PDA

View Full Version : Iraqi military effectiveness



wrbones
01-24-03, 03:48 PM
Updated Oct. 25, 2002 Printer-Friendly Version

All the information in the list below is taken from the 2002-2003 Military Balance from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). It does not take into account the quality of Iraqi forces or their manning levels.

According to testimony given to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, while half of Iraqi divisions are 8,000 strong (and in a "fair state of readiness") out of average authorized strengths of 10,000 men, at least half of the regular army is at 70 percent or less of its authorized strength, with some infantry units badly undermanned and very dependent on conscripts. He also notes that Republican Guards divisions average at least 80 percent of an authorized strength of 8,000-10,000, with brigades averaging the size of a large U.S. battalion of 2,500 men. IISS reports that all Iraqi divisions (except those of the Republican Guard) are at 50 percent combat effectiveness, with half of all army equipment lacking spare parts. IISS also cites the serviceability of the Iraqi fixed wing aircraft at around 55 percent, with serviceability of helicopters 'poor,' and lists senior pilots as having 90-120 flying hours, with junior pilots having as little as 20 hours of flight time.

Total personnel: 389,000
Reserves: 650,000


ARMY

Total personnel: 350,000 (including 100,000 recalled reservists)

Comprised of:
7 Corps HQs
3 armored divisions
3 mechanized divisions
11 infantry divisions
6 Republican Guard Force divisions
4 Special Republican Guard brigades
5 Commando brigades
2 Special Forces brigades


Equipment:

Main Battle Tanks: 2,600
1,900 T-55/62 and PRC Type-59

700 T-72

Reconnaissance vehicles: 400
Brdm-2, AML-60/90
EE-9 'Cascavel'
EE-3 'Jararaca'

Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicles: 1,200
BMP 1/2

Armored Personnel Carriers: 1,800
BTR 50/60/152
OT 62/64
MTLB
YW-701
M-113A1/A2
EE-11 'Urutu'

Towed Artillery: 1,900
105mm (Including: M-56 pack)
122mm (Including: D-74; D-30; M-1938)
130mm (Including: M-46; Type 59-1)
155mm (Including: G-5; GHN-45; M-114)

Self-propelled Artillery: 200
122mm (2SI)
152mm (2S3)
155mm (Including M-109A1/A2; AUF-1 (GCT))

Multiple Rocket Launchers: 200
107mm
122mm (BM-21)
127mm (ASTROS II)
132mm (BM-13/16)
262mm ('Ababeel-100’)

Mortars (numbers unknown):
81mm
120mm
160mm (M-1943)
240mm

Surface to Surface Missiles:
Launchers reported:
50 Free Rocket Over Ground (FROG)
6 'Scud'

(Possibly possess ‘al-Hussein’ also.)

Anti-Tank Guided Weapons (Numbers Unknown):
AT-3 'Sagger' (Including BRDM-2)
AT-4 'Spigot'
SS-11
'Milan'
High-subsonic Optically Teleguided (HOT) — includes: 100 VC-TH

Recoilless Launchers (Number Unknown):
73mm (SPG-9)
82mm (B-10)
107mm (B-11)

Anti-Tank Guns:
85mm
100mm (towed)

Helicopters: 164
Attack: 62
12 Mi-25
20 SA-319
10 SA-316
20 SA-342

Support: 102

20 SA-330-F

30 B0-105

10 Mi-6

30 Mi-8

12 Mi-17

Surveillance Equipment (Numbers unknown):

RASIT (Armored Reconnaissance Radar - detects vehicles and artillery)
'Cymbeline' (anti-mortar radar)


(cont)

wrbones
01-24-03, 03:49 PM
NAVY

Total personnel: 2,000


Patrol and coastal combat vessels: 6

Missile Craft:
1 Soviet 'Osa I' Fast Patrol Craft with 4 SS-N-2A 'Styx' surface-to-surface missiles

Inshore Patrol Craft: 5 (All believed inoperable)
1 Soviet 'Bogomol' Fast Patrol Craft (Inshore); 1 other Fast patrol Craft (Inshore); 1 Patrol Craft (Inshore). Also: 80 boats.

