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thedrifter
01-05-07, 08:26 AM
Dynamic Ideas for Iraq
How about a "counterinsurgency economic czar"?

BY DAN SENOR AND ROMAN MARTINEZ
Friday, January 5, 2007 12:01 a.m. EST

The president is on the cusp of making the most important decision of his second term: increasing our troop presence in Baghdad and Anbar in an effort to stave off Iraqi civil war. A troop surge into Baghdad will not solve problems overnight. But by helping to establish security, more troops can weaken the insurgency, which is the first step to addressing most of Iraq's other problems, including the growth of Shiite militias. Here are things for the president to consider as he moves forward: • No more half measures.With a possible troop increase gaining steam, some military officers at the Pentagon and in Baghdad are advocating only a temporary and minor increase of forces which they view as a reasonable compromise from their minimalist position. But 10,000-15,000 more troops would be insufficient to stabilize Baghdad and at the same time maintain a strong presence in Anbar, where the insurgency is likely to spill over if chased out of the capital. Such an approach would replicate the failures of "Operations Together Forward I and II" in 2006, when troop increases of 7,000 and 3,500 were unable to bring down the violence. In light of the deteriorating situation in Iraq--and the president's anemic poll ratings--this may be his last opportunity to shift his Iraq policy for good. This means erring on the side of more troops, not fewer--even if it is politically painful in the short run. If the president decides to add more troops, he will not score points at home for deciding on a smaller increase. Any size surge will be controversial. So he should go for a number that maximizes chances for success. • A new military strategy calls for military leaders who "own" the change. Donald Rumsfeld has been cast as the architect of our current military strategy--focused on training Iraqi soldiers and minimizing the U.S. footprint. But outgoing Central Command Chief John Abizaid and Iraq Commanding Gen. George Casey have also been firm backers of Mr. Rumsfeld's approach. A fresh plan centered around a surge in troops will require military leaders who are as invested in the new strategy as Gens. Abizaid and Casey are behind the current approach. Gen. Jack Keane, a former vice chief of the U.S. Army, has been an instrumental advocate for a substantial surge. He is well-respected among the Pentagon brass, rank-and-file troops and civilian policy makers. The president should call him out of retirement and appoint him to head Central Command, as Gen. Abizaid's successor. He should also send Lt. Gen. David Petraeus--a two-tour Iraq veteran who just finished crafting a new counterinsurgency doctrine for U.S. forces--back to Baghdad to replace Gen. Casey, who is set to rotate out of Iraq in the coming months. • Economic aid must be matched by dramatic distribution reform. The administration is considering proposals by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and field commanders to pair a troop increase with a funding surge for new Iraq jobs programs. But this only makes sense if there are vast changes in how the new programs are managed by the U.S. and Iraqi bureaucracies. The funds appropriated by our government barely affect the lives of average Iraqis. This is because large-scale U.S. reconstruction programs continue to be subject to Federal Acquisition Regulations applicable in peacetime. This means that major government contracts for Iraq are subjected, in advance, to the slow and cumbersome "Request For Proposal" process. An even larger cause of the bottleneck is that the Iraqi government lacks the manpower, infrastructure and decisiveness in its ministries to disperse funds effectively. So of those funds appropriated to the Iraqi government, only a small percentage ever moves from the government to the Iraqi people. To make a "New Deal"-style jobs program work in Iraq, the president should propose that Congress streamline the acquisition process to allow for rapid project approval, following the model of the enormously successful Commander's Emergency Response Program. He should also appoint a respected retired military leader or business executive with expertise in logistics management to oversee distribution of aid on the ground. Anything related to funding and contracting for Iraq is understandably a sensitive issue, especially given the new Democratic majority's focus on oversight. So the president should ask the Democratic congressional leadership to propose a candidate for this position of "counterinsurgency economic czar." • Continue to support democracy and constitutionalism. As the situation has grown worse, some have called for abandoning the goal of democracy. If giving up on democracy could magically solve Iraq's other problems, it might be worth considering. But dropping support for democracy would be radically destabilizing. Shiite and Kurdish leaders would fear a move to disenfranchise their communities and restore a Sunni strongman to power. Instead, the president should continue to seek political solutions--alongside a new security strategy--via existing political and constitutional structures. This is an area where he deserves enormous credit: His commitment to democracy has been admirably steadfast. • Become the briefer in chief. When announcing the troop surge, the president should also announce that he will come before the American people every four weeks with a prime-time update on the war. The goal should be to emulate FDR's wartime fireside chats, when Americans were told to be ready with their atlases so they could follow along. Each month, President Bush could provide Americans a live update--perhaps alongside his commanders, with maps, statistics, etc.--charting progress from the previous four weeks and outlining metrics for the next month. This would be a dramatic change in the president's public management of the war, to be sure. But the hands-off, "trust-my-generals" style is not working. Rightly or wrongly, too many citizens believe the president does not own his military campaign. Now is the time to change the dynamic. Messrs. Senor and Martinez served as foreign-policy advisers to the Bush administration, based in Baghdad from April 2003 through June 2004.

Ellie