thedrifter
01-17-07, 11:02 AM
An Interview with Lance Corporal Nathan (Chad) Yeager |
January 15, 2007
"Because the language they use is killing:"
An Interview with a Fallujan Police Officer
Posted by Bill
Jawa Report, TX
The difficulty of obtaining this interview underscores the political and cultural complexities of the American effort in Fallujah. In order to get a few minutes of alone candor with an Iraqi patrolman, the Marines had to coordinate a task that excused his visit to the American wing of the station. Some Iraqi policeman - typically the ones who are in positions to work most closely with the Marines and civilian advisors - like the Americans, some tolerate the Americans, some dislike the Americans, and it's widely believed that a few actually (at least passively) work with insurgents. Paradoxically in most cases, the majority want Americans to leave, but not yet.
Two reasons: American firepower in and around Fallujah keeps the lid on chaos that waits to engulf the city, and the young Fallujan government still views itself as dependent on the Marines for everything from fuel to equipment to administrative savvy. One of the most frustrating tasks for the Police Transition Team is to wean locals off of this culture of dependency, a process reliant on them learning to work with and trust their central government, as well as do for themselves.
But Fallujans are remarkably insular; their local culture is famously mistrustful. A visitor from Ramadi or Baghdad is considered a foreigner. A Marine intelligence officer remarked to me that the first things Fallujans rebuilt after Operation al-Fajr were the gated walls surrounding their own houses. Another revealing anecdote was supplied by a Marine who cited a Western travel guide to Iraq circa the 1940's: it advised tourists in the region to steer clear of Fallujah, condemning the city as a notorious den of xenophobic smugglers and thieves.
Add decades of war and fealty to a Stalinist yet locally benevolent government to the mix, and you've got a difficult cultural stew of suspicion and missing initiative. Fallujans are proud and many are brave, but a number lack much will beyond the desire to personally prosper or just survive.
Broaching American politics for a moment: a simplistic left-wing interpretation might conclude that Americans are despised occupiers who need to leave Fallujans in peace, while a simplistic right-wing or populist interpretation relies on applying something like the golden rule to a multi-layered political situation: the idea that if Americans are there to help, Fallujans should simply go along and be grateful. The reality of the situation - and any successful expression of both Fallujan and American interest - is so much more complex than either of these views.
"Mohammed" is a young Iraqi with bright eyes and gentle demeanor. He immediately asked me for things: food, a soda and, at the conclusion of the interview, some shampoo. I was surprised by three aspects of his answers to my questions: his seeming openness, his intelligence sans education, and his political opinions about the nature of the insurgency. I can't read minds, but his presentation seemed sincere. I also felt great sympathy for the man. It certainly wasn't empathy, as I can barely fathom what it must be like to live his life.
INDC: Why did you decide to join the police?
Mohammed: "Just to survive, because you can't make money anywhere else."
INDC: Is the pay good for you?
Mohammed: "Yes. Even I got hit before, I got shot. And that's (also) why I really hate those guys (the insurgents) and I came back to the police force again."
INDC: Where were you shot?
Mohammed: "Nearby the (a specific location in Fallujah). Actually Americans died and I got hurt."
INDC: And where were you shot on your body?
Mohammed: "In my hand and (motions to his side). It was a PKC ... and it was a Syrian guy who shot us."
INDC: How long did it take to recover?
Mohammed: "Two months. And I wished I were dead because it was so painful." (He smiled)
INDC: You mentioned that you hate the insurgents, is that just more now because you've been shot or did you have a different opinion of them before?
Mohammed: "They hit me and they also killed some of my family. Actually they killed my uncle who used to be an Iraqi Army soldier, and they killed him and burned his face. And then they actually started threatening us as well."
INDC: They burned his face?
Mohammed: "Yes. It's a substance called "tizar," it's like, acid. They put it in his face."
INDC: He was alive when they did this?
Mohammed: "Yes, he was alive. They burned him and stabbed him so many times, and also they shot him with bullets. And we found a note on him saying, 'The police and the army and the Americans are all the same.'
INDC: So they killed him because he was in the Iraqi Army?
Mohammed: "Yes. But we didn't tell any of these guys (the Iraqi police) around here (at the time) because they hated the Army as well."
INDC: So why do police hate the army?
Mohammed: "I think because the army actually liberated Fallujah, they work well, and they liberated Fallujah. And some of (the police) actually like (or liked) the insurgents."
"And the other thing would be because they are different (sects of Islam). But after the operations we started doing together, now we became like one and the same, we became like brothers."
INDC: The Iraqi police and the Iraqi Army?
Mohammed: "Yes. Now we became like brothers."
