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wrbones
03-06-03, 11:38 PM
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QUICK LOOK SUMMARY

FIFTH INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM

TECHNOLOGY AND THE MINE PROBLEM

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL, MONTEREY, CA

APRIL 22-25, 2002




HONORARY CHAIR: DR. CHESTER W. MCKINNEY, EMERITUS DIRECTOR

APPLIED RESEARCH LABORATORY, U. OF TEXAS

WIDELY ACCLAIMED AS THE FATHER OF ACOUSTIC MINEHUNTING




GENERAL CHAIR: PROF. CLYDE L. SCANDRETT, NPS

ORGANIZING COMMITTEE

RADM JOHN D. PEARSON, USN (RET), NPS

ALBERT M. BOTTOMS, CONSULTANT

THEME:

EMERGING TECHNOLOGY TO COUNTER MINES AND THE EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR (ERW) ON LAND AND AT SEA




DEDICATED TO Dr. Laurence Hoisington, Principal Technical Advisor (Mine Warfare) in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 1950-1974 and Dr. George Carrier, Harvard University Emeritus Professor of Applied Mathematics and conscience of Minefield Planning Theory. Both of these giants in our field died in recent months.







HIGHLIGHTS

Three hundred scientists, engineers, military and civilian deminers, and program sponsors from the international communities in Europe and the Pacific and from the US Army, US Marine Corps, and US Navy met in Monterey to share recent results and advances in the technologies that support future countermeasures systems development. It is this mix of attendees that sets this Symposium Series apart from other technical meetings that are held from time to time. The purpose is to encourage communication and the sharing of approaches.




In support of the Symposium purpose, there were approximately 120 technical papers that were evenly divided between naval mine technology and experience and landmines, humanitarian demining (Mine Action), and Unexploded Ordnance UXO) or ERW site remediation.




There were more than 40 non-US nationals from 15 countries in attendance.




Sponsorship: The Symposium Series is hosted by the Naval Postgraduate School with financial underwriting from the Office of Naval Research; the Program Executive Office for Mine and Undersea Warfare; the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA); and the Pacific Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command. Private sector sponsorship and support derive from the Society for Counter-Ordnance Technology (SCOT) and the Mine Warfare Association (MINWARA).




Distinguished Guests

LT GEN Robert B. Flowers, USA, Chief of Engineers and Commanding General US Army Corps of Engineers;

Responsibility for land countermine resides in the US Army Corps of Engineers. LT. GEN Flowers described the efforts that the US Army is making to understand the implications of the present "asymetric threat" and to obtain assured mobility in the prevention of mine placement and the maintenance of sustained momentum of operations. Understanding the threat and future tasks also includes operations that bear much similarity with Humanitarian Demining, UXO site remediation, and area clearance that often lie with non-governmental bodies. The US Army is working toward the initial Transformation Force Brigade by 2008. This transformation force element will include both currently available equipment and new, technology-driven systems. The text of General Flowers' remarks will be published in the Symposium PROCEEDINGS.




LTGEN Edward Hanlon, USMC, Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Center, Quantico, VA. (General Hanlon could not attend and was ably represented by his Chief of Marine Corps Requirements, Col. Len Blasiol, USMC.) The US Marine Corps starts the process of looking at Force Modernization and the development of systems requirements by developing agreed-upon concepts of operations. This process is entitled "Concept-based Requirements Process". In turn the building blocks are based on application of Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare in which a part is Ship to Objective Manuever

. A high priority is given to approaches that ensure tactical surprise and "in stride" operations. At the same time there is movement to integrating mine countermeasures operations throughout USMC tactical doctrine. There is much compatibility with the approaches described by LT GEN Flowers, USA, that are being developed by the US Army as it develops its "Transformation Force". The text of Gen Hanlon's message to the Symposium will by published in the Symposium PROCEEDINGS.




Mr Seymour Deitchman, Naval Studies Board - National Research Council

Mr. Deitchman outlined the major recommendations of the recently completed Study of Naval Mine Warfare. These recommendations are in the areas of (1)Establishing Mine Warfare as a major Naval Warfare area; (2) Reestablishing a Naval Mining Capability; (3) Modernizing the dedicated Mine Countermeasures force; (4) Improving the overall integration of the seven organic offshore mine countermeasures systems; (5) Improving the capabilities and clarifying Service responsibilities for inshore countermine warfare operations; and (6) Reducing (ship) vulnerability to sea mine threats. This important Study Report has been widely promulgated and is available from the National Academy of Sciences Press.

Dr. David Heberlein, Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA)




Dr. Heberlein presented the results of a study conducted by IDA for the Office of Naval Research and the United States Marine Corps on Near-term and far-term mine countermeasures requirements and approaches for operations on landing beaches and exits to the objective areas.




RADM Jay Cohen, USN. Chief of Naval Research (RADM Cohen appeared at the Symposium by Video Teleconferencing). RADM Cohen described the vigorous efforts being undertaken in the Office of Naval Research (ONR) to address the urgent operational needs of the US Navy/US Marine Corps to have the capability to conduct power projection operations in the littoral (shallow water/surf-zone environments as well as to strengthen and integrate the emergent capabilities that will modernize the organic and dedicated components of the US Navy's mine countermeasures suite. As in the land applications summarized

above, there is a premium placed on increased speed and maneuverability along with recognition of the potentials offered by unmanned vehicles and networked communications, command, and control capabilities.




RADM Paul D. Ryan, USN, Commander, US Navy Mine Warfare Command

RADM Ryan has recently assumed his command. He began by pointing out that the increasing proliferation of mines around the world and the emerging technical capabilities in mine countermeasures systems combine to make naval mine warfare an exciting and challenging field. As a person with immediate operational responsibilities, RADM Ryan stressed readiness activities and described the Navy's interest in exploiting "ships of opportunity" - particularly as platforms for mine countermeasures operations support.




continued

wrbones
03-06-03, 11:40 PM
Edward Salazar, PhD, Counselor to the US

Ambassador to NATO

Dr. Salazar discussed NATO Demining Initiatives in policy and in cooperative funding for Humanitarian Demining Projects in Europe and Central Asia. Lacking today are efficient mechanisms for the development/funding of Demining Policy.







LT GEN Robert Gard, USA (Ret), PhD, Consultant to the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF)

Dr. Gard discussed the initiatives of the VVAF and the International Committee of the Red Cross to reduce the number of Explosive Remnants of War (duds). There are a number of inexpensive manufacturing changes that can reduce current self-neutralizing reliability rates from the 80% range to about 99

%. On a world-wide basis casualties to ERW exceed those from anti-personnel landmines. There are protocols under consideration by the Nations that will address this problem.










Dr. E. Lawrence Saiers, Vice-President RONCO Corp (A principal Humanitarian

Demining contractor for the US Department of State).

Dr. Saiers briefly addressed the Annual Meeting of SCOT. He described RONCO activities and provided operational insights from the field in Afghanistan regarding the capabilities and limitations of flails and mechanical devices now being employed as area clearance tools. He noted the great value of dogs in reconnaissance

and proofing.




Dr. David Burnett, SACLANT Research Center, La Spezia, Italy Dr. Burnett represented the Director of the SACLANTCEN, RADM Spoel

stra, Netherlands Navy (Ret), by providing an overview of the SACLANTCEN program. Dr. Burnett then discussed his work with finite element analyses in improving the classification capabilities of acoustic detectors.




Dr. Rick Spinrad, Technical Director for the Oceanographer of the Navy

Dr. Spinrad provided an overview of the considerable efforts that are underway to provide useful environmental data to the mine countermeasures forces.




Technical ContentA principal value of Symposia such as this one is the opportunity presented for "networking" and technical discussion, among peers, of the issues, approaches, and results in the component areas of investigation. The papers that were presented will be found in the PROCEEDINGS of the Symposium that will be placed at the two websites, www.demine.org and www.minwara.org.

Every effort will be made to post these PROCEEDINGS on or before June 1, 2002.




Papers from the Symposium that have been subject to technical review will also be found in the Journal of Counter-Ordnance Technology along with other technical contributions that are submitted for review. The SCOT Journal is expected to appear two or three times a year on the SCOT website at http://www.demine.org/SCOT/




a. Subject Overviews

At this Symposium distinguished investigators were invited to present overviews or status reports concerning a number of the important constituent areas of technology that are being exploited in the attack on the "mine/UXO problem" on land and at sea. This series of review papers constitutes in and of itself a text on the subject of the technologies of the mine problem. From time-to-time additional "chapters" in this text will be added. This group of Review Papers will be published in the PROCEEDINGS in a separate section.




The initial topics and speakers are as follows.

(1) Topics in Land Mine Technology, Dr. Tom Altshuler, DARPA; (2)Sea Mine Developments, Mr. Bill Jones, CSS; (3)Attribute Sensors, Dr George Vourvopoulis; Western Kentucky University; (4) Optical Sensors, Dr. Joan Cleveland, ONR; (5) Technical Aspects of Fuzes and Explosives, Mr. R.G. Sewall, Former Naval Weapons Center; (6) Status Report: A Lobster-Based Robot for shallow water mine countermeasures, Dr. Joseph Ayers, Northeastern University; (7) AUV Power and Endurance, Dr Thomas G. Hughes, PennState University; (8) Magnetics, Dr. Carl Schneider, USNA; (9) High Resolution Sonar, Dr. John Huckabay, University of Texas; (10) Sensor Processing and Fusion, Dr. Gary Carriveau, SAIC, San Diego.

b. Technical Sessions

The Technical Sessions are the heart of any Symposium. At this FIFTH Symposium the following Technical Sessions were organized and executed by the Chairs and Co-Chairs. Some subjects required Sessions on successive days and were, in effect, mini-symposia. The 120 Technical Papers were distributed among the following Technical Sessions listed along with their Chairs and Co-Chairs.




