thedrifter
07-01-07, 04:27 PM
Ethics on the battlefield
Sarah Sewall
Sunday, July 1, 2007
Ethical lapses among military personnel in Iraq pose a grave danger not simply to U.S. military professionalism but also to the operation itself. According to a newly released Army field survey, significant numbers of U.S. troops directly undermine their mission by mistreating civilians. Ironically, the same person who inscribed high ethical standards into new U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine -- Gen. David H. Petraeus -- inherited this compromised force. While the Army and Marine Corps can address future education and training for U.S. forces, is it too late to fix the problem in Iraq?
Intuitively and anecdotally, we understand the corrosive effects of irregular warfare. An unseen enemy that won't respect the laws of war tempts the opposing force to abandon its professional ethic. Now for the first time, we have hard data that scopes the extent and nature of the problem.
In fall 2006, the Army's mental health advisory teams conducted a survey of some 1,600 soldiers and Marines in Iraq. For the first time in their monitoring of the battlefield, they also asked questions about troops' ethical behavior. Most service members perform with honor under the most trying of circumstances. Yet a noteworthy number evinced disdain for the very civilians whose "hearts and minds" are the contested prize of counterinsurgency. More than half of U.S. troops surveyed disagreed with the statement that non-combatants should be treated with dignity and respect. Almost 10 percent reported mistreating civilians by kicking them or unnecessarily damaging their possessions. Many claimed they had not been instructed otherwise. According to one-third of Marines and one-quarter of soldiers surveyed, their leaders failed to tell them not to mistreat civilians. Is it surprising, then, that fewer than half the troops said they would report a team member's unethical behavior? The bottom line is that significant numbers of U.S. troops think and act in ways that violate their professional ethics and the laws of war.
Their views are also self-defeating. Counterinsurgency, as spelled out in the new Army and Marine Corps doctrine -- is a profound paradigm shift in the American way of war. Unlike conventional wars, civilian protection is the military mission. This type of war demands that U.S. forces assume more risk on behalf of the civilian -- the opposite of what some in the survey understand. If even a small proportion of forces fail to "get it," their actions can discredit the larger effort.
Some responsibility lies with the post-Vietnam military leadership that assiduously ignored counterinsurgency. In Iraq, regular forces were left to learn a new trade on the job. Guerrillas, though, are the worst imaginable instructors of ethics. No wonder that more than a quarter of soldiers and almost a third of Marines faced ethical challenges to which they did not know how to respond. We can do better, but it will require a more radical and sustained approach.
After the reported massacre of civilians at Haditha in November 2005, the Marine Corps ordered up refresher training. But more of the same is unlikely to do the trick. Unlike laws or rules of engagement, ethics reflect a deeper cultural and institutional ethos. They provide an internal compass to help troops "know what to do" in challenging circumstances. Counterinsurgency ethics are particularly perplexing and complex because the primacy of civilian protection appears at odds with military service values that stress loyalty to fellow Marines and soldiers. It will take time for each service to articulate, inculcate and tend an ethic of counterinsurgency consistent with its culture.
Meanwhile in Iraq, Gen. Petraeus cannot wait for troops who "get it." His best option is establishing a positive command climate that clarifies expectations about the treatment of non-combatants. Immediately after the study was released, he wrote to all military personnel in Iraq stressing the need to respect human dignity and to speak up about battlefield violations of American values and the laws of war. "What sets us apart from our enemies in this fight," he wrote, "... is how we behave." The mental health survey showed that with better leadership, troops are more likely to follow the rules. So Petraeus will have to rely heavily upon his junior leaders in the field to fill the ethics vacuum. Meanwhile, though, much damage already has been done to Iraqi hearts and minds.
The Army and Marine Corps deserve credit for finally daring to measure the state of battlefield ethics. It's important to understand how many troops are morally adrift in this counterinsurgency. The tragedy is that this realization may -- like the counterinsurgency doctrine and the "surge" itself -- be too little, too late to change the course of Iraq.
