thedrifter
04-02-03, 01:53 PM
The Marines Have Landed
The Devil Dogs in Afghanistan.
By James S. Robbins, a national-security analyst & NRO contributor
November 27, 2001 8:25 a.m.
ou knew the Marines had to get into this one. The Halls of Montezuma, the shores of Tripoli, the slopes of Suribachi, now the plains of Afghanistan. About 500 Marines from the 15th and 26th Marine Expeditionary Units landed by helicopters near Kandahar to establish a Forward Operating Base (FOB) deep inside enemy territory, and in the heart of the spiritual home of the Taliban. The boldness of the move fits the Marine image. I worked for the Marines for two years and observed — indeed was immersed in — the spirit of relaxed competence and firm self-assuredness that pervades all ranks in the smallest of our armed services. One quickly learns that the "Devil Dogs" are proud of their hard-earned moniker and willing to reconfirm its essential truth whenever duty calls. So when you have a place like Afghanistan, famous for its warriors, the men who defeated the Soviet Union, legendary victors over all comers (which, like many legends, is not quite true), the country everyone warns never to put troops on the ground in or face the consequences — to the Marines that is an engraved invitation begging for an RSVP.
The FOB will serve a number of important purposes leading towards the endgame in this phase of the war on terror. It has a crude airstrip — built by a wealthy Arab to support his hunting lodge (aptly now our hunting lodge) — and can act as a staging and support base, supplying fuel and ammunition for aircraft, particularly helicopters, flying missions in Afghanistan. The Marines may also give fire support to the anti-Taliban forces — Northern Alliance and Pashtun — as they prosecute the siege of Kandahar. This was evidenced by a reported attack Monday by Marine Cobra gunships on a Taliban armored column with devastating results. Secretary Rumsfeld pointed out that the Marines' mission is not to take Kandahar, and they probably couldn't with such a small force, but the Marine Corps has been the lead service in developing new concepts in urban warfare and they may choose to give some of their proposals a field test as part of their support function. Ultimately the base will serve as a launching point for strikes in and around Kandahar as the Taliban fronts begin to collapse and the enemy attempts to escape. Having a staging base close to the action increases operational flexibility and gives commanders greater options. Our forces will be able to react much more quickly from 50 miles outside the city than they would from ships in the Arabian sea, which will be a critically important factor in apprehending leadership targets, particularly Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar if they are in that area.
Russian Airborne Commander Georgy Shpak, who commanded the Soviet 345th separate paratrooper regiment in Afghanistan from 1980 to 1982, cautioned that the Taliban might begin guerrilla attacks against the in-country troops which could stall the antiterror campaign. "The civil war may come up with a bang," he warned. The Soviet experience in Afghanistan is a cautionary tale not to be ignored, but it is also worth noting that the current situation is a reversal of the predicament the Red Army faced. During their war, the Russians controlled the cities and the mujahedeen the countryside. Today the Taliban are holed up in cities and the Americans are in the hinterland. The mujahedeen in the 1980s rarely deviated from guerrilla tactics, and when they fought battles conventionally — when they stood up to the Red Army instead of fleeing — they were decisively beaten. The Taliban have yet to begin a guerrilla phase, and been trying throughout the war to fight a conventional struggle against a Northern Alliance force backed by overwhelming allied airpower — and in the process they are being destroyed piecemeal. Ironically, the unconventional war has been fought primarily by the allies, relying on special operations forces fighting guerrilla-style hit-and-run attacks, and by all reports meeting with remarkable success.
But having a stationary target, the Taliban may choose to strike. It is a tempting objective — perhaps by design. In fact the United States may be hoping the Taliban will mount an attack. The U.S. may be employing the principle of strategic offense/tactical defense. This ancient doctrine is based on the recognition that the defense is the stronger art of war. In practice, one takes a piece of ground the foe can't live without, then defends it. The FOB is apparently located in the open ground somewhere to the south of Kandahar, probably along the lines of communication (and escape) to Taliban-friendly tribal areas in Pakistan. Visibility and fields of fire are unlimited, and cover for an attacking force is minimal. If the Taliban massed to launch an assault, or to try to breakout to the south, they would run headlong into the teeth of dug-in, well-supported Marines, and be annihilated from the ground and air. The American presence thus presents the Taliban with two unsatisfactory alternatives — attack and be destroyed, or dig in at Kandahar and be bombed and starved into submission.
The entire al Qaeda/Taliban strategy in this war was predicated on U.S. risk aversion. They never expected the Americans would place heavy forces on the ground inside Afghanistan, or that it would be accomplished with the cooperation of Afghans. They viewed the United States as indecisive and cowardly. If Westerners did manage to muster the will to get to Afghanistan, the locals would unite against the heathen invaders, as they had against the Soviets. But none of this came to pass. The allies have acted decisively, and the Taliban found that it was their friends in al Qaeda who were perceived as the invaders. Allied commanders have proceeded methodically, avoiding inordinate risk, utilizing local forces when possible, special forces when needed, and have now chosen to seize terrain and establish an operational presence. The move has both military importance and symbolic resonance. It is both an expression of confidence in the course of the struggle and a message to the Taliban and any other potential foe who might be watching that the United States is willing to bring the war to their doorstep. "The Marines have landed," stated Brigadier General James Mattis, commander of the attack task force, "and we now own a piece of Afghanistan."