Mine Warfare Craft: 3
Mine Countermeasures
1 Soviet 'Yevgenya,'
2 'Nestin' minesweeper (Inshore)

Support and Miscellaneous:

1 'Damen' miscellaneous auxiliary vessel
1 Yacht (with helicopter deck)


AIR FORCE

Total Personnel: 20,000
Total combat aircraft: 316 (no armed helicopters)


Aircraft:

Bombers: 6
H-6D
Tu-22

Fighter, Ground Attack: 130
Mig-23BN
'Mirage' F1EQ5
Su-20
40 Su-22 M
2 Su-24 MK
2 Su-25

Fighter: 180
18 F-7
40 MiG-21
50 MiG-23
12 Mig-25
50 'Mirage' F-1EQ
10 MiG-29

Reconnaissance: 5
MiG-25

Tanker (numbers unknown):
Includes: 2 Il-76

Transport: (numbers unknown)
An-2
3 An-12
An-24
6 An-26
Il-76

Training: (numbers unknown)
20 AS-202
50 EMB-312
50 L-39
'Mirage' F-1BQ
25 PC-7
12 PC-9


Missiles:

Air-to-Surface include:
Am-39; AS-4; AS-5; AS-11; AS-9; AS-12; AS-30L; C-601

Air-to-Air include:
AA-2/6/7/8/10; R-530; R-550


AIR DEFENSE COMMAND

Total Personnel: 17,000

Head Quarters: Baghdad/Al Muthanna

Regional Air Defense Centers:
Kirkuk (north)
Kut al Hayy (east)
Al Basra (south)
Ramadia (west)

Air Defense Guns: 3,000
23mm: ZSU-23-4 SP
37mm: M-1939 and twin
57mm: include ZSU-57-2 (self-propelled)
85mm
100mm
130mm

Surface to Air Missiles: Approx. 850 launchers
Include: SA-2/3/6/7/8/9/13/12/16, ‘Roland,’ and ‘Aspide.’


Paramilitary Forces

Total Personnel: 42,000-44,000

Security Troops: 15,000
Border Guards: 9,000
Saddaam's Fedayeen: 18,000-20,000



Mark Burgess
CDI Research Analyst
mburgess@cdi.org Printer-Friendly Version

wrbones
01-24-03, 09:16 PM
http://www.csis.org/stratassessment/reports/Iraqi10yrsAfter.pdf

wrbones
01-24-03, 09:29 PM
http://www.nctimes.net/news/2002/20020831/64157.html

U.S. detects Iraqi military buildup around Baghdad
JOHN J. LUMPKIN
Associated Press
WASHINGTON ---- The Iraqi military is digging in to protect Baghdad in what U.S. officials describe as the biggest buildup of defenses around the city since the Gulf War.

Spurred to action by American threats of attack, Iraqi earthmovers are digging defensive positions for tanks, artillery and troops, defense and other officials said, speaking on condition of anonymity. Some military units are spreading out their heavy equipment to make it more difficult to target, and anti-aircraft defenses are being moved to improve the protection of the Iraqi capital from U.S. airstrikes, officials said.


"It's the largest defensive preparation since Desert Storm," said a Bush administration official. "The rhetoric they are hearing coming from the United States ---- they're taking it very, very seriously."

Iraqi President Saddam Hussein recently said he will take any fight with U.S. forces to the streets of Baghdad and other Iraqi cities, and U.S. officials acknowledge this is probably Saddam's best strategy in a new war. Some of the U.S. military's vast advantage in technology and training are mitigated when fighting in a city, rather than in the open.

Defending Baghdad proper is half of the Iraqi Republican Guard ---- three armored divisions that ring the city's outer reaches, officials said. The Republican Guard is considered the army unit most loyal to Saddam.

Its soldiers receive better equipment than the regular Iraqi army, although all of Saddam's military is suffering from a shortage of spare parts due to the partially successful U.N. embargo on weapons imports. All of its equipment is more than a decade old.

Republican Guard divisions are also better trained and led and are expected to hold out under fire longer than other Iraqi military units, who U.S. officials consider to be liable to flee or surrender. The divisions have 10,000 to 15,000 troops each.

