Iraq's weapons of mass destruction

[wrbones]

http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Politics/documents/2002/09/24/dossier.pdf


Too much to download here. Lots of info from the British government.
http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1024051804483

[wrbones]

http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/iraq_wmd/Iraq_Oct_2002.htm

[wrbones]

Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East


IRAQ
Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Missile Capabilities and Programs[1]
Nuclear[2] With sufficient black-market uranium or plutonium, Iraq probably could fabricate a nuclear weapon.
If undetected and unobstructed, could produce weapons-grade fissile material within several years.
Engaged in clandestine procurement of special nuclear weapon-related equipment.
Retains large and experienced pool of nuclear scientists and technicians.
Retains nuclear weapons design, and may retain related components and software.
Repeatedly violated its obligations under the NPT, which Iraq ratified on 10/29/69.
Repeatedly violated its obligations under United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 687, which mandates destruction of Iraq's nuclear weapon capabilities.
Until halted by Coalition air attacks and UNSCOM disarmament efforts, Iraq had an extensive nuclear weapon development program that began in 1972, involved 10,000 personnel, and had a multi-year budget totaling approximately $10 billion.
In 1990, Iraq also launched a crash program to divert reactor fuel under IAEA safeguards to produce nuclear weapons.
Considered two delivery options for nuclear weapons: either using unmodified al-Hussein ballistic missile with 300km range, or producing Al-Hussein derivative with 650km range.
In 1987, Iraq reportedly field tested a radiological bomb.

Biological[3] May retain stockpile of biological weapon (BW) munitions, including over 150 R-400 aerial bombs, and 25 or more special chemical/biological Al-Hussein ballistic missile warheads.
May retain biological weapon sprayers for Mirage F-1 aircraft.
May retain mobile production facility with capacity to produce "dry" biological agents (i.e., with long shelf life and optimized for dissemination).
Has not accounted for 17 metric tonnes of BW growth media.
May possess smallpox virus; tested camelpox prior to Gulf War.
Maintains technical expertise and equipment to resume production of Bacillus anthracis spores (anthrax), botulinum toxin, aflatoxin, and Clostridium perfringens (gas gangrene).
Prepared BW munitions for missile and aircraft delivery in 1990-1991 Gulf War; this included loading al-Hussein ballistic missile warheads and R-400 aerial bombs with Bacillis anthracis.
Conducted research on BW dissemination using unmanned aerial vehicles.
Repeatedly violated its obligations under UNSC Resolution 687, which mandates destruction of Iraq's biological weapon capabilities.
Ratified the BTWC on 4/18/91, as required by the Gulf War cease-fire agreement.

Chemical[4] May retain stockpile of chemical weapon (CW) munitions, including 25 or more special chemical/biological al-Hussein ballistic missile warheads, 2,000 aerial bombs, 15,000-25,000 rockets, and 15,000 artillery shells.
Believed to possess sufficient precursor chemicals to produce hundreds of tons of mustard gas, VX, and other nerve agents.
Reconstructing former dual-use CW production facilities that were destroyed by U.S. bombing.
Retains sufficient technical expertise to revive CW programs within months.
Repeatedly used CW against Iraqi Kurds in 1988 and against Iran in 1983-1988 during the Iran-Iraq war.
An extensive CW arsenal–including 38,537 munitions, 690 tons of CW agents, and over 3,000 tons of CW precursor chemicals–has been destroyed by UNSCOM.
Repeatedly violated its obligations under UNSC Resolution 687, which mandates destruction of Iraq's chemical weapon capabilities.
Not a signatory of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Ballistic missiles[5] May retain several al-Hussein (modified Scud-B) missiles with 650km range and 500kg payload.
May retain components for dozens of Scud-B and al-Hussein missiles, as well as indigenously produced Scud missile engines.
Maintains clandestine procurement network to import missile components.
Reconstructing missile production facilities destroyed in 1998 by U.S. bombing.
May possess several hundred tons of propellant for Scud missiles.
If undetected and unobstructed, could resume production of al-Hussein missiles; could develop 3,000km-range missiles within five years; could develop ICBM within 15 years.
Launched 331 Scud-B missiles at Iran during the Iran-Iraq war, and 189 al-Hussein missiles at Iranian cities during the 1988 "War of the Cities."
Developing Ababil-100 with 150km range and 300kg payload, flight-testing al-Samoud with 140km range and 300kg payload, and producing Ababil-50 with 50km range and 95kg payload.