Ellie
Sarah Sewall
Sunday, July 1, 2007
Ethical lapses among military personnel in Iraq pose a grave danger not simply to U.S. military professionalism but also to the operation itself. According to a newly released Army field survey, significant numbers of U.S. troops directly undermine their mission by mistreating civilians. Ironically, the same person who inscribed high ethical standards into new U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine -- Gen. David H. Petraeus -- inherited this compromised force. While the Army and Marine Corps can address future education and training for U.S. forces, is it too late to fix the problem in Iraq?
Intuitively and anecdotally, we understand the corrosive effects of irregular warfare. An unseen enemy that won't respect the laws of war tempts the opposing force to abandon its professional ethic. Now for the first time, we have hard data that scopes the extent and nature of the problem.
In fall 2006, the Army's mental health advisory teams conducted a survey of some 1,600 soldiers and Marines in Iraq. For the first time in their monitoring of the battlefield, they also asked questions about troops' ethical behavior. Most service members perform with honor under the most trying of circumstances. Yet a noteworthy number evinced disdain for the very civilians whose "hearts and minds" are the contested prize of counterinsurgency. More than half of U.S. troops surveyed disagreed with the statement that non-combatants should be treated with dignity and respect. Almost 10 percent reported mistreating civilians by kicking them or unnecessarily damaging their possessions. Many claimed they had not been instructed otherwise. According to one-third of Marines and one-quarter of soldiers surveyed, their leaders failed to tell them not to mistreat civilians. Is it surprising, then, that fewer than half the troops said they would report a team member's unethical behavior? The bottom line is that significant numbers of U.S. troops think and act in ways that violate their professional ethics and the laws of war.
Their views are also self-defeating. Counterinsurgency, as spelled out in the new Army and Marine Corps doctrine -- is a profound paradigm shift in the American way of war. Unlike conventional wars, civilian protection is the military mission. This type of war demands that U.S. forces assume more risk on behalf of the civilian -- the opposite of what some in the survey understand. If even a small proportion of forces fail to "get it," their actions can discredit the larger effort.
Some responsibility lies with the post-Vietnam military leadership that assiduously ignored counterinsurgency. In Iraq, regular forces were left to learn a new trade on the job. Guerrillas, though, are the worst imaginable instructors of ethics. No wonder that more than a quarter of soldiers and almost a third of Marines faced ethical challenges to which they did not know how to respond. We can do better, but it will require a more radical and sustained approach.
After the reported massacre of civilians at Haditha in November 2005, the Marine Corps ordered up refresher training. But more of the same is unlikely to do the trick. Unlike laws or rules of engagement, ethics reflect a deeper cultural and institutional ethos. They provide an internal compass to help troops "know what to do" in challenging circumstances. Counterinsurgency ethics are particularly perplexing and complex because the primacy of civilian protection appears at odds with military service values that stress loyalty to fellow Marines and soldiers. It will take time for each service to articulate, inculcate and tend an ethic of counterinsurgency consistent with its culture.
Meanwhile in Iraq, Gen. Petraeus cannot wait for troops who "get it." His best option is establishing a positive command climate that clarifies expectations about the treatment of non-combatants. Immediately after the study was released, he wrote to all military personnel in Iraq stressing the need to respect human dignity and to speak up about battlefield violations of American values and the laws of war. "What sets us apart from our enemies in this fight," he wrote, "... is how we behave." The mental health survey showed that with better leadership, troops are more likely to follow the rules. So Petraeus will have to rely heavily upon his junior leaders in the field to fill the ethics vacuum. Meanwhile, though, much damage already has been done to Iraqi hearts and minds.
The Army and Marine Corps deserve credit for finally daring to measure the state of battlefield ethics. It's important to understand how many troops are morally adrift in this counterinsurgency. The tragedy is that this realization may -- like the counterinsurgency doctrine and the "surge" itself -- be too little, too late to change the course of Iraq.
Ellie