Inside Baghdad itself are several paramilitary forces, the strongest of which is the Special Republican Guard. While these troops, numbering about 15,000 fighters, don't have many tanks or other heavy equipment, they are well-trained.

Many of the troops, and especially the officers, come from Tikrit and other towns from the confederation of tribes that backed Saddam's rise to power, U.S. officials said.

Another force in town are troops from the Directorate of General Security, something like a hybrid between the FBI and military police.

Saddam also boasts a number of militias in Baghdad, such as his son's vaunted fedayeen, that are considered loyal but not particularly good at fighting, officials said. Regular army units are kept farther from the capital, to prevent them from taking part in a revolt against Saddam, U.S. officials said.

During the 1991 Gulf War, Saddam moved many of his units to the open desert to fight the U.S.-led coalition, and he lost badly. If his troops stay in the cities, U.S. forces will face having to go neighborhood-to-neighborhood, street-to-street to oust Saddam from power.

In addition, U.S. intelligence believes Saddam keeps some of his weapons research labs in cities. Biological weapons labs are believed to be under hospitals, and chemical labs may be in pharmaceutical factories, U.S. officials have said.

But the idea of a war built around urban combat in Baghdad, Basra and elsewhere, gives some U.S. military planners pause. While Pentagon officials are confident they can defeat Saddam's weakened military and conquer Baghdad, some worry that U.S. and civilian casualties will be higher than the U.S. public is willing to accept.

Urban warfare is particularly dangerous because it is in close quarters and buildings block most long-range reconnaissance and fire, experts say. Infantry and tanks must move block-to-block, facing sniper fire, booby traps and attacks from concealed forces at their sides or rear.

In addition, the precision bombing strikes that have served the U.S. military so well in open fights may be limited in a battle for Baghdad, as American planners try to limit civilian casualties in a war that will likely be billed as the liberation of the Iraqi people from Saddam's government.

However, the U.S. military, particularly the Marines, are developing some urban combat techniques designed to reduce friendly casualties.

8/31/02

wrbones
01-24-03, 09:32 PM
http://www.inc.org.uk/English/news/2000/2K1211_INCPr.htm

E-Mail: pressoffice@inc.org.uk

Home
Current News and INC Press Releases
Archived News & INC Press Releases [ 2000 • 1999 • 1998 • 1997 • 1996 ]

Iraqi Military Incursions Into Northern Iraq
LONDON (11 December): Iraqi military forces have made incursions into Iraqi Kurdistan in the area of Ba’Adra (east of Mosul).

According to information received by the INC, Saddam’s forces occupied strategic positions in the area starting in the early hours of Saturday December 9, 2000. They occupied the village of Ain Sifni and established a forward headquarters staffed with senior officers, including the commander of the 5th Army Corps. Following exchanges of fire with KDP forces, the regime’s initial deployment of two infantry brigades was reinforced with a further brigade. The situation remains tense and the regime’s forces are showing no signs of withdrawal.

The Leadership Council of the Iraqi National Congress has expressed its grave concern about these incursions of the Iraqi regime’s military forces. In a letter to US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, the INC Leadership said, “Saddam is testing the resolve of the international community with this attack. Unless he is stopped, there is no doubt that he will take further action to threaten the people of Iraqi Kurdistan.”

Contact: INC Press Office London +44-20-7402-4440

wrbones
01-24-03, 09:33 PM
http://www.analisidifesa.it/articolo.shtm/id/2460/ver/EN