INDC: So how does the police work with the Iraqi Army when some of the police hate the IA's?
Mohammed: "Some bad guys used to be part of the police, but now they quit and ran to Syria. And actually in the JCC (American control room) they know (who) most of them (are)."
The rift between the IP's and IA's that Mohammed describes is accurate, as is the recent, though potentially transitory accord. After a recent set of operations where the Marines encouraged the police and army to work together, the Americans were surprised to find Shia IA's and Sunni IP's joking around with each other and hugging after a successful raid. As Gunnery Sergeant Jason Lawson put it, they were showing off captured insurgents "like kids comparing Halloween candy." Whether this amity will last is anyone's guess.
INDC: So who are the insurgents? Who are the people who are fighting stability? Are they locals?
Mohammed: "(Yes), almost all of them."
INDC: So why are local Fallujans fighting other Fallujans?
Mohammed: "Because the al Qaeda organization came to this city and controlled it so hard by killing. And some people here actually like killing and they liked Saddam Hussein as well, and I think the al Qaeda organization and Saddam Hussein are the same face."
INDC: What do you mean by "the same face," because Saddam was secular, he was not religious and al Qaeda is ...
Mohammed: "Because the language they use is killing. And the same people who used to be with Saddam, now they participate with the insurgency."
INDC: So their motivation for killing is what?
Mohammed: "Money and to be famous. And I think the first reason is to fight the American troops. They say, 'we can start from here and cross all the way to America to fight them.'"
INDC: What would happen if America left Iraq and Fallujah right now? What would happen?
Mohammed: "It's going to be a disaster."
INDC: How so?
Mohammed: "There will be revenge from everybody. And now they are trying to (form the) Islamic Emirate right here."
INDC: What do you think can be done to stop the insurgents?
Mohammed: "By fighting them back and killing them. Or reporting them to the troops."
INDC: But if the Iraqi police isn't doing patrolling, and the Iraqi Army isn't trusted, and the Americans won't be here forever, who is going to do the killing?
Mohammed: "What do you mean about 'no trust for the Iraqi Army?'"
INDC: Well, I've been told that the locals don't trust the IA's because they are from Baghdad and they are mostly Shia.
Mohammed: "No, no, no. Most people they actually hate the Mujahedeen. But they are scared, they're scared, they don't have power in their hands."
INDC: So how do they feel about the Iraqi Army?
Mohammed: "Most of the educated people actually like the Iraqi Army. But two displacements (two major evacuations and upheavals) have happened here in Fallujah, and if another one happens, everybody will die."
INDC: Tell me about the history of the Iraqi police, they've been sort of up and down, they've gone from zero to being massacred, to being reconstituted by the Americans ... where do you think they are now?
Mohammed: "I think only the Americans can (maintain order) with the Iraqi Army."
INDC: What about the police?
Mohammed: "I don't think they can, because they are easy targets. Most of the police get attacked at home and killed."
INDC: Right. Whereas the Iraqi Army and the Americans live in barracks and bases, and their families are elsewhere.
Mohammed: "Yes."
He then told me that a secret war is going on in Fallujah. That citizens, fed up with the insurgency, are tracking down insurgents and killing them. These vigilantes then blame the killing on other insurgent groups, to try and get the splintered mass of terrorists to start killing each other.
Mohammed: "Actually now the mujahadeen and the al Qaeda organizations are fighting each other. Hopefully that will ease things on the police and the Americans."
INDC: What about the tribes? Where are they in all of this?
Mohammed: "Only in Ramadi the tribes are fighting the insurgents. Here in Fallujah some actually support the insurgents because they are scared."
A day earlier, an American soldier told me that the tribes has just, within the past week, declared themselves neutral, intending to let the insurgents fight each other, the Iraqi Army, the police and the Americans. Previously they had been passively or actively working with insurgents or playing both sides of the fence.
INDC: What are your personal plans for the next few years? What do you see yourself doing?
Mohammed: "I think if the situation keeps going the same way, (with vigilantes) killing the insurgents the same way, it (the insurgency) will finish."
"Not to mention the operation that took place yesterday, by the Iraqi Army and the police (Special Missions Group). It actually shook (the insurgents) so much. If we do another 5 or so, I think we'll finish them."
INDC: How many insurgents do you think are operating in Fallujah?
Mohammed: "A little more than 500. Maybe more than that."
"Actually I need to go, because I don't want to stay a long time."
INDC: Ok. One last, quick question: what do you think of Americans, and has that opinion changed over time?
Mohammed: "I think we need the Americans. If they go out right now it's gonna be a disaster. And believe me, even if they get out of Fallujah, Washington itself will be a target."
