thedrifter
03-29-03, 05:43 PM
March 29, 2003
Iraqi ultralights spotted over U.S. troops
By Sean D. Naylor
Times staff writer
CENTRAL IRAQ — At least two Iraqi ultralight aircraft flew over a patch of desert Friday where thousands of U.S. soldiers and several command and control facilities are located. The appearance of enemy aircraft over U.S. positions is especially alarming because the military believes ultralight aircraft of the type spotted Friday may be used to deliver chemical or biological weapons.
There is one other alarming possibility, according to briefings given intelligence officers here: Craft like that might be used in kamikaze suicide attacks, a possibility driven home Saturday morning when an apparent suicide bomber blew up a car at a checkpoint manned by soldiers from this same outfit, the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized). U.S. Central Command confirmed the report and said four American soldiers were killed. It had no reports of any wounded.
Maj. Gen. Victor E. “Gene” Renuart Jr., director of operations for Central Command, was quick to label the bombing as an act of terrorism. “That kind of an activity is a symbol of an organization that is beginning to get a little bit desperate,” he added.
The appearance of the aircraft caught the Central Command off guard. Saturday afternoon, 24 hours after the craft had flown over the U.S. position, Renuart told a press briefing that the Iraqis have “not flown an airplane, they have not had the capability to fly an airplane, they’ve not shown any inclination to fly an airplane.”
He added, “We keep a very close eye on the Iraqi airfields. We’ve kept them closed, we intend to continue to keep them closed. We’re concerned about any possible use of an airplane to conduct terror or military operations and we watch that very, very carefully.”
Both of the small, prop-driven aircraft spotted here evaded a tight air defense system and flew over an assembly area packed with helicopters, tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles other military equipment. They flew off before the anti-aircraft crews could get permission to shoot them down.
Soldiers at a command center were the first to raise the alarm about enemy aircraft after they looked up about 3 p.m. Friday and spotted an ultralight flying overhead, according to Capt. Ruel Smith. Those soldiers passed the word to Smith, who commands C Battery, 1st Battalion, 3rd Air Defense Artillery Regiment. Smith’s battery is attached to 3rd Infantry’s 3rd Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment.
“Once we got the report we oriented all our fire units in that direction, and then one of our units got eyes on it,” said Smith, whose battery consists mostly of Linebacker systems, which are Bradley fighting vehicles mounted with Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. Meanwhile, a report came in of a second ultralight over a different part of the assembly area.
Staff Sgt. Billy Armstrong, a Linebacker squad leader, was scanning the skies keenly. “We got the report that a possible ultralight paraglider would be coming close to the area,” he said. “My driver noticed an aircraft off to the east unlike any he’d ever seen before.”
Armstrong raised his binoculars to verify what his driver was reporting. About two miles away he saw a tiny aircraft — with a wingspan of about 15 to 20 feet — being steered by a pilot sitting on a seat beneath the wings, “with a small engine behind his backside.” The “grayish black” ultralight was about 900 feet above the ground, flying in a straight line “as slow as a helicopter would,” Armstrong said. The realization that he and his troops might be about to shoot at an enemy aircraft hit the squad leader hard. The dominance of U.S. air power in recent years has all but eliminated the threat to U.S. ground forces from enemy aircraft.
“I was thinking, ‘Oh ****! It’s the first time in my 12 years that an air defense role is gonna be played in a situation where we actually had the possibility of firing a Stinger missile,’ ” Armstrong recalled. But it was not to be.
Over the battalion radio net, Smith heard Avenger air defense systems — Humvees mounted with Stingers — also being cued to the target. But even though at least one of the ultralights was in the targets of his gunners, procedures here require that a higher command, in this case V Corps, gives the approval to shoot. The aircraft disappeared beyond the horizon while that permission was being sought.
Armstrong and his soldiers were “very frustrated,” he said. Smith acknowledged that the failure to attack it was frustrating.
