thedrifter
12-01-06, 04:44 AM
U.S. snipers less successful than hoped in killing Iraqi rebels
By C.J. Chivers
The New York Times
DenverPost.com
Article Last Updated:12/01/2006 12:40:15 AM MST
Karma, Iraq - The sniper team left friendly lines hours ahead of the sun. They were a group of U.S. Marines walking through the chill, hoping to be in hiding before the mullahs' predawn call to prayer would urge this city awake.
They reached an abandoned building. Two Marines stepped inside, swept the ground floor and signaled to the others to follow them to the flat roof, where they crawled to spots along its walls where they had previously chiseled out small viewing holes.
Out came their gear: a map, spotting scopes, binoculars, two-way radios and stools. The snipers took their places, peering through the holes, watching an Iraqi neighborhood from which insurgents often fire. They were hoping an insurgent would try to fire on this day. The waiting began.
If the recent pattern was any indication, the waiting could last a long time. This was this sniper team's 30th mission in Anbar province since early August. They had yet to fire a shot.
More than three years after the insurgency erupted across much of Iraq, sniping - one of the methods that the military thought would be essential in its counterinsurgency operations - is proving less successful in many areas of Iraq than had been hoped, U.S. Marine officers, trainers and snipers say.
In theory, snipers are a nearly perfect method of killing Iraq's insurgents and thwarting their attacks, all with little risk of damaging property or endangering passers-by. But in practice, the snipers say, they are seeing fewer clear targets than before and are shooting fewer insurgents than expected.
In 2003, one Marine sniper killed 32 combatants in 12 days, the snipers say, and many others had double-digit kill totals during tours in Iraq. By last summer, sniper platoons with several teams had typically been killing about a dozen insurgents in seven-month tours, with totals per platoon ranging from three to 26.
The gap between the expectations and the results has many causes but is in part a reflection of the insurgency's duration.
With the war in its fourth year, many of the best sniping positions are already well-known to the insurgents, and veteran insurgents have become more savvy and harder to kill.
In some areas of Iraq, where the insurgents are less experienced or still fight frontally, snipers have had the better rates of success, including the platoon with 26 kills. But many areas, the snipers say, have become maddening places in which to hide and hunt.
"A lot of Marine battalions have rotated through these same areas for six or seven months at a time," said Staff Sgt. Christopher Jones, the platoon sergeant of the Scout Sniper Platoon in the 2nd Battalion, 8th Marines. "But the insurgents live here. They know almost all the best places that have been used. Before we even get here, they know where we are going to go."
Moreover, the insurgents have developed safeguards, using shepherds and children to look for snipers in buildings and heavily vegetated areas, and networks of informants to spread the word when a sniper team has taken up a new position.
But some snipers now worry that the difficulties they face have been compounded by rules and conditions placed on them by senior military leaders.
Marine snipers have customarily trained to work in two-man teams who hide and stalk for days, seeking targets a half-mile or more away. Often an area might be saturated with the snipers, so they can support and protect one another while confusing an enemy force with different angles of fire.
This way, according to their thinking, they can kill more enemy combatants and sow more fear.
Those two-man teams are not allowed in Iraq, in part because of the killings of two groups of snipers earlier in the war.
The losses have made commanders hesitant to send out small teams, Marine officers said, a decision that many snipers said inhibits their work.
Snipers argue a counterintuitive point, saying that even though two-man teams have less firepower and fewer men, they are safer because they can hide more effectively.
Sgt. Joseph Chamblin, the leader of the battalion's 1st Sniper Team, said the sniper community is suffering from an overreaction.
"It's sad that they got killed, but when you think about it, we've been here three years, going on four, and we've only had two teams killed," he said.
Chamblin killed for the first time Nov. 10, shooting an insurgent who was putting a makeshift bomb beside a bridge near Saqlawiya, near Fallujah, a spot where a similar bomb killed three Marines and a translator in the summer.
He said snipers were willing to assume the risk of traveling in pairs. "It's a war," he said. "People are going to die, and the American public needs to get over that."
Snipers also say other protection issues are limiting their operations, including requirements to wear helmets and flak jackets, which slow them down and make hiding more difficult.
"You go to a 10-week sniper course, and never in that course are you in Kevlar and a helmet," Jones said. "Then you come to Iraq and immediately you're in your flak jacket and helmet and you've got a huge pack of gear."
Chamblin agreed.
"We are carrying way more stuff than we can be tactically sound with," he said. "My arms are numb because my pack is so heavy. Sometimes, on my missions, my pack has weighed more than I have, and I weigh 150 pounds."
The military also has tightened rules of engagement as the war has progressed, toughening the requirements before a sniper may shoot an Iraqi. Potential targets must be engaged in a hostile act or show clear hostile intent.
The Marines say insurgents know the rules and rarely carry weapons in the open. Instead, they pose as civilians and keep their weapons concealed in cars or buildings until just before they need them. Later, when they are done shooting, they put them swiftly out of sight and mingle with civilians.
