thedrifter
11-22-06, 06:57 PM
U.S. steps up training of Iraq military advisers
By Michael R. Gordon
The New York Times
This wind- swept stretch of Kansas has become the hub of a major effort by the United States to overhaul its effort to advise Iraq's fledgling security forces.
Following a disappointing performance by many Iraqi units and complaints that earlier efforts to train American advisers had been handicapped by bureaucratic inertia, the army has handed the mission to Carter Ham, a two-star general who served as a commander in Iraq.
Along with nearly 1,000 of soldiers from his 1st Infantry Division, Ham has sought to improve the training of the advisers as the army has moved to upgrade the quality of the teams.
The revamped effort began with little fanfare last summer but has gained increased prominence in recent weeks as experts inside and outside government have urged that the number of advisers be greatly increased and more resources poured into strengthening the Iraqi security forces.
In recent exercises, the would-be advisers were confronted by some of the vexing scenarios they were likely to face in Iraq: an Iraqi battalion commander who quarreled angrily with his Iraqi police counterpart, Iraqi troops that roughed up a detainee and an Iraqi crowd irate at the troops who had conducted a surprise raid.
The army is "transitioning from an endeavor that has been less than a high priority to one that is of the highest priority," said Jack Keane, a retired four- star general who served as the army vice chief of staff during the first several months of the war. "And it is long overdue."
The army has long experience in training military advisers, most notably in Vietnam. There, the army began with an active advisory program before the fighting escalated into a major conflict. In Iraq, however, the war began with major combat and the use of American advisers to work with the Iraq security forces was introduced later, almost as an afterthought.
"When we first started this transition team business in both Iraq and Afghanistan it was very much a hit and miss proposition," said Ham, who acknowledged that the adviser program was initially dogged by a host of problems. "The selection of individuals for duty on transition teams was probably more haphazard than any of us would have liked. The training was not standardized across the various training locations.."
"I think that was what led to some of the earlier criticisms, and in my view the criticism was fair and justified," Ham added. "We need to do it better, and this initiative that started the training here at Fort Riley is a part of that."
There are more than 430 teams in Iraq, accounting for more than 4,000 American soldiers and marines. General John Abizaid, head of the U.S. Central Command, said last week that the United States planned to substantially increase the size and number of teams and attach them not only to Iraqi battalions but also to Iraqi companies and possibly even platoons. Those ideas, however, have yet to be incorporated in the program to train advisers. To organize the training now under way, the army gave the mission to Ham and senior officers from two of his brigades.
The training program at Fort Riley is a jampacked 60 days. Soldiers practice a variety of combat skills, including how to counter the ever-present roadside bombs. They also receive a dose of cultural training and, for those headed to Iraq, 50 hours of Arabic language instruction - enough to provide only the most rudimentary skills but more training that most advisers previously received. There is additional training in Kuwait and at the sprawling military base at Taji, Iraq before the advisers take up their duties.
Ham said the advisory teams included more active-duty soldiers than during the early days of the advisory program when many of the teams were filled largely by reservists. As a matter of army policy, staffing the adviser teams is now a higher priority for army personnel officers and filling the empty slots in unit on alert to deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan. Since the teams are assembled from throughout the army the training is not only a period to learn new skills but a time to learn to work together.
According to current plans, Fort Riley will train the majority of the army adviser teams that are sent to advise the Iraqi Army, national police and border guards. The rest of the army teams are to drawn from units in Iraq. The Marines have a separate training effort for their own advisers.
Once the teams are in the field, they are managed by Brigadier General Dana Pittard, an assistant division commander, who provides feedback to Fort Riley. The expectation is that American advisers will be attached to Iraq military and police units well after the bulk of American combat forces are eventually withdrawn.
Major Andrew Yerkes, who is leading a team that is to advise Iraq's National Police, was thrust in a difficult situation during a recent exercise. An angry squabble broke out between the mock commander of an Iraq battalion and an Iraqi police captain over how to secure the town, a possible dynamic since Iraq's army is largely Shiite and the police in Sunni areas are recruited from local communities. Within minutes, the Iraq battalion commander had stormed out of the room, leaving Yerkes and his soldiers to ponder how they might better defuse tensions in the future.
