PDA

View Full Version : Pace Supports 'Surge' to Iraq



thedrifter
01-13-07, 07:33 AM
Pace Supports 'Surge' to Iraq
American Forces Press Service | January 12, 2007

WASHINGTON – President Bush's plan to send additional forces to Iraq and to increase the military end strength sends an important message to the troops, the defense secretary and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff told the Senate Armed Services Committee today.

U.S. military commanders on the ground asked for and support the plan to send more than 20,000 additional troops to Iraq to help stabilize the country, Marine Gen. Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told committee members.

"(Our commanders) have asked for additional forces and are happy to have additional forces in the pipeline," he said. These additional troops will give them the flexibility they need to "to reinforce success" already made or respond to unexpected increases in enemy action, he said. If conditions on the ground demonstrate the troop surge isn't needed, the pipeline "can be turned off," Pace said.

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates told committee members his recommendation to boost the active-duty Army by 65,000 soldiers and the active-duty Marine Corps by 27,000 Marines over the next five years will go a long way toward increasing their combat capability.

At the same time, the secretary said, it will help reduce stress on the force and help pave the way for more predictable deployment cycles. The rotation goal for the active force is one-year deployments followed by two years at home station, he said.

For the reserves and Guard, it is one-year deployments followed by five years at home, but Gates said that may not be possible across the board as quickly as he'd like. "Today's global demands will require a number of selected Guard and reserve units to be remobilized sooner than this standard," he told the committee today. "Our intention is that such exceptions will be temporary."

Even when a 547,000-soldier active-duty Army and 202,000-member active-duty Marine Corps is put into place, getting those new troops trained and ready for deployment won't happen right away, Gates acknowledged. But he said getting this effort started will offer reassurance to troops serving today.

"While it may take some time for these troops to become available for deployment, it is important for our men and women in uniform to know that additional manpower and resources are on the way," he said.

Pace praised the soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines who have endured frequent deployments and long family separations to wage the global war on terror. "(These troops) continue to perform magnificently and do everything we have asked them to do," he said.

The chairman extended his appreciation to military family members who he said also are sacrificing for the country. "The addition of troops, the extension of troops, all impact families, and we deeply appreciate what they do on the home front to provide support to the security of this nation," he said.

thedrifter
01-13-07, 08:32 AM
Opening Statements at House Armed Services Committee Hearing on Iraq
CQ Transcripts Wire
Thursday, January 11, 2007; 5:26 PM

JANUARY 11, 2007

REP. IKE SKELTON, D-MO. CHARIMAN: Ladies and gentlemen, the hearing will come to order.

This is the opening hearing of the Committee on Armed Services for the 110th Congress. And it's a pleasure to see my returning colleagues as well as the new faces.

And I'll have to admit it's a pleasure to receive the gavel. And I especially appreciate the gentleman from California presenting the gavel to me at our organizational gathering just a couple of days ago, and will do my best to use it, Mr. Hunter, as fairly as I possibly can. I appreciate your courtesy in doing so.

So, welcome.

The purpose of today's hearing is to discuss the president's proposal of a way forward in Iraq. Testifying to that proposal and ready to answer questions, of course, we have our newly appointed secretary of defense, Robert Gates, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace.

Secretary Gates has had a long and distinguished government career, culminating in his years as director of Central Intelligence Agency from 1991 to 1993.

And we are blessed to have you, Mr. Secretary. And thank you for making this your very first hearing in the Congress of the United States.

General Pace, of course, is an old pro to this room. United States Marine Corps and leader of our joint forces.

As always, General Pace, we count on you for your candor, your good judgment in performing our constitutional responsibility for oversight, as well as your duty under the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which was passed in 1986, which you perform admirably. And we wish to thank you for that.

Now, I understand, General Pace, you don't have prepared testimony today, as per we have discussed earlier.

I notice, if I may, on page five, Mr. Secretary, of your written testimony, you're going to turn to General Pace to provide the summary of the military elements of the president's plan. That, of course, is a critical piece of what the president laid out last evening, and our committee is given the responsibility for oversight in that area.

