thedrifter
01-02-07, 07:43 AM
Lessons of Vietnam
How to avoid a repeat, and why it's crucial to do so.
BY BRENDAN MINITER
Tuesday, January 2, 2007 12:01 a.m. EST
Sometime in the next few weeks President Bush is expected to unveil a new strategy for moving forward in Iraq. Let's hope he first takes a serious look at the missteps that tripped up this nation in its last drawn out, intractable war: Vietnam.
It's startling that today there are few parallels being drawn between Iraq and the conflict that ended in Southeast Asia some three decades ago. When President Bush moved to topple Saddam Hussein, comparisons to Vietnam never seemed far from the surface. The media were looking for the first sign that the war had become a quagmire; and antiwar activists, this time with graying ponytails and faded peace signs, gathered in public squares to protest the "pre-emptive" war. But now, just as the conflict is in danger of becoming another Vietnam, few are willing to sound notes of caution of how to avoid it.
And it's becoming increasingly clear that some policy makers in Washington would lead us down a similar road to defeat. Richard Nixon was sworn into office in 1969 promising to end the war in Vietnam, and he asked senior military personnel for their recommendations. He soon learned that there wasn't a consensus on how to achieve victory, so he settled on finding an exit. He called it "peace with honor" and began instituting a policy of "Vietnamization," substituting South Vietnam's soldiers for Americans on the battlefield while executing a staged withdrawal from the country. The difference today is that we've had a policy of Iraqification before the White House followed up with a group study. We'll have to wait and see if this results in a different outcome.
In his book "Abandoning Vietnam," James Willbanks, a historian at the Combat Studies Institute at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., digs through the Nixon administration's series of decisions that finally resulted in the fall of Saigon in 1975. Mr. Willbanks, a military veteran who saw combat as an infantrymen during North Vietnam's 1972 Easter Offensive, shows that the Nixon administration was focused more on ending the war than on winning it and a that the U.S. came a lot closer to winning than many people believe today.
One reason for broad military offensives from the North is that the U.S. policy of pacifying the countryside had largely worked, and that after the Tet Offensive in 1968, indigenous insurgents in the South were largely destroyed as an effective fighting force. In a conversation recently, Mr. Willbanks cautiously offered that with a little more help the South Vietnamese would have had a much better chance of holding on. At the end, the North was reduced to waging the very type of war the U.S. military was geared to fight: intensive, heavy infantry battles. But by then the war had been lost at home.
Mr. Willbanks noted that in defeating insurgencies, it takes a long time to build up indigenous forces capable of holding their own against a determined enemy. He also noted that successfully fighting off insurgents once isn't proof that a new army is capable of bearing the full burden of a nation's defense, and that it takes a lot more than handing over modern equipment to build a modern army. When South Vietnam fell, he noted, the North captured a treasure trove of American tanks, trucks and other equipment sitting in warehouses. American soldiers enjoy the most modern tools of war, but their real strength comes in the tactics and training needed to use those tools successfully.
Another lesson from Vietnam is that the real damage in withdrawing too early could come not in a far-off battlefield, but in Washington. Rep. John Kline, a former Marine and Minnesota Republican, is one policy maker who is cognizant of the effect losing a war can have on the home front. After flying helicopter combat missions in Vietnam, he spent several years serving in Washington, including carrying the nuclear "football" for President Reagan. In reading through President Ford's obituaries this past week, many Americans may remember the Vietnamese boat people Ford allowed to settle in the U.S.
But what Mr. Kline mentioned in our conversation is that while the nation was on the retreat in Southeast Asia, disdain for American military power abroad trickled down to disdain for American military personnel at home. And it wasn't only antiwar protestors. In the wake of Vietnam, military personnel were discouraged from wearing uniforms while off duty within the city limits, and the feeling in the ranks was that even senior officials in the government viewed the military as an embarrassment. Morale was predictably low. That changed with Reagan's inauguration in 1981 and his subsequent military buildup. But anyone who thinks accepting defeat in Iraq will return the nation to a prewar mindset of a confident American foreign policy might take a look at the 2008 presidential contenders and ask who would play the role Reagan ended up playing in the 1980s. Who will rebuild the nation's confidence and pride in its military and in projecting itself across the globe?