"It showed my team a different piece of culture we have not been exposed to and forced us to think our way through a problem," he said.
Ham is still looking for ways to improve the training. One drawback is that the teams of advisers do not train with the American combat brigades they will work with in Iraq, a limitation he hopes to address by arranging for them to train together.
Another constraint is the absence of actual Iraqi or Afghani soldiers. The role of foreign commanders, interpreters and townspeople in the exercises is played by American soldiers and contractors who were born in Iraq or are of Islamic descent.
Still, even when Iraqi-born contractors play the role of interpreters and townspeople the exercises can prove useful.
Major William Cotty, one of a small number of Special Forces officers who have volunteered to serve as advisers, is leading an advisory team that will be assigned to an Iraqi Army unit. A seasoned officer who served in Colombia and Afghanistan, Cotty was put to the test during a raid he conducted with a mock Iraqi battalion commander.
Cotty planned a raid to capture a suspected insurgent in the fictional town of Surdash, speaking through an interpreter to his Iraqi battalion commander, an Arab-speaking American soldier who was born in Sudan. The operation led to a sharp firefight. A suspected insurgent was killed. The Iraqis hauled away a captive and began to pummel him as an angry crowd began yelling at the Americans. In an effort to disperse the crowd, Cotty fired several blanks into the air.
At a review conducted immediate after the raid, the army officers overseeing the training cautioned the advisers to make sure they the suspected insurgents they plan to capture have not been targeted as part of a sectarian or personal vendetta, no small concern as Iraq teeters on the brink of civil war.
They also suggested that the major might have taken other steps before firing warning shots, a move that might have encouraged the Iraqi soldiers to fire wildly. The Americans, for example, might have brought along a loudspeaker and used their interpreter to talk to the townspeople about the point of a raid. Cotty said the exercise was helpful.
"According to the book on direct action, I had speed, surprise and violence of action," he said. "The number one thing I probably took away from this was the loudspeaker."
Ellie
By Michael R. Gordon
The New York Times
This wind- swept stretch of Kansas has become the hub of a major effort by the United States to overhaul its effort to advise Iraq's fledgling security forces.
Following a disappointing performance by many Iraqi units and complaints that earlier efforts to train American advisers had been handicapped by bureaucratic inertia, the army has handed the mission to Carter Ham, a two-star general who served as a commander in Iraq.
Along with nearly 1,000 of soldiers from his 1st Infantry Division, Ham has sought to improve the training of the advisers as the army has moved to upgrade the quality of the teams.
The revamped effort began with little fanfare last summer but has gained increased prominence in recent weeks as experts inside and outside government have urged that the number of advisers be greatly increased and more resources poured into strengthening the Iraqi security forces.
In recent exercises, the would-be advisers were confronted by some of the vexing scenarios they were likely to face in Iraq: an Iraqi battalion commander who quarreled angrily with his Iraqi police counterpart, Iraqi troops that roughed up a detainee and an Iraqi crowd irate at the troops who had conducted a surprise raid.
The army is "transitioning from an endeavor that has been less than a high priority to one that is of the highest priority," said Jack Keane, a retired four- star general who served as the army vice chief of staff during the first several months of the war. "And it is long overdue."
The army has long experience in training military advisers, most notably in Vietnam. There, the army began with an active advisory program before the fighting escalated into a major conflict. In Iraq, however, the war began with major combat and the use of American advisers to work with the Iraq security forces was introduced later, almost as an afterthought.
"When we first started this transition team business in both Iraq and Afghanistan it was very much a hit and miss proposition," said Ham, who acknowledged that the adviser program was initially dogged by a host of problems. "The selection of individuals for duty on transition teams was probably more haphazard than any of us would have liked. The training was not standardized across the various training locations.."
"I think that was what led to some of the earlier criticisms, and in my view the criticism was fair and justified," Ham added. "We need to do it better, and this initiative that started the training here at Fort Riley is a part of that."
