thedrifter
10-27-06, 08:51 AM
Iraq Is Not Lost
By Col. Jeff Bearor | October 27, 2006
Marines in Iraq now tell me that this fight is winnable if we make meaningful change now.
If you read the newspapers and news magazines or watch television news shows, you'll no doubt know that the struggle in Iraq is "lost." At least that's what the talking heads and their legions of guest commentators and "military experts" would have you believe.
The reality in Iraq, as told to me by Marines on the ground now and those who have just returned from the fighting, is different. The picture isn't rosy but the men and women who are serving there now haven't given up the fight. So why is it that the talking heads here at home are so willing to declare Iraq as hopeless? Unfortunately, you and I know the answer: its politics. Let's leave politics aside for a minute and break the Iraq problem down to some basics.
Counter-insurgency warfare like we see in Iraq is not new to either US Army soldiers or Marines. The Marine Corps published the definitive manual covering "small wars" in 1940 based on its experiences in the Caribbean and Central America in the 1920s and 1930s. You can find it here: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Small_Wars_Manual
There exist any number of historical templates on how to do this right, and how to do it wrong. The US military's own operational planning and "tactics, techniques and procedures" (TTPs in military speak, what Marines and soldiers actually do on the ground in the fight) for prosecuting a campaign against insurgents are sound. What's lacking is a real understanding, inside the beltway and among the pundits, about the nature of the current fight and the resources it takes to successfully prosecute a campaign against an insurgency. Lieutenant General James Mattis, now commander of the First Marine Expeditionary Force and of all Marines in the Middle East, Iraq and Afghanistan, calls wars like Iraq "hybrid war." Several essentials are evident about the military situation in Iraq and how we can gain the upper hand in this "hybrid war."
First we in the military and our leadership must correctly recognize the fight we are in and try and predict how the fight is changing. An illustration -- while the leadership predicted US forces would be welcomed with flags waving and cheers during the run to Baghdad, no soldier or Marine at the tactical level believed any such thing and prepared for a hard fight. The final outcome of the major combat phase was never in doubt but Marines and soldiers knew that the enemy "always gets a vote" on how the fight unfolds. In that case we saw our enemy's "TTPs" early and often when we found not Iraqi Army armored divisions, but small lightly armed groups of irregulars who used hit and run tactics to slow us down. They changed, we adapted and that cycle continues today. The trick here is we've got to out-think the enemy and adapt our TTPs more quickly than the enemy changes his. That's a primary tenet of how to fight in the 21st Century. The military is good at this but is weighed down still by ponderous bureaucracy and blinkered leadership at the top.
Second recognize that it's a fight about and amongst the people of Iraq. Plan and execute embracing that knowledge. At the end of the major combat phase of the Iraq operation, Iraqis waited to see what we would do. US forces were spread thinly on the ground because of the refusal of the Pentagon leaders to provide all the necessary ground forces. Worse though there was no clear guidance from the leadership on how to make the critical transition from the combat phase of the operation to the stability and rebuilding phase, so soldiers and Marines did not decisively take control of the civilian population. These "phase transitions" are important to the success of any military campaign and are hard to get right in the best of circumstances. Planning and preparation have to be meticulous. Our plan to change phase and support the people of Iraq was not good, not complete, not resourced, not coordinated across the interagency – in a word, a flop.
As a captain of US Marines I served for two years with the famed British Royal Marines Commandos. During a particularly long and arduous march in the Scottish Highlands (a "yomp" to the Royals) a young RM corporal trudged up to the front of the column where I was leading the march and asked "there is a plan isn't there Sir?" "Yes Corporal Miller," I said, "there is a plan." His unspoken point to me was that while he might be just a corporal it was as important that he know the plan and his part in it as it was for me to know the plan. Ask any Marine about the transition plan for the period after the end of major combat ops and you'll get an unfriendly blank stare.