That role may never have to be filled if President Bush can now find a way to avoid leaving the nation where Ford found it when he took the reins in 1974. But how can Mr. Bush do that with little more than two years left in office? One consensus that's forming among "realists" within foreign policy circles is a new domino theory: that to achieve victory in Iraq, the president must first get the other Middle Eastern dominos to fall into place. The Iraq Study Group concluded that the administration must reach out to Syria and Iran, among others, and before achieving victory in Iraq must first find a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Saddam Hussein lent his own moral authority--such as it is--to connecting the Palestinians' war on Israel to Iraq shortly before being led to the gallows. While being read his death sentence, the deposed tyrant shouted, "Long live the nation! Long live the people! Long live the Palestinians!"
Saddam is dead, but the problem of building a stable, democratic government in Baghdad remains. It's encouraging that the president seems intent on making a sharp turn. Senior policymakers who gathered at the president's ranch in Crawford, Texas, over the holidays reportedly debated "surging" American troops in Iraq with the hope that an additional 20,000 or 30,000 troops will finally tip the balance in favor of victory.
But tipping the balance in favor of winning--we may fairly conclude from Mr. Willbanks history of Nixon's war--isn't always everyone's goal in Washington. Sen. Joe Biden, who is poised to become the new chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, has already said he opposes sending more troops. Absolving himself of responsibility of what may happen if he successfully hamstrings the president, the Democrat has said there is nothing Congress can do to alter the outcome on the ground in Iraq: "This is President Bush's war." If Mr. Biden finds purchase with this line of reasoning as he stakes out the ground for a presidential campaign, we may indeed get another Vietnam. And it won't only be the man now in the White House who suffers from that defeat.
Ellie
How to avoid a repeat, and why it's crucial to do so.
BY BRENDAN MINITER
Tuesday, January 2, 2007 12:01 a.m. EST
Sometime in the next few weeks President Bush is expected to unveil a new strategy for moving forward in Iraq. Let's hope he first takes a serious look at the missteps that tripped up this nation in its last drawn out, intractable war: Vietnam.
It's startling that today there are few parallels being drawn between Iraq and the conflict that ended in Southeast Asia some three decades ago. When President Bush moved to topple Saddam Hussein, comparisons to Vietnam never seemed far from the surface. The media were looking for the first sign that the war had become a quagmire; and antiwar activists, this time with graying ponytails and faded peace signs, gathered in public squares to protest the "pre-emptive" war. But now, just as the conflict is in danger of becoming another Vietnam, few are willing to sound notes of caution of how to avoid it.
And it's becoming increasingly clear that some policy makers in Washington would lead us down a similar road to defeat. Richard Nixon was sworn into office in 1969 promising to end the war in Vietnam, and he asked senior military personnel for their recommendations. He soon learned that there wasn't a consensus on how to achieve victory, so he settled on finding an exit. He called it "peace with honor" and began instituting a policy of "Vietnamization," substituting South Vietnam's soldiers for Americans on the battlefield while executing a staged withdrawal from the country. The difference today is that we've had a policy of Iraqification before the White House followed up with a group study. We'll have to wait and see if this results in a different outcome.
In his book "Abandoning Vietnam," James Willbanks, a historian at the Combat Studies Institute at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., digs through the Nixon administration's series of decisions that finally resulted in the fall of Saigon in 1975. Mr. Willbanks, a military veteran who saw combat as an infantrymen during North Vietnam's 1972 Easter Offensive, shows that the Nixon administration was focused more on ending the war than on winning it and a that the U.S. came a lot closer to winning than many people believe today.
