thedrifter
12-18-06, 08:19 AM
Training the trainers
December 18,2006
Anne Clark
DAILY NEWS STAFF
If the U.S. wants to pull out most combat troops from Iraq by 2008, then they should accelerate the training of Iraqi security forces, the Iraq Study Group recommended earlier this month.
The group’s finding validates the success of military training teams, a concept as old as our involvement in Vietnam.
“The Iraq Study Group is saying that training teams work; they’re reinforcing success and want to expand it,” said Col. Raymond Coia, commanding officer of II MEF Headquarters Group, which is tasked with the training of transition teams aboard Camp Lejeune.
If the federal government acts on the Iraq Study Group’s recommendations, it could quintuple the number of U.S. military training teams embedded with Iraqi units.
The practice of taking certified U.S. trainers and embedding them with Iraqi security forces — which includes local, national, and border police, as well as their military — has been in place for about two years, Coia said.
At Lejeune, 10- to 15-man teams are pulled together from bases all over the world. Marines with specialties in combat arms, logistics, communications, administration, and fire support train for about three months before deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan.
Their training includes role playing with contracted Iraqis, exercises in simulated villages, and learning the culture and language. Military training teams can expect to be deployed to either Iraq or Afghanistan from seven months to a year.
Coia went to Iraq in February 2005 as the chief of the Iraqi security forces directorate for II MEF Forward.
When he arrived in Al Anbar province in western Iraq, he said the ISF there had been decimated, in large part because those troops had come from the same neighborhoods they were protecting.
That made them easy targets for insurgents, who knew where they lived and could take out violent revenge.
Part of the Americans’ task was to replace what was left of those units with Iraqi troops recruited from all over Iraq. They wound up with an Iraqi army that was primarily Shia, working in a Sunni region.
“The locals were initially cold; they’re focused on the family tribe,” Coia said.
Some foreign studies experts have doubts that Iraqi troops can ultimately be loyal to the central government, but they fight for their country at great personal risk.
“Those Iraqis are putting their lives on the line,” Coia said. “Working with the coalition could get them killed.”
Iraqi security forces have to slip home when they go on leave. They don’t travel directly from the base or police station; they’re dropped off at a neutral location and from there they make their way home, often in disguise.
Many times their own families don’t know what they do for a living.
“That’s why when we talk about withdrawing, I worry about that,” Coia said. “We’d be abandoning them, leaving them to the wolves.”
The military training teams have different missions, depending on the Iraqi forces with whom they’re embedded. A border training team, for instance, would teach Iraqi forces how to man outposts on the borders with Syria, Iran or Saudi Arabia. A national police training team would help Iraqis respond to civil issues.
Coming from very different cultures remains a challenge. In Iraq, where the banking system is not yet digital, soldiers have to go home every three weeks to bring home their pay. That means a unit is usually down by a third, even out in the field.
“That’s tough to get used to, but we make the best of it,” Coia said.
Conversely, Iraqi security forces have to get used to Western styles of leadership. In Iraq, top officers are used to taking the best equipment for themselves. U.S. training teams have taught them to lead by example, and take care of the younger troops first.
That generation is the future of Iraq.
“They’re willing to accept new ideas, and hungry for it,” Coia said. “They’re happy to have military training teams, they rely on their expertise.”
The Brookings Institution’s most recent Iraq Index estimates that about a third of the Iraqi security forces are currently able to control their own battle space.
The ISF work on a stairstep program, training, fighting, and training again at successive levels, whether in platoons or divisions.
The biggest success Coia saw during his time in Iraq was building two ISF divisions from 3,000 troops to around 20,000 troops in the Euphrates River Valley. These Iraqi troops were able to support the constitutional referendum and subsequent election in late 2005.
Military training teams are a successful part of a larger U.S. strategy, just as civil action teams worked in Vietnam.
In Iraq, “I watched a group walk back from training, and they looked like Marine riflemen, with a little swagger,” Coia said. “They felt good about what they were doing. They were no different than any fighting man.”