Third, of the many types and styles of warfare, counterinsurgencies are the most nuanced and take the most time to resolve. History and the study of successful and unsuccessful counterinsurgency campaigns makes these facts very clear. In many ways this style of warfare is more difficult that "traditional" fight of army against army. It takes time, it takes the ability for out-of-the-box thinking and guidance, and it takes the proper resources. Of huge importance is ensuring conditions for success are set at every stage. We haven't yet managed to set the most important condition for success – security of the people – because we've not had the forces on the ground necessary to do so. Had we had enough ground forces on the ground at the end of major combat and moved aggressively to take control on the ground, sweep up as many weapons as we could, clamp down on violence and lawlessness, and disarm emerging private and sectarian militias, we'd be well on the road to success right now.
What does this mean about the future of the American involvement in Iraq? We have options, some better than others.
One is, plus up the current ground forces to completely control the country to provide security, squash the militias, and root out as many of the hard core insurgents as possible. After greater security is established, put a big push on getting Iraqi Army and security forces to take over security for their country. Get American faces out of the neighborhoods and villages and replace them with Iraqi faces. Give the Iraqis a clear timeline for when they must take over responsibility and then stick to it. This will take many thousands more American soldiers and Marines in the short term and perhaps about one year. The American people will support this effort if they know, "there is a plan Sir," that has a good chance for success but isn't open ended.
Another option is to pull back the main American presence and push Iraqi security forces out now. In order for this to work we must immediately plus up the numbers of properly trained and resourced American military "transition teams" as the training teams are called. Both the Army and the Marine Corps are heavily engaged in preparing "TTs" right now but the fact is we could do this better and faster. This gives us the opportunity to approach the current fight much more like a traditional counterinsurgency campaign. This style of warfare takes time, lots of it, perhaps five to ten years of continued American involvement at significant levels of troop strength. But we'd take the "American face" off the fight and give the Iraqis a good chance in the long term.
Marines in Iraq now tell me that this fight is winnable if we make meaningful change now.
The President has continually said that our strategic goals in Iraq have not changed. The US military and civilian leadership team in Iraq right now is as good as it has been. What needs to change, and change right now, are the operational and tactical means and methods we use to get to the strategic goals.
The original article can be found at www.familysecuritymatters.org/
Ellie
By Col. Jeff Bearor | October 27, 2006
Marines in Iraq now tell me that this fight is winnable if we make meaningful change now.
If you read the newspapers and news magazines or watch television news shows, you'll no doubt know that the struggle in Iraq is "lost." At least that's what the talking heads and their legions of guest commentators and "military experts" would have you believe.
The reality in Iraq, as told to me by Marines on the ground now and those who have just returned from the fighting, is different. The picture isn't rosy but the men and women who are serving there now haven't given up the fight. So why is it that the talking heads here at home are so willing to declare Iraq as hopeless? Unfortunately, you and I know the answer: its politics. Let's leave politics aside for a minute and break the Iraq problem down to some basics.
Counter-insurgency warfare like we see in Iraq is not new to either US Army soldiers or Marines. The Marine Corps published the definitive manual covering "small wars" in 1940 based on its experiences in the Caribbean and Central America in the 1920s and 1930s. You can find it here: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Small_Wars_Manual
There exist any number of historical templates on how to do this right, and how to do it wrong. The US military's own operational planning and "tactics, techniques and procedures" (TTPs in military speak, what Marines and soldiers actually do on the ground in the fight) for prosecuting a campaign against insurgents are sound. What's lacking is a real understanding, inside the beltway and among the pundits, about the nature of the current fight and the resources it takes to successfully prosecute a campaign against an insurgency. Lieutenant General James Mattis, now commander of the First Marine Expeditionary Force and of all Marines in the Middle East, Iraq and Afghanistan, calls wars like Iraq "hybrid war." Several essentials are evident about the military situation in Iraq and how we can gain the upper hand in this "hybrid war."
