thedrifter
02-06-03, 10:02 AM
February 5, 2003
By Tom Knowlton
The U.S. and British forces deployed to the Persian Gulf to liberate the Iraqi people from the yoke of Saddam Hussein's regime are poised to unleash the most lethal air and missile attack ever witnessed by mankind. Pentagon reports expect allied air power to launch in excess of 1,500 sorties per day, augmented by missile strikes launched from a formidable American armada.
There is little question that much of the demoralized Iraqi military will crumble beneath the onslaught before the first American troops land to combat the remnants of Saddam's fanatical loyalists. Among both supporters and protestors of the war, there is little doubt that American and allied military forces will succeed in defeating and toppling Saddam's regime.
However, the Bush administration needs to be watchful that the achievements of a military victory are not washed away by the pitfalls of a poorly planned occupation.
We need only to look to then-Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon's 1982 invasion of Lebanon, Operation Big Pines, to see what dangers lay before us.
Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin had intended for the invasion to crush the military power of the Lebanon-based Palestine Liberation Organization, to save the Lebanese Christian community from genocide at the hands of Lebanese Muslims, and to install a pro-Israeli government.
While the Israeli Defense Force succeeded in militarily devastating the PLO, and paving the way for Bashir Gemayel, a Maronite Christian, to ascend to the presidency (though he would be assassinated before actually assuming the office), the Israeli occupation was an unqualified disaster.
The government of Bashir Gemayel and his brother Amin, who won the presidency after Bashir's assassination in 1983, proved not to be as pro-Israeli as Begin had envisioned. The lack of a capable Lebanese Army to maintain order contributed to the deteriorating situation that eventually pitted the IDF against not only the PLO but also the Syrian and warring factions of Muslims and Christians.
Moreover, the vengeful massacre of over a thousand Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in 1983 by soldiers of the Lebanese Forces (the Christian militia aligned with the Gemayels) significantly damaged the West's view of the Israeli occupation and undermined public support within Israel itself, turning the occupation into a political quagmire.
Similarly, there are already signs that some of the Iraqi opposition forces may not be as pro-American as we may wish to believe. As I discussed in a DefenseWatch article on Dec. 24, 2002 ("Our Enemy's Enemy May End Up As- Our Enemy"), the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), an Iranian-backed organization that represents Iraq's Shiite Muslim majority, has expressed strongly anti-Western sentiments. On Jan 15, 2003, Hamid al-Bayati, the London-based representative for SCIRI, stated during an interview with the Islamic news network Al-Jazeera, "We do not consider it necessary to have discussions with U.S. officials" and, "We do not accept any country interfering in or imposing anything on the Iraqi opposition."
Moreover, the death and destruction inflicted upon the Iraqi people and infrastructure will likely be considerable, even using today's advanced high-precision smart bombs. The loss of civilian life during what will be viewed by the Arab world as an "invasion" will become the rally cry of Islamic terrorist recruiters throughout the Middle East and anti-war protestors in the West.
Should the toppling of Saddam's regime result in massacres of the formerly ruling Sunni Muslims by Shiite Muslims, the damage to the foreign policy goals of the United States and to the morale of the American liberation forces will be significant.
The best chance for a transition to a stable, post-Saddam government will be to leave as much of the infrastructure and regular Iraqi Army of conscripts in tact as possible.
The ongoing work of American PSYOPS units and intelligence specialists has created serious morale and loyalty issues within the Iraqi military. It is believed that few in the regular army and to a lesser degree, Republican Guard, cherish the thought of a fight to the bitter end.
Air Force Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told reporters on Jan 22, 2003, that although "The regime has taken measures to enforce loyalty extra measures by populating some of the major [military] units with people they consider loyal," there are "some indications about unrest in some of the Iraqi leadership."
While some within the Iraqi leadership may be planning to desert, surrender or even join the liberation forces, their efforts may be substantively hampered by the devastating air and missile attacks in the opening hours of the war.
