thedrifter
06-26-07, 04:50 AM
Chief may have died for aiding Americans
Sheik Fassal al Gaood offered himself and his tribesmen as a bulwark against insurgents.
By Mohammed al Dulaimy and Hannah Allam
McClatchy Newspapers
BAGHDAD - More than two years ago, Sheik Fassal al Gaood approached the U.S. military with what was then an unprecedented offer: His tribesmen were prepared to help American troops rout insurgents linked to al-Qaeda from Anbar province.
But the Sunni Muslim tribal leader and former provincial governor met one rebuff after another from American officers, he told McClatchy Newspapers at the time.
Discouraged and angry, he warned that U.S. officers risked losing him as an ally.
The Americans eventually came around, and al Gaood renewed his offer. He helped turn some of Anbar's most prominent Sunni tribes into a force in the war against al-Qaeda's followers. That high-stakes partnership may have cost him his life: Al Gaood and 11 other Iraqis were killed yesterday by a suicide bomber at the Mansour Hotel.
"This is not about Qaeda. This is a security breach and recklessness, and it is beyond al-Qaeda," said Ali Hatem Ali al Sulaiman, a leader of the powerful Dulaim tribe of Anbar. "This attack was about killing any patriot who speaks for Iraq and cares about this country."
In his last interview with McClatchy, three weeks ago in the hotel lobby where he died, al Gaood alluded to internecine trouble brewing in Anbar. He was keenly aware his life was in peril, saying his home outside the provincial capital of Ramadi had been destroyed, his cars burned, and five of his bodyguards slain by al-Qaeda.
"Iraq is marching toward the edge of a valley," he said. "Daily killings, kidnappings and bodies in the street."
He lounged on a red sofa, a pack of Marlboros always within reach. As usual, he wore a politician's tailored suit instead of the flowing robes favored by more traditional tribal leaders. And when talk turned to controlling Iraq, he supported strongmen and brute force over his American allies' visions of democracy.
"We should behead anyone who does a terrorist attack in Anbar," he said.
Al Gaood's story mirrors the war itself - a series of shifting alliances, missed opportunities, and lives ended in murky circumstances. As of late yesterday, al-Qaeda had not claimed responsibility for the bombing on the Internet message boards it typically uses, leading some tribal leaders to wonder whether another enemy might have been responsible. Possible suspects range from Shiite groups to al Gaood's tribal comrades, who had accused him of dealing behind their backs.
In early 2005, al Gaood became one of the first Sunni leaders to propose that the U.S. military enlist Anbar tribes to strike at al-Qaeda.
He considered it a way to give jobs and a sense of purpose to his disgruntled followers, while isolating the foreign fighters streaming across the border from Syria.
The results were disastrous, he told McClatchy in May 2005, at the end of the offensive.
He said locals had razed insurgent safe houses and set up checkpoints to keep al-Qaeda militants from fleeing ahead of the offensive. But when 1,000 U.S. Marines stormed the area, al Gaood said, they didn't distinguish friend from foe, and several tribesmen were killed in the fighting.
"The Americans were bombing whole villages and saying they were only after the foreigners," he said. "An AK-47 can't distinguish between a terrorist and a tribesman, so how could a missile or tank?"
Bitterly disappointed with the Americans and facing growing anger from his constituents, al Gaood embarked on a life on the run.
He hopped from Baghdad hotels to Anbar retreats to Jordan, always with bodyguards.
Whether he was an opportunist eager for the rewards of American friendship, a patriot dedicated to cleansing al-Qaeda from his area or both, al Gaood didn't abandon his tribal strategy for restoring calm to Anbar. In November 2006, al Gaood was instrumental in the formation of the Anbar Salvation Council.
U.S. officers have praised the group, holding it up as a model for other tribes, though they privately worry that such vigilante groups will undermine the progress toward an inclusive, national Iraqi military.
Ellie
Sheik Fassal al Gaood offered himself and his tribesmen as a bulwark against insurgents.
By Mohammed al Dulaimy and Hannah Allam
McClatchy Newspapers
BAGHDAD - More than two years ago, Sheik Fassal al Gaood approached the U.S. military with what was then an unprecedented offer: His tribesmen were prepared to help American troops rout insurgents linked to al-Qaeda from Anbar province.
But the Sunni Muslim tribal leader and former provincial governor met one rebuff after another from American officers, he told McClatchy Newspapers at the time.
Discouraged and angry, he warned that U.S. officers risked losing him as an ally.
The Americans eventually came around, and al Gaood renewed his offer. He helped turn some of Anbar's most prominent Sunni tribes into a force in the war against al-Qaeda's followers. That high-stakes partnership may have cost him his life: Al Gaood and 11 other Iraqis were killed yesterday by a suicide bomber at the Mansour Hotel.
"This is not about Qaeda. This is a security breach and recklessness, and it is beyond al-Qaeda," said Ali Hatem Ali al Sulaiman, a leader of the powerful Dulaim tribe of Anbar. "This attack was about killing any patriot who speaks for Iraq and cares about this country."
In his last interview with McClatchy, three weeks ago in the hotel lobby where he died, al Gaood alluded to internecine trouble brewing in Anbar. He was keenly aware his life was in peril, saying his home outside the provincial capital of Ramadi had been destroyed, his cars burned, and five of his bodyguards slain by al-Qaeda.
"Iraq is marching toward the edge of a valley," he said. "Daily killings, kidnappings and bodies in the street."
He lounged on a red sofa, a pack of Marlboros always within reach. As usual, he wore a politician's tailored suit instead of the flowing robes favored by more traditional tribal leaders. And when talk turned to controlling Iraq, he supported strongmen and brute force over his American allies' visions of democracy.
"We should behead anyone who does a terrorist attack in Anbar," he said.
Al Gaood's story mirrors the war itself - a series of shifting alliances, missed opportunities, and lives ended in murky circumstances. As of late yesterday, al-Qaeda had not claimed responsibility for the bombing on the Internet message boards it typically uses, leading some tribal leaders to wonder whether another enemy might have been responsible. Possible suspects range from Shiite groups to al Gaood's tribal comrades, who had accused him of dealing behind their backs.
In early 2005, al Gaood became one of the first Sunni leaders to propose that the U.S. military enlist Anbar tribes to strike at al-Qaeda.
He considered it a way to give jobs and a sense of purpose to his disgruntled followers, while isolating the foreign fighters streaming across the border from Syria.
The results were disastrous, he told McClatchy in May 2005, at the end of the offensive.
He said locals had razed insurgent safe houses and set up checkpoints to keep al-Qaeda militants from fleeing ahead of the offensive. But when 1,000 U.S. Marines stormed the area, al Gaood said, they didn't distinguish friend from foe, and several tribesmen were killed in the fighting.
"The Americans were bombing whole villages and saying they were only after the foreigners," he said. "An AK-47 can't distinguish between a terrorist and a tribesman, so how could a missile or tank?"
Bitterly disappointed with the Americans and facing growing anger from his constituents, al Gaood embarked on a life on the run.
He hopped from Baghdad hotels to Anbar retreats to Jordan, always with bodyguards.
Whether he was an opportunist eager for the rewards of American friendship, a patriot dedicated to cleansing al-Qaeda from his area or both, al Gaood didn't abandon his tribal strategy for restoring calm to Anbar. In November 2006, al Gaood was instrumental in the formation of the Anbar Salvation Council.
U.S. officers have praised the group, holding it up as a model for other tribes, though they privately worry that such vigilante groups will undermine the progress toward an inclusive, national Iraqi military.
Ellie