(1) Government-Industry Forum, RADM Charles F. Horne, USN (Ret). Although not, strictly speaking, a technical session; this forum has been a popular event at the NPS Symposia. Opportunity is provided in this Forum for frank exchange between and among Industry leaders and Flag and General Officers (Program Sponsors). At this Forum it is possible to raise issues or focus on aspects of the acquisition process that are counter-productive to the best interests of the Forces Afloat.




(2) Sea Environment, Dr. Herb Eppert, NRL-Stennis and Dr. Ed Thornton, NPS.

Several papers in this session discussed the obtaining of environmental data, in situ, for support of operations.




(3) Land Environment, Dr. James Sabatier, University of Mississippi and Night Vision Laboratory, Ft. Belvoir.

The use of seismic acoustic approaches suggest a potential "confirmation Tool".




(4) Optical Sensors, Dr. Joan Cleveland, ONR, and Dr. R. Norris Keeler, Direct Technologies, Inc.

This subject area attracted nearly 20 high quality papers. In effect, Dr. Cleveland, assisted by Dr. Keeler, conducted a mini-symposium on electro-optical processes in the ocean.




(5) UXO Site Remediation Issues, Mr. Bob Smith, Parsons, and Dr. Christopher Penny, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Atlantic Division

We are particularly grateful to Col John Selstrom, USAF, the OSD point of contact for UXO in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, for sharing DoD policy regarding environmental clean-up objectives, This session developed the scope of the substantive risk management issues and the roles of the stakeholders.




(6) Acoustic Sensors, Dr. Darrel Jackson, U. of Washington, Applied Physics Laboratory and Dr. Ralph Goodman, NRL-Stennis (Dr. Goodman was unable to attend).

The papers in this session reflect the increasing concern with shallow water operations and operations from autonomous platforms.




(7) Chemical/Biochemical Sensors, Prof. Nathan S. Lewis, CALTECH, and Dr. Ron Woodfin, Consultant(formerly Sandia National Laboratory)(Professor Lewis was unable to attend). The Nomadics application of chemical detection technology is proving effective explosives detection

at very low concentrations.




(8) Electromagnetic Detectors, Dr. Steve Azevedo, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Dr. Carey Rappaport, Northeastern University

The papers in this session concentrated on Ground Penetrating Radar and Nuclear Quadrupole Resonance techniques.




(9) Biological and Biomimetric Systems, Dr. Joseph Ayers, Northeastern University, and Dr. Sam Ridgway, Naval ocean Systems Center

Biomimicry is being followed in the development of vehicles patterned after lobsters, lampreys, and snakes. In the water, substantial progress has occurred in the effort to develop and build a man-made dolphin sonar.




(10) Risk Management and Neutralization of Mines/UXO Dr. James Putnam, NAVFACPAC,

Progress continues in the single largest UXO site remediation project in the world. The Kaho'olawe Site Remediation project in Hawaii is moving into the "end-game" even as the major efforts at Fort Ord and Vieques begin.




(11) Sensor Processing/Fusion, Dr. Gary W. Carriveau, SAIC San Diego

Concentration is on multi-spectral and hyper-spectral fusion as well as upon the fuzing of data from detectors that employ different physical principles.




12) Reconnaissance and Surveillance, Dr. John Huckabay, University of Texas, Applied Physics Laboratory, and Dr. Dave Tubridy, Coastal Systems Station (CSS)

The papers deal with signal processing and in-situ measurements with present fleet equipment..




(13) Field Experience (Land), Dr Stephen Stewart, James Madison University, and Dr. Robert Suart, Canadian Centre for Mine Action Technologies In this session, reality and urgency come together as focus shifts

to actual humanitarian demining experience in Chad and elsewhere. Colin King presented some seminal work on field observations of the effects of ageing on mine and UXO explosives and fuzes. Some of the material in this session may well become the basis of sessions at the Brussels Meeting in 2003




14) Nuclear Sensors, Dr George Vourvopoulis, Western Kentucky University Field res

ults were shown for miniature nuclear sensors. These are still confirmation sensors with rather short ranges.

(15) Robotic Applications and Remote Sensors, Dr, Tony Healey, NPS, and Dr. Doug Todoroff, ONR

Robotic AUV are shown to perform militarily useful tasks at the AUV Fest last year. There is progress since the First Symposium and widespread interest in the development of ancillary capabilities of command and control.

Symposium Staff are working diligently to complete the CD_ROM PROCEEDINGS and mail them to participants. Additional copies will be available at nominal cost from DMC Companies, 824 Munras Ave (Suite C) Monterey, CA 93940. Tel. (831)373.0508. (Attn. Carol Killip). In addition, the Refereed Papers have been put on the website at www.demine.org in the SCOT Journal. The rest of the PROCEEDINGS will follow as a separate posting when available.




continued

wrbones
03-06-03, 11:41 PM
c. Papers of Merit




An innovation at this Symposium was to identify four submitted papers to be designated papers of merit and to provide opportunity for the material to be presented in Plenary Session. The criteria for selection included technological or scientific quality, originality, potential as enabling technology, and breadth or applicability of results. The selection was very difficult because of the excellence of submittal. The papers chosen are:

Dr. Nicholas P. Chotiros, Applied Research Laboratory, University of Texas "Sonar Coverage Mapping"";

Joseph Rice, Naval Postgraduate School, "Autonomous Sensors and network-centric undersea weaponry";

Dr. James Sabatier, U. of Mississippi "Linear and Non-Linear Acoustic Velocity Profiles over Buried Mines";

Dr. Andre Kuznetsov, Khlopin Radium Institute, Russia "Combined Sensor for Detection of Explosives Based on Timed Neutron Source and Continuous Microwaves".




Rappateur's Comment

The papers at the Symposium again illustrated an important aspect of the interaction between the "operator" or user and the technical community. Guests such as LT GEN Flowers and LT Gen Hanlon provide a general statement of the problem. That problem statement is couched in operational terms that may not map very well with what might be thought of as a technical description of the need. It is up to the technical community to parse the requirements statements into a set of what in mathematics is termed a "well-posed set of problem statements - statements that suggest the avenues for technical solution”. Papers such as were provided by Seymour Deitchman and David Heberlein represent an intermediate approach to the translation of the general requirements statements into more specific

statements that suggest technical approaches. It is then up to the technical communities to carry out a further transformation to describe the specific technical parameters that serve as surrogates for the more general operational statements of need. This is the process of problem identification and solving and usually rewards patient pursuit.




The five symposia at NPS have showcased a great deal of new, interesting, and relevant technology that can be applied to the mine problem on land and at sea. Much of this technology is still at the "proof of concept" or 6.2 stage of exploratory development. It remains, in most cases, to take the technology to possible system levels, to evaluate performance, and to determine relative cost-effectiveness among the possible approaches. That the process of the development cycle is slow and tedious does not in any way detract from the high urgency of finding technology-based solutions to the seemingly intractable mine problem.

Urgency and Realism. Again at this FIFTH Symposium,a degree of complacency is detectable

that is not supported by the situation on land or at sea. There seems to be a lack of awareness by technology developers of the realities of mine clearance/humanitarian demining operations and processes. The high rates of failure in the introduction of new approaches is due in large measure to the failure to understand the user's needs and constraints - including the non-availability of trained maintenance and repair technicians in the field. Premature introduction of technology in any kind of operational environment carries a burden of opportunity cost that includes the prejudicing of subsequent efforts to introduce technology- based methods. However, those concerns that argue for a conservative approach to the deployment of technology-based solutions must be off-set by the immediate need.

The technical problems on land and at sea are of high difficulty bordering on intractable. Much is at risk if we fail. And,

in the words of Professor Jean-Daniel Nicoud of Lausanne, Switzerland, "There still must be something better than a child's foot to find a landmine".




Some Future Opportunities

Please watch the websites at www.demine.org and www.minwara.org

for announcements of future meetings. SCOT will also establish hyperlinks with the James Madison Mine Action Information Center website.




September 2003 Brussels (SCOT) Tentative




March 2004 Canberra or Sydney THIRD Joint Australian American Conference on te Technology of Mine Countermeasures (Tentative)




These Conferences and Symposia occupy a technology niche that is not duplicated by other major conference series. We complement those other efforts.

wrbones
03-06-03, 11:44 PM
OUTLINE SHEET LESSON TOPIC 1.2
INTRODUCTION TO MANEUVER WARFARE


ENABLING OBJECTIVES:

2.1 With the aid of references, select from a list, the definition of maneuver concept.

2.2 With the aid of references, select from a list, the four forms of maneuver.

OUTLINE
Nature Of War
Spectrums and Levels of War
Maneuver Warfare Terms
Forms of Maneuver
Mission type Orders
Leadership
Operational Maneuver From The Sea









































INFORMATION SHEET LESSON TOPIC 1.2
INTRODUCTION TO MANEUVER WARFARE

REFERENCES:
MCDP-1, Warfighting, 1997
Battle Doctrine for Front-Line Leaders, A. A. Vandergrift, LtGen, USMC, (Third Marine Division, 1944)
Marine Corps Concept Paper, Operational Maneuver From The Sea, 1996.

1. Introduction. This handout introduces to the reader the Marine Corps philosophy of warfighting. It can be useful in understanding the Landing Force Commander's intent, and explaining the tactics involved in the scheme of maneuver ashore. To understand the Marine Corps' philosophy of warfighting, however, we first need an appreciation for the nature of war itself -- its moral and physical characteristics and demands. A common view among Marines of the nature of war is a necessary base for the development of a cohesive doctrine.

a. War Defined. War is a state of hostilities that exists between or among nations, characterized by the use of military force. The essence of war is a violent clash between two hostile, independent, and irreconcilable wills, each trying to impose itself on the other. Thus, the object of war is to impose our will on our enemy. The means to that end is the organized application or threat of violence by military force.

