Shaffer
01-16-03, 10:21 AM
US military leaders claim combat in Iraq will be an order of magnitude more efficient than it was in Desert Storm (1991).
To helicopter observers, however, there is an unrelenting familiarity to the picture of CH-46s, CH-53s Black Hawks and Chinooks working up for the assumed battle ahead
A recent (informal) review turned up this list of US service rotorcraft initiatives scheduled to happen since Desert Storm:
Bigger, better UH-60s (L version to convert to M version):
Bigger, better Chinook force (CH-47Ds to change to F model, Special Ops aircraft to be modified);
Procurement of D model Apaches;
Fitting of so-called ‘blue force’ position kits to Army helicopters (EPLRS);
Development of digitised systems for majority of Army fleet (IDMs, EPLRS, multi-function displays or appliqué kits);
Procurement of a better targeting and fire control FLIR for Apaches (Gen II);
Procurement of improved EW equipment, to include rapid development of ATIRCM/SFIRCM;
Digitisation and improvements for Navy SH-60s (to R version);
Large scale change to 701 C versions of T-700 engines;
Attention to air to air self defence requirements for Army helicopters (Stinger ATM);
Procurement of USMC MV-22 and USAF CV-22s (then slated for mid-to-late 90s).
A change to a new forms of simulator-supported training for inexperienced aviators to avoid ‘in-country’ training work-ups (and subsequent accidents).
Procurement of a new generation of medevac Black Hawks (the Q version);
Procurement of improved battlefield control and command helicopters for higher echelon commanders.
It’s a long list - though by no means a fully comprehensive one. It’s not meant to be. But the message just from this sample is clear: Hardly any of this has happened. If there is déjà vu to the helicopter picture among those who follow what’s happening, it’s thoroughly justified.
The many rhetorically supported efforts aimed at modernising systems coming out of Desert Storm have simply run into the procurement process mud, where they got stuck.
It’s true there are some bright spots. The Army now has several battalions of D model Apaches in the field, in itself a revolutionary capability.
But these weapons systems, formidable as they are, still lack a modern infra-red fire control sensor system (the process dragged its feet on the new system - Arrowhead - with the result it won’t start arriving for two or three more years.) They still lack comprehensive EW, using in fact, marginally modified systems from the ones Gen Dick Cody (now Army Planning director) famously complained to Congress about after events in Kosovo caught attention
As a fighting entity D model Apache units will be alone out there. Hardly any investment - beyond experimentation - has gone into the digital networks the Army has studied for many years.
Some of the other horror stories are perhaps better known. The MV-22 tilt-rotor is hung up in a seemingly endless development cycle destined, once again, to sit out the kind of mobility warfare it was specifically designed for.
The Marines still are not close to obtaining their now-old W model Cobra and UH-1N replacements, forced therefore to use technology only slightly modified from what they had in Desert Storm (when a man portable FLIR was used from a Huey to target Cobra gunships after an Iraqi breakthrough at Kafji).
The story of the CH-53E is also well known. Sure, a mod program is in the works - but its outcome is years away from fruition. The aircraft plods along, denied all semblance of a glass cockpit or modern comm. and EW systems, carrying its own maintainers and tools, forced to perform combat miracles such as a 400 nm insertion sortie during operations in Afghanistan.
But it’s when you come down to the systems, the all-important enabling electronics, that you find out how badly the inertia of the last 10-11 years has bitten.
The Army has known for years what to do to digitise its helicopter fleet. From Task Force 21 to the Capstone exercises at Ft Hood, it has long been clear that a huge - perhaps decisive - combat multiplier effect can be realised from putting helicopters four square into the tactical internet.
But in reality, beyond those D model Apaches (which are netted together well), very little has been achieved either in the air or on the ground. While USAF elements will all benefit from massive upgrades in commander situational awareness, it’s likely that keeping track of the Army’s helicopters will be done the same way it always has - with a grease pencil and the talent of the helicopter controllers on the staffs.
The aircraft remain most vulnerable in two main areas: EW and training.