SPECIAL
INTEL OFFICIAL: IRAQI MILITARY NOT EAGER TO ENGAGE U.S. TROOPS
di AD




By Kathleen T. Rhem
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Dec. 18, 2002 -- The Iraqi military is demoralized and not eager to engage American troops, according to U.S. intelligence assessments. "The Iraqis, across the board, have a serious morale problem. They are not eager to engage U.S.-led coalition forces in combat," a U.S. intelligence official said this week. The official is an expert on Iraqi military capabilities and spoke to reporters on the condition he not be identified by name. He said the Iraqi forces are generally not confident in their abilities. "The Gulf War defeat is an advantage we have now that we didn't have in 1991," he said. "We have history on record. We showed them what we can do to them, and they remember that." Much of the problems facing the Iraqi military stem from poor training. Years of U.N.-imposed sanctions have had an effect. "Equipment shortages and manpower shortages, we believe, affect the quality and quantity of their training," the official said. Even when they do train, training methods are ineffective by Western standards. They don't often conduct live-fire exercises, and training lacks realism, complexity and intensity, he explained. The Iraqi military is considerably smaller than the force that opposed coalition troops in the Gulf War. The Iraqi army had 70 divisions in 1991, but only 23 today. Its elite Republican Guard is half the 12 divisions it was in 1991. "Not only do they have fewer divisions, but the divisions tend to be more hollow than they were in 1991, because . they lost a lot of equipment in 1991," the official said. Trucks, in particular, are in critically short supply, making it difficult for Iraqi forces to move equipment, ammunition and personnel.

None of this means conflict with Iraq wouldn't be dangerous, however. The Republican Guard may be experiencing manpower shortages, but they're still the "best-trained, best-equipped, and most-experienced forces in Iraq," the official said. Air forces have been in seeming disarray for years. Throughout the 1990s, several air force officers were implicated in alleged coup attempts and executed, causing morale in the air force to plummet, the official said. U.S. officials estimate Iraq has about 300 combat aircraft, less than half 1991 levels, and only about 80 percent are in good enough shape to fly. Pilots, however, rarely if ever get training. The official estimated the average Iraqi pilot gets tens of hours of flying time each year. American military pilots, in contrast, are required to have hundreds of hours each year. Also, Iraqi pilots generally don't train at night or in poor weather. "The air force is in very sad shape, even compared to '91, when they didn't perform very well," the official said. He noted, however, there have been indications that Iraq is seeking to improve its air forces. U.S. intelligence sources have counted hundreds of training sorties by Iraqi MiG-29s fighters so far this year, compared to only "a handful" in each of the past several years. The official said this indicated Iraq has been more successful in smuggling spare parts into the country. Iraqi air defenders are somewhat more capable than their airborne counterparts.

"Air defenders took a lot of losses in the Gulf War," the official said. "But they've pretty much done a good job of maintaining their order of battle despite the no-fly zone strikes, because they have a lot of spare parts and repair capability in Baghdad." The official said most of the Iraqi air defense capability is concentrated around Baghdad and Saddam Hussein's hometown of Tikrit. Much of the air defense equipment is mobile as well. Iraqi air defenders are particularly adept at low-level protection of fixed sites, he said, noting they can blanket an area with anti- aircraft fire. "They don't necessarily have the morale or motivation (to hit individual aircraft)," he said. "But they can throw a lot of 'golden BBs' up in the air. " Across the spectrum of Iraqi military forces, the official said the officer corps is not pro-Saddam. He doesn't trust them, and they don't trust him. "(Hussein has) oppressed the military, as he has all other segments of society," the official explained. Opposing forces would do well to remember, however, that the officer corps is a professional group of soldiers, he added. "We have to respect that the Iraqi military has a core of professional officers," he said, noting some officers might fight out of a sense of personal honor. "They have traditions that they're proud of."


index

wrbones
01-24-03, 09:34 PM
http://www.txcn.com/sharedcontent/dallas/graphics/10-02/0826int_iraq_military.pdf

leroy8541
01-24-03, 09:37 PM
I' seen all this before and if I had my scanner up and running I'd show you guys a picture of an officer in the "elite" republican guards kissing my boots!!!!
All the equipment in the world is useless if they don't have the teticular fortitude to use it and after the last a$$whoopin i'll bet they won't fire a round!!!!

wrbones
01-24-03, 09:56 PM
Ayup.

I'm just postin this stuff fer the info and to get a handle on some this myself.

Too many folks, includin' me, have been runnin off at the mouth without knowin everything we oughta about what's goin' on.

I still stick with what I've said before.

Saddam and the Islamic right wing has gotta go. Period.

greybeard
01-26-03, 12:21 AM
I need some help Marines-particularly from you Arty types. I need to know the country of origin of a lot of the things listed in the original post above-especially anything with an "M" designation. Like the M-56 105. Any of that M designated stuff ours?
The aircraft, I recognize as mostly Russian.
The French stuff sticks out like a sore thumb. The rest, I don't know about.