Ellie
December 18,2006
Anne Clark
DAILY NEWS STAFF
If the U.S. wants to pull out most combat troops from Iraq by 2008, then they should accelerate the training of Iraqi security forces, the Iraq Study Group recommended earlier this month.
The group’s finding validates the success of military training teams, a concept as old as our involvement in Vietnam.
“The Iraq Study Group is saying that training teams work; they’re reinforcing success and want to expand it,” said Col. Raymond Coia, commanding officer of II MEF Headquarters Group, which is tasked with the training of transition teams aboard Camp Lejeune.
If the federal government acts on the Iraq Study Group’s recommendations, it could quintuple the number of U.S. military training teams embedded with Iraqi units.
The practice of taking certified U.S. trainers and embedding them with Iraqi security forces — which includes local, national, and border police, as well as their military — has been in place for about two years, Coia said.
At Lejeune, 10- to 15-man teams are pulled together from bases all over the world. Marines with specialties in combat arms, logistics, communications, administration, and fire support train for about three months before deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan.
Their training includes role playing with contracted Iraqis, exercises in simulated villages, and learning the culture and language. Military training teams can expect to be deployed to either Iraq or Afghanistan from seven months to a year.
Coia went to Iraq in February 2005 as the chief of the Iraqi security forces directorate for II MEF Forward.
When he arrived in Al Anbar province in western Iraq, he said the ISF there had been decimated, in large part because those troops had come from the same neighborhoods they were protecting.
That made them easy targets for insurgents, who knew where they lived and could take out violent revenge.
Part of the Americans’ task was to replace what was left of those units with Iraqi troops recruited from all over Iraq. They wound up with an Iraqi army that was primarily Shia, working in a Sunni region.
“The locals were initially cold; they’re focused on the family tribe,” Coia said.
Some foreign studies experts have doubts that Iraqi troops can ultimately be loyal to the central government, but they fight for their country at great personal risk.
“Those Iraqis are putting their lives on the line,” Coia said. “Working with the coalition could get them killed.”
Iraqi security forces have to slip home when they go on leave. They don’t travel directly from the base or police station; they’re dropped off at a neutral location and from there they make their way home, often in disguise.
Many times their own families don’t know what they do for a living.
“That’s why when we talk about withdrawing, I worry about that,” Coia said. “We’d be abandoning them, leaving them to the wolves.”
The military training teams have different missions, depending on the Iraqi forces with whom they’re embedded. A border training team, for instance, would teach Iraqi forces how to man outposts on the borders with Syria, Iran or Saudi Arabia. A national police training team would help Iraqis respond to civil issues.
Coming from very different cultures remains a challenge. In Iraq, where the banking system is not yet digital, soldiers have to go home every three weeks to bring home their pay. That means a unit is usually down by a third, even out in the field.
“That’s tough to get used to, but we make the best of it,” Coia said.
Conversely, Iraqi security forces have to get used to Western styles of leadership. In Iraq, top officers are used to taking the best equipment for themselves. U.S. training teams have taught them to lead by example, and take care of the younger troops first.
That generation is the future of Iraq.
“They’re willing to accept new ideas, and hungry for it,” Coia said. “They’re happy to have military training teams, they rely on their expertise.”
The Brookings Institution’s most recent Iraq Index estimates that about a third of the Iraqi security forces are currently able to control their own battle space.
The ISF work on a stairstep program, training, fighting, and training again at successive levels, whether in platoons or divisions.
The biggest success Coia saw during his time in Iraq was building two ISF divisions from 3,000 troops to around 20,000 troops in the Euphrates River Valley. These Iraqi troops were able to support the constitutional referendum and subsequent election in late 2005.
Military training teams are a successful part of a larger U.S. strategy, just as civil action teams worked in Vietnam.
In Iraq, “I watched a group walk back from training, and they looked like Marine riflemen, with a little swagger,” Coia said. “They felt good about what they were doing. They were no different than any fighting man.”
Ellie