thedrifter
07-07-07, 07:31 AM
07-05-2007
Coffman’s Commandos
By Matthew Dodd
“…[T]he blood you shed will never be forgotten,” said [Bayan] Jabr, the [Iraqi] Interior Minister. ‘We, the forces of the (Ministry of Interior) and the (Ministry of Defense) will continue to fight until we defeat terrorism. Right will always defeat wrong.’”
According to an August 24, 2005 Army News Service/Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq Public Affairs article, those stirring words were spoken that very same day at an awards ceremony at Adnon Palace in Baghdad’s International Zone to another Distinguished Service Cross (the nation’s second-highest medal for battlefield valor behind only the Medal of Honor) hero, U.S. Army Colonel James H. Coffman, Jr., for his actions as an advisor to an Iraqi police brigade.
With all that has been going on in Iraq with Coalition forces working with and helping Iraqi forces transition to power, and upon the occasion of our country’s 231st celebration of its independence from oppression and tyranny, I find those words to be extra special, as borne out in Col Coffman’s citation….
“For exceptionally valorous conduct while assigned as the Senior Advisor to the 1st Iraqi Special Police Commando Brigade during a lengthy battle on 14 November 2004 in Mosul, Iraq, during which the unit likely would have been overrun were it not for the courageous leadership of Colonel Coffman and the one Commando officer not wounded.”
Of all the citations I have shared in this heroes article series, this opening sentence is by far the best ‘scene-setter’ for what is to follow. Another unique aspect of this citation is that Col Coffman is the first, and so far the only, hero to serve in an advisor role to an Iraqi force. From what I know about advisors, they serve in direct support of fledgling indigenous forces who are responsible for bringing stability and security to the population in their assigned areas. Advisors develop a special bond with their supported forces by participating in common hardships, sharing tactical and operational expertise and experiences, and providing a link to emergency Coalition resources when needed. In many cases, advisors are literally the ‘pointy end’ of U.S. foreign policy, especially in counterinsurgency operations like we have in Iraq.
“At approximately 1030 hours on 14 November, Colonel Coffman moved with a Commando Quick Reaction Force (QRF) to reinforce a Commando platoon under attack at the Four West Police Station in Mosul. As the QRF neared the besieged platoon, it came under intense rocket-propelled grenade, mortar, machinegun, and AK-47 fire by a large insurgent force.”
According to a November 9, 2006 USA Today article, “He didn't know it at the time, but the insurgents "had baited a trap for us to roll into," Coffman [said].” A common tactic of Iraqi insurgents is to ambush reinforcements en route to a threatened position. This ambush was executed very well, with accounts detailing a very large, well-positioned, and well-prepared enemy. Many of Coffman’s 80-85 man QRF became casualties in the opening moments of what was to become a lengthy battle. The citation continued….
“Over the next four hours, the enemy repeatedly assaulted the Commandos' position, at times culminating their attacks twenty meters from Colonel Coffman's location. With all but one of the commando officers killed or seriously wounded by the initial enemy fire, Colonel Coffman exhibited truly inspirational leadership, rallying the Commandos and organizing a hasty defense while attempting to radio higher headquarters for reinforcements. Under heavy fire, he moved from Commando to Commando, looking each in the eye and using hand and arm signals to demonstrate what he wanted done. At one point, an enemy round shattered Colonel Coffman's shooting hand and rendered his M4 rifle inoperable. After bandaging his hand, Colonel Coffman picked up AK-47s from Commando casualties and fired them with his other hand until each ran out of ammunition. With the assistance of the one remaining Commando officer, Colonel Coffman redistributed ammunition among the uninjured commandos until he had only loose ammunition that he loaded by placing magazines between his legs and using his one working hand. Throughout this period, he repeatedly demonstrated exceptional courage and an extraordinary example to the commandos as they repulsed attack after attack by the enemy.”
Subtly implied in this citation excerpt was the language barrier that existed between Col Coffman and his Iraqi commandos. The USA Today article described it best: “Coffman doesn't speak Arabic and the Iraqis didn't speak much English. But he does speak ‘soldier.’” Fighting out of a well-executed ambush site is arguably one of the toughest tactical scenarios for any force. Split-second actions and decisions are essential for success. Implicit communications, what I would describe as the non-spoken nods, looks, expressions, and mannerisms of a well-trained and cohesive force, was not applicable to Coffman’s newly formed and evolving group of commandos. The most basic, common, universal language on the battlefield is the language of the soldier, and Coffman and his commandos shared fluency in it.
From accounts I have read of this battle, Coffman’s hand injury occurred about an hour into the battle, which included four separate insurgent attacks on the commandos’ positions. If Coffman had not already forged a special bond with his commandos, I believe by participating in those battlefield hardships, sharing his tactical expertise under fire, and providing a link to emergency Coalition resources in these dire circumstances solidified that bond. Coffman’s job was not yet done, as his citation concluded….