Ellie
January 15, 2007
"Because the language they use is killing:"
An Interview with a Fallujan Police Officer
Posted by Bill
Jawa Report, TX
The difficulty of obtaining this interview underscores the political and cultural complexities of the American effort in Fallujah. In order to get a few minutes of alone candor with an Iraqi patrolman, the Marines had to coordinate a task that excused his visit to the American wing of the station. Some Iraqi policeman - typically the ones who are in positions to work most closely with the Marines and civilian advisors - like the Americans, some tolerate the Americans, some dislike the Americans, and it's widely believed that a few actually (at least passively) work with insurgents. Paradoxically in most cases, the majority want Americans to leave, but not yet.
Two reasons: American firepower in and around Fallujah keeps the lid on chaos that waits to engulf the city, and the young Fallujan government still views itself as dependent on the Marines for everything from fuel to equipment to administrative savvy. One of the most frustrating tasks for the Police Transition Team is to wean locals off of this culture of dependency, a process reliant on them learning to work with and trust their central government, as well as do for themselves.
But Fallujans are remarkably insular; their local culture is famously mistrustful. A visitor from Ramadi or Baghdad is considered a foreigner. A Marine intelligence officer remarked to me that the first things Fallujans rebuilt after Operation al-Fajr were the gated walls surrounding their own houses. Another revealing anecdote was supplied by a Marine who cited a Western travel guide to Iraq circa the 1940's: it advised tourists in the region to steer clear of Fallujah, condemning the city as a notorious den of xenophobic smugglers and thieves.
Add decades of war and fealty to a Stalinist yet locally benevolent government to the mix, and you've got a difficult cultural stew of suspicion and missing initiative. Fallujans are proud and many are brave, but a number lack much will beyond the desire to personally prosper or just survive.
Broaching American politics for a moment: a simplistic left-wing interpretation might conclude that Americans are despised occupiers who need to leave Fallujans in peace, while a simplistic right-wing or populist interpretation relies on applying something like the golden rule to a multi-layered political situation: the idea that if Americans are there to help, Fallujans should simply go along and be grateful. The reality of the situation - and any successful expression of both Fallujan and American interest - is so much more complex than either of these views.
"Mohammed" is a young Iraqi with bright eyes and gentle demeanor. He immediately asked me for things: food, a soda and, at the conclusion of the interview, some shampoo. I was surprised by three aspects of his answers to my questions: his seeming openness, his intelligence sans education, and his political opinions about the nature of the insurgency. I can't read minds, but his presentation seemed sincere. I also felt great sympathy for the man. It certainly wasn't empathy, as I can barely fathom what it must be like to live his life.
INDC: Why did you decide to join the police?
Mohammed: "Just to survive, because you can't make money anywhere else."
INDC: Is the pay good for you?
Mohammed: "Yes. Even I got hit before, I got shot. And that's (also) why I really hate those guys (the insurgents) and I came back to the police force again."
INDC: Where were you shot?
Mohammed: "Nearby the (a specific location in Fallujah). Actually Americans died and I got hurt."
INDC: And where were you shot on your body?
Mohammed: "In my hand and (motions to his side). It was a PKC ... and it was a Syrian guy who shot us."
INDC: How long did it take to recover?
Mohammed: "Two months. And I wished I were dead because it was so painful." (He smiled)
INDC: You mentioned that you hate the insurgents, is that just more now because you've been shot or did you have a different opinion of them before?
Mohammed: "They hit me and they also killed some of my family. Actually they killed my uncle who used to be an Iraqi Army soldier, and they killed him and burned his face. And then they actually started threatening us as well."
INDC: They burned his face?
Mohammed: "Yes. It's a substance called "tizar," it's like, acid. They put it in his face."
INDC: He was alive when they did this?
Mohammed: "Yes, he was alive. They burned him and stabbed him so many times, and also they shot him with bullets. And we found a note on him saying, 'The police and the army and the Americans are all the same.'
INDC: So they killed him because he was in the Iraqi Army?
Mohammed: "Yes. But we didn't tell any of these guys (the Iraqi police) around here (at the time) because they hated the Army as well."
INDC: So why do police hate the army?
Mohammed: "I think because the army actually liberated Fallujah, they work well, and they liberated Fallujah. And some of (the police) actually like (or liked) the insurgents."
"And the other thing would be because they are different (sects of Islam). But after the operations we started doing together, now we became like one and the same, we became like brothers."
INDC: The Iraqi police and the Iraqi Army?
Mohammed: "Yes. Now we became like brothers."
