thedrifter
07-23-07, 07:13 PM
Marine leaders defend 2005 MRAP decision
By Tom Vanden Brook - USA Today
Posted : Monday Jul 23, 2007 7:38:00 EDT
WASHINGTON — In February 2005, then-Brig. Gen. Dennis Hejlik signed an urgent request asking for 1,169 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles to “increase survivability and mobility of Marines operating in a hazardous fire area” in Iraq’s Anbar province.
Now, as they defend their decision to send armored Humvees instead of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles, top U.S. Marine commanders are saying Hejlik did not specifically mean MRAPs, which are now called the Pentagon’s top procurement priority.
In 2005, Hejlik, now a major general, signed the request that started: “There is an immediate need for an MRAP vehicle capability to increase survivability and mobility of Marines operating in a hazardous fire area against known threats.”
On Friday, Marine Corps Commandant James Conway said at the National Press Club that “what Denny Hejlik was asking for in that urgent-need statement was that kind of a capability, not that family of vehicles. He wanted a vehicle that gave him an ambush- and mine-protected kind of capability.”
Hejlik, who leads the Corps’ special operations command, issued a memo last week about the February 2005 request. The memo followed a USA Today story about the slow response of military officials to the need for MRAP vehicles. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has pushed the Pentagon to buy more MRAPs, citing the safety they have provided Marines. No Marines have been killed in more than 300 attacks on MRAPs. The Pentagon plans to spend about $5 billion this year to field more MRAPs.
“I must stress that we were not seeking a specific vehicle design,” Hejlik wrote. “Rather, we wanted to significantly enhance the force protection capability of our vehicles. Frankly, the term Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle meant nothing to me at the time, other than additional force protection for our forces.”
However, the 2005 request Hejlik signed cited the term MRAP and some of the vehicle’s unique characteristics, such as its V-shaped hull “designed specifically to disperse explosive blast and fragmentary effects.” The request also said the vehicles should have special “firing ports,” which are standard features on the MRAPs the Pentagon is ordering now.
“MRAP vehicles will protect Marines, reduce casualties, increase mobility and enhance mission success,” the request read. “Without MRAP, personnel loss rates are likely to continue at their current rate.”
Last week, USA Today reported that in the summer of 2005, then-Marine Corps commandant Gen. Michael Hagee decided against MRAPs because factory-built, armored Humvees were considered the best solution to the insurgent threat, which was deemed to be primarily from attacks that struck the sides of vehicles.
“Terrorists also employed mines, but to a much lesser degree and with much less destructive power than we are experiencing today,” Hejlik said in his memo. “The terrorists primarily targeted the sides of our vehicles and, to a much lesser extent, the undercarriage” of Marine vehicles.
Conway said Friday that improvised explosive devices were not a significant threat in early 2005.
The February 2005 request said MRAPs were needed for more than just underbelly blasts. It said the “expanded use” of IEDs, rocket-propelled grenades and small-arms fire “requires a more robust family of vehicles.”
Conway provided statistics on underbelly blasts for the first time Friday. From January to September 2005, there were about 10 such attacks. After September, there were 10 per month for the rest of the year. There were 16 attacks in January 2006, and 120 for all of 2006.
Such attacks increased, Conway said, because there were more armored Humvees in Anbar.
Ellie
By Tom Vanden Brook - USA Today
Posted : Monday Jul 23, 2007 7:38:00 EDT
WASHINGTON — In February 2005, then-Brig. Gen. Dennis Hejlik signed an urgent request asking for 1,169 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles to “increase survivability and mobility of Marines operating in a hazardous fire area” in Iraq’s Anbar province.
Now, as they defend their decision to send armored Humvees instead of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles, top U.S. Marine commanders are saying Hejlik did not specifically mean MRAPs, which are now called the Pentagon’s top procurement priority.
In 2005, Hejlik, now a major general, signed the request that started: “There is an immediate need for an MRAP vehicle capability to increase survivability and mobility of Marines operating in a hazardous fire area against known threats.”
On Friday, Marine Corps Commandant James Conway said at the National Press Club that “what Denny Hejlik was asking for in that urgent-need statement was that kind of a capability, not that family of vehicles. He wanted a vehicle that gave him an ambush- and mine-protected kind of capability.”
Hejlik, who leads the Corps’ special operations command, issued a memo last week about the February 2005 request. The memo followed a USA Today story about the slow response of military officials to the need for MRAP vehicles. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has pushed the Pentagon to buy more MRAPs, citing the safety they have provided Marines. No Marines have been killed in more than 300 attacks on MRAPs. The Pentagon plans to spend about $5 billion this year to field more MRAPs.
“I must stress that we were not seeking a specific vehicle design,” Hejlik wrote. “Rather, we wanted to significantly enhance the force protection capability of our vehicles. Frankly, the term Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle meant nothing to me at the time, other than additional force protection for our forces.”
However, the 2005 request Hejlik signed cited the term MRAP and some of the vehicle’s unique characteristics, such as its V-shaped hull “designed specifically to disperse explosive blast and fragmentary effects.” The request also said the vehicles should have special “firing ports,” which are standard features on the MRAPs the Pentagon is ordering now.
“MRAP vehicles will protect Marines, reduce casualties, increase mobility and enhance mission success,” the request read. “Without MRAP, personnel loss rates are likely to continue at their current rate.”
Last week, USA Today reported that in the summer of 2005, then-Marine Corps commandant Gen. Michael Hagee decided against MRAPs because factory-built, armored Humvees were considered the best solution to the insurgent threat, which was deemed to be primarily from attacks that struck the sides of vehicles.
“Terrorists also employed mines, but to a much lesser degree and with much less destructive power than we are experiencing today,” Hejlik said in his memo. “The terrorists primarily targeted the sides of our vehicles and, to a much lesser extent, the undercarriage” of Marine vehicles.
Conway said Friday that improvised explosive devices were not a significant threat in early 2005.
The February 2005 request said MRAPs were needed for more than just underbelly blasts. It said the “expanded use” of IEDs, rocket-propelled grenades and small-arms fire “requires a more robust family of vehicles.”
Conway provided statistics on underbelly blasts for the first time Friday. From January to September 2005, there were about 10 such attacks. After September, there were 10 per month for the rest of the year. There were 16 attacks in January 2006, and 120 for all of 2006.
Such attacks increased, Conway said, because there were more armored Humvees in Anbar.
Ellie