(1) Friction. The very essence of war as a clash between opposed wills creates friction. Friction is the force that resists all action. It makes the simple difficult and the difficult seemingly impossible. Friction may appear in many forms. It may be mental, as in indecision over a course of action. Or it may by physical, as in effective enemy fire or a terrain obstacle that must be overcome. Friction may be external, imposed by enemy action, the terrain, weather, or mere chance. Friction may also be self-induced, caused by such factors as lack of a clearly defined goal, lack of coordination, unclear or complicated plans, complex task organizations, command relationships, or complicated communications systems. Whatever form it takes, because war is a human enterprise, friction will always have a psychological as well as a physical impact.

(2) Uncertainty. All actions in war take place in an atmosphere of uncertainty -- the fog of war. Uncertainty pervades battle in the form of unknowns about the enemy, about the environment, and even about the friendly situation. While we try to reduce these unknowns by gathering information, we must realize we cannot eliminate them. The very nature of war makes absolute certainty impossible; all actions in war will be based on incomplete, inaccurate, or even contradictory information.

a Risk. By its nature, uncertainty invariably involves the estimation and acceptance of risk.

b Chance. Part of risk is the ungovernable element of chance. Chance consists of turns of events that cannot reasonably be foreseen and over which us and our enemy have no control. The element of chance is a universal characteristic of war and a continuous source of friction.

(3) Fluidity. Each episode in war is the temporary result of a unique combination of circumstances, requiring an original solution. No episode can be viewed in isolation. Rather, each merges with those that precede and follow it -- shaped by the former and shaping the conditions of the latter-- creating a continuous, fluctuating fabric of activity replete with fleeting opportunities and unforeseen events.

(4) Disorder. War gravitates naturally toward disorder. In the heat of battle, plans will go awry, instructions and information will be unclear and misinterpreted, communications will fail, and mistakes and unforeseen events will be commonplace.

(5) The Human Dimension. Since war is a clash between opposing human wills, the human dimension is central in war. It is the human dimension which infuses war with its intangible moral factors. Any view of the nature of war would hardly be accurate or complete without consideration of the effects of danger, fear, exhaustion, and privation on the men who must do the fighting.


b. The Theory of War. War does not exist for its own sake. It is an extension of policy with military force. The single most important thought to understand about the theory of war is that war must serve policy. As the policy aims of war may vary from resistance against aggression to complete annihilation of the enemy, so must the application of violence vary in accordance with those aims.

(1) The Spectrum Of Conflict. Conflict can take a wide range of forms, constituting a spectrum which reflects the magnitude of violence involved. The spectrum is normally defined in the following terms:

a Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) - Military Operations Other Than War.

b Mid Intensity Conflict (MIC) - Major Regional Conflict.

c High Intensity Conflict (HIC) - Theater & Strategic Nuclear Exchange.

(2) Levels Of War. War takes place simultaneously at several correlated levels, each with differing ends, means, characteristics, and requirements.

a Strategic - Focuses directly on national policy objectives.

b Tactical - The art and science of winning engagements and battles.

Firepower & Maneuver

Combined Arms

Immediate Exploitation Of Success To Defeat Enemy

c Operational - The use of tactical results to attain strategic objectives. Links the strategic and tactical level.

Introduction to Maneuver Warfare.



"He who does not know history is doomed to repeat it."

Napoleon



a. If we learned anything from our studies of warfare, it is that wars of attrition result in an unbelievable - and equally unacceptable - number of casualties. History is replete with example after example from the oldest battles to the present which illustrate this point.

b. History also shows that wars of maneuver yield greater victories with far fewer losses. The early German victories of World War I are clear examples of battles won through maximum maneuver with minimum loss. But once stopped at the Marne, the war settled into static trench warfare with each side standing toe-to-toe, pitting strength against strength (or, in terms of MCDP-1, surface against surface). Both the Allied and Central Powers suffered millions of casualties due to costly and nonproductive positional warfare. The emphasis was on mass firepower and infantry attacks with little thought given to solving the problem of new warfare and old tactics.

c. Additionally, maneuver warfare and all of its tenants are, in essence, a combat multiplier which allows a smaller and less equipped force to wreak havoc on a larger force by a more flexible or agile Observation, Orientation, Decision and Action (OODA) loop and the use of tempo as a weapon.

NOTE: The Finnish in the Russo-Finnish war held an army at bay and killed hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers, both directly and indirectly, with only a small albeit highly mobile ski-borne force without artillery, armor, or any of the structure normally associated with modern war. The Chinese in Korea and the Vietnamese in Viet Nam delivered similar "lessons" to the United States.

continued

wrbones
03-06-03, 11:45 PM
3. Definitions of Maneuver

a. U.S. Army. USA/USAF air-land battle doctrine, FM 100-5, describes maneuver as movement in relation to the enemy to secure or retain a positional advantage. In effect, maneuver is a spatial concept.

b. Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The former USSR doctrinal material also describes maneuver as movement in a spatial sense only.

c. USMC. MCDP-1, Warfighting has taken the concept of maneuver one step further, stressing not only the spatial concept of movement but also emphasizing the criticality of time as well.

4. Attrition versus Maneuver

Warfare by Attrition. Attrition warfare seeks victory through the cumulative destruction of enemy assets, usually by superior firepower. An attritionist takes a very structured and methodical approach to war. He tries to make the chaotic orderly. He sees the enemy as a target to be engaged and destroyed in quantitative terms: body counts, battle damage reports, number of objectives taken, or number of miles advanced. Results are proportionate to efforts: greater expenditures of personnel, ammunition and equipment yield greater results - that is, greater attrition. Victory does not depend so much on military competence as it does on sheer superiority of numbers in men and equipment. An attritionist will not fight unless the statistics say he will win.


NOTE: General George S. Patton often said that Field Marshal Montgomery never would attack unless he possessed overwhelming superiority in numbers far exceeding the accepted combat ratios. Unfortunately, a consideration not always given its due credit is the human will. General Lee fought a much larger and better-equipped army for more than three years when a "formula" would have given him a survival time of probably a month or so.

Warfare by Maneuver. Maneuver warfare seeks to avoid enemy strengths, attacking instead enemy vulnerabilities (gaps). We seek to apply our strengths against their weakness or critical vulnerabilities. A key element of maneuver is that of time and tempo. Forcing the enemy off balance and pressing him is an effective way to shatter his cohesion.


NOTE: The battle of France in 1940 is the example of the use of tempo as a weapon. The French mounted appropriate response to the attacks; unfortunately for them, however, they were always a "day late and dollar short." As they would be responding to one situation, two more would confront them. This reality had an effect that eventually broke the French cohesion. Soon this became overwhelming. Enemy weaknesses do not always, in fact often do not, have to be measured in tangible means, i.e., size of force, quality of equipment, etc. The speed of the German advance was swift to be sure, but the fact that the French commanders were too far separated from the action and unable to make timely decisions was a large contributor to the overwhelming German successes.


5. Maneuver Mindset. Finally, maneuver is a mindset. It accepts war as inherently disorderly, uncertain, dynamic and dominated by what Clausewitz first described as friction. For our purpose, it's Murphy's law: what can go wrong will. With its emphasis on speed and initiative, maneuver is an especially free-flowing style of warfare that seeks to create confusion on the battlefield and then take advantage of it. Mentally we must put aside our structured approaches once battle is joined and adapt a more flexible approach while always orienting on the commander's intent. In this vein, maneuver warfare cannot be turned on and off. It must be the way we do business every day. Its hallmarks are decentralized execution, coordination and encouragement of initiative in small unit leaders. Zero-defect mentality and maneuver warfare are two concepts which are diametrically opposed.

6. Terms of Maneuver Warfare. Some of the terms of maneuver warfare have been in use for some time and are often misused. Knowing the terms and definitions is only one side of the coin. Application of these principles on a daily basis is of paramount importance.

a. Combined Arms. To maximize combat power we must fight all available resources. By the full integration of all arms, we force upon the enemy a no win situation. More than the use of different weapons, it is the effects of the weapons that counts. It is using the effects of one weapon to enhance the effects of another and giving the enemy a "Damned if I do, damned if I don't" situation or "horns of a dilemma." For example: faced with a moving mechanized threat, the commander can place a minefield on a likely avenue of approach for enemy mechanized units. This measure by itself will slow the enemy and delay his progress. Another option is the use of the AT-4 which can destroy tanks, but the odds of hitting a moving tank are not very good. However, combining the effects of these weapons is very effective - using the mine field to stop the tanks and then attacking them with AT-4s. Combining the effects of these weapons has a synergistic result - that is, their use together adds up to more than the sum of effects that each has separately.

b. Operational Art. The tactical level of war focuses on the application of combat power to defeat the enemy in combat at a particular place and time. The operational art is the piecing together of tactical events to achieve a strategic end. Actions at this level imply a broader dimension of time and space. As the tactical level deals with winning battles and engagements, the operational level of war is the art of winning campaigns and includes deciding when, where and under what conditions to engage -or not engage- the enemy.

c. Center of Gravity. Clausewitz defined it as the place where mass is most densely concentrated, presenting the most effective target for a blow. Therefore it was considered an area of enemy strength. If this source of strength is successfully attacked and exploited, it will unbalance the enemy's plan of operations, allowing us to gain and maintain the initiative. For example, a mechanized force's strength is its mobility and superior firepower. To obviate this strength, we would seek to perhaps attack its fuel, ammo dumps and command and control. Therefore, the enemy's center of gravity is not necessarily the enemy's strongest military position, rather it is the element that if attacked will have the greatest impact on his ability to fight (Critical Vulnerability).

d. Focus of Effort. The focus of effort represents our bid for victory. Its focus is on the one thing that will allow us to achieve a decision; that is the enemy's critical vulnerability. At the strategic level, this vulnerability may be public opinion, seizing the enemy's capitol city, or crippling an essential war resource. At the tactical level, it may be a command post or piece of key terrain. We usually designate the focus of effort by assigning one unit responsibility for accomplishing that effort. It then becomes clear to all other units in the command that they must support that unit in its efforts. Faced with a decision in planning or on a battlefield, commanders must ask themselves, "How can I best support the focus of effort?" The focus of effort may change as the battle unfolds and the enemy's critical vulnerability becomes obvious or changes. An important note is that the allotment of all support including logistics, communications assets and supporting arms (including air power) goes to the needs of the focus of effort first and then, and only then, to other units.


continued

wrbones
03-06-03, 11:46 PM
e. Surfaces and Gaps.