Cruise missiles[6] C-601/Nisa 28 and HY-2 Silkworm with 95km range and 513kg payload.
SS-N-2c Styx with 80km range and 513kg payload.
Exocet AM-39 with 50km range and 165kg payload.
YJ-1/C-801 with 40km range and 165kg payload.

Other delivery systems[7] Reportedly converting L-29 jet trainers to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for delivery of BW or CW.
May possess spraying equipment for BW dissemination by helicopter.
Experimented with MIG-21 as unmanned delivery vehicle for BW.
Fighter and ground attack forces may total 300 fixed-wing aircraft, including Su-25, Su-24MK, Su-20, Su-7, MiG-29, MiG-25, MiG-23BN, MiG-21, Mirage F1EQ5, and F-7.
Ground systems include artillery and rocket launchers, notably 500+ FROG-7 artillery rockets and 12-15 launchers, with 70km range and 450kg payload.

[wrbones]

Sources:

[1] This chart summarizes data available from public sources. Precise assessment of a Iraq's capabilities is difficult because most weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs remain secret and cannot be verified independently. Although inspections by UNSCOM and the IAEA's Iraq Action Team provided detailed information about past Iraqi programs, assessing Iraq's current capabilities is difficult due to its policies of denial and deception, and to its expulsion of UNSCOM inspectors in November 1998.

On Iraq's deception and denial policies, see: Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker (New York: Scribner, 2000). David Albright, "Masters of Deception," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 54:3 (May/June 1998). Barton Gellman, "A Futile Game of Hide and Seek," Washington Post, 10/11/98. Barton Gellman, "Arms Inspectors ‘Shake the Tree," Washington Post, 10/12/98.

On UNSCOM's efforts to disarm Iraq of WMD, see Robert Einhorn, Robert Gallucci, Dimitri Perricos, Jere Nichols, Gary Dillon, Ephraim Asculai, and Michael Eisenstadt, 6/14-15/01, transcripts from a conference, "Understanding the Lessons of Nuclear Inspections and Monitoring in Iraq: A Ten-Year Review," Washington, DC. Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS). <http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iraq/index.html>. Richard Butler, The Greatest Threat: Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Growing Crisis in Global Security, (New York: Public Affairs, 2000). Tim Trevan, Saddam's Secrets-The Hunt for Iraq's Hidden Weapons, (New York: Harper Collins, 1999).

[2] IAEA Action Team on Iraq, 7/13/01, "Fact Sheet: Iraq's Nuclear Weapon Programme," International Atomic Energy Agency, <http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/nwp2.html>. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Proliferation: Threat and Response, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001). Kelly Motz, undated [accessed 9/12/01] "What Has Iraq Been Doing Since Inspectors Left? What Is On Its Shopping List?" Iraq Watch, <http://www.iraqwatch.org/updates/update.asp?id=wpn200107231601>. William J. Broad, "Document Reveals 1987 Bomb Test by Iraq," New York Times, 4/29/01, p. 16. David Albright, "Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program: Past, Present, and Future Challenges," PolicyWatch #301, 2/18/98, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/Policywatch/policywatch1998/301.htm>. U.S. Government White Paper, "Iraq Weapons Of Mass Destruction Programs," 2/13/98, <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/nea/iraq_white_paper.html>. Steven Dolley, 5/12/98, "Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program: Unresolved Issues," Nuclear Control Institute, <http://www.nci.org/iraq/iraq511.htm>. Steven Dolley, 2/19/98, "Iraq and the Bomb: The Nuclear Threat Continues," Nuclear Control Institute, <http://www.nci.org/i/ib21998.htm>. Anthony H. Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: Regional Trends, National Forces, Warfighting Capabilities, Delivery Options, and Weapons Effects, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2001, <http://www.csis.org/burke/mb/me_wmd_mideast.pdf>, pp. 85-86. David Albright, "A Special Case: Iraq," Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities, and Policies, (Oxford: Oxford University Press/SIPRI, 1997), pp. 309-50.