Taking the last first. When the Army deployed to Saudi Arabia at the beginning of Desert Storm they experienced a number of training and work-up accidents. Cross-over effects caused by radical desert temperature changes forced them to turn to NVGs, which also produced training issues. But all that changed after the fleets came back. In many cockpits, the Apaches particularly, NVGs disappeared.
The question is: will the situation as far as training goes be predictably repeatable? Is the experience level of the aircrews what it should be in the first place? (It was disturbing to hear that the Army’s Flight School 21 training plan - one designed to increase the raw experience level of pilots before they go to units has been stymied by a lack of funds for the underlying simulators. The message carrier - no less a person than MG Mark Curran, CG of the Army Aviation Center - practically pleaded with an industry audience recently for them to help him get it put back into out-year budgets).
It seems obvious there will be a number of helicopter accidents as the crews re-learn old lessons.
The EW situation is incomprehensible. The one weapon area the Iraqis are supposed to have heavied up on is air defences. The development of the awkwardly named ATIRCM/SFIRCM (acronyms for infra-red and radar EW protection) was called an urgent need when Army leaders spoke about it in 1991, a technical response then said to be much needed against AD proliferation and improvements in guidance system smartness.
But, in 2000 the Army summarily stopped work on its new system, consigning the few systems it has instead to the special forces aviation regiment (160th SOAR, who may or may not have any of them installed yet.).
It’s questionable, too, that there are even enough of the ‘old’ systems to go around.
Who can forget then US Army Col Tom Rynkober’s legendary efforts to spread out a small number of ASE (Aircraft Survivability Equipment) ‘B’ kits (using Hertz rental trucks) among the Army fleet in the Storm build-up? And who would bet against such an initiative being needed again?
None of this is to say helicopters will not perform their jobs should there be a new war on the sands of Iraq. They will, thanks, as always, to the sheer spirit and dedication of the people involved.
What is left to ask, however, is (a) if it’s accepted that the Desert Storm ‘lessons learned’ were worth learning - in terms of multiplying rotary wing effectiveness etc etc, what (b) does it actually take to implement them?
Eleven years and billions of dollars spent on eternal R&D may be useful for setting a roadmap for the far future. But for the here and now, they seem of very little help.
To helicopter observers, however, there is an unrelenting familiarity to the picture of CH-46s, CH-53s Black Hawks and Chinooks working up for the assumed battle ahead
A recent (informal) review turned up this list of US service rotorcraft initiatives scheduled to happen since Desert Storm:
Bigger, better UH-60s (L version to convert to M version):
Bigger, better Chinook force (CH-47Ds to change to F model, Special Ops aircraft to be modified);
Procurement of D model Apaches;
Fitting of so-called ‘blue force’ position kits to Army helicopters (EPLRS);
Development of digitised systems for majority of Army fleet (IDMs, EPLRS, multi-function displays or appliqué kits);
Procurement of a better targeting and fire control FLIR for Apaches (Gen II);
Procurement of improved EW equipment, to include rapid development of ATIRCM/SFIRCM;
Digitisation and improvements for Navy SH-60s (to R version);
Large scale change to 701 C versions of T-700 engines;
Attention to air to air self defence requirements for Army helicopters (Stinger ATM);
Procurement of USMC MV-22 and USAF CV-22s (then slated for mid-to-late 90s).
A change to a new forms of simulator-supported training for inexperienced aviators to avoid ‘in-country’ training work-ups (and subsequent accidents).
Procurement of a new generation of medevac Black Hawks (the Q version);
Procurement of improved battlefield control and command helicopters for higher echelon commanders.
It’s a long list - though by no means a fully comprehensive one. It’s not meant to be. But the message just from this sample is clear: Hardly any of this has happened. If there is déjà vu to the helicopter picture among those who follow what’s happening, it’s thoroughly justified.
The many rhetorically supported efforts aimed at modernising systems coming out of Desert Storm have simply run into the procurement process mud, where they got stuck.
It’s true there are some bright spots. The Army now has several battalions of D model Apaches in the field, in itself a revolutionary capability.