Our understanding and arrangement with you and General Pace was that the only formal testimony that would be presented would be by you, Mr. Secretary, and the general would be available for questions during our time for interrogation.

SKELTON: We, of course, had to waive Committee Rule 13, by virtue of the fact that the president didn't speak until last night, which requires witnesses to submit their testimony not less than 48 hours before a hearing.

And in further the part that you will turn to General Pace for was not included in your statement or a proposed statement by him. And I'm sure it was a matter of miscommunication, but I did wish to bring that to the members' attention, because I undoubtedly will receive inquiry on that.

But so we know, General Pace, when the secretary does turn to you, we will accept your testimony as you had planned, despite the fact that it is not laid out.

But hopefully you, Mr. Secretary, could provide us a summary at the end of the hearing so we could extend your remarks formally.

Now, I suspect this hearing may be marked by a bit of pessimism and a number of hard questions. So let me, Mr. Secretary, start on a positive note.

I was very pleased to hear the president embrace a substantial and permanent increase in the size of our ground forces, the Army and the Marines.

This committee began receiving testimony to that effect in 1995, when then-Army Lieutenant General Ted Stroup testified we needed 40,000 more troops.

And sometimes I've felt, and my colleagues may agree, like a broken record ever since. Every time I had a chance to say, "We need more Army troops, more Marines," I said it. And I'm delighted to have the president and you, Mr. Secretary, chiming in this chorus.

And our soldiers, in particular, I feel are worn out. This increase is a smart policy. I'm more than pleased to say better late than never.

History lesson: 1942, the War Department began planning for the administration of what would become the occupied areas of Europe. These plans progressed to the point of where 1943, General George Marshall selected Major General John Hildring to prepare plans for the civil affairs administrators and military governors in those occupied areas of Europe.

SKELTON: General Marshall told him that the Army didn't want the job, but they were going to do it properly. And they did it.

Compare that to our situation today. After a remarkable drive into Baghdad in April 2003, our troops found themselves asking each other, "Well, what now?"

It was a good question. There was no plan issued to them.

Such plans existed. General Zinni had one when he was the Central Command commander. The State Department had their Future of Iraq Project. We were told that some commanders subordinate to General Franks began planning on their own accord, but those plans never made it into the hands of our troops.

Now, while I could run you through the efforts of retired Lieutenant General Jay Garner and the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, his successor, Ambassador Paul Bremer, and the Coalition Provisional Authority, and what's happened since the transition of sovereignty to the Iraqi people, I will spare you the litany of errors. There are detailed histories available for that, in Tom Ricks' book "Fiasco," as well as in the book entitled "Cobra II."

In any case, the proof, as they say, is in the pudding, and we've got a mess on our hands in Iraq.

The time for a so-called surge in troop numbers was back in 2003; as General Eric Shinseki said, several hundred thousand troops, with a coordinated political and economic plan for postwar reconstruction. Sadly, here we are, three and a half years too late, and several hundred thousand troops short.

Time has passed, and time has not been kind to the situation on the ground. Attacks and casualties are at an all-time high. And while there is a democratically elected government, it's not clear to all that Prime Minister Maliki has either the ability or the will to control the violence or broker a compromise among the competing sectarian and religious groups.

There is no silver bullet.

But I remain convinced that we must send a signal to the Iraqis that they must take a much greater responsibility for their own security. We must do this while we rebuild the strength of our forces, which has been sapped by repeated deployments and decimated equipment.

Forty percent -- Mr. Secretary, you know this -- 40 percent of all the Army equipment is either in Iraq or Afghanistan.

SKELTON: And so much of it is not here on which to train for the future.

Now, I continue to listen to all proposals with an open mind, but only the gradual and responsible redeployment of some number of troops achieves our goals.

Will this temporary increase in troops have a well-defined mission? Will it quickly get us to a point of responsible redeployment?

We've increased our troop level in Baghdad before -- four times as I understand it -- and violence has only increased.

