thedrifter
03-27-07, 01:21 PM
The Lore of the Corps
Poor replacement system at Iwo added to casualties
By Charles A. Jones - Special to the Times
Posted : April 02, 2007
To continue functioning, combat commands must replace service members lost to death, injury and illness. No replacement system works perfectly, but the Marine Corps learned that one — replacement drafts — worked very poorly on Iwo Jima.
Comments in after-action reports universally condemned the replacement draft system on Iwo.
According to the reports, members would generally work shore party details until called forward. Some were assigned the dangerous job of stretcher bearer.
Replacement draft members were inexperienced and poorly trained, having never trained together as a unit, and they did not know the members of the commands to which they were sent. These factors made them a danger to themselves and to veterans, producing a high casualty rate among replacements.
One battalion commander wrote, “The casualties in those kids was horrifying. Some just sort of wandered around until they got shot or huddled in exposed places.”
One after-action report summarized the situation well: “[We believe] the Replacement method used during the ... operation was by far the weakest link in the activities of the one section.
“To alleviate this situation ... replacements [should] be formed into platoons, complete with officers and NCOs and [assigned] to the regiment for training in infantry tactics ... two months before an operation. These platoons would be able to work as Shore Party personnel and then could be released to the regiment as complete platoons.”
Another report stated that replacements should be used only in the rear “for jobs such as supply, litter bearing, burying the dead and other working parties. While serving with our assault platoons, we found them to be poorly trained soldiers. Their casualty rate was extremely high and often they were somewhat hysterical in the face of fire, having a bad morale effect on our old men. As our leaders didn’t know them, control was very difficult and many men turned up missing in action.”
A regimental commander wrote that the replacements arrived in “driblets or groups of approximately 100 men,” and his officers knew very little about them.
“Since the replacements knew little of what was expected of them, battalion officers and [NCOs] ... had to constantly tell them what to do, where to go and show them how to maneuver,” the commander wrote. But leaders displaying such direction marked themselves as targets for snipers.
Part of the replacement problem may have been Lt. Gen. H.M. Smith’s refusal to land 3rd Marines. Under Smith, the senior Marine commander, was V Amphibious Corps, which included 3rd, 4th and 5th divisions. All three regiments from 4th and 5th divisions landed on Iwo.
Third Division included 3rd, 9th and 21st Marines; only 9th and 21st Marines landed on Iwo. Smith refused to land 3rd Marines, possibly wanting to keep its manpower available to invade Japan.
Thus, rather than landing the regiment or its components as whole units, men from replacement drafts “dribbled” into units.
The writer is a lawyer and Marine Corps Reserve colonel in Norfolk, Va. He can be reached at cajones@earthlink.net.
Ellie
Poor replacement system at Iwo added to casualties
By Charles A. Jones - Special to the Times
Posted : April 02, 2007
To continue functioning, combat commands must replace service members lost to death, injury and illness. No replacement system works perfectly, but the Marine Corps learned that one — replacement drafts — worked very poorly on Iwo Jima.
Comments in after-action reports universally condemned the replacement draft system on Iwo.
According to the reports, members would generally work shore party details until called forward. Some were assigned the dangerous job of stretcher bearer.
Replacement draft members were inexperienced and poorly trained, having never trained together as a unit, and they did not know the members of the commands to which they were sent. These factors made them a danger to themselves and to veterans, producing a high casualty rate among replacements.
One battalion commander wrote, “The casualties in those kids was horrifying. Some just sort of wandered around until they got shot or huddled in exposed places.”
One after-action report summarized the situation well: “[We believe] the Replacement method used during the ... operation was by far the weakest link in the activities of the one section.
“To alleviate this situation ... replacements [should] be formed into platoons, complete with officers and NCOs and [assigned] to the regiment for training in infantry tactics ... two months before an operation. These platoons would be able to work as Shore Party personnel and then could be released to the regiment as complete platoons.”
Another report stated that replacements should be used only in the rear “for jobs such as supply, litter bearing, burying the dead and other working parties. While serving with our assault platoons, we found them to be poorly trained soldiers. Their casualty rate was extremely high and often they were somewhat hysterical in the face of fire, having a bad morale effect on our old men. As our leaders didn’t know them, control was very difficult and many men turned up missing in action.”
A regimental commander wrote that the replacements arrived in “driblets or groups of approximately 100 men,” and his officers knew very little about them.
“Since the replacements knew little of what was expected of them, battalion officers and [NCOs] ... had to constantly tell them what to do, where to go and show them how to maneuver,” the commander wrote. But leaders displaying such direction marked themselves as targets for snipers.
Part of the replacement problem may have been Lt. Gen. H.M. Smith’s refusal to land 3rd Marines. Under Smith, the senior Marine commander, was V Amphibious Corps, which included 3rd, 4th and 5th divisions. All three regiments from 4th and 5th divisions landed on Iwo.
Third Division included 3rd, 9th and 21st Marines; only 9th and 21st Marines landed on Iwo. Smith refused to land 3rd Marines, possibly wanting to keep its manpower available to invade Japan.
Thus, rather than landing the regiment or its components as whole units, men from replacement drafts “dribbled” into units.
The writer is a lawyer and Marine Corps Reserve colonel in Norfolk, Va. He can be reached at cajones@earthlink.net.
Ellie