(1) Put simply, surfaces are hard spots -- enemy strengths -- and gaps are soft spots -- enemy weakness. We avoid enemy strength, if possible, and focus our efforts against enemy weakness, since pitting strength against weakness reduces casualties and is more likely to yield decisive results. Whenever possible, we exploit existing gaps. Failing that, we create gaps.

Gaps may in fact be physical gaps in the enemy's dispositions, but they may also be any weakness in time or space: a moment in time when the enemy is overexposed and vulnerable, a seam in an air defense umbrella, an infantry unit caught unprepared in open terrain, or a boundary between two units. Similarly, a surface may be an actual strong point, or it may be any enemy strength: a moment when the enemy has just replenished and consolidated his position or an integrated air defense system.


NOTE: An appreciation for surfaces and gaps requires a certain amount of judgment. What is a surface in one case may be a gap in another. For example, a forest which is a surface to an armored unit because it restricts vehicle movement can be a gap to an infantry unit which can infiltrate through it. Furthermore, we can expect the enemy to disguise his dispositions in order to lure us against a surface that appears to be a gap.

(3) Due to the fluid nature of war, gaps will not be permanent and will usually be fleeting. To exploit them demands flexibility and speed. We must actively seek out gaps by continuous and aggressive reconnaissance. Once we locate them, we must exploit them by funneling our forces through rapidly. For example, if our focus of effort has struck a surface but another unit has located a gap, we shift the focus of effort to the second unit and redirect our combat power in support of it. In this manner we "pull" combat power through gaps from the front rather than "pushing" it through from the rear.

f. Culminating Points

(1) Unless an offensive operation is decisive, sooner or later it will reach a point where the strength of the attacker no longer exceeds that of the defender. Beyond this point, continued operations risk over extension, counterattack and defeat. In operational theory this point is the culminating point. The art of attack is to achieve decisive objectives before the culminating point is reached. Conversely, the art of defense is to hasten the culminating point of the enemy through successful screening or covering force operations.

(2) Strategic or operational culminating points can result from the following:

A forward movement of supplies not organized or lack of transportation.

b Supply stocks exhausted.

c Need to protect lines of communication may reduce the strength of forward forces.

d The attacker suffered enough combat losses to tip the balance of forces.

e Attacker entered terrain that is more easily defended.

f Troops become physically exhausted.

g The defending force becomes more determined as large portions of terrain are lost.

h Sufficient reserve not available to continue the attack.

(3) Some examples of culminating points include the following:

a Rommel's drive to Egypt which culminated at El Alamein where he had to stop due to logistics.

b German counteroffensive in 1944 through the Ardennes that ended with the Battle of the Bulge and Patton's 3d Army attack into Germany's southern flank.

(4) Defense in Depth. This tactic was developed by the Germans in WWI in an effort to lower their casualty count. Basically it allowed the enemy to enjoy "success" until they reached a culminating point and then the Germans would counter-attack with their reserve. It was extremely successful and was a genesis for their entire war fighting frame of mind that ultimately led to their successes in 1940.

g. Thickening the Battlefield. Thickening the battlefield is another method by which reaching the culminating point can be hastened or delayed depending upon whether your perspective is that of the attacker or defender. Two techniques immediately come to mind:

(1) The first technique is to weight the main effort. Another is to adjust unit boundaries. The main effort is weighted by allocating additional combat, combat support and combat service support assets. Assigning priority of fires also weights the main effort.

Adjusting unit boundaries can also favorably increase combat ratios without having to increase the number of combat formations. By adjusting the boundaries, a unit's combat power can be increased by reducing the sector of attack or zone of defense, while producing a more favorable force ratio.


continued

wrbones
03-06-03, 11:48 PM
.


NOTE: An excellent defensive example of thickening the battlefield was demonstrated on the Eastern Front during WWII. Field Marshal von Mainstein found his Southern Army Group vastly outnumbered and outgunned by the advancing Russian hordes. As Soviet forces massed and penetrated his defenses, Von Mainstein had few resources to block and destroy the enemy. Finally, with Hitler's approval, he was allowed to strategically withdraw his forces westward, thereby shortening his front. By doing so, Von Mainstein was able to form operational reserves that added depth to his defenses. This adjustment also freed up other maneuver formations to be used to conduct limited offensive operations that kept the Russians off balance.

7. Forms of Offensive Maneuver

a. Frontal Attack. Frontal attack strikes the enemy across a wide front along the most direct approaches. This typically takes place where the enemy is strongest. It is the simplest form of maneuver, but the least economical, as it exposes the attacker to the concentrated fires of the defender. It is arguably only useful in overcoming light enemy defenses during meeting engagements and hasty attacks.

b. Penetration. Penetration is used when enemy flanks are not easily assailable; it attempts to rupture the enemy defense thereby creating assailable flanks and access to the enemy's rear areas. Because the penetration force is itself vulnerable to flank attack, the follow-on forces must be close at hand to widen the gap, secure the shoulder of the penetration, and perhaps most of all, exploit.

Envelopment. This basic form of maneuver applies strength against the enemy's weakness. Envelopment avoids the enemy's front by moving around or over the enemy's positions while often fixing his attention through the use of supporting, diversionary or fixing attacks. Single or double envelopment by larger units can result in encirclement if the attacker is successful and cuts the enemy's lines of communication (LOCs) and prevents his escape or reinforcement. Turning movements are a variant of the envelopment where the attacker attempts to avoid the defense entirely, striking deep to secure key terrain in the enemy's rear. Faced with this major threat, the enemy is "turned" out of his defenses and forced to attack rearward at a disadvantage. This action is executable at any level and is always in the mind of the commander.

Infiltration. Infiltration is another means of reaching the enemy's rear without methodically fighting through prepared defenses. It is the relatively covert movement of all or part of an attacking force through enemy lines into his vulnerable rear. Successful infiltration requires, above all, the initial avoidance of decisive engagement. It seeks to defeat the defense by collapsing it from the rear by destroying logistic sites, command and control nodes, and headquarters, and by ambushing reserves and counter attack forces. Infiltrations can be magnitudes ranging from patrol raids to full-scale invasion involving armored forces such as 1st Marine Division action during operation Desert Storm.


Offensive tactics, briefly summarized, may be stated as follows: Hold the attention of your enemy with a minimum of force, then quickly strike him suddenly and hard on his flank or rear with every weapon you have, then rush him when his fire slackens. Any plan that accomplishes this will usually win if it is driven home quickly. Be slow to change a plan -- the reason for the change should be obvious."
-- Battle Doctrine for Front-Line Leaders, 1942

8. Role of the Reserves. The reserve plays a key role in both offensive and defensive operations. Historically, the reserve was frequently ignored, being held in readiness by the commander to be committed wherever he desired. Often the reserve was not given any mission except to be ready to march at a moment's notice to a threatened sector and try to shore up a weak spot in the line or reinforce an attack that was having difficulty. The proper role for the reserve is to be a force ready to exploit success or to be a counterattack force striking an attacker in his flank or rear after the enemy reaches its culminating point where it is most disorganized and least able to react. The reserve must therefore be ready to join the fray and carry out the aims of the commander. In order for this to happen, the reserve must be actively involved in all planning and must understand the intent of the commander.

9. OODA Loop. The Observation, Orientation, Decision, and Action process pioneered by Colonel John Boyd, USAF (Ret.). Each party to a battle first observes the situation. Based on that observation, each party orients; that is, it makes an estimate of the situation. Based on this orientation, it makes a decision and acts accordingly. This action creates a new situation and thus the process begins anew. The key point is that the party who completes the cycle fastest gains an advantage that increases with each cycle. The enemy reactions, by comparison, become increasing slower until he is finally overcome by events. This is not unlike the skills necessary to defeat an airborne adversary in a flat or rolling scissors. Therefore, the tempo of operations not only refers to how quickly we move about the battlefield, but also how quickly we observe, orient, decide and act over time relative to the enemy.

10. Mission Type Orders. Orders must emphasize the commander's intent. This intent must be clearly understood two levels up and down the chain of command. While the concept of operations tells us what must be done, the commander's intent tells us why the commander wants certain things done and his desired end state. The commander should also issue follow-on missions as much as practicable. This enables subordinates to exploit opportunities beyond the original objectives as these opportunities present themselves. Rommel was famous for his ability to attack beyond the original objective. On the other hand, an example of a failure to do this was General Ewell's failure to take the abandoned high ground on the first day of the Battle of Gettysburg.

a. Initiative. Once subordinate commanders understand what must be done and why, they should be allowed to determine how they will go about accomplishing their assigned missions.

b. Decentralized Execution. In an increasingly complex and confusing combat environment, rigid control of operations may not only be impossible but also undesirable. Subordinate commanders must be allocated the resources needed to accomplish the mission and then be trusted to get the job done. The empowerment and accountability of corporals and sergeants is the make or break issue here.