“If I had authority to shoot it myself, we would have engaged it,” he said. But he added that he understood why he was required to seek approval from a three-star headquarters before shooting at an enemy aircraft that was virtually overhead. “A lot of it has to do with cluttered skies,” Smith said. “There are a lot of friendly aircraft in these skies.”
The crowd of helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft flying through this airspace probably accounted for the ultralight pilots’ ability to fly over such a sensitive assembly area before being detected, according to Smith. The mass of aircraft showing up on radar screens makes it difficult for soldiers watching those screens to distinguish, for instance, an Iraqi ultralight aircraft from a small U.S. Army helicopter, he said.
“It moves slow, and it has a prop, so it looks to us like a helicopter … and there’s many, many, many helicopters here,” he said.
“There are more aircraft here than I’ve ever seen on a radar screen in my life,” Smith said, “98 percent of which we positively know are friendly.”
Once the ultralights disappeared over the horizon, the Army units here did not give up the chase. Smith requested and received permission from 3rd ID to continue the hunt, and three Linebackers headed out and drove two-and-a-half miles without catching sight of the aircraft. Two 3rd Infantry Division Apaches were also diverted to search for the aircraft, Smith said.
About 30 minutes later came a report that OH-58D Kiowa Warrior helicopters of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) had seen an ultralight 25 miles south of here, Smith said. But the 101st helicopters apparently did not follow the ultralight, for reasons Smith said he could not explain.
The appearance of the ultralight aircraft over this vital rear area did not come as a complete shock to intelligence and air defense officers here. In December about “half-a-dozen” ultralight aircraft were also spotted flying over two U.S. military camps in Kuwait, according to Capt. Jeff Ryals, 3-7 Cav’s intelligence officer. U.S. forces failed to shoot the aircraft down in that instance as well.
That “was a test to see if they could violate our airspace without getting shot down,” Ryals said.
Smith said he had been briefed on the threat posed by the small aircraft, “although we were told to expect a slightly different type of vehicle, which was a paraglider.” The difference between the two is that a paraglider has a steerable parachute canopy while an ultralight has a stable framed wing, he added.
Reports briefed to officers here indicate that the Iraqi regime tried to buy at least 100 ultralights from an overseas company. But intelligence indicates that only about 50 have been delivered, Ryals said.
He listed three ways the Iraqis could use the ultralights: strategic reconnaissance of Allied positions, spreading chemical or biological weapons, or loading the aircraft with high-explosives and using them in Kamikaze-style suicide attacks. The aircraft were probably being flown by pilots drawn from one of the paramilitary forces loyal to the Hussein regime, or by Iraqi special forces, Ryals said.
“All the [Iraqi] special forces missions we’ve seen in the last 10 years have been strategic reconnaissance on motorcycles or infiltrators dressed as Bedouins,” he said. “So it would be a new tactic if special forces used these [ultralights] for strategic reconnaissance.”
The flights over this area yesterday were probably for the purpose of strategic reconnaissance, “scouting out the sexiest targets to strike with surface-to-surface missiles,” Ryals said.
Authorities here have made two key changes in the wake of the yesterday’s overflights. “Something is being worked on right now to help someone looking at a radar air picture determine which track is the ultralight,” Smith said. And if another ultralight appears overhead, Smith and other air defense commanders now have the authority to shoot on sight.
Although none could be certain, officers here believe this is the first time an enemy aircraft has flown over American ground forces since the Korean War.
There was a second hint Saturday that U.S. forces may have underestimated Iraq’s technological capability. Journalists traveling with units in the field were told to stop using a certain brand of satellite telephone. The command is worried that, in some fashion it would not explain, the Iraqis might use signals from those phones to gather intelligence about American operations. The command did not order all phones shut down, just those using the Thuraya satellite. That system is based in the United Arab Emirates and is Arab owned. Other satellite phones, including those in the Iridium system, were not subject to a shut down order. Iridium is an American-owned system.