Basically, I'm trying to disprove the idea that the USA provided most of the arms to IRAQ. (dang Canadians) Help a guy out please? Meanwhile, I'll be lookin on my own.

wrbones
01-26-03, 03:10 PM
Last updated Nov. 12, 2002 Printer-Friendly Version

The Gulf War: Before and After

Sadaam Hussein began the 1991 Gulf War with the world's fifth largest armed forces, fielding some 950,000 troops, over 5,000 tanks (and twice as many other armored vehicles), and almost 4,000 artillery pieces. 2 By the war's end, his armed forces were militarily devastated (having been heavily defeated if not totally destroyed) and, just one year later, were estimated to number around 382,500. 3

Despite such prodigious losses, Saddam managed to stay in power, and made some headway in reconstituting his shattered military. As recently as 1996, for instance, the factory established to build the "Lion of Babylon" Main Battle Tank (as Iraq's domestic version of its most sophisticated tank - the Russian T-72, is designated), while producing few of the vehicles, was making enough spare parts to keep remaining Iraqi T-72s running. 4 Nonetheless, Iraq's Army, Air Force and Navy (the latter never a significant force), remain much smaller than their pre-Gulf War levels; a situation that has been compounded by UN sanctions; coalition air attacks in support of the post-war "no-fly" zones; and the periodic purges of Saddam himself, ever fearful that his armed forces might be tempted to stage a coup.

Today, the Iraqi armed forces number approximately 389,000. 5 Moreover, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), while half of Iraqi divisions are 8,000 strong (and in a "fair state of readiness") out of average authorized strengths of 10,000 men, at least half of the regular Army is at 70 percent or less of its authorized strength, with some infantry units badly undermanned and very dependent on conscripts. CSIS also notes that Republican Guard divisions average at least 80 percent of an authorized strength of 8,000-10,000, with brigades averaging the size of a large U.S. battalion of 2,500 men. 6 In addition, all Iraqi divisions (except those of the Republican Guard) are estimated by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) to be at 50 percent combat effectiveness, with half of all Army equipment lacking spare parts.

IISS also cites the serviceability of the Iraqi fixed wing aircraft at around 55 percent, with serviceability of helicopters 'poor.' Further, according to IISS, senior pilots are averaging only 90-120 flying hours per year, with junior pilots having as little as 20 hours of flight time. 7

These figures, while an indispensable adjunct to any listing of the Iraqi order of battle, still paint an insufficient picture of the likely future performance of the Iraqi armed forces when opposing a modern Western force such as that which defeated them in 1991, and such as they will again face should U.S. military action against Iraq be forthcoming. A fuller appreciation of this capability only begins to emerge when some of the factors that have shaped and continue to influence the Iraqi armed forces are considered.


Doctrine

For instance, the performance of the Iraqi armed forces, in common with militaries worldwide, is affected by their military doctrine. In Iraq's case, military doctrine is often assumed to be adapted from that of the former Soviet Union, which emerged as the main military patron of the Iraqis during the Cold War. This is partly true. However, as Michael Eisenstadt and Kenneth M. Pollack relate, Soviet military influence in Iraq was never as extensive as it was in other Arab states such as Egypt or Syria. Rather, Iraq, while equipping its armed forces with Russian arms and equipment, adopted a doctrine that was a mix of Soviet, French, American and British precepts. The latter's influence was particularly pervasive due to Britain's former role as the colonial power in Iraq, with many of the manuals captured after the 1991 war actually Iraqi translations of World War II British military handbooks. 8

The application of all these influences was peculiarly Iraqi in nature however. The individual elements of Iraqi doctrine were often also incompatible with each other and inappropriate to Iraq's military goals. This was apparent during the Gulf War when, the predominantly infantry-based Iraqi Army planned to absorb coalition thrusts before counterattacking with Regular Army heavy divisions and Republican Guard formations. A strategic and operational concept that owed much to Soviet military thought, the Iraqi plan would have been sufficient to overpower weaker opponents such as the Iranians and Kuwaitis. It was, however, totally inappropriate for countering the maneuver, speed and violence employed by a qualitatively superior U.S.-led coalition force that, while enjoying a technological advantage over its opponents, would likely still have prevailed had equipment levels been evenly matched.

