thedrifter
06-13-07, 04:24 AM
Floyd J. McKay / Guest columnist
Why the Korean model won't work in Iraq
American soldiers entered Korea in 1945 and wound up staying 62 years and still counting. An unintended occupation was followed by a war that nearly started World War III and eventually by the rise of one of the world's most dynamic economies, for which the U.S. can claim a share of the credit.
So, why not follow the "Korean Model" in Iraq? The White House is floating that scenario, looking for any rationale to justify a permanent presence in the Middle East.
Korea was my generation's war, those of us too young for WWII and too old for Vietnam. A classmate left school, enlisted in the Marines and came home in a coffin; older friends served there. President Dwight D. Eisenhower ended it before my draft board called — I Like Ike.
When I got to Korea 30 years later, the place was booming, an Asian-style democracy. The truce village at Panmunjom was weird, almost comical, but the short drive from Seoul to the border was sobering — too close to North Korean guns and rockets. Today, the biggest desire of most South Koreans is to erase that border and reunite with kinsmen to the north. The once-warm welcome for Americans has dimmed and many Koreans want us out.
But South Korea in 1945 and Iraq in 2007 are not the same. Security brought prosperity and democracy — eventually — in South Korea, but it's a different world and a different time.
Americans were welcomed overwhelmingly in 1945. Thirty-five years of a cruel Japanese occupation were ended, leaving Korea devastated, without indigenous leaders or modern institutions. There was no functioning government on the peninsula after Japan surrendered. We were seen as liberators, a rich country that could help. Occupation was replaced by a mutual-defense treaty in 1953.
Iraq is similar in the devastation, but the flattening of Iraq was done by its would-be liberator. Iraqis, contrary to neocon predictions, did not universally welcome Americans — an anti-American insurgency began almost immediately and has lasted three years.
Korea's culture differed dramatically in 1945 from Iraq's Islamic culture of 2007. An ancient Confucian culture, shared with China, was overlaid with a strong Christian presence, dating to Protestant missionaries as early as the 1880s. Much of the nation's education was delivered in Christian schools, and after 1945 an American educational system was adopted.
American occupiers, therefore, had a cultural climate that was at least not hostile to their presence.
Islam, by contrast, is hostile to Western values and religions, and will remain so long after we leave Iraq. An Islamic education, not one based on an American model, will prevail.
Artificial borders live to plague us. We remain in Korea because of a line drawn at the 38th parallel by Russians and Americans 62 years ago. Iraq's borders created by England's Gertrude Bell and Sir Percy Cox in 1922 set off 85 years of wrangling over religion, oil and nationalism.
America in 1945 was the most popular nation on Earth, the only large industrial society virtually undamaged by war. We moved quickly to shore up our advantages and to restrict the advance of communism: the Marshall Plan in Europe, a Western-style government and economy for Japan, the United Nations.
In 1945 our good intentions were accepted, in Korea and across what we were starting to call "the free world." Locating a semi-permanent American military base in South Korea has only in recent years been controversial, as the Korean War generation retires from power. Our involvement in Korea was entirely political — a Cold War checkmate to an aggressive Soviet Union and an emerging Communist China. Korea had few natural resources, no economic reasons for us to remain there.
Because Cold War issues were at stake, we invested billions to rebuild Korea as an Asian showcase, but it took decades. Does anyone think that would work in Iraq? Are we willing to make that commitment?
Iraq has oil, and we have invested billions of dollars in permanent air bases and installations to maintain our presence in the oil patch. But American bases, regardless of the rationale, will be resisted by most of the region, a constant reminder of Western power and values. They will become fortified bunkers surrounded by hostility.
The Cold War divided Koreans along ideological lines fashioned in Moscow and Washington, a new form of colonialism that lasted long past its sell-by date; Koreans are now groping for ways to unite.
Iraq created its own internal divisions along religious lines centuries old and beyond our ability to erase with a protracted military presence.