The United States needs to create a catalyst for elements of the Iraqi military to abandon or turn upon Saddam prior to a U.S strike. The best opportunity to create such a catalyst would be a pre-emptive strike upon Ansar al-Islam, the al Qaeda-aligned army operating within Kurdish-controlled territory in Northern Iraq.
Al Qaeda operative Abu Zubair Shami organized Ansar al-Islam, which translated means Supporters of Islam, in the weeks leading up to the 9/11 attacks. Osama bin Laden is believed to have sent Shamir to Iraq's Sharazoor Plains to unite Kurdish Islamic insurgents under a single operational command and create a major staging ground for al Qaeda operations in the Northern Iraqi village of Beyara.
Kurdish intelligence estimates believe that the initial 650 Kurdish insurgents have been augmented by as many as 1,500 al Qaeda terrorists who were forced to flee from their havens in Afghanistan. According to a December 2002 statement by the Jordanian authorities, Abu Mussab al-Zaqawi, the senior al Qaeda lieutenant who ordered the assassination of U.S. Agency for International Development officer Laurence Foley in Amman, has also sought refuge with Ansar al-Islam.
Ansar al-Islam operates primarily in the Bardashan and Shinrawi mountain regions in northeastern Iraq along the border with Iran, an area loosely governed by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The Islamic insurgents have succeeded in setting up a harsh Taliban-style regime in the villages under their control
Western intelligence sources have accumulated significant evidence of cooperation between Ansar al-Islam and Saddam's regime. U.S. reconnaissance units have witnessed elements of the Iraqi Republican Guard meeting with Ansar al-Islam on at least two occasions, and Kurdish officials have evidence that the Iraqi secret service, Mukhabarat, has smuggled weapons and materials to the group.
Kurdish militant Najmuddin Faraj Ahmad led Ansar al-Islam until his arrest in the Netherlands in September 2002. Mullah Mohammad Hasan has since assumed command of the terrorist organization and indicated that the group will present a significant threat to U.S. and allied forces in the event of an invasion of Iraq.
In a January 2003 interview with Turkish reporter Namik Durukan, Hasan stated, "If America invades Iraq, we will attack its troops." It is a threat that the Bush administration should not take lightly. Ansar al-Islam's stockpile of ricin, cyanide gas and aflatoxin could pose a significant threat to U.S. and allied forces in northern Iraq.
The Islamic militants are well equipped with heavy machine guns, mortars and RPGs. PUK military forces have been engaged in sporadically heavy fighting with the terrorist organization since September 2001, including a devastating attack on PUK positions during Ramadan on the eve of Eid al-Fitr in December 2002, which left over 100 PUK soldiers dead. .
Captured Islamic militants have revealed that the Arab fighters that have joined them from Afghanistan have dubbed their mountainous military stronghold "little Tora Bora." U.S. intelligence sources believe the mountain stronghold to be vulnerable to air strikes.
The Kurdish government has already officially requested American assistance in combating Ansar al-Islam, and inflicting a devastating series of air and missile strikes against Ansar al-Islam positions would be highly beneficial to the U.S. position in Iraq.
First, and most importantly, a substantive attack against Ansar al-Islam would eliminate a deadly threat operating potentially behind friendly lines in northern Iraq - a threat made all the more deadly by the presence of chemical weapons.
Second, a massive bombardment of Ansar al-Islam positions would likely be mistaken by Iraqi troops as the initiation of a U.S. offensive, and set in motion any elements who are likely to defect or surrender.
Among the Iraqi military units who would be able to view the attack on the northern border is the Iraqi Army's II Corps. Several times in recent years officers from II Corps divisions have been executed for planning to rebel or defect. However, there have not been a sizable number of Tikriti officers placed in II Corps, thus it represents the segment of the military most likely to surrender in the opening days of the conflict.
Visual reports of the attack from II Corps as well as reports of American warplanes and missiles streaming over Iraq should quickly spread through the Iraqi ranks and act as a catalyst for units hoping to defect once hostilities began, as Saddam would be less likely to move against them.
continued...