So with those thoughts in mind, I visited with the president earlier this week and I listened to him closely last night. And despite the president's statement, where he said, "It's clear that we need to change our strategy in Iraq," in my opinion, he did not present a new strategy. It's a change in tactics.

A new strategy would have redefined the end-state to something different and then laid out the ways and means to accomplish it. Instead, the president has offered some adjustments of our current course. But these adjustments do not represent a radical departure.

The military side of the plan might do some good in the short term if it's executed by capable commanders if the Iraqi forces in the field step up to the challenges presented them. But there are issues of sustainability, and I hope both of you will address how long this effort twill be designed to be sustaining.

But the pivotal element of this entire plan does not lie with the military plan. It's with the political will and commitment of the Iraqi leadership and of the Iraqi people. They must be ready to seize the moment, to go after the militias, to purge sectarianism from the ministries and the military's ranks, to allow the Iraqi security forces to go after the targets that they must go after.

The president says he has the confidence in the prime minister, but we need to understand how the United States will hold the Iraqis accountable, measuring their progress, and what will be done if the Iraqi government fails to deliver in its promises.

Of all my questions, Mr. Secretary, I worry -- I worry the most about our strategic risks.

Part of the committee's job is making sure that the military can meet its future missions as well as today's requirements. This requires an examination of how much strategic risk we're taking as a result of being in Iraq on a sustained basis with the troop levels we have there.

We will look at these issues. We're trying to make sure that in the worst case our military could deter or fight a potential adversary who threatens America's interests.

SKELTON: It's only by looking in our current operational demands, plans to increase those demands and determine whether those demands increase our strategic risk for meeting future challenges.

If they do, it's our obligation to take steps to reduce that risk because we must ensure that we can protect the American people and our interests today as well as in the future.

This committee must take a very serious look at these questions. Today is the first of several hearings on this subject.

Again, I appreciate your making this your very first hearing. I intend to use future hearings to pursue these issues in depth, consulting outside experts for their views. And I intend to ask the Army chief of staff and the commandant of the Marine Corps to discuss the strategic risk in both readiness and the personnel implications.

Our first step is to hear from you gentlemen, and I look forward to your testimony.

One administrative note to my members: I intend to strictly adhere to the five-minute rule at this and the other hearings.

Of course the gentleman from California who, by the way, I owe an apology to. I introduced him recently as being from San Francisco, and I publicly announced that he's from San Diego. And he and I, of course by rule, are exempt from that, but we've discussed it. We will do our best to be as brief as humanly possible.

Before I yield to my friend from California, you may have been wondering where Solomon Ortiz was for a couple of days.

Congressman Ortiz, our friend from Texas, was attending the ceremony of his son, Solomon Jr., being sworn in to the state legislature of the state of Texas.

And we're so proud for you as well as for him, Solomon.

(APPLAUSE)

I am told that he graduated from Texas A&M where, Mr. Secretary, you are late of.

Let me yield to the gentlemen who has been my friend and my partner through the years. And we thank him for his courtesy, again, publicly, for making the transition work and work smoothly.

My friend, the ranking member, Duncan Hunter from California?

REP. DUNCAN HUNTER, R-CALIF. RANKING MEMBER: Mr. Chairman, thank you.

And thanks to our guests for being with us this morning.

And, Mr. Secretary and General Pace, let me start off by joining with the chairman on his strong affirmation that we do need to increase the size of the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Army.

This committee has actually led the increase that has taken place. We have moved the end strength of the Marine Corps up from 175,000 to 180,000, and we've moved the Army end strength up from 482,000 to 512,000.

Your recommendation that's manifested in your statement, I believe would take the Army up to 547,000 and take the Marine Corps up to 202,000. We'll make available to you our analysis that the committee defense review did in the wake of the QDR in which we recommended an increase of eight Marine battalions or nine Marine battalions and eight Army brigades.

And so, I would commend that to you. Take a look at it and see if some of the analysis doesn't track with the current analysis going on in the Pentagon.

But it looks to me like the numbers aren't far apart in your recommendation and this recommendation that we did.

