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thedrifter
08-01-06, 09:01 AM
Punching Above Your Weight

by The Officers of MSSG–31

MEU Service Support Group 31 in the battle for Fallujah.

On 8 November 2004, Regimental Combat Teams (RCTs) 1 and 7 crossed the line of departure attacking south into the city of Fallujah and commencing Phase III of Operation AL FAJR. The 1st Marine Division (1st MarDiv) depended upon the ability of the RCTs to generate and maintain combat tempo as a key to rapid defeat of an insurgent force unable to keep pace with around-the-clock combined arms operations. Providing the sustainment to maintain tempo was the responsibility of the combat service support element (CSSE). This article will focus on the actions of “Shiloh” Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Service Support Group 31 (MSSG–31) (Minus) (Reinforced) providing direct support to “Ripper” RCT–7 during Operation AL FAJR.

Background
The 31st MEU moved into Iraq in mid-October 2004 following an unscheduled deployment to the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility and was decomposited upon arrival in the I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) area of operations (AO). The command element assumed responsibility for AO Denver and collocated at Al Asad Airbase with Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 265 that supported the air tasking order for 3d Marine Aircraft Wing. 7th Marines assumed tactical control (TaCon) of 1st Battalion, 3d Marines (1/3)—the battalion landing team (BLT) assigned to 31st MEU (Special Operations Capable) (SOC). CSS Group 11 (CSSG–11)—an element of 1st Force Service Support Group (1st FSSG) providing direct support to the 1st MarDiv—assumed TaCon of MSSG–31.

Two perceived advantages influenced the decision to assign MSSG–31 the task of direct support to RCT–7. The first advantage was maintaining the ongoing relationship between BLT 1/3, assigned to RCT–7, and MSSG–31. The second advantage was found in breaking the existing habitual relationship between CSS Battalion 7 (CSSB–7) and RCT–7, but retaining CSSB–7 in place in the complex and dispersed AO Denver.

Preparations and Integration: Phase I of Operation AL FAJR
The tables of organization and equipment for MSSG–31 were designed to support a MEU operating from amphibious shipping not a reinforced RCT. To support RCT–7, 1st FSSG reinforced MSSG–31 with 121 Marines, sailors, an interpreter, and equipment from CSSB–7. This reinforcement focused on enhancing the motor transport, military police, and engineering capabilities of the MSSG. Other reinforcement included communications equipment to provide MSSG–31 with data connectivity, as well as blue force tracker and mounted digital automated communications terminal (MDACT).

Integration of the reinforcements, establishment of a functioning CSS operations center, detailed planning, development of work spaces, and “left seat, right seat” rides with CSSB–1 for AO familiarization occupied the 3 weeks between force closure on 18 October 2005 and the commencement of offensive operations. These objectives were accomplished concurrently with support to RCT–7 as they moved from AO Denver and assumed their portion of battlespace in AO Raleigh.

Integration of the Marines and sailors from CSSB–7 was seamless. The ease of task organization at the lowest levels supports the assertion by LtGen James A. Brabham, USMC(Ret) that the strength of the FSSG is its inherent ability to rapidly task organize. Workspaces to enhance the effectiveness for upcoming operations were carved from ground allocated to MSSG–31 on Camp Fallujah. A motor pool and engineer, maintenance, and supply lots emerged from the dust. Force protection in the form of berms and bunkers for survivability against indirect fire was a priority.

Course of Action Development, Decision, and Transition
Detailed planning occurred between MSSG–31 and RCT–7, focusing on the functions of CSS, identifying standing operating procedures, requirements determination, and the synchronization of the logistics capabilities of both organizations. Anticipating potential challenges associated with theater-wide transportation during the upcoming fight, 1st FSSG built an “iron mountain” of Classes I, III (bulk), limited IV, V, and limited IX items at Camp Fallujah. This iron mountain reduced risk by eliminating the critical vulnerability of supply convoys. MSSG–31 further established on-hand stocks in the MSSG supply lot, precluding the friction and time expenditures associated with requisitioning supplies and building convoys from multiple, dispersed supply points on Camp Fallujah.

During the remaining time leading up to the battle, MSSG–31 planners attended the I MEF confirmation brief, 1st MarDiv’s logistics rehearsal of concept brief, and RCT–7’s confirmation brief. It was important for the logisticians of MSSG–31 to understand 7th Marines’ scheme of maneuver, logistics coordination procedures within the 1st MarDiv, and the commander’s intent two levels up.

Execution: Phase IIIA—Ground Assault
Phase II of Operation AL FAJR, a violent supporting arms shaping effort, ended as MSSG–31 employed D7 bulldozers to cut four berms allowing BLTs 1/8 and 1/3, as well as RCT–7, to uncoil from firm bases. RCT–7 occupied staging areas prior to movement to attack positions to the northeast of the city of Fallujah. MSSG–31 motor transport Marines employed medium tactical vehicles to reinforce battalion transportation assets and moved the Marines of Company B, 1/3 to their attack positions. Concurrent with Phase II, the U.S. Army’s 2d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, or “Blackjack,” assumed responsibility for AO Raleigh outside Fallujah and blocked all but military traffic on vital main supply routes. This allowed uninterrupted movements of combat, combat support, and CSS forces and mitigated the threat from suicide vehicleborne improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

Crossing the line of departure on 8 November 2005 and attacking south into the city, each battalion carried 2 days of Class I supplies and combat loads of ammunition. RCT–7 operators and logisticians planned to establish regimental and battalion logistics trains north of the city, with a regimental ambulance exchange point and a temporary detainee holding facility. 1/8, 1/3, and the Army’s Task Force 2–2, 2d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division logistics trains arrayed to the northeast along Route Mobile.