Floyd J. McKay, a journalism professor emeritus at Western Washington University, is a regular contributor to Times editorial pages. E-mail him at floydmckay@yahoo.com
Ellie
Why the Korean model won't work in Iraq
American soldiers entered Korea in 1945 and wound up staying 62 years and still counting. An unintended occupation was followed by a war that nearly started World War III and eventually by the rise of one of the world's most dynamic economies, for which the U.S. can claim a share of the credit.
So, why not follow the "Korean Model" in Iraq? The White House is floating that scenario, looking for any rationale to justify a permanent presence in the Middle East.
Korea was my generation's war, those of us too young for WWII and too old for Vietnam. A classmate left school, enlisted in the Marines and came home in a coffin; older friends served there. President Dwight D. Eisenhower ended it before my draft board called — I Like Ike.
When I got to Korea 30 years later, the place was booming, an Asian-style democracy. The truce village at Panmunjom was weird, almost comical, but the short drive from Seoul to the border was sobering — too close to North Korean guns and rockets. Today, the biggest desire of most South Koreans is to erase that border and reunite with kinsmen to the north. The once-warm welcome for Americans has dimmed and many Koreans want us out.
But South Korea in 1945 and Iraq in 2007 are not the same. Security brought prosperity and democracy — eventually — in South Korea, but it's a different world and a different time.
Americans were welcomed overwhelmingly in 1945. Thirty-five years of a cruel Japanese occupation were ended, leaving Korea devastated, without indigenous leaders or modern institutions. There was no functioning government on the peninsula after Japan surrendered. We were seen as liberators, a rich country that could help. Occupation was replaced by a mutual-defense treaty in 1953.
Iraq is similar in the devastation, but the flattening of Iraq was done by its would-be liberator. Iraqis, contrary to neocon predictions, did not universally welcome Americans — an anti-American insurgency began almost immediately and has lasted three years.
Korea's culture differed dramatically in 1945 from Iraq's Islamic culture of 2007. An ancient Confucian culture, shared with China, was overlaid with a strong Christian presence, dating to Protestant missionaries as early as the 1880s. Much of the nation's education was delivered in Christian schools, and after 1945 an American educational system was adopted.
American occupiers, therefore, had a cultural climate that was at least not hostile to their presence.
Islam, by contrast, is hostile to Western values and religions, and will remain so long after we leave Iraq. An Islamic education, not one based on an American model, will prevail.
Artificial borders live to plague us. We remain in Korea because of a line drawn at the 38th parallel by Russians and Americans 62 years ago. Iraq's borders created by England's Gertrude Bell and Sir Percy Cox in 1922 set off 85 years of wrangling over religion, oil and nationalism.
America in 1945 was the most popular nation on Earth, the only large industrial society virtually undamaged by war. We moved quickly to shore up our advantages and to restrict the advance of communism: the Marshall Plan in Europe, a Western-style government and economy for Japan, the United Nations.
In 1945 our good intentions were accepted, in Korea and across what we were starting to call "the free world." Locating a semi-permanent American military base in South Korea has only in recent years been controversial, as the Korean War generation retires from power. Our involvement in Korea was entirely political — a Cold War checkmate to an aggressive Soviet Union and an emerging Communist China. Korea had few natural resources, no economic reasons for us to remain there.
Because Cold War issues were at stake, we invested billions to rebuild Korea as an Asian showcase, but it took decades. Does anyone think that would work in Iraq? Are we willing to make that commitment?
Iraq has oil, and we have invested billions of dollars in permanent air bases and installations to maintain our presence in the oil patch. But American bases, regardless of the rationale, will be resisted by most of the region, a constant reminder of Western power and values. They will become fortified bunkers surrounded by hostility.
The Cold War divided Koreans along ideological lines fashioned in Moscow and Washington, a new form of colonialism that lasted long past its sell-by date; Koreans are now groping for ways to unite.
Iraq created its own internal divisions along religious lines centuries old and beyond our ability to erase with a protracted military presence.
Floyd J. McKay, a journalism professor emeritus at Western Washington University, is a regular contributor to Times editorial pages. E-mail him at floydmckay@yahoo.com
Ellie