Sempers,
Roger
Iraqi ultralights spotted over U.S. troops
By Sean D. Naylor
Times staff writer
CENTRAL IRAQ — At least two Iraqi ultralight aircraft flew over a patch of desert Friday where thousands of U.S. soldiers and several command and control facilities are located. The appearance of enemy aircraft over U.S. positions is especially alarming because the military believes ultralight aircraft of the type spotted Friday may be used to deliver chemical or biological weapons.
There is one other alarming possibility, according to briefings given intelligence officers here: Craft like that might be used in kamikaze suicide attacks, a possibility driven home Saturday morning when an apparent suicide bomber blew up a car at a checkpoint manned by soldiers from this same outfit, the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized). U.S. Central Command confirmed the report and said four American soldiers were killed. It had no reports of any wounded.
Maj. Gen. Victor E. “Gene” Renuart Jr., director of operations for Central Command, was quick to label the bombing as an act of terrorism. “That kind of an activity is a symbol of an organization that is beginning to get a little bit desperate,” he added.
The appearance of the aircraft caught the Central Command off guard. Saturday afternoon, 24 hours after the craft had flown over the U.S. position, Renuart told a press briefing that the Iraqis have “not flown an airplane, they have not had the capability to fly an airplane, they’ve not shown any inclination to fly an airplane.”
He added, “We keep a very close eye on the Iraqi airfields. We’ve kept them closed, we intend to continue to keep them closed. We’re concerned about any possible use of an airplane to conduct terror or military operations and we watch that very, very carefully.”
Both of the small, prop-driven aircraft spotted here evaded a tight air defense system and flew over an assembly area packed with helicopters, tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles other military equipment. They flew off before the anti-aircraft crews could get permission to shoot them down.
Soldiers at a command center were the first to raise the alarm about enemy aircraft after they looked up about 3 p.m. Friday and spotted an ultralight flying overhead, according to Capt. Ruel Smith. Those soldiers passed the word to Smith, who commands C Battery, 1st Battalion, 3rd Air Defense Artillery Regiment. Smith’s battery is attached to 3rd Infantry’s 3rd Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment.
“Once we got the report we oriented all our fire units in that direction, and then one of our units got eyes on it,” said Smith, whose battery consists mostly of Linebacker systems, which are Bradley fighting vehicles mounted with Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. Meanwhile, a report came in of a second ultralight over a different part of the assembly area.
Staff Sgt. Billy Armstrong, a Linebacker squad leader, was scanning the skies keenly. “We got the report that a possible ultralight paraglider would be coming close to the area,” he said. “My driver noticed an aircraft off to the east unlike any he’d ever seen before.”
Armstrong raised his binoculars to verify what his driver was reporting. About two miles away he saw a tiny aircraft — with a wingspan of about 15 to 20 feet — being steered by a pilot sitting on a seat beneath the wings, “with a small engine behind his backside.” The “grayish black” ultralight was about 900 feet above the ground, flying in a straight line “as slow as a helicopter would,” Armstrong said. The realization that he and his troops might be about to shoot at an enemy aircraft hit the squad leader hard. The dominance of U.S. air power in recent years has all but eliminated the threat to U.S. ground forces from enemy aircraft.
“I was thinking, ‘Oh ****! It’s the first time in my 12 years that an air defense role is gonna be played in a situation where we actually had the possibility of firing a Stinger missile,’ ” Armstrong recalled. But it was not to be.
Over the battalion radio net, Smith heard Avenger air defense systems — Humvees mounted with Stingers — also being cued to the target. But even though at least one of the ultralights was in the targets of his gunners, procedures here require that a higher command, in this case V Corps, gives the approval to shoot. The aircraft disappeared beyond the horizon while that permission was being sought.
Armstrong and his soldiers were “very frustrated,” he said. Smith acknowledged that the failure to attack it was frustrating.