Training. The commander needs to know the personalities and capabilities of each of his subordinate leaders. Additionally, the subordinates must know how the commander thinks, and upon what he places emphasis. This can only be done through extensive training both academically and practically. If subordinates are expected to utilize their initiative, then they must be given latitude during training to try their ideas and make mistakes without repercussions. Again, the term’s zero-defect mentality and maneuver warfare are diametrically opposed. The term "good initiative, bad judgment" is also not consistent with maneuver warfare. The use of initiative is inherently good judgment. Of course it is understood that the difference between honest mistakes and stupidity is recognized, and there obviously is no room for stupidity in maneuver warfare - or in any kind of warfare for that matter.



continued

wrbones
03-06-03, 11:51 PM
Training. The commander needs to know the personalities and capabilities of each of his subordinate leaders. Additionally, the subordinates must know how the commander thinks, and upon what he places emphasis. This can only be done through extensive training both academically and practically. If subordinates are expected to utilize their initiative, then they must be given latitude during training to try their ideas and make mistakes without repercussions. Again, the term’s zero-defect mentality and maneuver warfare are diametrically opposed. The term "good initiative, bad judgment" is also not consistent with maneuver warfare. The use of initiative is inherently good judgment. Of course it is understood that the difference between honest mistakes and stupidity is recognized, and there obviously is no room for stupidity in maneuver warfare - or in any kind of warfare for that matter.



"Battles are won during the training period."
-- Battle Doctrine for Front-Line Leaders, 1942

"Untutored courage [is] useless in the face of educated bullets."
-- George S. Patton, Jr.

"The best form of welfare for the troops is first-class training, for this saves unnecessary casualties."
-- Erwin Rommel


11. Combat Service Support

a. Forward Push. Logisticians must ensure supplies are pushed forward as quickly as possible. Palletized packages can be configured in advance and pushed forward to distribution/pick-up points that have been identified along main supply routes (MSR) during the planning phase.

b. Anticipate Needs. Needs must be anticipated. To this end, it is important that logisticians are included in the planning process and all training events. The logistician must know the intent of the commander as much as any other subordinate. He must also understand the tactical situation and anticipate needs consistent with the scenario. For example, if the enemy possesses a strong mechanized capability which the commander plans to defeat using kill zones and obstacles, then the logistician must be prepared to support the counter-mech plan with prepackaged quantities of barrier materials and anti-tank missiles. He must know where these materials will be needed on the battlefield and have a plan to transport them in such a manner that they are on scene at the time that they are needed. Timing and flexibility are critical in logistics.

Leadership. Leadership is the common thread which ties together all of the elements of maneuver warfare. Gone are the days when a commander can ride to the top of a single hill and survey the entire battlefield. Leadership that prides itself on its technical and tactical expertise coupled with initiative demonstrated at all levels will certainly find success on today's battlefield. Again subordinates must be given room to develop and utilize their full potential. One note, however, is that maneuver warfare is not an excuse for leaders to fail in the area of supervision. It is imperative that the subordinate understand what is expected of him, but it is equally important that he understand that he is accountable for achieving whatever is assigned to him. "Micro-management" is never desirous in the maneuver warfare arena, but some individuals require more guidance than others do. The commander must supervise and discuss actions taken by subordinates that both pleased and disappointed him. Through this method, the commander will learn the capabilities of his subordinates and learn the amount of guidance each subordinate requires to accomplish the mission. In like fashion, the subordinate acquires an understanding of his commander's intent.


"A great and successful troop leader said that there comes a point in every close battle when each commander concludes that he is defeated. The leader who carries on, wins."
-- Battle Doctrine for Front-Line Leaders, 1942


MCDP-1 emphasizes the importance of maneuver warfare. As a concept, maneuver warfare is not new. However, what is relatively new is its adoption as the doctrinal way that the United States Marine Corps does business. The change to this style of both warfighting and leadership will not happen overnight, and begins now. The principles outlined in MCDP-1 are fully applicable in day to day operations, and must be practiced in all areas. The term "fight like you train" is certainly true.



"Nothing on this earth is so uplifting to a human being as victory in battle; nothing so degrading as defeat."
-- Battle Doctrine for Front-Line Leaders, 1942


14. OPERATIONAL MANEUVER FROM THE SEA

a. Like its predecessor, the approach to amphibious warfare developed at Quantico during the 1930's, Operational Maneuver from the Sea is a response to both danger and opportunity. The danger, summarized by the phrase "chaos in the littorals", consists of a world characterized by the clash of the myriad forces of national aspiration, religious intolerance, and ethnic hatred. The opportunity comes from significant enhancements in information management, battlefield mobility, and the lethality of conventional weapons.

b. In the not too distant future, the United States is likely to face a number of very different threats to its security, interests, and way of life. Many of these will be associated with the littorals, those areas characterized by great cities, well-populated coasts, and the intersection of trade routes where land and sea meet. While representing a relatively small portion of the world's surface, littorals provide homes to over three-quarters of the world's population, locations for over 80 percent of the world's capital cities, and nearly all of the marketplaces for international trade. Because of this, littorals are also the place where most of the world's important conflicts are likely to occur.

c. The centerpiece of our preparations for the future is an approach to expeditionary, littoral, and amphibious warfare known as Operational Maneuver from the Sea. While Operational Maneuver from the Sea will not define all Navy/Marine operations, the attitudes, skills, techniques and equipment associated with it will provide naval forces with a solid foundation for future improvisation.

d. The heart of Operational Maneuver from the Sea is the maneuver of naval forces at the operational level, a bold bid for victory that aims at exploiting a significant enemy weakness in order to deal a decisive blow. Mere movement, which may lead to indecisive results or even be counterproductive, does not qualify as operational maneuver. That is to say, operational maneuver should be directed against an enemy center of gravity -- something that is essential to the enemy's ability to effectively continue the struggle.

e. Tenets of Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS)

(1) OMFTS focuses on an operational objective.

(2) OMFTS uses the sea as maneuver space.

(3) OMFTS generates overwhelming tempo and momentum.

(4) OMFTS pits strength against weakness.

(5) OMFTS emphasizes intelligence, deceptions, and flexibility.

(6) OMFTS integrates all organic, joint, and combined assets.

f. The search for decisive effect is common to all forms of operational maneuver, whether on land, at sea, or in the littorals where land and sea meet. What distinguishes OMFTS from all other species of operational maneuver is the extensive use of the sea as a means of gaining advantage, an avenue for friendly movement that is simultaneously a barrier to the enemy and a means of avoiding disadvantageous engagements. This aspect of OMFTS may make use of, but is not limited to, such techniques as sea-based logistics, sea-based fire support and the use of the sea as a medium for tactical and operational movement.

g. Just as a littoral is formed by the meeting of land and sea, OMFTS is a marriage between maneuver warfare and naval warfare. From maneuver warfare comes an understanding of the dynamic nature of conflict, the imperative of decisive objectives, and the requirement for skillful operations executed at a high tempo. From naval warfare are derived a deep appreciation for the strategic level of war, the advantages inherent in sea-borne movement, and the flexibility provided by sea-based logistics. OMFTS will couple doctrine with technological advances in speed, mobility, fire support, communications, and navigation to seamlessly and rapidly identify and exploit enemy weakness across the entire spectrum of conflict. When properly united, these elements of OMFTS provide the United States with a naval expeditionary force that, while deployed unobtrusively in international waters, is instantly ready to help any friend, defeat any foe, and convince potential enemies of the wisdom of keeping the peace.

wrbones
03-09-03, 11:59 PM
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Reconnaissance and Special Operations: The Key to Maneuver Warfare

AUTHOR Major Thomas W. Parker,USMC

CSC 1988

SUBJECT AREA Intelligence




EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TITLE: Reconnaissance and Special Operations: The Key to
Maneuver Warfare

I. Purpose: To propose that if the Marine Corps intends to fully
embrace the doctrine of maneuver warfare, the MAGTF Commander re-
quires enhanced ground reconnaissance forces capable of a wide va-
riety of special operations.

II. Problem: Although the Marine Corps has embarked upon an effort
to incorporate the doctrine of maneuver warfare, the use of recon-
naissance and special operations forces to act as a combat multi-
plier and complement maneuver is little recognized.

III. Data: The basic structure and means of employment of ground
reconnaissance and special operations forces is fundamentally
flawed. Doctrine as stated in FMFM 2-2 does not address the MAGTF,
nor does it speak to the reality of the mobile battlefield. Doctrine
is based on close, distant, and deep reconnaissance, while a more
functional way of looking at it is simply tactical, the responsi-
bility of the Ground Combat Element, and operational, the respon-
sibility of the MAGTF. Additionally, the problem of mobility for
our tactical reconnaissance units is a real one that can largely
be remedied by integrating the Light Armor Vehicle Battalion into
the Reconnaissance Battalion. At the operational level, a unified
structure embracing the missions of deep reconnaissance, signals
reconnaissance, surgical raids, sabotage, and amphibious recon-
naissance is required. The primary goal should be to enhance
unity of effort, mobility and employment doctrine.

IV. Conclusions: The concept of tactical and operational recon-
naissance, linked to a revitalized structure at both levels, gives
the MAGTF Commander and his GCE the proper tools with which to
influence the battlefield. Maneuver warfare is now Marine Corps
doctrine and will require mobile reconnaissance forces and deep
striking special operations forces to acheive maximum results.

V. Recommendations: The case for reform is a strong one. FMFM 2-2
must be revised along with structure and missions. Unity of effort,
enhanced mobility, and a combined arms approach to reconnaissance
and special operations is the key to providing the MAGTF Commander
with a responsive warfighting capability.


RECONNAISSANCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS:

THE KEY TO MANUEVER WARFARE

Thesis Statement: As the Marine Corps coves to fully embrace the

doctrine of maneuver warfare, the MAGTF Commander requires enhanced

ground reconnaissance forces capable of a wide variety of special

operations.