First we in the military and our leadership must correctly recognize the fight we are in and try and predict how the fight is changing. An illustration -- while the leadership predicted US forces would be welcomed with flags waving and cheers during the run to Baghdad, no soldier or Marine at the tactical level believed any such thing and prepared for a hard fight. The final outcome of the major combat phase was never in doubt but Marines and soldiers knew that the enemy "always gets a vote" on how the fight unfolds. In that case we saw our enemy's "TTPs" early and often when we found not Iraqi Army armored divisions, but small lightly armed groups of irregulars who used hit and run tactics to slow us down. They changed, we adapted and that cycle continues today. The trick here is we've got to out-think the enemy and adapt our TTPs more quickly than the enemy changes his. That's a primary tenet of how to fight in the 21st Century. The military is good at this but is weighed down still by ponderous bureaucracy and blinkered leadership at the top.
Second recognize that it's a fight about and amongst the people of Iraq. Plan and execute embracing that knowledge. At the end of the major combat phase of the Iraq operation, Iraqis waited to see what we would do. US forces were spread thinly on the ground because of the refusal of the Pentagon leaders to provide all the necessary ground forces. Worse though there was no clear guidance from the leadership on how to make the critical transition from the combat phase of the operation to the stability and rebuilding phase, so soldiers and Marines did not decisively take control of the civilian population. These "phase transitions" are important to the success of any military campaign and are hard to get right in the best of circumstances. Planning and preparation have to be meticulous. Our plan to change phase and support the people of Iraq was not good, not complete, not resourced, not coordinated across the interagency – in a word, a flop.
As a captain of US Marines I served for two years with the famed British Royal Marines Commandos. During a particularly long and arduous march in the Scottish Highlands (a "yomp" to the Royals) a young RM corporal trudged up to the front of the column where I was leading the march and asked "there is a plan isn't there Sir?" "Yes Corporal Miller," I said, "there is a plan." His unspoken point to me was that while he might be just a corporal it was as important that he know the plan and his part in it as it was for me to know the plan. Ask any Marine about the transition plan for the period after the end of major combat ops and you'll get an unfriendly blank stare.
Third, of the many types and styles of warfare, counterinsurgencies are the most nuanced and take the most time to resolve. History and the study of successful and unsuccessful counterinsurgency campaigns makes these facts very clear. In many ways this style of warfare is more difficult that "traditional" fight of army against army. It takes time, it takes the ability for out-of-the-box thinking and guidance, and it takes the proper resources. Of huge importance is ensuring conditions for success are set at every stage. We haven't yet managed to set the most important condition for success – security of the people – because we've not had the forces on the ground necessary to do so. Had we had enough ground forces on the ground at the end of major combat and moved aggressively to take control on the ground, sweep up as many weapons as we could, clamp down on violence and lawlessness, and disarm emerging private and sectarian militias, we'd be well on the road to success right now.
What does this mean about the future of the American involvement in Iraq? We have options, some better than others.
One is, plus up the current ground forces to completely control the country to provide security, squash the militias, and root out as many of the hard core insurgents as possible. After greater security is established, put a big push on getting Iraqi Army and security forces to take over security for their country. Get American faces out of the neighborhoods and villages and replace them with Iraqi faces. Give the Iraqis a clear timeline for when they must take over responsibility and then stick to it. This will take many thousands more American soldiers and Marines in the short term and perhaps about one year. The American people will support this effort if they know, "there is a plan Sir," that has a good chance for success but isn't open ended.
Another option is to pull back the main American presence and push Iraqi security forces out now. In order for this to work we must immediately plus up the numbers of properly trained and resourced American military "transition teams" as the training teams are called. Both the Army and the Marine Corps are heavily engaged in preparing "TTs" right now but the fact is we could do this better and faster. This gives us the opportunity to approach the current fight much more like a traditional counterinsurgency campaign. This style of warfare takes time, lots of it, perhaps five to ten years of continued American involvement at significant levels of troop strength. But we'd take the "American face" off the fight and give the Iraqis a good chance in the long term.
Marines in Iraq now tell me that this fight is winnable if we make meaningful change now.
The President has continually said that our strategic goals in Iraq have not changed. The US military and civilian leadership team in Iraq right now is as good as it has been. What needs to change, and change right now, are the operational and tactical means and methods we use to get to the strategic goals.
The original article can be found at www.familysecuritymatters.org/
Ellie