Gentlemen, you've already served this country effectively, and we appreciate you -- we appreciate your commitment.

Dr. Gates, thanks for taking on this extraordinarily difficult challenge.

Now, last night the president outlined a new strategy for Iraq, and he told us that in this plan, as a part of the plan, he is going to be calling up reinforcements to carry out the plan. Let me just state that I intend to support him strongly.

Four thousands of those reinforcements are going to be going to Anbar province. I've talked to the Marine leadership. They have requested those persons, that increase in Marine strength. The 17,500 are going to be utilized in other provinces, primarily Baghdad, and primarily to carry out what I refer to as the Baghdad plan.

And I think the Baghdad plan offers a bolder use of Iraqi military forces and an innovative use of American forces.

HUNTER: And I want to go, especially, to the point that I understand that the plan involves a commitment by the Iraqi government to deploy nine additional Iraqi battalions into the heart of battle within that city.

Those battalions coming from the north and south of Iraq -- coming from some of the peaceful areas that we've noted are the provinces in which some 27 Iraqi battalions have been stationed and that those nine battalions will be joining in Operation Baghdad.

I recommend going further and working with the Iraqi government to ensure that all Iraqi battalions participate at some point in what I would call "combat tours" of these hot spot or contentious areas.

As our witnesses know, I strongly believe that such redeployment will battle-harden the Iraqi units. It will also reinforce civilian control of the military.

That is, when that battalion commander gets a call from the ministry of defense to move out and he doesn't saddle up and move out, that he is then replaced with a commander that will move out.

It will also help develop the military chain of command and minimize what we're seeing now in localized militaries that have what I would call a community bias in their area of operations.

Today, I wrote a letter to the president recognizing the positive aspects of this new strategy and the particular, what I call the "Baghdad 3-1 Plan."

And please tell me during your testimony if it's other than, as I understand it through the briefings that we've had.

The "3-1 Plan" uses a combination of three Iraqi battalions and one U.S. battalion in a backup and mentoring role in each of nine security sectors in that city.

Now, I recommended to the president that if that, in fact, is the case and it works in Baghdad, that we use this plan as a blueprint for handing off security responsibilities throughout Iraq.

As I told the president, this plan leverages the Iraqi military's unique ability to operate in the urban environment; that doesn't require high-tech. It is obviously important that they have the cultural understanding and the language capability to do that, which Americans don't have. And it allows the Americans to support the operations by moving to what I would call our leverage positions of special operations, intelligence, firepower, precision strike and logistics capabilities.

The Iraqis that are in Baghdad will gain combat experience, they'll improve their military capabilities, they'll increase operational competence through these combined U.S.-Iraqi operations.

And I would see if this works in Baghdad, Mr. Secretary. I would see the opportunity to employ it throughout the country, but particularly in these contentious areas where you have three Iraqi maneuver battalions with one American backup battalion.

And after the Iraqi forces hit their stride and they're operating efficiently, the American battalion can then turn over to an Iraqi battalion, leaving essentially the security apparatus in the hands of the Iraqis.

HUNTER: I think this can serve as a template. And I would hope that you would look at it and talk to the combatant commanders in theater and see if we can't utilize it throughout the country -- understanding, of course, that we have used this partnership, this combined arms and combined forces, in a number of operations.

So let me just offer that to you. And we'll give you some backup data on this recommendation.

Let me just conclude by saying this: I think that this operation in Iraq is following the basic blueprint that we've followed in this country for 60 years, in bringing freedom to other nations, whether you're talking about Japan or the Philippines or Salvador or dozens of other nations.

That is that you stand up a free government. Number two, you stand up a military capable of protecting that free government. Number three, the Americans leave.

And, right now, we're involved in the most difficult challenge, which is standing up that military which is capable of protecting the free government.

The president has a plan. He's vetted it with his military leadership. He has requested reinforcements to Anbar and to Baghdad to make this plan work. And I think it's incumbent upon us, in light of the fact that we are engaged in combat right now, that reinforcements have been requested, that they are needed. And this 21,500-person increase takes us essentially to the same level that we were last year at this time.