[3] United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), Report: Disarmament, 1/25/99, United Nations, <http://cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/ucreport/index.htm>. Motz undated. Steve Bowman, "Iraqi Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) Capabilities," (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2/17/98), pp. 1-5. Barbara Starr, "UNSCOM Inspectors Still Doubt Iraq's Arms Claims," Jane's Defence Weekly, 2/25/98, p. 18. U.S. Government White Paper 1998. Cordesman 2001, pp. 81-84. Gellman 1998. Jonathan Tucker, "Lessons of Iraq's Biological Weapons Program," Arms Control Today, 1993, 14(3): 229-71.

[4]U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2000," 9/7/01, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_sep_2001.htm>. Motz undated. Javed Ali, Spring 2001, "Chemical Weapons and the Iran-Iraq War: A Case Study in Noncompliance," Nonproliferation Review 8(1): 43-58. UNSCOM 1/25/99. Bowman 1998, pp. 1-5. U.S. Government White Paper 1998. Starr 1998, p. 18. Cordesman 2001, pp. 75-79. United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), "UNSCOM Main Achievements," 5/98, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/achievement.htm>. Physicians for Human Rights, "Winds of Death: Iraq's Use of Poison Gas Against its Kurdish Population," (Boston, MA: Physicians for Human Rights, 2/89), pp. 1-2.

[5] CIA 9/7/01. Cordesman 2001, pp.71-75. "German Assessment: Iraqi Missiles Will Reach Europe by 2005," Deutsche Presse Agentur (Berlin), 2/23/00, <http://www.BerlinOnline.de>. Jane's Online, "Country Inventory – In Service," and "Offensive Weapons, Iraq," Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems 36, 7/24/01, <http://online.janes.com>. National Intelligence Council, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015, 9/99, <http://www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/other_products/foreign_missle_developments.htm>. Carnegie Nuclear Non-Proliferation Project, undated [accessed 8/14/01], "World Missile Chart, <http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/ballisticmissilechart.htm>. Motz undated. UNSCOM 1/25/99. Federation of American Scientists, undated, "Iraq," <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/missile/>. Centre for Defence and International Security Studies (CDISS), undated, "National Briefings: Iraq," "Ballistic Missile Capabilities by Country," and "Iraqi Ballistic Missile Capabilities," <http://www.cdiss.org/>. U.S. Government White Paper 1998. Starr, p. 18. Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict (London: Grafton Books, 1989). Interview with Tim McCarthy, Senior Missile Analyst, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 4/30/98.

[6] National Defense Industrial Association, Feasibility of Third World Advanced Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat: Volume 2, Emerging Cruise Missile Threat, 8/99, <http://www.ndia.org/committees/slaad/ECMTVol2.pdf>, pp. 138-145. CDISS, undated, "Emerging Cruise Missile Capabilities," <http://www.cdiss.org/images/tabled.htm>.

[7] CIA 9/7/01. Motz undated. Jane's Online 7/24/01. The Military Balance 2000/2001 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2000), p. 141.


September 2001 update by Michael Barletta and Jeffrey Fields.
November 1998 original by Michael Barletta and Erik Jorgensen.
© Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Monterey Institute of International Studies

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Return to the WMDME home page.