INDC: So how does the police work with the Iraqi Army when some of the police hate the IA's?
Mohammed: "Some bad guys used to be part of the police, but now they quit and ran to Syria. And actually in the JCC (American control room) they know (who) most of them (are)."
The rift between the IP's and IA's that Mohammed describes is accurate, as is the recent, though potentially transitory accord. After a recent set of operations where the Marines encouraged the police and army to work together, the Americans were surprised to find Shia IA's and Sunni IP's joking around with each other and hugging after a successful raid. As Gunnery Sergeant Jason Lawson put it, they were showing off captured insurgents "like kids comparing Halloween candy." Whether this amity will last is anyone's guess.
INDC: So who are the insurgents? Who are the people who are fighting stability? Are they locals?
Mohammed: "(Yes), almost all of them."
INDC: So why are local Fallujans fighting other Fallujans?
Mohammed: "Because the al Qaeda organization came to this city and controlled it so hard by killing. And some people here actually like killing and they liked Saddam Hussein as well, and I think the al Qaeda organization and Saddam Hussein are the same face."
INDC: What do you mean by "the same face," because Saddam was secular, he was not religious and al Qaeda is ...
Mohammed: "Because the language they use is killing. And the same people who used to be with Saddam, now they participate with the insurgency."
INDC: So their motivation for killing is what?
Mohammed: "Money and to be famous. And I think the first reason is to fight the American troops. They say, 'we can start from here and cross all the way to America to fight them.'"
INDC: What would happen if America left Iraq and Fallujah right now? What would happen?
Mohammed: "It's going to be a disaster."
INDC: How so?
Mohammed: "There will be revenge from everybody. And now they are trying to (form the) Islamic Emirate right here."
INDC: What do you think can be done to stop the insurgents?
Mohammed: "By fighting them back and killing them. Or reporting them to the troops."
INDC: But if the Iraqi police isn't doing patrolling, and the Iraqi Army isn't trusted, and the Americans won't be here forever, who is going to do the killing?
Mohammed: "What do you mean about 'no trust for the Iraqi Army?'"
INDC: Well, I've been told that the locals don't trust the IA's because they are from Baghdad and they are mostly Shia.
Mohammed: "No, no, no. Most people they actually hate the Mujahedeen. But they are scared, they're scared, they don't have power in their hands."
INDC: So how do they feel about the Iraqi Army?
Mohammed: "Most of the educated people actually like the Iraqi Army. But two displacements (two major evacuations and upheavals) have happened here in Fallujah, and if another one happens, everybody will die."
INDC: Tell me about the history of the Iraqi police, they've been sort of up and down, they've gone from zero to being massacred, to being reconstituted by the Americans ... where do you think they are now?
Mohammed: "I think only the Americans can (maintain order) with the Iraqi Army."
INDC: What about the police?
Mohammed: "I don't think they can, because they are easy targets. Most of the police get attacked at home and killed."
INDC: Right. Whereas the Iraqi Army and the Americans live in barracks and bases, and their families are elsewhere.
Mohammed: "Yes."
He then told me that a secret war is going on in Fallujah. That citizens, fed up with the insurgency, are tracking down insurgents and killing them. These vigilantes then blame the killing on other insurgent groups, to try and get the splintered mass of terrorists to start killing each other.
Mohammed: "Actually now the mujahadeen and the al Qaeda organizations are fighting each other. Hopefully that will ease things on the police and the Americans."
INDC: What about the tribes? Where are they in all of this?
Mohammed: "Only in Ramadi the tribes are fighting the insurgents. Here in Fallujah some actually support the insurgents because they are scared."
A day earlier, an American soldier told me that the tribes has just, within the past week, declared themselves neutral, intending to let the insurgents fight each other, the Iraqi Army, the police and the Americans. Previously they had been passively or actively working with insurgents or playing both sides of the fence.
INDC: What are your personal plans for the next few years? What do you see yourself doing?
Mohammed: "I think if the situation keeps going the same way, (with vigilantes) killing the insurgents the same way, it (the insurgency) will finish."
"Not to mention the operation that took place yesterday, by the Iraqi Army and the police (Special Missions Group). It actually shook (the insurgents) so much. If we do another 5 or so, I think we'll finish them."
INDC: How many insurgents do you think are operating in Fallujah?
Mohammed: "A little more than 500. Maybe more than that."
"Actually I need to go, because I don't want to stay a long time."
INDC: Ok. One last, quick question: what do you think of Americans, and has that opinion changed over time?
Mohammed: "I think we need the Americans. If they go out right now it's gonna be a disaster. And believe me, even if they get out of Fallujah, Washington itself will be a target."
Ellie