One reason for broad military offensives from the North is that the U.S. policy of pacifying the countryside had largely worked, and that after the Tet Offensive in 1968, indigenous insurgents in the South were largely destroyed as an effective fighting force. In a conversation recently, Mr. Willbanks cautiously offered that with a little more help the South Vietnamese would have had a much better chance of holding on. At the end, the North was reduced to waging the very type of war the U.S. military was geared to fight: intensive, heavy infantry battles. But by then the war had been lost at home.
Mr. Willbanks noted that in defeating insurgencies, it takes a long time to build up indigenous forces capable of holding their own against a determined enemy. He also noted that successfully fighting off insurgents once isn't proof that a new army is capable of bearing the full burden of a nation's defense, and that it takes a lot more than handing over modern equipment to build a modern army. When South Vietnam fell, he noted, the North captured a treasure trove of American tanks, trucks and other equipment sitting in warehouses. American soldiers enjoy the most modern tools of war, but their real strength comes in the tactics and training needed to use those tools successfully.
Another lesson from Vietnam is that the real damage in withdrawing too early could come not in a far-off battlefield, but in Washington. Rep. John Kline, a former Marine and Minnesota Republican, is one policy maker who is cognizant of the effect losing a war can have on the home front. After flying helicopter combat missions in Vietnam, he spent several years serving in Washington, including carrying the nuclear "football" for President Reagan. In reading through President Ford's obituaries this past week, many Americans may remember the Vietnamese boat people Ford allowed to settle in the U.S.
But what Mr. Kline mentioned in our conversation is that while the nation was on the retreat in Southeast Asia, disdain for American military power abroad trickled down to disdain for American military personnel at home. And it wasn't only antiwar protestors. In the wake of Vietnam, military personnel were discouraged from wearing uniforms while off duty within the city limits, and the feeling in the ranks was that even senior officials in the government viewed the military as an embarrassment. Morale was predictably low. That changed with Reagan's inauguration in 1981 and his subsequent military buildup. But anyone who thinks accepting defeat in Iraq will return the nation to a prewar mindset of a confident American foreign policy might take a look at the 2008 presidential contenders and ask who would play the role Reagan ended up playing in the 1980s. Who will rebuild the nation's confidence and pride in its military and in projecting itself across the globe?
That role may never have to be filled if President Bush can now find a way to avoid leaving the nation where Ford found it when he took the reins in 1974. But how can Mr. Bush do that with little more than two years left in office? One consensus that's forming among "realists" within foreign policy circles is a new domino theory: that to achieve victory in Iraq, the president must first get the other Middle Eastern dominos to fall into place. The Iraq Study Group concluded that the administration must reach out to Syria and Iran, among others, and before achieving victory in Iraq must first find a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Saddam Hussein lent his own moral authority--such as it is--to connecting the Palestinians' war on Israel to Iraq shortly before being led to the gallows. While being read his death sentence, the deposed tyrant shouted, "Long live the nation! Long live the people! Long live the Palestinians!"
Saddam is dead, but the problem of building a stable, democratic government in Baghdad remains. It's encouraging that the president seems intent on making a sharp turn. Senior policymakers who gathered at the president's ranch in Crawford, Texas, over the holidays reportedly debated "surging" American troops in Iraq with the hope that an additional 20,000 or 30,000 troops will finally tip the balance in favor of victory.
But tipping the balance in favor of winning--we may fairly conclude from Mr. Willbanks history of Nixon's war--isn't always everyone's goal in Washington. Sen. Joe Biden, who is poised to become the new chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, has already said he opposes sending more troops. Absolving himself of responsibility of what may happen if he successfully hamstrings the president, the Democrat has said there is nothing Congress can do to alter the outcome on the ground in Iraq: "This is President Bush's war." If Mr. Biden finds purchase with this line of reasoning as he stakes out the ground for a presidential campaign, we may indeed get another Vietnam. And it won't only be the man now in the White House who suffers from that defeat.
Ellie