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Center for Nonproliferation Studies
460 Pierce Street, Monterey, CA 93940, USA
Telephone: +1 (831) 647-4154; Fax: +1 (831) 647-3519
E-mail: cns@miis.edu; Web: http://cns.miis.edu
Copyright © 2002 Monterey Institute of International Studies. All rights reserved.


http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/iraq.htm

[wrbones]

http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2002/020917_fa_iraq_wmd.html



http://www.dfat.gov.au/globalissues/iraq_wmd/

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http://www.fas.org/index.html

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http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/department/focus/weapons_mass_destruction-en.asp

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Back to News



U.N. Spy Photos Show New Building at Iraqi Nuclear Sites
(September 6, 2002)

The New York Times
Atomic Anxiety
By JULIA PRESTON
nytimes.com



UNITED NATIONS, Sept. 5 - A team of weapons inspectors, studying satellite photography, have identified several nuclear-related sites in Iraq where new construction or other unexplained changes have occurred since the last international inspections nearly four years ago, a United Nations official said today.

Experts in New York and Vienna have continued to scrutinize aerial photographs and pore over intelligence reports, even after United Nations inspectors pulled out of Iraq in December 1998 in advance of bombing by the United States and Britain.

Officials representing the team of nuclear inspectors in Vienna and a separate team on chemical and biological weapons based in New York said United Nations inspectors are equipped, trained and ready to go to Iraq and could begin their work within weeks if Baghdad gave permission. But they said it would take about a year to complete work to determine whether Iraq was developing prohibited weapons, and then only if Iraq cooperated fully.

A team of about 15 experts at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna noted the new structures and other alterations in photographs shot by a commercial satellite, said Jacques Baute, the French physicist who is the team leader of the nuclear inspectors.

The shots were compared to pictures and information from the sites gathered by inspectors the last time they were in Iraq. He declined to identify exact locations.

"We are very curious to see what is under the roof," Mr. Baute said, referring to the new buildings. "There are some activities that could be part of prohibited activities, but we have nothing now that allows us to draw a conclusion.

"We want to open any door we want to open," he said.

President Bush, facing concern from many nations over the possibility of a military strike by the United States against Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi president, plans to consult over the next two days with leaders from Security Council nations to see if new action can be taken through the United Nations to confront Iraq on the weapons inspections.

But even if inspectors were allowed to return, United Nations officials acknowledge that their timetable is slower than United States officials say they want. The inspectors said it would take them about 12 months to examine locations, scrutinize documents and analyze samples to get a full picture of Iraq's weapons efforts - if they could work unimpeded.

Iraq has continued to allow annual inspections of one warehouse in a Baghdad suburb, part of the Tawaitha nuclear research center, by a different team of the atomic agency. In their last visit, in January, the inspectors did not detect any illegal weapons activity there.

But Iraq has not been reporting to the United Nations its "dual-use" imports - substances that might be used for weapons production as well as nuclear fuel - as it is required to do, according to a report released today by Hans Blix, the head of the biological and chemical weapons team.

That team, which is based in New York, was reorganized by the Security Council two years ago to make it more professional and finance it with revenues from sales of Iraqi oil, which is monitored by the United Nations. The team, which also will inspect for development of long-range missiles, now includes 63 permanent staff members from 27 countries.

After a meeting last weekend, European Union countries have been discussing the idea of setting a deadline to force Iraq to allow the United Nations inspectors to return. But diplomats in New York said that European governments had not yet decided on that course, and were waiting to hear from President Bush.

Secretary General Kofi Annan, increasingly impatient with Baghdad's delays, has resisted attempts by Iraq since August to draw him into new talks about the purpose of the inspections. Mr. Annan told Iraqi officials that their next exchange with him should be an invitation for the inspectors to return.













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Copyright © 2002 The Iraq Foundation. All rights reserved.

[wrbones]

http://www.foxnews.com/projects/pdf/120202_saddamdossier.pdf

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http://www.ciaonet.org/special_section/iraq/papers/cia01/cia01d.pdf

[wrbones]

Home > Publications > WMDME > Page


Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East
Go to Iraq Special Collections.
Go to Iraq's Biological Weapons Program.

