thedrifter
02-02-07, 09:16 AM
Getting good intelligence
How Counter-intelligence is now being conducted in Iraq:
"You tell me if it can work"
By Dave Gaubatz,
Friday, February 2, 2007
This is how it worked from Mar -- July 2003 Counter-intelligence Agents woke up around 0600 hours (6 a.m.). The agents were still tired & stunk to high heaven, but they were ready to work. We slept with our M-16 and 9mm. Counter-intelligence teams consisting of two or possibly 3 Agents would hit the roads of Nasiriyah or Baghdad around 0630 hours (6:30 a.m.). We had six agents in Nasiriyah. The first month we had only four bottles of water each day. You could save it to drink or you could take your four bottles and bathe. We chose to drink ours. We took our MRE's (ready prepared meals) with us and 4 bottles of water. We then hit the road in a non-armored vehicle. Our teams would hit the streets from early morning until sundown. We talked with people from all walks of life. We dropped by the local police stations, the hospitals, the restaurants, and retail stores. Often we traveled into the deep parts of the desert and talked with the Bedouin people. Although they live in isolated areas, they seemed to know everything. Counter-intelligence was collected simply by talking to people. Of course we had our priorities of what we wanted to discuss, but the point is we were out meeting people. They felt more open to speak with and we obtained very valuable information. We had very few problems because the Iraqi people saw a heavy presence (with Army and Marines on the streets as well) of U.S. personnel. We returned to the base late in the evening and then wrote several intelligence reports. Sometimes we got into bed by midnight.
This is how it works now: Counter-intelligence teams now wake up around 0730 hours (7:30 a.m.) and go take a hot shower, then head toward the dining hall that is stocked with fresh eggs, breads, and plenty of juices, etc..You get the point. After the agents have had a hot shower and breakfast they then rush (in their armored vehicles) to their air-conditioned offices (located in the safe confines of the base or "Green Zone"). The agents conduct background checks of foreign nationals who want to work on base. They use their telephones and computer to do this. Sometimes during the day the agents will receive a call from Security forces advising them of an Iraqi at the gate who wants to provide information (they are called walk in sources). The agent's arm up, run to their armored vehicles and blaze to the front gate (well within the safe zone). The agents meet with the walk in and interview him/her. The agents blaze back to their office and electronically file their valuable intelligence report. Eventually the report makes it to the combat ready troops of the U.S. Army and Marines. They then respond to the locations where the walk in said there were insurgents, weapons, etc.. The majority of the time it is false information and many times our soldiers are ambushed. Why? Because the intelligence is the weakest type of intelligence you can collect. If you can't get into the streets of Iraq and speak with them in their own surroundings, you will continue to get poor intelligence.
Conclusion: The lack of good intelligence is the number one problem our troops are now facing and it will not change until we get back onto the streets. Instead of having 95% of the 150,000 troops assigned to support positions, we need 95% to be combat troops who live, eat, sleep, and fight on the streets of Iraq. Then and only then will we have a chance of securing Iraq. Why do senior U.S. military leaders and politicians feel Iraq can be secured and insurgents driven out if intelligence is done from the safe confines of a base? One need only ask this question to understand why there are major problems in Iraq. Can law enforcement authorities in the U.S. or Canada combat violence in their cities if the police and intelligence personnel worked from an office in a safe compound? Of course not. The criminals would take over the cities. The criminals have taken over Iraq
Ellie
How Counter-intelligence is now being conducted in Iraq:
"You tell me if it can work"
By Dave Gaubatz,
Friday, February 2, 2007
This is how it worked from Mar -- July 2003 Counter-intelligence Agents woke up around 0600 hours (6 a.m.). The agents were still tired & stunk to high heaven, but they were ready to work. We slept with our M-16 and 9mm. Counter-intelligence teams consisting of two or possibly 3 Agents would hit the roads of Nasiriyah or Baghdad around 0630 hours (6:30 a.m.). We had six agents in Nasiriyah. The first month we had only four bottles of water each day. You could save it to drink or you could take your four bottles and bathe. We chose to drink ours. We took our MRE's (ready prepared meals) with us and 4 bottles of water. We then hit the road in a non-armored vehicle. Our teams would hit the streets from early morning until sundown. We talked with people from all walks of life. We dropped by the local police stations, the hospitals, the restaurants, and retail stores. Often we traveled into the deep parts of the desert and talked with the Bedouin people. Although they live in isolated areas, they seemed to know everything. Counter-intelligence was collected simply by talking to people. Of course we had our priorities of what we wanted to discuss, but the point is we were out meeting people. They felt more open to speak with and we obtained very valuable information. We had very few problems because the Iraqi people saw a heavy presence (with Army and Marines on the streets as well) of U.S. personnel. We returned to the base late in the evening and then wrote several intelligence reports. Sometimes we got into bed by midnight.
This is how it works now: Counter-intelligence teams now wake up around 0730 hours (7:30 a.m.) and go take a hot shower, then head toward the dining hall that is stocked with fresh eggs, breads, and plenty of juices, etc..You get the point. After the agents have had a hot shower and breakfast they then rush (in their armored vehicles) to their air-conditioned offices (located in the safe confines of the base or "Green Zone"). The agents conduct background checks of foreign nationals who want to work on base. They use their telephones and computer to do this. Sometimes during the day the agents will receive a call from Security forces advising them of an Iraqi at the gate who wants to provide information (they are called walk in sources). The agent's arm up, run to their armored vehicles and blaze to the front gate (well within the safe zone). The agents meet with the walk in and interview him/her. The agents blaze back to their office and electronically file their valuable intelligence report. Eventually the report makes it to the combat ready troops of the U.S. Army and Marines. They then respond to the locations where the walk in said there were insurgents, weapons, etc.. The majority of the time it is false information and many times our soldiers are ambushed. Why? Because the intelligence is the weakest type of intelligence you can collect. If you can't get into the streets of Iraq and speak with them in their own surroundings, you will continue to get poor intelligence.
Conclusion: The lack of good intelligence is the number one problem our troops are now facing and it will not change until we get back onto the streets. Instead of having 95% of the 150,000 troops assigned to support positions, we need 95% to be combat troops who live, eat, sleep, and fight on the streets of Iraq. Then and only then will we have a chance of securing Iraq. Why do senior U.S. military leaders and politicians feel Iraq can be secured and insurgents driven out if intelligence is done from the safe confines of a base? One need only ask this question to understand why there are major problems in Iraq. Can law enforcement authorities in the U.S. or Canada combat violence in their cities if the police and intelligence personnel worked from an office in a safe compound? Of course not. The criminals would take over the cities. The criminals have taken over Iraq
Ellie