I. Introduction

A. Historical use of special forces

B. Clausewitz and use of suprise

C. Definition of special operations

II. Historical Background

A. Tentative Manual for Landing Operations (1935)

B. World War II use of Raider and Parachute Battalions

C. Marine reconnaissance and special operations units

D. Deficiencies of Marine units

III. Forging the Link with Maneuver

A. Operational level

B. Use of information at tactical level

(1) Deterinine weaknesses

(2) Acheive suprise

C. FMFM 2-2 concept of reconnaissance employment

D. Operational reconnaissance and tactical reconnaissance

IV. Structural Change

A. Responsibilities of GCE and MAGTF Commander

B. Mobility, employment, and unity of effort

C. "Warfighting" Reconnaissance Battalion

D. Operational Warfare Group

V. A Proposal

A. Mission and structure of Reconnaissance Battalion

B. Mission and structure of Operational Warfare Group

VI. Conclusion

A. Case for doctrinal reform

B. Combined arms concept of employment


I. INTRODUCTION


"During the 15th century BC on an unnamed day between the years

1475 and 1449, the Egyptian King Thutmosis III decided to attack the

port of Jaffa. He entrusted the operation to a Captain Thute . . .

Thute had a fine sense of the economics of warfare. The perfect

operation . . . was one in which the gains were out of all proportion

to the numbers of men and material used . . . Instead of pitting his

men against the port's substantial defenses, he decided to take it

from within . . . He selected 200 crack troops . . . baled (them) in

flour sack(s) (while) others disguised as laborers, carried them from

the docks to a point well within the walls. The parcelled warriors. .

.cut themselves loose and took the garrison by suprise. Jaffa fell at

a moderate cost. Captain Thute can be fairly described as the world's

first commando officer."1

The utility of specially selected, trained, and organized forces

to acheive tactical, and even strategic advantages has been known at

least since the time of Thutmosis. These forces, when properly

employed, have the capability to perform as combat multipliers by

acheiving suprise, exercising economy of force, outmaneuvering the

enemy, attacking his most vital facilities, and destroying or

capturing areas critical to his operations.

If we examine recent history, the exploits of the British Special

Air Service (SAS) in the Falklands Campaign demonstrate the utility of

such forces. There the SAS was employed in such a way as to acheive

decisive results with minimum force, not only disrupting future enemy

plans but, as well, the physical ability to carry them through.

SAS elements were able to land on South Georgia Island under

cover of darkness and bad weather and within three hours seize the

Argentine garrison, capturing its defenders without bloodshed,

effectively isolating the island for the remainder of the campaign.2

In a subsequent action eight SAS men were placed ashore on Pebble

Island, destroyed eleven Argentine aircraft, withdrawing undetected,

without the loss of a single man.3 A major threat to the landing force

and the fleet was thus eliminated. The Argentines were left at a grave

psychological disadvantage which obliged them to devote greater

resources to the threat, real and imagined, of sabotage and

infiltration.

Clausewitz has described suprise as a means of placing the enemy

at a disadvantage, both physically and psychologically. Although he

believed that most intelligence was false, the value of reconnaissance

for an army was as its ". . . vanguard . . . its strategic eyes,

sending out individual detachments, spies and so forth."4 He further

saw the necessity for advance guards and outposts ". . . to detect and

reconnoiter the enemy's approach before he comes into view."5

Likewise, poor intelligence increases chance and since "War is the

realm of chance", the problem compounds itself through "friction", in

turn increasing the level of chance.6 The true value of information

concerning the enemy, according to Clausewitz, is that it "magnifies

strength".7 It further effects the ability of the commander to gain

suprise. The means of gaining superiority, therefore, is suprise and

information concerning the enemy is the crucial link.8 The gaining of

suprise is by its nature a failure of intelligence on the part of the

victim.9

Since Clausewitz's era the battlefield has become more dispersed,

radio and satellite communications have been invented, but the need

for accurate, timely information has increased. The days of

blackpowder weapons are gone, when enemies faced each other at close

range due to the ineffectiveness of their weapons. The ranges at which

forces may engage each other today give an even greater advantage to

that commander who has detailed, accurate, and timely information

concerning the enemy. On it he bases his decision of when to do

battle, where to place the focus of his main effort, and what future

operations he may envision.

continued

wrbones
03-10-03, 12:01 AM
continued

B.H. Liddell Hart's "Man in a Dark Room" analogy is a simple

demonstration of the need to first find the enemy. Two men, he tells

us, are placed in a darkened room with the object of each being to

subdue the other. The intial task is to find the opponent. Nothing can

replace the initial step: FIND THE ENEMY.10

Reconnaissance and special operations can be seen, then, to be

interrelated. They should remain inseparable in the commander's mind.

At times each can be seen as extensions of the other.

JCS Pub 1 defines reconnaissance as "A mission undertaken to

obtain by visual observation or other detection methods, information

about the activities of an enemy . . ." Special operations are further

described as "Operations conducted by specially trained, equipped and

organized (forces) against tactical or strategic targets . . . They may

support conventional operations . . . "

Edward Luttwak, the noted strategist, has given his own

definition, expanding and complementing the JCS characterization, to

give cognizance to their special quality by stating theat special

operations are ". . . self contained acts of war mounted by self

sufficient forces operating within hostile territory . . . (they) are

not bust ordinary operations writ small, they are qualitatively

different." Luttwak goes on to place deep reconnaissance, sabotage,

and raids under the rubric of special operations.11

Special operations in today's military, including the Marine

Corps, are most often linked, by thought and doctrine, to Low

Intensity Conflict, hostage rescue and antiterrorist activities.

KAlthough it is, of course, possible to envision the use of force in

this manner, we cannot look at the use of special operations forces so

narrowly. One study by the Rand Corporation has documented their low

success rate (33%) when used in this fashion.12 Special operations and

reconnaissance must be examined as another part of the "combined arms"

team in their support of Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF)

operations.

As the Marine Corps moves to fully embrace the doctrine of

manuever warfare, the MAGTF Commander requires enhanced ground

reconnaissance forces capable of a wide variety of special operations.



II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND



The "Tentative Manual for Landing Operations", published by the

Marine Corps in 1935 states that "Raiding forces . . . may be employed

. . . when the operations of other agencies fail to secure essential

information.

Marine Corps special operations forces, U.S. Marine Raiders, were

born at the outset of World War II. Then Commandant of the Marine

Corps, General Thomas Holcomb, wrote to Lieutenant General H.M. Smith

in 1942: "We must prepare ourselves particularly for one of our most

important missions, viz.;the execution of amphibious raids . . . in

view of the situation now facing us, it is imperative that we

intensify this type of training."13

Soon followed the creation of two raider units with the mission

of spearheading amphibious landings by larger forces, conducting raids

requiring speed and suprise, and conducting guerilla operations,

including sabotage behind enemy lines.14

In the summer of 1940 another special unit had been envisioned by

Headquarters Marine Corps planners. Marine parachute units were the

result, created with three basic missions: "As a reconnoitering and

raiding force with a limited ability to return to its parent

organization; as a spearhead or advance guard, to seize and hold

strategic installations or terrain features until arrival of larger

forces; as an independent force operating for extended periods,

presumably in a guerilla role in hostile territory."15

The goal of both raider and parachute units was to provide the

Landing Force Commander with an independent unit capable of performing

special operations, including raids, reconnaissance, and sabotage,

without the requirement to use organic infantry from the landing

force. As well, these units were given the specialized training to

carry out their missions. The Annual Fleet Exercises of the late

1930's had pointed to the need for reconnaissance and raiding parties,

landed by rubber boat from high speed transports.16

The raider and parachute units did not survive World War II as

Fleet Marine Force organizations. Three factors mitigated against

them. One, the nature of the island campaigns made harassment,

distraction, and deep reconnaissance superflous. Two, the belief held

by many senior Marines that any well trained infantry unit was capable

of carrying out the raider/parachute missions. Finally, the feeling

was widely held within the Marine Corps that these units represented

an "elite within an elite" and thereby drained vital resources from

the infantry.17

The need for reconnaissance and other special operations has, of

course, been recognized by the Marine Corps since World War II. The

Reconnaissance Battalion is a lineal descendant of the Amphibious

Reconnaissance Company and the Force Reconnaissance Company came into

being thirty years ago as a specialized deep reconnaissance

capability. The emphasis given these units waxes and wanes over the

years. The proliferation of various "technical" means of information

collection, including sensors, remotely piloted vehicles, and signal

acquisition, have resulted in a series of new organizations or

appendages to existing organizations.

A review of these organizations is necessary at this point to

determine the current status of forces and missions. They are as shown

below:

(1) Reconnaissance Battalion: The primary mission of the

Reconnaissance Battalion is the conduct of ground reconnaissance and

surveillance. The battalion emphasizes directed reconnaissance vice

passive surveillance. Extensive use of helicopters is envisioned to

provide mobility. Only a limited capability to perform amphibious

reconnaissance is resident in the battalion.

(2) Force Reconnaissance Company: Conduct preassault and deep

post-assault reconnaissancein support of the landing force. The Force

Reconnaissance Company is employed to collect information of

significance to the commander and when necessary, to provide initial

terminal guidance for assault helicopters.

(3) Radio Battalion: Conducts direction finding, electronic

countermeasures, all signals intelligence collection, and electronic

warfare.

(4) Light Armor Vehicle Battalion: Locate, close with and destroy

enemy forces by fire and manuever, exploiting high mobility, agility,

and firepower, and conduct reconnaissance, security and economy of

force missions.

(5) Sensor Control and Management Platoon: Controls, manages and

monitors ground sensors and intrusion devices.

(6) Remotely Piloted Vehicle Platoon: Conducts surveillance,

observation, radio relay, and target acquisition missions utilizing

the remotely piloted vehicle.

The assets listed above may be called upon by the MAGTF Commander

to fulfill his reconnaissance and special operations needs. The

question, however, must be asked: Does the present configuration,

missions, and doctrine provide the MAGTF Commander, and by

inference his Ground Combat Element (GCE), with a coherent, well

concceived capability?

To answer this important question, the capabilities of the units

must be examined. Figure 1 helps to illustrate the current problem.