“If I had authority to shoot it myself, we would have engaged it,” he said. But he added that he understood why he was required to seek approval from a three-star headquarters before shooting at an enemy aircraft that was virtually overhead. “A lot of it has to do with cluttered skies,” Smith said. “There are a lot of friendly aircraft in these skies.”
The crowd of helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft flying through this airspace probably accounted for the ultralight pilots’ ability to fly over such a sensitive assembly area before being detected, according to Smith. The mass of aircraft showing up on radar screens makes it difficult for soldiers watching those screens to distinguish, for instance, an Iraqi ultralight aircraft from a small U.S. Army helicopter, he said.
“It moves slow, and it has a prop, so it looks to us like a helicopter … and there’s many, many, many helicopters here,” he said.
“There are more aircraft here than I’ve ever seen on a radar screen in my life,” Smith said, “98 percent of which we positively know are friendly.”
Once the ultralights disappeared over the horizon, the Army units here did not give up the chase. Smith requested and received permission from 3rd ID to continue the hunt, and three Linebackers headed out and drove two-and-a-half miles without catching sight of the aircraft. Two 3rd Infantry Division Apaches were also diverted to search for the aircraft, Smith said.
About 30 minutes later came a report that OH-58D Kiowa Warrior helicopters of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) had seen an ultralight 25 miles south of here, Smith said. But the 101st helicopters apparently did not follow the ultralight, for reasons Smith said he could not explain.
The appearance of the ultralight aircraft over this vital rear area did not come as a complete shock to intelligence and air defense officers here. In December about “half-a-dozen” ultralight aircraft were also spotted flying over two U.S. military camps in Kuwait, according to Capt. Jeff Ryals, 3-7 Cav’s intelligence officer. U.S. forces failed to shoot the aircraft down in that instance as well.
That “was a test to see if they could violate our airspace without getting shot down,” Ryals said.
Smith said he had been briefed on the threat posed by the small aircraft, “although we were told to expect a slightly different type of vehicle, which was a paraglider.” The difference between the two is that a paraglider has a steerable parachute canopy while an ultralight has a stable framed wing, he added.
Reports briefed to officers here indicate that the Iraqi regime tried to buy at least 100 ultralights from an overseas company. But intelligence indicates that only about 50 have been delivered, Ryals said.
He listed three ways the Iraqis could use the ultralights: strategic reconnaissance of Allied positions, spreading chemical or biological weapons, or loading the aircraft with high-explosives and using them in Kamikaze-style suicide attacks. The aircraft were probably being flown by pilots drawn from one of the paramilitary forces loyal to the Hussein regime, or by Iraqi special forces, Ryals said.
“All the [Iraqi] special forces missions we’ve seen in the last 10 years have been strategic reconnaissance on motorcycles or infiltrators dressed as Bedouins,” he said. “So it would be a new tactic if special forces used these [ultralights] for strategic reconnaissance.”
The flights over this area yesterday were probably for the purpose of strategic reconnaissance, “scouting out the sexiest targets to strike with surface-to-surface missiles,” Ryals said.
Authorities here have made two key changes in the wake of the yesterday’s overflights. “Something is being worked on right now to help someone looking at a radar air picture determine which track is the ultralight,” Smith said. And if another ultralight appears overhead, Smith and other air defense commanders now have the authority to shoot on sight.
Although none could be certain, officers here believe this is the first time an enemy aircraft has flown over American ground forces since the Korean War.
There was a second hint Saturday that U.S. forces may have underestimated Iraq’s technological capability. Journalists traveling with units in the field were told to stop using a certain brand of satellite telephone. The command is worried that, in some fashion it would not explain, the Iraqis might use signals from those phones to gather intelligence about American operations. The command did not order all phones shut down, just those using the Thuraya satellite. That system is based in the United Arab Emirates and is Arab owned. Other satellite phones, including those in the Iridium system, were not subject to a shut down order. Iridium is an American-owned system.
Sempers,
Roger