thedrifter
01-13-07, 02:31 PM
Jonathan Gurwitz: Victory hinges on strategy change, not a 'surge'
Web Posted: 01/13/2007 12:00 PM CST
San Antonio Express-News
A surge of 12,000 U.S. and Iraqi troops in Baghdad last summer failed to stem the tide of sectarian violence. It's difficult to understand how the escalation of another 21,500, without a fundamental shift in strategy, will turn the security key today.
No one should understand this better than Lt. Gen. David Petraeus. As co-author of the Army's brilliant new counterinsurgency field manual, he endorsed the principle that 20 counterinsurgents per 1,000 residents is "the minimum troop density required for effective COIN operations
To pacify Baghdad, therefore, would require at least 120,000 American and Iraqi combat troops. There are 70,000 U.S. combat personnel in Iraq, only a fraction of which are deployed in Baghdad. Figuring effective Iraqi combat strength is a numbers game. A U.S. government report to the U.N. Security Council last month cited 91 battalions that "have the security lead in their areas of operation."
At 600 trigger-pullers per battalion, that means there are barely enough battle-ready forces in all of Iraq to provide minimal security in Baghdad alone. Unless the new Bush plan envisions abandoning the rest of the country, the slow buildup of soldiers and Marines can't be expected to have a significant impact in Iraq.
Outside Iraq, it could have a profound impact. Missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans, Somalia and elsewhere have placed a strategic strain on the U.S. military. Even before the escalation, current global deployments have dangerously weakened the ability of the United States to respond to any new military contingencies.
Beyond the strategic considerations are the human ones. Extending the tours of Reserve units that have already been mobilized for 24 months and have already served in Iraq is unconscionable. So is ordering active duty combat units that have already seen two or more tours back to Iraq.
Even if we had a larger capability, it's not clear that it would be prudent to use it. "By midtour," says the counterinsurgency manual, "U.S. forces should be working closely with local forces, training or supporting them and building an indigenous security capability."
Four years would seem to put us past midtour. Shouldering the security burden in Iraq beyond that has the deleterious effects of removing responsibility from the Iraqi leadership and eliminating the only real lever the United States has on the dynamics in Iraq.
Arab Sunnis must know that if the United States withdraws prematurely, their minority community will face unrestrained violence. The divided Shiite majority must know that in response to such bloodshed, their country will become the battleground for a historic sectarian struggle. And Iraq's neighbors must know that in the absence of U.S. targets, their proxy war in Iraq will become a full-fledged regional war.
The primary impediment to a clear understanding of the consequences of American withdrawal and the primary disincentive for political and diplomatic cooperation is an open-ended U.S. military commitment.
The counterinsurgency manual stresses this from a historical point. From the Vietnam War, it identifies the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support program — a joint civil-military program with the South Vietnamese government — and an accelerated pacification program by the South Vietnamese military as model efforts. "The U.S. military contribution to pacification" the manual notes, "consisted of thousands of advisors."
That's what the United States should be doing in Iraq, embedding U.S. units in Iraqi battalions to bolster their effectiveness, increasing the American advisory role, expanding civilian reconstruction and decreasing the American combat role. In the end, only Iraqis will be able to secure their country.
The Marines have already employed this strategy on a limited basis with great success. Iraqification of the conflict makes far more sense than only putting enough additional American combat troops into Iraq to raise the casualty rate but not enough to alter the circumstances on the ground.
jgurwitz@express-news.net
Web Posted: 01/13/2007 12:00 PM CST
San Antonio Express-News
A surge of 12,000 U.S. and Iraqi troops in Baghdad last summer failed to stem the tide of sectarian violence. It's difficult to understand how the escalation of another 21,500, without a fundamental shift in strategy, will turn the security key today.
No one should understand this better than Lt. Gen. David Petraeus. As co-author of the Army's brilliant new counterinsurgency field manual, he endorsed the principle that 20 counterinsurgents per 1,000 residents is "the minimum troop density required for effective COIN operations
To pacify Baghdad, therefore, would require at least 120,000 American and Iraqi combat troops. There are 70,000 U.S. combat personnel in Iraq, only a fraction of which are deployed in Baghdad. Figuring effective Iraqi combat strength is a numbers game. A U.S. government report to the U.N. Security Council last month cited 91 battalions that "have the security lead in their areas of operation."
At 600 trigger-pullers per battalion, that means there are barely enough battle-ready forces in all of Iraq to provide minimal security in Baghdad alone. Unless the new Bush plan envisions abandoning the rest of the country, the slow buildup of soldiers and Marines can't be expected to have a significant impact in Iraq.
Outside Iraq, it could have a profound impact. Missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans, Somalia and elsewhere have placed a strategic strain on the U.S. military. Even before the escalation, current global deployments have dangerously weakened the ability of the United States to respond to any new military contingencies.
Beyond the strategic considerations are the human ones. Extending the tours of Reserve units that have already been mobilized for 24 months and have already served in Iraq is unconscionable. So is ordering active duty combat units that have already seen two or more tours back to Iraq.
Even if we had a larger capability, it's not clear that it would be prudent to use it. "By midtour," says the counterinsurgency manual, "U.S. forces should be working closely with local forces, training or supporting them and building an indigenous security capability."
Four years would seem to put us past midtour. Shouldering the security burden in Iraq beyond that has the deleterious effects of removing responsibility from the Iraqi leadership and eliminating the only real lever the United States has on the dynamics in Iraq.
Arab Sunnis must know that if the United States withdraws prematurely, their minority community will face unrestrained violence. The divided Shiite majority must know that in response to such bloodshed, their country will become the battleground for a historic sectarian struggle. And Iraq's neighbors must know that in the absence of U.S. targets, their proxy war in Iraq will become a full-fledged regional war.
The primary impediment to a clear understanding of the consequences of American withdrawal and the primary disincentive for political and diplomatic cooperation is an open-ended U.S. military commitment.
The counterinsurgency manual stresses this from a historical point. From the Vietnam War, it identifies the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support program — a joint civil-military program with the South Vietnamese government — and an accelerated pacification program by the South Vietnamese military as model efforts. "The U.S. military contribution to pacification" the manual notes, "consisted of thousands of advisors."
That's what the United States should be doing in Iraq, embedding U.S. units in Iraqi battalions to bolster their effectiveness, increasing the American advisory role, expanding civilian reconstruction and decreasing the American combat role. In the end, only Iraqis will be able to secure their country.
The Marines have already employed this strategy on a limited basis with great success. Iraqification of the conflict makes far more sense than only putting enough additional American combat troops into Iraq to raise the casualty rate but not enough to alter the circumstances on the ground.
jgurwitz@express-news.net