But these weapons systems, formidable as they are, still lack a modern infra-red fire control sensor system (the process dragged its feet on the new system - Arrowhead - with the result it won’t start arriving for two or three more years.) They still lack comprehensive EW, using in fact, marginally modified systems from the ones Gen Dick Cody (now Army Planning director) famously complained to Congress about after events in Kosovo caught attention
As a fighting entity D model Apache units will be alone out there. Hardly any investment - beyond experimentation - has gone into the digital networks the Army has studied for many years.
Some of the other horror stories are perhaps better known. The MV-22 tilt-rotor is hung up in a seemingly endless development cycle destined, once again, to sit out the kind of mobility warfare it was specifically designed for.
The Marines still are not close to obtaining their now-old W model Cobra and UH-1N replacements, forced therefore to use technology only slightly modified from what they had in Desert Storm (when a man portable FLIR was used from a Huey to target Cobra gunships after an Iraqi breakthrough at Kafji).
The story of the CH-53E is also well known. Sure, a mod program is in the works - but its outcome is years away from fruition. The aircraft plods along, denied all semblance of a glass cockpit or modern comm. and EW systems, carrying its own maintainers and tools, forced to perform combat miracles such as a 400 nm insertion sortie during operations in Afghanistan.
But it’s when you come down to the systems, the all-important enabling electronics, that you find out how badly the inertia of the last 10-11 years has bitten.
The Army has known for years what to do to digitise its helicopter fleet. From Task Force 21 to the Capstone exercises at Ft Hood, it has long been clear that a huge - perhaps decisive - combat multiplier effect can be realised from putting helicopters four square into the tactical internet.
But in reality, beyond those D model Apaches (which are netted together well), very little has been achieved either in the air or on the ground. While USAF elements will all benefit from massive upgrades in commander situational awareness, it’s likely that keeping track of the Army’s helicopters will be done the same way it always has - with a grease pencil and the talent of the helicopter controllers on the staffs.
The aircraft remain most vulnerable in two main areas: EW and training.
Taking the last first. When the Army deployed to Saudi Arabia at the beginning of Desert Storm they experienced a number of training and work-up accidents. Cross-over effects caused by radical desert temperature changes forced them to turn to NVGs, which also produced training issues. But all that changed after the fleets came back. In many cockpits, the Apaches particularly, NVGs disappeared.
The question is: will the situation as far as training goes be predictably repeatable? Is the experience level of the aircrews what it should be in the first place? (It was disturbing to hear that the Army’s Flight School 21 training plan - one designed to increase the raw experience level of pilots before they go to units has been stymied by a lack of funds for the underlying simulators. The message carrier - no less a person than MG Mark Curran, CG of the Army Aviation Center - practically pleaded with an industry audience recently for them to help him get it put back into out-year budgets).
It seems obvious there will be a number of helicopter accidents as the crews re-learn old lessons.
The EW situation is incomprehensible. The one weapon area the Iraqis are supposed to have heavied up on is air defences. The development of the awkwardly named ATIRCM/SFIRCM (acronyms for infra-red and radar EW protection) was called an urgent need when Army leaders spoke about it in 1991, a technical response then said to be much needed against AD proliferation and improvements in guidance system smartness.
But, in 2000 the Army summarily stopped work on its new system, consigning the few systems it has instead to the special forces aviation regiment (160th SOAR, who may or may not have any of them installed yet.).
It’s questionable, too, that there are even enough of the ‘old’ systems to go around.
Who can forget then US Army Col Tom Rynkober’s legendary efforts to spread out a small number of ASE (Aircraft Survivability Equipment) ‘B’ kits (using Hertz rental trucks) among the Army fleet in the Storm build-up? And who would bet against such an initiative being needed again?
None of this is to say helicopters will not perform their jobs should there be a new war on the sands of Iraq. They will, thanks, as always, to the sheer spirit and dedication of the people involved.
What is left to ask, however, is (a) if it’s accepted that the Desert Storm ‘lessons learned’ were worth learning - in terms of multiplying rotary wing effectiveness etc etc, what (b) does it actually take to implement them?
Eleven years and billions of dollars spent on eternal R&D may be useful for setting a roadmap for the far future. But for the here and now, they seem of very little help.