There are more than 430 teams in Iraq, accounting for more than 4,000 American soldiers and marines. General John Abizaid, head of the U.S. Central Command, said last week that the United States planned to substantially increase the size and number of teams and attach them not only to Iraqi battalions but also to Iraqi companies and possibly even platoons. Those ideas, however, have yet to be incorporated in the program to train advisers. To organize the training now under way, the army gave the mission to Ham and senior officers from two of his brigades.
The training program at Fort Riley is a jampacked 60 days. Soldiers practice a variety of combat skills, including how to counter the ever-present roadside bombs. They also receive a dose of cultural training and, for those headed to Iraq, 50 hours of Arabic language instruction - enough to provide only the most rudimentary skills but more training that most advisers previously received. There is additional training in Kuwait and at the sprawling military base at Taji, Iraq before the advisers take up their duties.
Ham said the advisory teams included more active-duty soldiers than during the early days of the advisory program when many of the teams were filled largely by reservists. As a matter of army policy, staffing the adviser teams is now a higher priority for army personnel officers and filling the empty slots in unit on alert to deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan. Since the teams are assembled from throughout the army the training is not only a period to learn new skills but a time to learn to work together.
According to current plans, Fort Riley will train the majority of the army adviser teams that are sent to advise the Iraqi Army, national police and border guards. The rest of the army teams are to drawn from units in Iraq. The Marines have a separate training effort for their own advisers.
Once the teams are in the field, they are managed by Brigadier General Dana Pittard, an assistant division commander, who provides feedback to Fort Riley. The expectation is that American advisers will be attached to Iraq military and police units well after the bulk of American combat forces are eventually withdrawn.
Major Andrew Yerkes, who is leading a team that is to advise Iraq's National Police, was thrust in a difficult situation during a recent exercise. An angry squabble broke out between the mock commander of an Iraq battalion and an Iraqi police captain over how to secure the town, a possible dynamic since Iraq's army is largely Shiite and the police in Sunni areas are recruited from local communities. Within minutes, the Iraq battalion commander had stormed out of the room, leaving Yerkes and his soldiers to ponder how they might better defuse tensions in the future.
"It showed my team a different piece of culture we have not been exposed to and forced us to think our way through a problem," he said.
Ham is still looking for ways to improve the training. One drawback is that the teams of advisers do not train with the American combat brigades they will work with in Iraq, a limitation he hopes to address by arranging for them to train together.
Another constraint is the absence of actual Iraqi or Afghani soldiers. The role of foreign commanders, interpreters and townspeople in the exercises is played by American soldiers and contractors who were born in Iraq or are of Islamic descent.
Still, even when Iraqi-born contractors play the role of interpreters and townspeople the exercises can prove useful.
Major William Cotty, one of a small number of Special Forces officers who have volunteered to serve as advisers, is leading an advisory team that will be assigned to an Iraqi Army unit. A seasoned officer who served in Colombia and Afghanistan, Cotty was put to the test during a raid he conducted with a mock Iraqi battalion commander.
Cotty planned a raid to capture a suspected insurgent in the fictional town of Surdash, speaking through an interpreter to his Iraqi battalion commander, an Arab-speaking American soldier who was born in Sudan. The operation led to a sharp firefight. A suspected insurgent was killed. The Iraqis hauled away a captive and began to pummel him as an angry crowd began yelling at the Americans. In an effort to disperse the crowd, Cotty fired several blanks into the air.
At a review conducted immediate after the raid, the army officers overseeing the training cautioned the advisers to make sure they the suspected insurgents they plan to capture have not been targeted as part of a sectarian or personal vendetta, no small concern as Iraq teeters on the brink of civil war.
They also suggested that the major might have taken other steps before firing warning shots, a move that might have encouraged the Iraqi soldiers to fire wildly. The Americans, for example, might have brought along a loudspeaker and used their interpreter to talk to the townspeople about the point of a raid. Cotty said the exercise was helpful.
"According to the book on direct action, I had speed, surprise and violence of action," he said. "The number one thing I probably took away from this was the loudspeaker."
Ellie