“Four hours after the start of the battle, a second Commando element arrived and Colonel Coffman guided them to his position. Even after their arrival, he continued to direct the fight, refusing to be evacuated until the enemy was defeated. Shortly thereafter, attack helicopters also arrived, followed closely by a Stryker Brigade QRF, and Colonel Coffman used Iraqi radios to direct air strikes and to provide vital information on the location of enemy and friendly forces. After supervising the evacuation of several dozen wounded Commandos, Colonel Coffman led a squad-sized element to the Four West Iraqi Police Station, fifty meters ahead of the Strykers, to make contact with the Commandos still in the station. After they linked up, the Strykers moved forward, and attack helicopters engaged the buildings occupied by the enemy, following which Colonel Coffman returned to his original position to ensure that all of the Iraqi casualties had been evacuated. Only then did he consent to be evacuated for surgery for his own serious wound. During the fierce four-hour battle, twelve Commandos were killed and 42 were wounded. Twenty-five enemy were killed and many dozens more were wounded.”
From accounts I have read, somewhere between the time when the second commando unit arrived and when the U.S. reinforcements arrived, Coffman was literally down to his last four rounds and the advancing insurgents were as close as twenty yards from his commandos’ hasty defensive positions. When all was done, Coffman’s commandos had suffered around sixty-five percent casualties, which far exceeded the accepted standard for considering a unit “combat-effective.”
Although probably not as strategically significant, Coffman’s commandos’ efforts made me think about the similarities with Chamberlain’s 20th Maine at Little Round Top at Gettysburg on July 2, 1863: hasty defensive positions, multiple assaults by a determined and numerically superior foe, ultimate outcome of the battle uncertain for both sides, and a last-minute tactical event that led to final victory.
As we come down from the normal patriotic high of our traditional Independence Day celebrations, I believe it would be appropriate to reflect on the words of Distinguished Service Cross hero, Col James H. Coffman, Jr., as quoted by the Army News Service:
“Coffman doesn’t believe democracy can be fast-tracked here. The United States had to work through several years of contentious issues – including a Civil War – before it enjoyed a stable democratic government.
“It’s easy when you’ve had a couple centuries of experience with democracy to overlook the difficulties in getting that,” Coffman said. ‘I can’t think of a nobler endeavor than to help 28 million people achieve it.’”
May right always defeat wrong. Col Coffman, I salute you for your noble service in the noble cause of freedom.
Ellie
Coffman’s Commandos
By Matthew Dodd
“…[T]he blood you shed will never be forgotten,” said [Bayan] Jabr, the [Iraqi] Interior Minister. ‘We, the forces of the (Ministry of Interior) and the (Ministry of Defense) will continue to fight until we defeat terrorism. Right will always defeat wrong.’”
According to an August 24, 2005 Army News Service/Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq Public Affairs article, those stirring words were spoken that very same day at an awards ceremony at Adnon Palace in Baghdad’s International Zone to another Distinguished Service Cross (the nation’s second-highest medal for battlefield valor behind only the Medal of Honor) hero, U.S. Army Colonel James H. Coffman, Jr., for his actions as an advisor to an Iraqi police brigade.
With all that has been going on in Iraq with Coalition forces working with and helping Iraqi forces transition to power, and upon the occasion of our country’s 231st celebration of its independence from oppression and tyranny, I find those words to be extra special, as borne out in Col Coffman’s citation….
“For exceptionally valorous conduct while assigned as the Senior Advisor to the 1st Iraqi Special Police Commando Brigade during a lengthy battle on 14 November 2004 in Mosul, Iraq, during which the unit likely would have been overrun were it not for the courageous leadership of Colonel Coffman and the one Commando officer not wounded.”
Of all the citations I have shared in this heroes article series, this opening sentence is by far the best ‘scene-setter’ for what is to follow. Another unique aspect of this citation is that Col Coffman is the first, and so far the only, hero to serve in an advisor role to an Iraqi force. From what I know about advisors, they serve in direct support of fledgling indigenous forces who are responsible for bringing stability and security to the population in their assigned areas. Advisors develop a special bond with their supported forces by participating in common hardships, sharing tactical and operational expertise and experiences, and providing a link to emergency Coalition resources when needed. In many cases, advisors are literally the ‘pointy end’ of U.S. foreign policy, especially in counterinsurgency operations like we have in Iraq.
“At approximately 1030 hours on 14 November, Colonel Coffman moved with a Commando Quick Reaction Force (QRF) to reinforce a Commando platoon under attack at the Four West Police Station in Mosul. As the QRF neared the besieged platoon, it came under intense rocket-propelled grenade, mortar, machinegun, and AK-47 fire by a large insurgent force.”