IRAQ
Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Missile Capabilities and Programs[1]
Nuclear[2] With sufficient black-market uranium or plutonium, Iraq probably could fabricate a nuclear weapon.
If undetected and unobstructed, could produce weapons-grade fissile material within several years.
Engaged in clandestine procurement of special nuclear weapon-related equipment.
Retains large and experienced pool of nuclear scientists and technicians.
Retains nuclear weapons design, and may retain related components and software.
Repeatedly violated its obligations under the NPT, which Iraq ratified on 10/29/69.
Repeatedly violated its obligations under United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 687, which mandates destruction of Iraq's nuclear weapon capabilities.
Until halted by Coalition air attacks and UNSCOM disarmament efforts, Iraq had an extensive nuclear weapon development program that began in 1972, involved 10,000 personnel, and had a multi-year budget totaling approximately $10 billion.
In 1990, Iraq also launched a crash program to divert reactor fuel under IAEA safeguards to produce nuclear weapons.
Considered two delivery options for nuclear weapons: either using unmodified al-Hussein ballistic missile with 300km range, or producing Al-Hussein derivative with 650km range.
In 1987, Iraq reportedly field tested a radiological bomb.

Biological[3] May retain stockpile of biological weapon (BW) munitions, including over 150 R-400 aerial bombs, and 25 or more special chemical/biological Al-Hussein ballistic missile warheads.
May retain biological weapon sprayers for Mirage F-1 aircraft.
May retain mobile production facility with capacity to produce "dry" biological agents (i.e., with long shelf life and optimized for dissemination).
Has not accounted for 17 metric tonnes of BW growth media.
May possess smallpox virus; tested camelpox prior to Gulf War.
Maintains technical expertise and equipment to resume production of Bacillus anthracis spores (anthrax), botulinum toxin, aflatoxin, and Clostridium perfringens (gas gangrene).
Prepared BW munitions for missile and aircraft delivery in 1990-1991 Gulf War; this included loading al-Hussein ballistic missile warheads and R-400 aerial bombs with Bacillis anthracis.
Conducted research on BW dissemination using unmanned aerial vehicles.
Repeatedly violated its obligations under UNSC Resolution 687, which mandates destruction of Iraq's biological weapon capabilities.
Ratified the BTWC on 4/18/91, as required by the Gulf War cease-fire agreement.

Chemical[4] May retain stockpile of chemical weapon (CW) munitions, including 25 or more special chemical/biological al-Hussein ballistic missile warheads, 2,000 aerial bombs, 15,000-25,000 rockets, and 15,000 artillery shells.
Believed to possess sufficient precursor chemicals to produce hundreds of tons of mustard gas, VX, and other nerve agents.
Reconstructing former dual-use CW production facilities that were destroyed by U.S. bombing.
Retains sufficient technical expertise to revive CW programs within months.
Repeatedly used CW against Iraqi Kurds in 1988 and against Iran in 1983-1988 during the Iran-Iraq war.
An extensive CW arsenal–including 38,537 munitions, 690 tons of CW agents, and over 3,000 tons of CW precursor chemicals–has been destroyed by UNSCOM.
Repeatedly violated its obligations under UNSC Resolution 687, which mandates destruction of Iraq's chemical weapon capabilities.
Not a signatory of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Ballistic missiles[5] May retain several al-Hussein (modified Scud-B) missiles with 650km range and 500kg payload.
May retain components for dozens of Scud-B and al-Hussein missiles, as well as indigenously produced Scud missile engines.
Maintains clandestine procurement network to import missile components.
Reconstructing missile production facilities destroyed in 1998 by U.S. bombing.
May possess several hundred tons of propellant for Scud missiles.
If undetected and unobstructed, could resume production of al-Hussein missiles; could develop 3,000km-range missiles within five years; could develop ICBM within 15 years.
Launched 331 Scud-B missiles at Iran during the Iran-Iraq war, and 189 al-Hussein missiles at Iranian cities during the 1988 "War of the Cities."
Developing Ababil-100 with 150km range and 300kg payload, flight-testing al-Samoud with 140km range and 300kg payload, and producing Ababil-50 with 50km range and 95kg payload.