I recommend strongly to my colleagues that we support the military leadership, we support the commander in chief and, Mr. Chairman, that we support the call for reinforcements.

And thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SKELTON: I thank my friend from San Diego. Did I get it right? I got it right. Thank you so much.

Secretary Gates, the floor is yours.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT M. GATES: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Hunter, members of the committee.

Let me say at the outset that it is a pleasure to appear before this committee for the first time as secretary of defense and, I might add, on the anniversary of the conclusion of my third week in the job.

The House Armed Services Committee has long been a steadfast friend and ally of our men and women in uniform, and a source of support in meeting our nation's defense goals. I thank you for that and I look forward to working with you.

Let me begin by advising you of two announcements that I made this morning. First, the president announced last night that he would strengthen our military for the long war against terrorism by authorizing an increase in the overall strength of the Army and the Marine Corps. I am recommending to him a total increase in the two services of 92,000 soldiers and Marines over the next five years: 65,000 soldiers and 27,000 Marines. The emphasis will be on increasing combat capability.

This increase will be accomplished in two ways. First, we will propose to make permanent the temporary increase of 30,000 for the Army and 5,000 for the Marine Corps. Then we propose to build up from that basis, over a five-year period, in annual increments of 7,000 troops per year for the Army, for a total of -- as Mr. Hunter said -- 547,000; and 5,000 a year for five years for the Marine Corps until they reach 202,000.

I'm aware that this committee has been leading the national debate over the proper size of the military.

GATES: And, accordingly, I hope that you will join us in supporting this important initiative.

It will take some time for these new troops to become available for deployment. But it is important that our men and women in uniform know that additional manpower and resources are on the way.

Second, for several months, the department has been assessing whether we have the right policies to govern how we manage and deploy members of the Reserves, the National Guard and our active component units.

Based on this assessment and the recommendations of our military leadership, I am prepared to make the following changes to Department of Defense policy.

First, mobilization of ground Reserve forces will be managed on a unit basis instead of an individual basis. This change will allow us to achieve greater unit cohesion and predictability in how Reserve units train and deploy.

Second, from this point forward, members of the Reserves will be involuntarily mobilized for a maximum of one year at any one time, in contrast to the current practice of 16 to 24 months.

Third, the planning objective for the Guard and Reserve units will remain one year of being mobilized, followed by five years demobilized.

However, today's global demands will require a number of selected Guard and Reserve units to be remobilized sooner than this standard. Our intention is that such exceptions will be temporary.

The goal for the active force rotation cycle remains one year deployed for every two years at home station. Today, however, most active units are receiving one year at home before deploying again.

Mobilizing select Guard and Reserve units before their five-year period is complete will allow us to move closer to relieving the stress on the total force.

Fourth, I'm directing the establishment of a new program to compensate individuals in both the active and Reserve components who are required to mobilize or deploy early or to extend beyond the established rotation policy goals.

Fifth and finally, I am directing that all commands and units review how they administer the hardship waiver program, to ensure that they are properly taking into account exceptional circumstances facing our military families of deployed servicemembers.

GATES: It is important to note that these policy changes have been under discussion for some time within the Department of Defense and would be needed regardless of the president's announcement on Iraq last night.

Finally, I'm pleased to report that all of the active branches of the United States military exceeded their recruiting goals for the month of December, with particularly strong showings by the Army and the Marine Corps.

Our nation is truly blessed that so many talented and patriotic young people have stepped forward to defend our nation, and that so many service men and women have chosen to continue to serve.

A few words on the new Iraq strategy: Last night, the president described a new way forward in Iraq, a new approach to overcoming the steep challenges facing us in that country and in that part of the world.

I know many of you have concerns about the new strategy in Iraq and in particular are skeptical of the Iraqi government's will and ability to act decisively against sectarian violence, and are skeptical, as well, about a commitment of additional American troops.