By Tom Knowlton
The U.S. and British forces deployed to the Persian Gulf to liberate the Iraqi people from the yoke of Saddam Hussein's regime are poised to unleash the most lethal air and missile attack ever witnessed by mankind. Pentagon reports expect allied air power to launch in excess of 1,500 sorties per day, augmented by missile strikes launched from a formidable American armada.
There is little question that much of the demoralized Iraqi military will crumble beneath the onslaught before the first American troops land to combat the remnants of Saddam's fanatical loyalists. Among both supporters and protestors of the war, there is little doubt that American and allied military forces will succeed in defeating and toppling Saddam's regime.
However, the Bush administration needs to be watchful that the achievements of a military victory are not washed away by the pitfalls of a poorly planned occupation.
We need only to look to then-Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon's 1982 invasion of Lebanon, Operation Big Pines, to see what dangers lay before us.
Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin had intended for the invasion to crush the military power of the Lebanon-based Palestine Liberation Organization, to save the Lebanese Christian community from genocide at the hands of Lebanese Muslims, and to install a pro-Israeli government.
While the Israeli Defense Force succeeded in militarily devastating the PLO, and paving the way for Bashir Gemayel, a Maronite Christian, to ascend to the presidency (though he would be assassinated before actually assuming the office), the Israeli occupation was an unqualified disaster.
The government of Bashir Gemayel and his brother Amin, who won the presidency after Bashir's assassination in 1983, proved not to be as pro-Israeli as Begin had envisioned. The lack of a capable Lebanese Army to maintain order contributed to the deteriorating situation that eventually pitted the IDF against not only the PLO but also the Syrian and warring factions of Muslims and Christians.
Moreover, the vengeful massacre of over a thousand Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in 1983 by soldiers of the Lebanese Forces (the Christian militia aligned with the Gemayels) significantly damaged the West's view of the Israeli occupation and undermined public support within Israel itself, turning the occupation into a political quagmire.
Similarly, there are already signs that some of the Iraqi opposition forces may not be as pro-American as we may wish to believe. As I discussed in a DefenseWatch article on Dec. 24, 2002 ("Our Enemy's Enemy May End Up As- Our Enemy"), the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), an Iranian-backed organization that represents Iraq's Shiite Muslim majority, has expressed strongly anti-Western sentiments. On Jan 15, 2003, Hamid al-Bayati, the London-based representative for SCIRI, stated during an interview with the Islamic news network Al-Jazeera, "We do not consider it necessary to have discussions with U.S. officials" and, "We do not accept any country interfering in or imposing anything on the Iraqi opposition."
Moreover, the death and destruction inflicted upon the Iraqi people and infrastructure will likely be considerable, even using today's advanced high-precision smart bombs. The loss of civilian life during what will be viewed by the Arab world as an "invasion" will become the rally cry of Islamic terrorist recruiters throughout the Middle East and anti-war protestors in the West.
Should the toppling of Saddam's regime result in massacres of the formerly ruling Sunni Muslims by Shiite Muslims, the damage to the foreign policy goals of the United States and to the morale of the American liberation forces will be significant.
The best chance for a transition to a stable, post-Saddam government will be to leave as much of the infrastructure and regular Iraqi Army of conscripts in tact as possible.
The ongoing work of American PSYOPS units and intelligence specialists has created serious morale and loyalty issues within the Iraqi military. It is believed that few in the regular army and to a lesser degree, Republican Guard, cherish the thought of a fight to the bitter end.
Air Force Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told reporters on Jan 22, 2003, that although "The regime has taken measures to enforce loyalty extra measures by populating some of the major [military] units with people they consider loyal," there are "some indications about unrest in some of the Iraqi leadership."
While some within the Iraqi leadership may be planning to desert, surrender or even join the liberation forces, their efforts may be substantively hampered by the devastating air and missile attacks in the opening hours of the war.