Cruise missiles[6] C-601/Nisa 28 and HY-2 Silkworm with 95km range and 513kg payload.
SS-N-2c Styx with 80km range and 513kg payload.
Exocet AM-39 with 50km range and 165kg payload.
YJ-1/C-801 with 40km range and 165kg payload.

Other delivery systems[7] Reportedly converting L-29 jet trainers to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for delivery of BW or CW.
May possess spraying equipment for BW dissemination by helicopter.
Experimented with MIG-21 as unmanned delivery vehicle for BW.
Fighter and ground attack forces may total 300 fixed-wing aircraft, including Su-25, Su-24MK, Su-20, Su-7, MiG-29, MiG-25, MiG-23BN, MiG-21, Mirage F1EQ5, and F-7.
Ground systems include artillery and rocket launchers, notably 500+ FROG-7 artillery rockets and 12-15 launchers, with 70km range and 450kg payload.



(cont)

[wrbones]

Sources:

[1] This chart summarizes data available from public sources. Precise assessment of a Iraq's capabilities is difficult because most weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs remain secret and cannot be verified independently. Although inspections by UNSCOM and the IAEA's Iraq Action Team provided detailed information about past Iraqi programs, assessing Iraq's current capabilities is difficult due to its policies of denial and deception, and to its expulsion of UNSCOM inspectors in November 1998.

On Iraq's deception and denial policies, see: Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker (New York: Scribner, 2000). David Albright, "Masters of Deception," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 54:3 (May/June 1998). Barton Gellman, "A Futile Game of Hide and Seek," Washington Post, 10/11/98. Barton Gellman, "Arms Inspectors ‘Shake the Tree," Washington Post, 10/12/98.

On UNSCOM's efforts to disarm Iraq of WMD, see Robert Einhorn, Robert Gallucci, Dimitri Perricos, Jere Nichols, Gary Dillon, Ephraim Asculai, and Michael Eisenstadt, 6/14-15/01, transcripts from a conference, "Understanding the Lessons of Nuclear Inspections and Monitoring in Iraq: A Ten-Year Review," Washington, DC. Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS). <http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iraq/index.html>. Richard Butler, The Greatest Threat: Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Growing Crisis in Global Security, (New York: Public Affairs, 2000). Tim Trevan, Saddam's Secrets-The Hunt for Iraq's Hidden Weapons, (New York: Harper Collins, 1999).

[2] IAEA Action Team on Iraq, 7/13/01, "Fact Sheet: Iraq's Nuclear Weapon Programme," International Atomic Energy Agency, <http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/nwp2.html>. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Proliferation: Threat and Response, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001). Kelly Motz, undated [accessed 9/12/01] "What Has Iraq Been Doing Since Inspectors Left? What Is On Its Shopping List?" Iraq Watch, <http://www.iraqwatch.org/updates/update.asp?id=wpn200107231601>. William J. Broad, "Document Reveals 1987 Bomb Test by Iraq," New York Times, 4/29/01, p. 16. David Albright, "Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program: Past, Present, and Future Challenges," PolicyWatch #301, 2/18/98, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/Policywatch/policywatch1998/301.htm>. U.S. Government White Paper, "Iraq Weapons Of Mass Destruction Programs," 2/13/98, <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/nea/iraq_white_paper.html>. Steven Dolley, 5/12/98, "Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program: Unresolved Issues," Nuclear Control Institute, <http://www.nci.org/iraq/iraq511.htm>. Steven Dolley, 2/19/98, "Iraq and the Bomb: The Nuclear Threat Continues," Nuclear Control Institute, <http://www.nci.org/i/ib21998.htm>. Anthony H. Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: Regional Trends, National Forces, Warfighting Capabilities, Delivery Options, and Weapons Effects, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2001, <http://www.csis.org/burke/mb/me_wmd_mideast.pdf>, pp. 85-86. David Albright, "A Special Case: Iraq," Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities, and Policies, (Oxford: Oxford University Press/SIPRI, 1997), pp. 309-50.