Ellie
By C.J. Chivers
The New York Times
DenverPost.com
Article Last Updated:12/01/2006 12:40:15 AM MST
Karma, Iraq - The sniper team left friendly lines hours ahead of the sun. They were a group of U.S. Marines walking through the chill, hoping to be in hiding before the mullahs' predawn call to prayer would urge this city awake.
They reached an abandoned building. Two Marines stepped inside, swept the ground floor and signaled to the others to follow them to the flat roof, where they crawled to spots along its walls where they had previously chiseled out small viewing holes.
Out came their gear: a map, spotting scopes, binoculars, two-way radios and stools. The snipers took their places, peering through the holes, watching an Iraqi neighborhood from which insurgents often fire. They were hoping an insurgent would try to fire on this day. The waiting began.
If the recent pattern was any indication, the waiting could last a long time. This was this sniper team's 30th mission in Anbar province since early August. They had yet to fire a shot.
More than three years after the insurgency erupted across much of Iraq, sniping - one of the methods that the military thought would be essential in its counterinsurgency operations - is proving less successful in many areas of Iraq than had been hoped, U.S. Marine officers, trainers and snipers say.
In theory, snipers are a nearly perfect method of killing Iraq's insurgents and thwarting their attacks, all with little risk of damaging property or endangering passers-by. But in practice, the snipers say, they are seeing fewer clear targets than before and are shooting fewer insurgents than expected.
In 2003, one Marine sniper killed 32 combatants in 12 days, the snipers say, and many others had double-digit kill totals during tours in Iraq. By last summer, sniper platoons with several teams had typically been killing about a dozen insurgents in seven-month tours, with totals per platoon ranging from three to 26.
The gap between the expectations and the results has many causes but is in part a reflection of the insurgency's duration.
With the war in its fourth year, many of the best sniping positions are already well-known to the insurgents, and veteran insurgents have become more savvy and harder to kill.
In some areas of Iraq, where the insurgents are less experienced or still fight frontally, snipers have had the better rates of success, including the platoon with 26 kills. But many areas, the snipers say, have become maddening places in which to hide and hunt.
"A lot of Marine battalions have rotated through these same areas for six or seven months at a time," said Staff Sgt. Christopher Jones, the platoon sergeant of the Scout Sniper Platoon in the 2nd Battalion, 8th Marines. "But the insurgents live here. They know almost all the best places that have been used. Before we even get here, they know where we are going to go."
Moreover, the insurgents have developed safeguards, using shepherds and children to look for snipers in buildings and heavily vegetated areas, and networks of informants to spread the word when a sniper team has taken up a new position.
But some snipers now worry that the difficulties they face have been compounded by rules and conditions placed on them by senior military leaders.
Marine snipers have customarily trained to work in two-man teams who hide and stalk for days, seeking targets a half-mile or more away. Often an area might be saturated with the snipers, so they can support and protect one another while confusing an enemy force with different angles of fire.
This way, according to their thinking, they can kill more enemy combatants and sow more fear.
Those two-man teams are not allowed in Iraq, in part because of the killings of two groups of snipers earlier in the war.
The losses have made commanders hesitant to send out small teams, Marine officers said, a decision that many snipers said inhibits their work.
Snipers argue a counterintuitive point, saying that even though two-man teams have less firepower and fewer men, they are safer because they can hide more effectively.
Sgt. Joseph Chamblin, the leader of the battalion's 1st Sniper Team, said the sniper community is suffering from an overreaction.
"It's sad that they got killed, but when you think about it, we've been here three years, going on four, and we've only had two teams killed," he said.
Chamblin killed for the first time Nov. 10, shooting an insurgent who was putting a makeshift bomb beside a bridge near Saqlawiya, near Fallujah, a spot where a similar bomb killed three Marines and a translator in the summer.
He said snipers were willing to assume the risk of traveling in pairs. "It's a war," he said. "People are going to die, and the American public needs to get over that."
Snipers also say other protection issues are limiting their operations, including requirements to wear helmets and flak jackets, which slow them down and make hiding more difficult.
"You go to a 10-week sniper course, and never in that course are you in Kevlar and a helmet," Jones said. "Then you come to Iraq and immediately you're in your flak jacket and helmet and you've got a huge pack of gear."
Chamblin agreed.
"We are carrying way more stuff than we can be tactically sound with," he said. "My arms are numb because my pack is so heavy. Sometimes, on my missions, my pack has weighed more than I have, and I weigh 150 pounds."
The military also has tightened rules of engagement as the war has progressed, toughening the requirements before a sniper may shoot an Iraqi. Potential targets must be engaged in a hostile act or show clear hostile intent.
The Marines say insurgents know the rules and rarely carry weapons in the open. Instead, they pose as civilians and keep their weapons concealed in cars or buildings until just before they need them. Later, when they are done shooting, they put them swiftly out of sight and mingle with civilians.
Ellie