Some conclusions are possible at this point. Certain deficiencies

are common to all or most of the units listed in Figure 1. They can,

however, be grouped within useable categories which will illustrate

the conceptual framework. The major deficiencies can thus be addressed

as:

-Mobility

-Employment

-Unity of Effort

Only by addressing these broad areas is it possible to recommend

changes to missions and organization necessary to complement the

requirements of manuever warfare doctrine. Before doing so, however,

the link between these forces and manuever warfare bust be forged.



III. FORGING THE LINK WITH MANUEVER



FM 100-5 states that "At the operational level deep operations

are designed to shape the battlefield to assure advantage in

subsequent operations."18 The same may be said of special operations,

including raids, sabotage, or deep reconnaissance. The MAGTF must be

able to fight numerically superior forces and win. The employment of

manuever warfare principles is a thought process involving decisions

about when and where to fight, acheiving quick victory with minimal

tactical actions, and destroy the enemy as an effective force at the

highest level.

The Marine Corps emphasizes highly mobile, combined arms task

forces equipped with modern weapons. OH 9-3A "Mechanized Combined Arms

Task Forces", as an example, states that Marine units must become

adept at manuever and defeat their adversaries by attacking weaknesses

with strength. "Reconnaissance pull", not "command push" is required.

Simply, offensive acts are generated as a direct result of

reconnaissance activities and not as a result of the commander pushing

blindly into battle. Before committing his manuever elements,

reconnaissance forces must determine for the commander where these

elements would be best employed to exploit enemy weaknesses.

wrbones
03-10-03, 12:02 AM
continued

"The total process, therefore, was to concentrate a force on a

narrow front . . . attain an irruption, and through such an irruption

create the necessary flanks to effect a Cannae."19 The point to be

attacked is first decided upon only after thorough reconnaissance of

the enemy force. As General George S. Patton stated, "You can never

have too much reconnaissance."20

As a corollary Patton said that, "Information is like eggs; the

fresher the better."21 To accomplish this rapidity of reporting both

mobility and communications are required. To remain ahead of the

enemy's "observation-orientation-decision-action" cycle, information

must be reported accurately and rapidly. Freedom of manuever and

action are attained by the commander as a result.

A MAGTF when faced with a Soviet or Soviet trained and equipped

force must have the ability to gain and maintain contact, either

physically or by observation, developing the situation as deemed

appropriate by the commander. For the GCE, route, zone, and area

reconnaissance are an absolute necessity as well. To give the MAGTF

Commander and his GCE the ability to manuever, these missions must be

accomplished.

Besides determining the enemy's strengths and weaknesses so as to

best support the commander's manuever, other operations may be

conducted to destroy installations and facilities critical to the

enemy's operations The attacks, either by raid or sabotage,". . .

may be mounted prior to or in conjunction with other offensive

operations to confuse the enemy or divert his attention."21

The MAGTF must use suprise in the same priority given it by

Clausewitz: a primary necessity. "Suprise can . . . be created by

radically altering the structure and tempo of the battle."22 Raiding

forces deep in the enemy's rear ". . . can sharply and suddenly

increase the enemy's sense of threat, sowing fear and confusion, and

in the extreme case, inducing outright paralysis."23

Manuever warfare requires special operations, information,

mobility and combined arms. As well, it must be based on sound

organization and anticipation of enemy actions ". . . well beyond the

current battle."24

FMFM 2-2 assigns reconnaissance responsiblities as shown in

Figure 2. "Close reconnaissance" is conducted in the area forward of

the FEBA by the ground manuever element. It's mission is to gain

information on the location, disposition, capabilities, and activities

of committed enemy forces. "Close reconnaissance" is the task of the

units manning the FEBA. Figure 2, however, shows the "area of

influence" as extending well beyond the Fire Support Coordination Line

(FSCL). In other words it is shown to extend beyond that line where

the GCE can actually influence with his ". . . ground gaining elements

or . . . fire support systems normally under his control or

command. "25 Simply, the GCE controls no fires beyond the FSCL by

definition. Only the MAGTF Commander has influence in this area. For

the GCE his "area of indluence" is that area within which his organic

forces can bring combat power to bear on the enemy.

"Distant reconnaissance" is accomplished in the "area of

interest" by the Division's Reconnaissance Battalion. As we have and

will see, the means by which they accomplish this and the lack of

mobility of these forces severely hampers their effectiveness.

Likewise, Figure 2 shows the "deep reconnaissance" mission area

to within the "area of interest". This mission, according to FMFM 2-2,

is ". . . directed toward determining the location, dosposition, and

movement of enemy reinforcements."

The "area of interest", in the words of FM 100-5, includes those

". . . extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or

planned operations. This includes areas occupied by enemy forces who

could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission." This area is,

therefore, most properly the responsibility of the MAGTF Commander.

Through his information collection assets and special operations he

determines the course of future operations and provides the GCE with

the freedom to maneuver.

The GCE's reconnaissance concerns, therefore, can be more

properly termed "tactical" and satisfied through organic assets, while

the MAGTF Cammander's can be described as "operational", to be

satisfied by his own assets, both groung and air.

Further, a clearer and more logical doctrinal configuration would

define "tactical reconnaissance" as that which extends to the limits

of the GCE's organic fire support capabilities and is directed toward

determining the status of committed enemy units. "Operational

reconnaissance", on the other hand, would extend beyond the GCE's fire

support capabilities and be directed toward determining the status of

enemy forces or capabilities which could jeopardize the MAGTF mission.

The interrelationships can be graphically depicted as shown in

Figure 3.

"Strategic reconnaissance", of course, may well extend beyond the

MAGTF's area of responsibility and inherent capabilities. However, it

needs to be recongized as an important component of the MAGTF

information collection effort, primarily as a user. The growing role

of the military in space and the use of U.S. Navy and Marine assets to

link with the proper agencies is critical to providing the MAGTF

Commander with the product of "strategic reconnasissance".

The necessity for amphibious reconnaissance cannot be overlooked.

Undeniably, a need still exists for amphibious reconnasissance. With

the incorporation of Underwater Demolition Teams into the SEAL Team

structure in recent years a "mission gap" has potentially been

created. Although in Marine Corps Landing Force Manual 01 dated

November 1986 the Navy (SEAL Team) continues to retain the mission

for obstacle clearance, mine clearance, hydrographic surveys, and

beach reconnaissance from the 3.5 fathom line tothe high water line,

the Landing Force must continue to possess an amphibious

reconnaissance capability. The very real potential exists for the

employment of SEAL Team in other roles as the CATF may see fit, to the

exclusion of amphibious reconnaissance. Amphibious reconnaissance,

because it may effect where, when, and in what force the MAGTF lands,

is most properly considered then to be "operational reconnaissance."

wrbones
03-10-03, 12:04 AM
continued

The current FMFM 2-2 must be updated and revised to complement

the manuever warfare doctrine expressed in the new OH 6-1. Doctrinal

reform, however, must be closely linked with structural change to

fully complete the process.

The proposed structure can be debated. What must remain, however,

is the thought that reconnaissance and special operations at the MAGTF

level is different than that at the GCE. A flexible structure, which

provides for unity of effort, enhanced mobility, and a combined arms

concept for employment is the key to providing MAGTF Commanders with a

responsive warfighting capability. The Marine Corps has the ability

and the brainpower to solve this problem. It must act now to

reinvigorate the reconnaissance and special operations forces.


Click here to view images


NOTES


1Richard Garrett, The Raiders (New York: Van Nostrand
Company, 1980), p.9.

2Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the
Falklands (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1983), p. 128-29.

3Ibid., p.186-87.

4Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael
Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1976), p.259.

5Ibid., p.3O2.

6Ibid., p.1O1.

7Ibid., p.121.

8Ibid., p.198.

9Ibid., p.121.

l0John A. English, A Perspective on Infantry (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1981), p.42.

11Frank R. Barnett, B. Hugh Tovar, and Richard H. Shultz,
ed., Special Operations and U.S. Strategy (Washington, D.C.:
National Defense University Press, 1984, p.33-34.

12Bruce Hoffman, "Commando Raids", (RAND Note prepared
for the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy,
1985), p.25.

13Charles L. Updegraph, U.S. Marine Corps Special Units
of World War II (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division,
HQMC, 1972), p.3.

14Ibid., p.3.

15Ibid., p.36-37.

16Ibid., p.1.

17Ibid., p.18.

18Headquarters, Department of the Army, Operations, FM 100-5
(Washington, D.C.. 1986), p.107

19English, p.96.

20George S. Patton, War As I Knew It (New York: Pyramid Books,
1966), p.343.

21Ibid., p.343.

22FM 100-5, p.95.

23Ibid., p.95.

24Ibid., p.12.

25Headquarters, Department of the Army, Operational Terms and
Graphics, FM 101-5-1 (Washington. D.C.,' 1980), p.1-8.

26MCDEC, U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Light Armor Employment,
OH 6-6, 1985. p.403.

27Ibid., p.404.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Barnett, Frank R., B. Hugh Tovar, and Richard H. Shultz, ed.
Special Operations and U.S. Strategy. Washington, D.C.:
National Defense University Press, 1984.

Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. ed. and trans. Michael Howard
and Peter Paret. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1976.

Department of the Army. Operations, FM 100-5, Washington, D.C.,
1986.

Department of the Army, Operational Terms and Graphics, FM
101-5-1. Washington, D.C., 1980.

Department of the Navy. Amphibious Reconnaissance, FMFM 2-2.
Washington, D.C., 1976.

English, John A. A Perspective on Infantry. New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1981.

Garrett, Richard. The Raiders. New York: Van Nostrand Company,
1980.

Hastings, Max and Simon Jenkins. The Battle for the Falklands.
New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1983.

Hoffman, Bruce. "Commando Raids". RAND Note prepared for the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 1985.

MCDEC, U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Light Armor Employment, OH 6-6.
1985.

Patton, George S. War As I Knew It. New York: Pyramid Books,
1966.