Attempts to adopt British and French tactics were similarly unsuccessful, with the Iraqis relying on a limited and inelastic repertoire of doctrinaire battlefield skills and techniques that were learned through repetition and easily countered by their more adaptive, fluid and better-trained Western adversaries. 9


Culture

This misapplication of imported doctrine is compounded by Arab cultural traits antithetical to the training and maintenance (and therefore fighting ability) of a modern fighting force. According to Norvell B. Atkine, a retired U.S. Army colonel with much experience training with Arab militaries, these cultural traits manifest themselves in many areas. For instance, in Arab militaries generally, information is viewed as power, U.S trainers noting that much of the knowledge they imparted did not percolate through the ranks. Often, individuals refuse to pass on what they have learned lest their own value and importance diminish. Open competition is also shunned to avoid the prospect of losing parties feeling humiliated, particularly when mixed ranks are involved, with education heavily dependant on memorization techniques and therefore discouraging "thinking outside the box."

Moreover, possibly reinforced by the attitude often ascribed to the Soviet officer class, Arab officers enjoy very poor relations with other ranks. Arab armies further lack the solid non-commissioned officer corps that is the backbone of successful modern armies in the West. Finally, virtually all military information is classified in an atmosphere of suspicion, paranoia and secrecy, with battalion level decisions referred to the defense ministry for approval - a habit estimated to leave an Arab colonel with about as much authority as a U.S. Army sergeant first class. 10 Such factors, detrimental to the efficiency of any military, are probably particularly prominent in the Iraqi armed forces given the extremely autocratic nature of Saddam himself, and compounded by the periodic purges to which he has submitted them. 11


(cont)

wrbones
01-26-03, 03:11 PM
Experience

In addition, Iraq's prior military record does not bode well for their armed forces' prospects in any future war with Western troops. Historically, the Iraqi Army has been used mainly for internal security. Indeed, apart from what amounted to little more than token deployments (militarily if not numerically) during the 1948 , 1967, and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars, the Army's only action against a foreign force up until the 1980-1988 war with Iran was in May 1941, when it was routed in 17 days by a small British invasion force that landed at Basra. 12 his lackluster showing was little improved upon in 1948, 1967, or 1973, with the performance of the Iraqi Army against its ill-trained and ill-equipped Iranian adversaries in the 1980s similarly unimpressive. 13 While technically, Iraq won this conflict, the victory was much more Pyrrhic than Iraqi military advantages over Iran should have allowed. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was also militarily mediocre; its success due to numerical and material superiority and predicated on an inflexible attack plan that had to be learnt by repetition and would have been inadequate against a more prepared and proactive enemy. As with their other wars, the Iraqi performance revealed a far from high level of strategic, operational and tactical prowess. Finally, as the subsequent U.S.-led operation to liberate Kuwait showed, Iraq's armed forces, while strong regionally, are incapable of standing up to a modern Western military force.

Similarly, the Iraqi military's long and bloody experience in internal security operations does not equate to the professionalism and enhanced effectiveness that Western armed forces (most notably the British in Northern Ireland) have found to be forged by the difficulties inherent in such operations. Internal security duties in liberal democracies require adherence to a democratically instigated rule of law and therefore necessitate sophisticated and demanding operational measures. By comparison, the internal security duties of Saddam's military were undertaken virtually without restrictions (apart from those imposed by the fixed-wing 'no-fly' zones). The planning and execution of the armed helicopter, armor, and chemical weapons attacks on largely defenseless and unarmed civilians that typified such operations added little to the effectiveness of Iraq's armed forces that would assist them in fighting a world-class military. Indeed the nature of these operations may have detrimentally affected Iraq's ability to face such a foe by inuring them to the challenges this entails.