The president and his national security team have had the same concerns, as we have debated and examined our options in Iraq going forward. And yet, our commanders on the ground and the president's intended nominee as the new commander in Baghdad believe this is a sound plan, in no small part because General Casey and other senior military officers have worked closely with the Iraqi government in developing it.

Further, the president, Ambassador Khalilzad and General Casey have had prolonged and extremely candid conversations, not just with Prime Minister Maliki but with other senior leaders of the Iraqi government, and have come away persuaded that they have the will to act against all instigators of violence in Baghdad.

This is, I think, the pivot point in Iraq, as the Iraqi government insists on assuming the mantle of leadership in the effort to regain control of its own capital.

I want you to know that the timetable for the introduction of additional U.S. forces will provide ample opportunity, early on, and before many of the additional U.S. troops arrive in Iraq, to evaluate the progress of this endeavor and whether the Iraqis are fulfilling their commitments to us.

With apologies for the miscommunication, Mr. Chairman, at the end of my remarks, General Pace will summarize the military aspects of the plan.

GATES: But let me make just two points.

First, this strategy entails a strengthening across all aspects of the war effort, military and nonmilitary, including the economic, governance and political areas.

Overcoming the challenges in Iraq cannot be achieve simply by military means, no matter how large or sustained, without progress by the Iraqis in addressing the underlying issues dividing the country.

Second, we must keep in mind the consequences of an American failure in Iraq. Multiple administrations of both political parties have concluded that what happens in Southwest Asia, the Gulf region and the Middle East is of vital interest to the security and prosperity of the American people.

As I said in my confirmation hearing, developments in Iraq over the next year or two will shape the future of the Middle East and impact global geopolitics for a long time to come.

Whatever one's views of the original decision to go to war and the decisions that have brought us to this point, there seems to be broad agreement that failure in Iraq would be a calamity for our nation of lasting historical consequence.

The violence in Iraq, if unchecked, could spread outside its border and draw other states into a regional conflagration. In addition, one would see an emboldened, strengthened Iran, a safe haven and base of operations for jihadist networks in the heart of the Middle East, a humiliating defeat in the overall campaign against violence extremism worldwide, and an undermining of the credibility of the United States.

The actors in this region, both friends and adversaries, are watching closely what we do in Iraq and will draw conclusions about our resolve and the reliability of our commitments.

And should we withdraw prematurely, we could well leave chaos and the disintegration of Iraq behind us.

Further, governments in the region already are asking themselves: If the Americans withdraw in defeat from Iraq, just how much farther and from where else might we withdraw?

I would not have taken this position if I did not believe that the outcome in Iraq will have a profound and long-lived impact on our national interest. Mistakes have certainly been made by the United States in Iraq, just like in virtually every war in human history.

GATES: That is the nature of war.

But however we got to this moment, the stakes now are incalculable. Your senior professional military officers in Iraq and at Washington believe in the efficacy of the strategy outlined by the president last night. They believe it is a sound plan that can work if the Iraqi government follows through on its commitments and if the nonmilitary aspects of the strategy are implemented and sustained.

Our senior military officers have worked closely with the Iraqis to develop this plan. The impetus to add U.S. forces came initially from our commanders there. It would be a sublime yet historic irony if those who believe the views of the military professionals were neglected at the onset of the war were now to dismiss the views of the military as irrelevant or wrong.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my opening statement. And with your permission, I'll ask General Pace to say a few words about the military plan itself.

SKELTON: You bet.

General?

GENERAL PETER PACE (USMC) CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Hunter, members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to be with you. I would like to echo the secretary's thanks to all of you for your very strong, consistent, bipartisan support of all of us in the military.

Thanks, too, to you -- many of you -- who have traveled overseas to see your troops and many of you who have gone to see our troops in the hospitals. Your attention to that, your concern, makes a difference to all of us in uniform. And we thank you for that.

I'd also like to thank the incredible young men and women who serve in our armed forces. It's my honor to sit before you as their representative as they continue to amaze us all with the way that they strap on the duties that they've sworn to uphold and the way that they do it.