[3] United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), Report: Disarmament, 1/25/99, United Nations, <http://cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/ucreport/index.htm>. Motz undated. Steve Bowman, "Iraqi Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) Capabilities," (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2/17/98), pp. 1-5. Barbara Starr, "UNSCOM Inspectors Still Doubt Iraq's Arms Claims," Jane's Defence Weekly, 2/25/98, p. 18. U.S. Government White Paper 1998. Cordesman 2001, pp. 81-84. Gellman 1998. Jonathan Tucker, "Lessons of Iraq's Biological Weapons Program," Arms Control Today, 1993, 14(3): 229-71.

[4]U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2000," 9/7/01, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_sep_2001.htm>. Motz undated. Javed Ali, Spring 2001, "Chemical Weapons and the Iran-Iraq War: A Case Study in Noncompliance," Nonproliferation Review 8(1): 43-58. UNSCOM 1/25/99. Bowman 1998, pp. 1-5. U.S. Government White Paper 1998. Starr 1998, p. 18. Cordesman 2001, pp. 75-79. United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), "UNSCOM Main Achievements," 5/98, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/achievement.htm>. Physicians for Human Rights, "Winds of Death: Iraq's Use of Poison Gas Against its Kurdish Population," (Boston, MA: Physicians for Human Rights, 2/89), pp. 1-2.

[5] CIA 9/7/01. Cordesman 2001, pp.71-75. "German Assessment: Iraqi Missiles Will Reach Europe by 2005," Deutsche Presse Agentur (Berlin), 2/23/00, <http://www.BerlinOnline.de>. Jane's Online, "Country Inventory – In Service," and "Offensive Weapons, Iraq," Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems 36, 7/24/01, <http://online.janes.com>. National Intelligence Council, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015, 9/99, <http://www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/other_products/foreign_missle_developments.htm>. Carnegie Nuclear Non-Proliferation Project, undated [accessed 8/14/01], "World Missile Chart, <http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/ballisticmissilechart.htm>. Motz undated. UNSCOM 1/25/99. Federation of American Scientists, undated, "Iraq," <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/missile/>. Centre for Defence and International Security Studies (CDISS), undated, "National Briefings: Iraq," "Ballistic Missile Capabilities by Country," and "Iraqi Ballistic Missile Capabilities," <http://www.cdiss.org/>. U.S. Government White Paper 1998. Starr, p. 18. Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict (London: Grafton Books, 1989). Interview with Tim McCarthy, Senior Missile Analyst, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 4/30/98.

[6] National Defense Industrial Association, Feasibility of Third World Advanced Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat: Volume 2, Emerging Cruise Missile Threat, 8/99, <http://www.ndia.org/committees/slaad/ECMTVol2.pdf>, pp. 138-145. CDISS, undated, "Emerging Cruise Missile Capabilities," <http://www.cdiss.org/images/tabled.htm>.

[7] CIA 9/7/01. Motz undated. Jane's Online 7/24/01. The Military Balance 2000/2001 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2000), p. 141.


September 2001 update by Michael Barletta and Jeffrey Fields.
November 1998 original by Michael Barletta and Erik Jorgensen.
© Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Monterey Institute of International Studies

Go to the Regional Map.


Return to the WMDME home page.




[Top]



Center for Nonproliferation Studies
460 Pierce Street, Monterey, CA 93940, USA
Telephone: +1 (831) 647-4154; Fax: +1 (831) 647-3519
E-mail: cns@miis.edu; Web: http://cns.miis.edu
Copyright © 2002 Monterey Institute of International Studies. All rights reserved.