Conclusions

All these considerations, along with the huge technological advances made by the American military in the last 10 years, suggest that, should a confrontation with the United States occur, Iraq's armed forces will put up even less of a fight than in 1991. Similarly, while it is true that certain elite units such as the Republican Guard can be expected to fight harder than the Iraqi Regular Army, "elite" is a relative term. As its poor performance in 1991 showed, the Republican Guard, while perhaps Iraq's best fighting formation, can be expected to be heavily outclassed by any American opponents. Nonetheless, the obvious weaknesses of the Iraqi armed forces does not detract from the dangers of underestimating the enemy. Should an American invasion of Iraq occur --while many Iraqi units can be expected to perform poorly, or even to defect -- the possibility of some demonstrating an increased fighting spirit against a foreign invasion force on home soil cannot be discounted. As Kenneth Pollack reminds us, while 150,000 - 250,000 Iraqi troops deserted during the Coalition air campaign in 1991 -- with another 80,000 surrendering virtually without a fight during the subsequent ground war -- another 250, 000 remained at their posts - some of them putting up a hard, if futile fight. 14

Similarly, the possibility that shortcomings in his conventional military capabilities will lead Saddam to deploy chemical, biological or (should he possess them) radiological or nuclear weapons in defense of his regime is a distinct one. That said, the Iraqi armed forces will still be unlikely to prevail, not least because U.S. troops, and their likely allies, have long trained to fight in such an environment. The same can be said for urban warfare, even if the higher potential for friendly and non-combatant casualties this entails would increase the political risks of U.S. military action against Iraq. Such scenarios would undoubtedly make defeating Iraq a more difficult undertaking as well as a more costly one in blood and treasure, but it would not prevent it.

As such, while "Desert Storm II" may not quite be the "walk in the park" predicted by some in the United States 15, the indications are that an American military victory against Iraq is imminently achievable. The only question remains: at what cost?

Endnotes


1 CDI Primers are not intended to give anything more than an overview of a given topic. As such, for a more comprehensive treatment of the subject of Iraqi Military Effectiveness readers are directed to the sources listed in the notes below, in particular Kenneth Pollack's recent book Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991, and Norvell B. De Atkine's article "Why Arabs Lose Wars: Fighting As You Train, and the Impact of Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness."

2 International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 1990-91, Brassey's, London, 1991, p. 105.

3 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1991-92, Brassey's, London, 1991, p. 107.

4 Sean Boyne, "How Saddam Rebuilt," Jane's Intelligence Review, November 1996, pp. 506-509, p. 507.

5 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2002-2003, Brassey's, London, 2002, p. 105.

6 Anthony Cordesman, "Iraqi War Fighting Capabilities: A Dynamic Net Assessment," Revised July 31, 2002, p. 3. Online at: http://www.csis.org/burke/mb/iraq_dynamic.pdf

7 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2001-2002, Brassey's, London, 2002, p. 105-106.

8 Michael Eisenstadt and Kenneth M. Pollack, "Armies of Snow and Armies of Sand: The Impact of Soviet Military Doctrine on Arab Militaries," Middle East Journal, Volume 55. No. 4, Autumn 2001.

9 Ibid.

10 Norvell B. De Atkine, "Why Arabs Lose Wars: Fighting As You Train, and the Impact of Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness," Middle East Quarterly, Volume 6, No. 2, December 1999.

11 For a succinct character profile of Saddam Hussein see, Mark Bowden, "Tales of the Tyrant," The Atlantic Monthly, May 2002.

12 Samir al-Khalil, "Republic of Fear," University of California Press, Berkeley, 1998, pp. 21 -29 & p. 312.

13 For a detailed analysis of this conflict see, Anthony H. Cordesman, and Abraham R. Wagner, "The Lessons of Modern War, Volume II: The Iran-Iraq War," Westview Press, Boulder, 1990.

14 Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991 (Studies in War, Society, and the Military) , 2002, p.150.