And especially to their families. Every decision to deploy forces impacts families. And this one will as well. Our military families serve this country as well as anyone who's ever worn the uniform, and I'd like to thank them publicly.

PACE: The military plan that's been developed has been developed jointly by General Casey and his U.S. commanders and his counterpart in the Iraq army and his commanders, and have worked it through in great detail in support of Prime Minister Maliki's initiative.

And the number one most important difference between this plan and other plans is the political environment in which it will be executed.

But to the plan itself, it calls for the appointment of an Iraqi commander of all of Baghdad -- that has been done.

The assignment of two Iraqi division commanders, one for east of the river and one for west; the selection of those commanders was done jointly by the Iraqi ground forces commander and by General Casey.

To have Baghdad divided into nine districts; each of those districts will have a Iraqi brigade in it. Those brigades and their leaders were also jointly selected by the Iraqi and American leadership.

In support of each of those Iraqi brigades will be a U.S. battalion so that in each sector, as Mr. Hunter has said, there will be several Iraqi battalions, plus a U.S. battalion.

And in each sector, there will be three or four police stations that will serve as the hub of operations from which the forces that are located there -- which will be a mixture of Iraqi army, Iraqi national police, Iraqi local police and U.S. and coalition forces -- from which they will do their daily patrolling, the door-to-door work to let the population know that they're there, to take census-type information and to provide the street awareness and presence that allows security to come to fore.

From those stations will be conducted the raids that may be necessary, and from those stations will be the quick reaction forces should some of the Iraqi forces get into trouble.

In analyzing what we call "troop to task," meaning, "What do you need to do and how many folks do you need to do it?," in analyzing that, General Casey and his Iraqi counterparts have determined that there are more forces needed. More Iraqi forces for sure; and the prime minister and his government have promised that they will allocate three more Iraqi brigades into Baghdad.

The first of those is already moving. The next two are scheduled within the month.

The commander will have freedom of operations to do what he must do to impose the rule of law on all; that there will be no political interference with those troops on the ground who are carrying out the mission that they've been given; and that the rule of law and the rules of engagement will apply to all criminals, regardless of which community they come from; that mixed communities and Sunni communities and Shia communities will all be treated the same.

To do this, we're going to need additional U.S. forces. General Casey and General Abizaid have asked for those additional forces, as have the commanders below them.

The additional forces will do what I have mentioned, which is to be able to have a battalion of our forces available with each Iraqi brigade. But they will also strengthen the size of the embed teams that we have with each Iraqi brigade, battalion and company, so that when the Iraqi units get into trouble or need fire support, we're able to provide it to them quickly and efficiently.

PACE: In addition, to reinforce success at al Anbar province, the Marine commander out there has asked for, and General Casey and General Abizaid have asked for, an increase of about 4,000 troops out there.

The Sunni sheiks in that region have led the way in fighting Al Qaida. They have recruited their own sons in the thousands to join their local police forces. In fact, about 1,000 Sunni youngsters right now from al Anbar are in Jordan at the police academy.

And these additional U.S. forces at al Anbar will allow those sheiks in the Iraqi armed forces that are out there to provide continuing security, to take advantage of this window of opportunity that's presented by the leaders out there.

So, collectively, the military commanders, both U.S. and Iraqi, have asked for this increase. And those of us in advisory positions agree with their request.

Mr. Chairman, I'll save any further comment about how I got to my own conviction about this to the Q&A piece. But I do want to state, for the record, that I am of conviction that this military plan, properly part of new political emphasis and new economic plus-up, can provide the success we're looking for.

Thank you, sir.

Ellie

yellowwing
01-13-07, 09:36 AM
But the pivotal element of this entire plan does not lie with the military plan. It's with the political will and commitment of the Iraqi leadership and of the Iraqi people. They must be ready to seize the moment, to go after the militias, to purge sectarianism from the ministries and the military's ranks, to allow the Iraqi security forces to go after the targets that they must go after.
Only one mention in the whole precedings of the militias. Al Sadr and his ugly crew is a large fly in the ointment.