Updegraph, Charles L. U.S. Marine Corps Special Units of World
War II. Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division,
HQMC, 1972.
-END-

wrbones
03-10-03, 12:13 AM
http://www.usmchq.com/theory.htm

wrbones
03-10-03, 12:15 AM
https://www.doctrine.usmc.mil/


http://www.mstp.quantico.usmc.mil/

wrbones
03-10-03, 12:18 AM
April 1996


No Scholarships Given



EDUCATION:
Inside an institution geared to produce U.S. Marine leaders
who embody the very essence of military professionalism.
By Cpl. Thomas R. Arntz, MCB Quantico, Va.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Established in 1989 under the direction of the 29th Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. Alfred M. Gray, the Marine Corps University provides a common foundation throughout the Corps by being the focal point for the Professional Military Education Program.

"I consider the professional military education and development of Marine leaders to be of the utmost importance as we prepare to move into the 21st century," stated Gen. Gray when he announced the establishment of the MCU.

With the goal of providing a world class institution to educate Marines in the Art of War and produce leaders with the confidence and vision to exercise sound military judgment in battle, Gen. Gray laid the groundwork for the University and assigned LtGen. Paul K. Van Riper, then brigadier general, at the helm as its first president.

"The mission of the MCU is to develop, recommend, implement, and monitor the resident and nonresident PME policies and programs for all Marines, active and reserve," Gen. Gray explained in a message to all Marines.

Although nearly seven years have passed since its establishment, the basic objective of the University remains the same: to produce Marine leaders who embody the very essence of military professionalism by providing the structure and policy for the Corps' worldwide PME network.

The MCU is comprised of the Marine Corps War College, Command and Staff College, School of Advanced Warfighting, Amphibious Warfare School, Command and Control Systems School, The Basic School, Officer Candidates School, Staff Non-Commissioned Officer Academy (Marine Corps Combat Development Command), and affiliated SNCO academies or Sergeant Courses at other commands throughout the Marine Corps, the Marine Corps Research Center, and the Doctrine Division.


War College
The Marine Corps War College prepares a select group of Marine lieutenant colonels and other service O-5s with an education in the nature of, preparation for, and conduct of, war and military operations other than war. With the knowledge that is provided by MCWAR, officers are prepared for the responsibility of senior-level positions associated with the application of maritime expeditionary warfare, Marine Air-Ground Task Force operations, joint and multinational military strategy, the elements of national power and national security strategy.

One unique aspect of MCWAR is the size of the student body, which is kept to a minimal number to allow the class to travel and visit unified commanders and their staffs throughout the world. Upon graduation of MCWAR, the Marine officers become instructors for the Command and Staff College for a two-year period.


Command and Staff College
The Command and Staff College is a cohesive PME institution that provides field grade United States officers and officers from designated foreign countries with the knowledge to work in command and staff assignments with joint and combined service forces and other high-level military organizations. During the 46-week course, students are required to solve problems individually and in groups. These problem-solving lessons are enhanced by intensive student exercises, computer-assisted battle simulations, and historical battle studies.


School of Advanced Warfighting
The School of Advanced Warfighting provides a follow-on course for selected graduates of the Command and Staff College and other service intermediate level schools. The goal of the School of Advanced Warfighting is to provide graduate level PME for select field grade officers to enhance their operational-level decision making skills. These officers will then be able to contribute more effectively in helping their nation's armed forces meet future demands.


Amphibious Warfare School
The students attending the nine-month Amphibious Warfare Course receive career level PME with emphasis on combined arms operation, warfighting skills, tactical decision-making and MAGTFs in amphibious operations. This course prepares Marine captains to function as commanders and staff officers at the appropriate levels within the Fleet Marine Force.


Command and Control Systems School
The Command and Control Systems School offers three courses; the Basic Communication Officers Course, the Command and Control Systems Course, and the Reserve Communication Officers Course. These courses range from entry-level to career-level.


The Basic School
A truly Marine Corps-unique school is The Basic School, where each new Marine Corps officer furthers his or her education in the high standards of professional knowledge, esprit d' corps and leadership to prepare them for duty in the FMF. During the 26-week course, the new officers spend many hours learning the duties, responsibilities and warfighting skills required of a rifle platoon commander. Newly-selected warrant officers attend a 13-week Warrant Officer Basic Course.


Officer Candidates School
The Officer Candidates School, located at Quantico since 1935, annually trains, evaluates and screens more than 2,500 officer candidates for commissioning into the Marine Corps. This physically and mentally challenging school ensures that each candidate possesses the moral, intellectual and physical qualities for commissioning and the leadership potential to serve successfully as a company grade officer in the FMF.


SNCO Academy
Another unique aspect of the MCU is that the Staff Non-Commissioned Officer Academy is instructed and directed solely by enlisted Marines, for enlisted Marines. The SNCOA offers SNCO and NCOs the PME and leadership training that enhances their professional qualifications in preparation for assuming duties of greater responsibility. The academy at Quantico, designated the lead SNCOA, is specifically dedicated to the validation of all enlisted PME for all academies throughout the Marine Corps.


Research Center
The Marine Corps Research Center was specifically designed to meet the growing demands for information leading toward the next century. The MCRC has a comprehensive collection of traditional library, research and archival material readily available for anyone to use. The MCRC serves the information needs of the operating forces around the world, as well as those of PME schools and students.


Most PME schools were established before the opening of the MCU and, with such strong structures already in place, not many changes have occurred. According to the President of the MCU, MajGen. Marvin T. Hopgood Jr., the university ensures the curriculum provides continuity and that the PME, from school to school, is progressive and not repetitive.

A recent realignment of the Doctrine Division from MCCDC to the University ensures that the necessary relationship between the writing and teaching of Marine Corps doctrine is recognized.

The Marine Corps University will continue to provide PME for Marine Corps officers and many enlisted personnel as well, while the Marine Corps continues to march toward the 21st Century.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Photos:
Marine Corps Research Center
The Basic School
The Sergeants Course

Related items: N/A

wrbones
06-08-03, 03:03 PM
http://www.comw.org/pda/webman.htm




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Traduction | Übersetzung | Traduzione | Tradução | Traduccion (powered by Babel Fish)

Maneuver Warfare Principles and Terms
Project on Defense Alternatives
Carl Conetta
12 March 1998




In the words of one strategic analyst, attrition is "war waged by industrial methods." In the attrition approach, the adversary is defined as a series of targets to be "serviced" (that is, destroyed). Other than the achievement of initial surprise in the attack, there is little art or artifice in the approach. As an ideal type it takes as its prime objective the physical destruction of the adversary's material strength; it associates success with material superiority; and it adopts as a basic principle the simple imperative; "more."

In maneuver warfare, by contrast, "the goal is to incapacitate by systemic disruption" and dislocation. The target is the coherence of the adversary's combat systems, methods, and plans. The hope is that a very selective action can have a cascading effect -- an effect disproportionately greater than the degree of effort. An analogy from architecture would be the removal or destruction of the keystone of an arch. Here the arch is conceived as a "system" whose dynamic element is gravity which has been converted to useful purpose by the positioning of the keystone -- the removal of which disrupts the stability of the system, resulting in its destruction.

The three basic principles of maneuver warfare are: (1) identify and target enemy centers of gravity, (2) set and maintain favorable terms of battle, and (3) find and exploit "gaps" in enemy strength.

In the example of the arch, the keystone is a "center of gravity" (in the strategic, not literal sense). Notably, it is not a "weakness," nor a "strength" of the system (arch), but rather a source or enabler of strength. In war, centers of gravity are not absolute, but instead relative to the adversary's character, methods, objectives, and plans. (In the First and Second World Wars, for instance, one of the Allied powers' strategic centers of gravity was the secure industrial capacity of the United States, which Germany targeted indirectly by means of submarine warfare.) If centers of gravity have a universal or defining attribute, it is this: attacking them successfully has a cascading or catastrophic effect on enemy morale, organization, and operations. Centers of gravity exist at every level of war, and the epitome of maneuver is for a unit to upset an enemy center at one or more levels higher than its own level of organization, and to do so with minimal combat.
Setting the "terms of battle" (which among other things may include time, place, pace, intensity, and type of engagement) means ensuring that combat proceeds under conditions favorable to the defense. In general, the aim is to set terms that accentuate friendly strengths and enemy weaknesses while minimizing friendly vulnerabilities and enemy strengths. The challenge for the practioner of maneuver is to establish and maintain this condition.
Despite its linear connotation, the injunction to "find and exploit gaps" means aligning friendly strength against enemy weakness in the combat process. Success in setting the terms of battle facilitates this effort, while restricting enemy opportunities to exploit gaps in friendly strength.

The three aspects of maneuver operate together to achieve disproportionate effects, in the following fashion: centers of gravity define the objective, the imperative to find and exploit "gaps" defines the approach to the objective, and setting the terms of battle facilitates the effort overall while controlling for enemy counter-initiatives. Indeed, the greater the success in setting the overall terms of battle, the easier it is to find gaps and compromise centers of gravity.

Any significant success in the maneuver contest depends on first, achieving and maintaining a relative advantage in the flow of accurate information, and second, possessing greater relative flexibility in the allocation of combat power.


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wrbones
06-08-03, 03:12 PM
http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/1997/summer/art2su97.htm


http://www.triumphpc.com/militaryquality/maneuver-warfare2.shtml

resources:

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0891415181/qid%3D935712894/sr%3D1-5/002-1847557-1826814/ltcoldavegrossmaA/102-7035224-3704156


business applications:

http://www.belisarius.com/modern_business_strategy/boyd/patterns/maneuver1.htm

In other words, what you use as a Marine may have implcations and uses after your career in the Marine Corps.

wrbones
06-08-03, 04:06 PM
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1990/DDC.htm


http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/406375.html


http://www.google.com/search?q=maneuver+warfare&hl=en&lr=&ie=UTF-8&start=20&sa=N