15 Kenneth Adelman, "Desert Storm II Would Be a Walk in the Park," London Times, August 29, 2002.

Mark Burgess
CDI Research Analyst
mburgess@cdi.org Printer-Friendly Version









CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION
1779 Massachusetts Ave, NW, Washington, DC 20036-2109
Ph: (202) 332-0600 · Fax: (202) 462-4559
info@cdi.org

wrbones
01-27-03, 06:21 PM
Fast Facts: The Iraqi Military







Thursday, January 09, 2003

Iraqi Army | Iraqi Air Force





Iraqi Army

Overview:
• The Iraqi Army has been in disarray following the Gulf War, suffering serious equipment loses, damage to production facilities and continuing supply problems. The Iraqis were forced to cannibalize many vehicles for the parts needed to keep more advanced equipment in service.
• The role of the armed forces is to protect the president and the ruling Baath Military Party (BPMB), to preserve internal security and to confront the external enemies of the state.
• The size of the Iraqi army -- estimated at 350,000 soldiers -- is much smaller following the Gulf War. This may have led to increased command efficiency, but its effectiveness is still in question.
• Most of the army's lower ranks are made up of conscripts, serving for periods of 18 to 24 months.
• The number of regular army divisions was cut from seven armored/mechanized and 20 infantry divisions to two or three armor divisions, three mechanized divisions and 15 to 17 infantry divisions.
• Saddam Hussein and his close advisers rule the military through the BPMB. The bureau has the responsibility of forming policy from a military and political point of view.
• In 1998, Saddam divided the country into four military commands designed to prevent popular uprisings. Each was under the command of one of Saddam's trusted inner circle. The commands were suspended in June 2000, but can be activated if the need once again arises. The four commands are the Southern Region, the Northern Region, the Central Euphrates Region and the Central Region.


Special Republican Guard (SRG):
• Reported to be supervised by Saddam's son Qusay Saddam Hussein, its commander is Staff MG Kheir-Allah Waheed Omar al-Nassiri.
• The super-elite military force's mission is to protect Saddam's regime, as well as the security of Baghdad.
• The SRG numbers approximately 26,000 men.
• It consists of four infantry brigades with a total of 14 infantry battalions. This force is augmented with armor, artillery and air defense units.
• The SRG is the only divisional strength unit allowed to be based in central Baghdad, where it has tight control of key government installations and Republican Palace.
• Potential recruits undergo exhaustive background checks; ethnic and family background is included.

Iraqi Air Force

Overview:
• According to sources within the Iraqi National Congress (INC), the Iraqi Air Force has 350 operational aircraft. However, the definition of "operational" is questionable, and this number may be inflated. According to Jane's Information, only 90 of the estimated 750 combat aircraft available during the Gulf War are now operational.
• Iraq now has only about 17 air squadrons, compared to a pre-Desert Storm 41 squadrons.
• Before the Gulf War, the IAF had 60 functioning airfields. However, a quarter of these has been rendered unusable because they are located in the no-fly zone.
• The serious losses of the 1991 Gulf War had not been replaced due to sanctions, but new engines and other spare parts for Mig-23 and 25's from Syria.
• International sanctions have prevented Iraqi access to overseas maintenance and repair facilities, although spare parts for MIG-23s and MIG-25s enter the nation from Syria. Iraq has also been unable to acquire new modern aircraft or improve in-air refueling capabilities.
• The combat efficiency of the IAF is considered very low.

Commanders (as of late 2001):
• Air Force Commander: General Hamid Rajah Shalah
• Assistant for Operations: General Saad Ahmad Naji
• Commander of Aviation: General Ibrahim Ali Youssef
• Commander of AF Training: General Sabah Mutlik
• Air Force Intelligence Commander: General Hussein Zibin

Inventory:
Interceptors
• 30 MIG-23ML "Flogger-G"
• 5 MIG-25PD "Foxbat-E"
• 4 MIG-29 "Fulcrum-A"

Air Defense/Attack
• 20 Dassault Mirage F1EQ/BQ
• 30 MIG-21PF/MF "Fishbed-D/J"

Attack
• 20 Sukhoi Su-22M "Fitter-J"
• 5 Sukhoi Su-24K "Fencer-D"
• 10 Sukhoi Su-25K "Frogfoot-A"

Combat Helicopters
• 2 Bell 214ST

Transport
• 2 Antonov An-24 "Coke"
• 6 Antonov An-26 "Curl"
• 1 Ilyushin Il-76 "Candid"

Source: Jane's Information, Global Security.com