The United States needs to create a catalyst for elements of the Iraqi military to abandon or turn upon Saddam prior to a U.S strike. The best opportunity to create such a catalyst would be a pre-emptive strike upon Ansar al-Islam, the al Qaeda-aligned army operating within Kurdish-controlled territory in Northern Iraq.
Al Qaeda operative Abu Zubair Shami organized Ansar al-Islam, which translated means Supporters of Islam, in the weeks leading up to the 9/11 attacks. Osama bin Laden is believed to have sent Shamir to Iraq's Sharazoor Plains to unite Kurdish Islamic insurgents under a single operational command and create a major staging ground for al Qaeda operations in the Northern Iraqi village of Beyara.
Kurdish intelligence estimates believe that the initial 650 Kurdish insurgents have been augmented by as many as 1,500 al Qaeda terrorists who were forced to flee from their havens in Afghanistan. According to a December 2002 statement by the Jordanian authorities, Abu Mussab al-Zaqawi, the senior al Qaeda lieutenant who ordered the assassination of U.S. Agency for International Development officer Laurence Foley in Amman, has also sought refuge with Ansar al-Islam.
Ansar al-Islam operates primarily in the Bardashan and Shinrawi mountain regions in northeastern Iraq along the border with Iran, an area loosely governed by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The Islamic insurgents have succeeded in setting up a harsh Taliban-style regime in the villages under their control
Western intelligence sources have accumulated significant evidence of cooperation between Ansar al-Islam and Saddam's regime. U.S. reconnaissance units have witnessed elements of the Iraqi Republican Guard meeting with Ansar al-Islam on at least two occasions, and Kurdish officials have evidence that the Iraqi secret service, Mukhabarat, has smuggled weapons and materials to the group.
Kurdish militant Najmuddin Faraj Ahmad led Ansar al-Islam until his arrest in the Netherlands in September 2002. Mullah Mohammad Hasan has since assumed command of the terrorist organization and indicated that the group will present a significant threat to U.S. and allied forces in the event of an invasion of Iraq.
In a January 2003 interview with Turkish reporter Namik Durukan, Hasan stated, "If America invades Iraq, we will attack its troops." It is a threat that the Bush administration should not take lightly. Ansar al-Islam's stockpile of ricin, cyanide gas and aflatoxin could pose a significant threat to U.S. and allied forces in northern Iraq.
The Islamic militants are well equipped with heavy machine guns, mortars and RPGs. PUK military forces have been engaged in sporadically heavy fighting with the terrorist organization since September 2001, including a devastating attack on PUK positions during Ramadan on the eve of Eid al-Fitr in December 2002, which left over 100 PUK soldiers dead. .
Captured Islamic militants have revealed that the Arab fighters that have joined them from Afghanistan have dubbed their mountainous military stronghold "little Tora Bora." U.S. intelligence sources believe the mountain stronghold to be vulnerable to air strikes.
The Kurdish government has already officially requested American assistance in combating Ansar al-Islam, and inflicting a devastating series of air and missile strikes against Ansar al-Islam positions would be highly beneficial to the U.S. position in Iraq.
First, and most importantly, a substantive attack against Ansar al-Islam would eliminate a deadly threat operating potentially behind friendly lines in northern Iraq - a threat made all the more deadly by the presence of chemical weapons.
Second, a massive bombardment of Ansar al-Islam positions would likely be mistaken by Iraqi troops as the initiation of a U.S. offensive, and set in motion any elements who are likely to defect or surrender.
Among the Iraqi military units who would be able to view the attack on the northern border is the Iraqi Army's II Corps. Several times in recent years officers from II Corps divisions have been executed for planning to rebel or defect. However, there have not been a sizable number of Tikriti officers placed in II Corps, thus it represents the segment of the military most likely to surrender in the opening days of the conflict.
Visual reports of the attack from II Corps as well as reports of American warplanes and missiles streaming over Iraq should quickly spread through the Iraqi ranks and act as a catalyst for units hoping to defect once hostilities began, as Saddam would be less likely to move against them.
continued...