Ooh-rah
Sempers,
Roger
The Devil Dogs in Afghanistan.
By James S. Robbins, a national-security analyst & NRO contributor
November 27, 2001 8:25 a.m.
ou knew the Marines had to get into this one. The Halls of Montezuma, the shores of Tripoli, the slopes of Suribachi, now the plains of Afghanistan. About 500 Marines from the 15th and 26th Marine Expeditionary Units landed by helicopters near Kandahar to establish a Forward Operating Base (FOB) deep inside enemy territory, and in the heart of the spiritual home of the Taliban. The boldness of the move fits the Marine image. I worked for the Marines for two years and observed — indeed was immersed in — the spirit of relaxed competence and firm self-assuredness that pervades all ranks in the smallest of our armed services. One quickly learns that the "Devil Dogs" are proud of their hard-earned moniker and willing to reconfirm its essential truth whenever duty calls. So when you have a place like Afghanistan, famous for its warriors, the men who defeated the Soviet Union, legendary victors over all comers (which, like many legends, is not quite true), the country everyone warns never to put troops on the ground in or face the consequences — to the Marines that is an engraved invitation begging for an RSVP.
The FOB will serve a number of important purposes leading towards the endgame in this phase of the war on terror. It has a crude airstrip — built by a wealthy Arab to support his hunting lodge (aptly now our hunting lodge) — and can act as a staging and support base, supplying fuel and ammunition for aircraft, particularly helicopters, flying missions in Afghanistan. The Marines may also give fire support to the anti-Taliban forces — Northern Alliance and Pashtun — as they prosecute the siege of Kandahar. This was evidenced by a reported attack Monday by Marine Cobra gunships on a Taliban armored column with devastating results. Secretary Rumsfeld pointed out that the Marines' mission is not to take Kandahar, and they probably couldn't with such a small force, but the Marine Corps has been the lead service in developing new concepts in urban warfare and they may choose to give some of their proposals a field test as part of their support function. Ultimately the base will serve as a launching point for strikes in and around Kandahar as the Taliban fronts begin to collapse and the enemy attempts to escape. Having a staging base close to the action increases operational flexibility and gives commanders greater options. Our forces will be able to react much more quickly from 50 miles outside the city than they would from ships in the Arabian sea, which will be a critically important factor in apprehending leadership targets, particularly Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar if they are in that area.
Russian Airborne Commander Georgy Shpak, who commanded the Soviet 345th separate paratrooper regiment in Afghanistan from 1980 to 1982, cautioned that the Taliban might begin guerrilla attacks against the in-country troops which could stall the antiterror campaign. "The civil war may come up with a bang," he warned. The Soviet experience in Afghanistan is a cautionary tale not to be ignored, but it is also worth noting that the current situation is a reversal of the predicament the Red Army faced. During their war, the Russians controlled the cities and the mujahedeen the countryside. Today the Taliban are holed up in cities and the Americans are in the hinterland. The mujahedeen in the 1980s rarely deviated from guerrilla tactics, and when they fought battles conventionally — when they stood up to the Red Army instead of fleeing — they were decisively beaten. The Taliban have yet to begin a guerrilla phase, and been trying throughout the war to fight a conventional struggle against a Northern Alliance force backed by overwhelming allied airpower — and in the process they are being destroyed piecemeal. Ironically, the unconventional war has been fought primarily by the allies, relying on special operations forces fighting guerrilla-style hit-and-run attacks, and by all reports meeting with remarkable success.
But having a stationary target, the Taliban may choose to strike. It is a tempting objective — perhaps by design. In fact the United States may be hoping the Taliban will mount an attack. The U.S. may be employing the principle of strategic offense/tactical defense. This ancient doctrine is based on the recognition that the defense is the stronger art of war. In practice, one takes a piece of ground the foe can't live without, then defends it. The FOB is apparently located in the open ground somewhere to the south of Kandahar, probably along the lines of communication (and escape) to Taliban-friendly tribal areas in Pakistan. Visibility and fields of fire are unlimited, and cover for an attacking force is minimal. If the Taliban massed to launch an assault, or to try to breakout to the south, they would run headlong into the teeth of dug-in, well-supported Marines, and be annihilated from the ground and air. The American presence thus presents the Taliban with two unsatisfactory alternatives — attack and be destroyed, or dig in at Kandahar and be bombed and starved into submission.
The entire al Qaeda/Taliban strategy in this war was predicated on U.S. risk aversion. They never expected the Americans would place heavy forces on the ground inside Afghanistan, or that it would be accomplished with the cooperation of Afghans. They viewed the United States as indecisive and cowardly. If Westerners did manage to muster the will to get to Afghanistan, the locals would unite against the heathen invaders, as they had against the Soviets. But none of this came to pass. The allies have acted decisively, and the Taliban found that it was their friends in al Qaeda who were perceived as the invaders. Allied commanders have proceeded methodically, avoiding inordinate risk, utilizing local forces when possible, special forces when needed, and have now chosen to seize terrain and establish an operational presence. The move has both military importance and symbolic resonance. It is both an expression of confidence in the course of the struggle and a message to the Taliban and any other potential foe who might be watching that the United States is willing to bring the war to their doorstep. "The Marines have landed," stated Brigadier General James Mattis, commander of the attack task force, "and we now own a piece of Afghanistan."
Ooh-rah
Sempers,
Roger