According to a November 9, 2006 USA Today article, “He didn't know it at the time, but the insurgents "had baited a trap for us to roll into," Coffman [said].” A common tactic of Iraqi insurgents is to ambush reinforcements en route to a threatened position. This ambush was executed very well, with accounts detailing a very large, well-positioned, and well-prepared enemy. Many of Coffman’s 80-85 man QRF became casualties in the opening moments of what was to become a lengthy battle. The citation continued….
“Over the next four hours, the enemy repeatedly assaulted the Commandos' position, at times culminating their attacks twenty meters from Colonel Coffman's location. With all but one of the commando officers killed or seriously wounded by the initial enemy fire, Colonel Coffman exhibited truly inspirational leadership, rallying the Commandos and organizing a hasty defense while attempting to radio higher headquarters for reinforcements. Under heavy fire, he moved from Commando to Commando, looking each in the eye and using hand and arm signals to demonstrate what he wanted done. At one point, an enemy round shattered Colonel Coffman's shooting hand and rendered his M4 rifle inoperable. After bandaging his hand, Colonel Coffman picked up AK-47s from Commando casualties and fired them with his other hand until each ran out of ammunition. With the assistance of the one remaining Commando officer, Colonel Coffman redistributed ammunition among the uninjured commandos until he had only loose ammunition that he loaded by placing magazines between his legs and using his one working hand. Throughout this period, he repeatedly demonstrated exceptional courage and an extraordinary example to the commandos as they repulsed attack after attack by the enemy.”
Subtly implied in this citation excerpt was the language barrier that existed between Col Coffman and his Iraqi commandos. The USA Today article described it best: “Coffman doesn't speak Arabic and the Iraqis didn't speak much English. But he does speak ‘soldier.’” Fighting out of a well-executed ambush site is arguably one of the toughest tactical scenarios for any force. Split-second actions and decisions are essential for success. Implicit communications, what I would describe as the non-spoken nods, looks, expressions, and mannerisms of a well-trained and cohesive force, was not applicable to Coffman’s newly formed and evolving group of commandos. The most basic, common, universal language on the battlefield is the language of the soldier, and Coffman and his commandos shared fluency in it.
From accounts I have read of this battle, Coffman’s hand injury occurred about an hour into the battle, which included four separate insurgent attacks on the commandos’ positions. If Coffman had not already forged a special bond with his commandos, I believe by participating in those battlefield hardships, sharing his tactical expertise under fire, and providing a link to emergency Coalition resources in these dire circumstances solidified that bond. Coffman’s job was not yet done, as his citation concluded….
“Four hours after the start of the battle, a second Commando element arrived and Colonel Coffman guided them to his position. Even after their arrival, he continued to direct the fight, refusing to be evacuated until the enemy was defeated. Shortly thereafter, attack helicopters also arrived, followed closely by a Stryker Brigade QRF, and Colonel Coffman used Iraqi radios to direct air strikes and to provide vital information on the location of enemy and friendly forces. After supervising the evacuation of several dozen wounded Commandos, Colonel Coffman led a squad-sized element to the Four West Iraqi Police Station, fifty meters ahead of the Strykers, to make contact with the Commandos still in the station. After they linked up, the Strykers moved forward, and attack helicopters engaged the buildings occupied by the enemy, following which Colonel Coffman returned to his original position to ensure that all of the Iraqi casualties had been evacuated. Only then did he consent to be evacuated for surgery for his own serious wound. During the fierce four-hour battle, twelve Commandos were killed and 42 were wounded. Twenty-five enemy were killed and many dozens more were wounded.”
From accounts I have read, somewhere between the time when the second commando unit arrived and when the U.S. reinforcements arrived, Coffman was literally down to his last four rounds and the advancing insurgents were as close as twenty yards from his commandos’ hasty defensive positions. When all was done, Coffman’s commandos had suffered around sixty-five percent casualties, which far exceeded the accepted standard for considering a unit “combat-effective.”
Although probably not as strategically significant, Coffman’s commandos’ efforts made me think about the similarities with Chamberlain’s 20th Maine at Little Round Top at Gettysburg on July 2, 1863: hasty defensive positions, multiple assaults by a determined and numerically superior foe, ultimate outcome of the battle uncertain for both sides, and a last-minute tactical event that led to final victory.
As we come down from the normal patriotic high of our traditional Independence Day celebrations, I believe it would be appropriate to reflect on the words of Distinguished Service Cross hero, Col James H. Coffman, Jr., as quoted by the Army News Service:
“Coffman doesn’t believe democracy can be fast-tracked here. The United States had to work through several years of contentious issues – including a Civil War – before it enjoyed a stable democratic government.
“It’s easy when you’ve had a couple centuries of experience with democracy to overlook the difficulties in getting that,” Coffman said. ‘I can’t think of a nobler endeavor than to help 28 million people achieve it.’”
May right always defeat wrong. Col Coffman, I salute you for your noble service in the noble cause of freedom.
Ellie