporting, including the quick takedown of the Iraqi oil fields, the isolation of Iraqi military bases in western Iraq, the unconventional war being fought with the Kurds and 173 Airborne Brigade in northern Iraq, and unconfirmed accounts of SOF reconnaissance teams in Baghdad itself long before conventional units arrived. These are all indicators that USSOCOM and its joint special operations command planners have achieved a true synergy based on effective inter-service cooperation and training.
Moreover, the fact that we USSOCCOM has had SOF units from several allied countries working in concert in Iraq – Great Britain, Australia and others – is a positive indicator for employment of SOF in future operations including the ongoing campaign against al Qaeda terrorists.
The efficiency of the rescue mission that retrieved Pfc. Lynch from an Iraqi hospital, despite several unexpected complications, further validated the importance of joint SOF planning and training.
News reports of the rescue operation revealed that the Marines mounted a sizable diversionary attack to draw off the Iraqi defenders. For the rescue itself, Army aviation provided helicopters for the insertion and extraction parts of the operation and the Air Force provided air cover from any hostile armor that might have responded. For the raid on the hospital itself, a force of U.S. Army Rangers set up an effective perimeter around the site, while Navy SEALs made the actual recovery of Pfc. Lynch and the remains of a number of American soldiers who had been killed in the ambush of their unit.
The rapid and effective take-down of the hospital stands in sharp contrast to the ill-managed rescue mission of 23 years earlier in Iran, when the various service components did not even practice the mission with one another in full before deploying to the staging point.
We should all be proud, not only of the heroic conduct of the SOF team members who rescued Pfc. Lynch, but of the military and congressional leaders who successfully forged USSOCOM into being and set the stage for this remarkable military capability.
R.J. Thomas is a Contributing Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at win70shooter@hotmail.com.
Sempers,
Roger