Concurrent with the first sustainment push to the infantry battalions, MSSG–31 engineers improved the survivability of regimental and battalion logistics sites. Engineers employed D7 bulldozers and a TRAM (tractor, rubber-tired, articulated steering, multipurpose) to provide protection from direct and indirect fire weapons. Excavation also provided pits for fuel bladders, ammunition storage, and a detainee holding site. With many barriers prebuilt and Class IV items, such as HESCO Bastion barrier systems, concertina wire, and prefilled sandbags on hand, entry control points and bunkers went rapidly into place.

Once the regimental and battalion trains were established, MSSG–31 maintained a continuous push of supplies. Requirements were anticipated, based on known usage, with bottled water and meals, ready-to-eat (MREs) being the easiest to predict. Bottled water proved to be convenient for the infantry battalions. Difficulties encountered in transporting flimsy pallets were overcome by packing 20-foot industry standard organization containers with pallets of water and transporting via MK18A1 logistics vehicle systems.

The infantry battalions employed attached assault amphibious vehicles (AAVs) for transporting logistics in the city and for casualty evacuation. Movement of thin-skinned, wheeled vehicles was not practical or attempted until the success of the attack had progressed to the point where supply routes could be traveled with reasonable confidence.

Medical planning during AL FAJR focused on reducing the time to move a Marine from the point of wounding to treatment. For RCT–7, time and distance factors dictated that the primary means of casualty evacuation was ground transportation. For Marines requiring Level II treatment at Surgical Company B, 1st Medical Battalion (Bravo Surgical) on Camp Fallujah, this translated to evacuation via AAV or M113 U.S. Army armored ambulances attached to battalion aid stations. Ambulance routes were carefully controlled, even on camp, to ensure they remained open. MSSG–31 was prepared to provide overflow ambulance transportation if the requirement outstripped the resources of either the battalions or the regiment. Fortunately, this reinforcement was never required.

Medical supply support was pushed by MSSG–31 to the battalion aid stations. In preparing for the battle, MSSG–31 medical planners built an inventory, or another iron mountain, of Class VIII (medical supplies) sufficient to sustain battalion and regimental aid stations. Other medical considerations included planning for the treatment of Iraqi soldiers and wounded insurgents. During the battle Iraqi soldiers with significant wounds “found” MSSG–31’s aid station, showing up on a daily basis for dressing changes. This support, while certainly not an anticipated MSSG mission, provided a concrete demonstration of teamwork and support to the Iraqi soldiers.
Enemy wounded awaiting evacuation.

Ammunition was also stockpiled at Camp Fallujah and was second only to repair parts as a demand forecasting challenge. Particularly high expenditures were experienced in 155mm high-explosive ammunition, specialized rockets, tank rounds, AT–4s, non-lethal grenades, and 12-gauge lock-buster rounds. Ammunition requests made up the majority of immediate requests during the battle and were difficult to meet in a timely manner due to the custodial relationships between RCT–7 and MSSG–31. The unanticipated impact of the delineation of responsibility between the division and the CSS units for ammunition management became apparent in the form of friction once the fight commenced.

With the iron mountain in place, transportation from Camp Fallujah to the regimental and battalion logistics sites was the bottom line to success. Convoys, in an environment where the threat was assessed to be focused on logistics units, had to be carefully coordinated and executed. Before any convoy could move, clearance was required from 1st MarDiv. Convoy security for MSSG–31 was provided by military police operating in armored HMMWVs with crew-served weapons.

Military police scouted roads for threats, such as IEDs; controlled civilian traffic; navigated; and provided overwatch during CSS operations. They also transported 106 detainees from the RCT–7 temporary detainee holding facility to Camp Fallujah during the battle. A significant portion of CSSB–7’s military police reinforcement to MSSG–31 included Marines who were not military police but were cross-trained as provisional security forces.

Communications presented challenges for MSSG–31 during Operation AL FAJR as an MSSG table of equipment is deficient in meeting the data communications requirements. To compensate, CSSB–7 provided MSSG–31 with tactical fiber, fiber switches, and a remote multiplexer-combiner. These assets allowed MSSG–31 to pull tactical data and phone services from CSSB–1. Each convoy typically employed commercial global positioning systems, an AN/MRC–145, a dozen personal role radios, one enhanced position location reporting system powering the MDACT, three blue force tracker terminals, and one Iridium phone. When combined, they provided effective communications with higher and adjacent units.

A significant factor in ensuring the right supplies arrived on time, was logistics command and control (C2). Detailed coordination worked out in advance paid dividends throughout the operation. For logisticians, another significant factor contributing to C2 during Operation AL FAJR was the logistics request process that must be aligned with the chain of command and support relationships. To focus the effort of the CSS unit, battalion requests required validation and prioritization by the regiment.

A brilliance of design that was appreciated during the battle for Fallujah was the responsiveness derived from the depth of logistics capabilities across the battalions and regimental headquarters. When managed properly, battalion logistics trains responded to the immediate needs of the Marines in the fight, allowing MSSG–31 to maintain constant and effective bulk movements. This division of effort and responsibility must be preserved to maintain logistics tempo and flexibility for commanders.

The initial positioning of the regimental and battalion logistics sites allowed the use of the streets running north to south in the city of Fallujah for logistics lines of communications. As the fight progressed, the plan called for movement of the battalion logistics trains. The new site, outside of town and along the main road through the center of Fallujah, was intended to take advantage of the high-speed avenue of approach. This movement of logistics trains was accomplished on 13 November, 5 days after the beginning of Phase IIIA. The trigger for movement was condition-based, with the most important consideration being the security of east-west movement along the main route through the city.

A significant engineering effort ensued, as had occurred before, to harden the new logistics site, with the emphasis on survivability. The importance of providing for survivability was graphically demonstrated within a few days of site occupation when the 81mm mortar platoon from 1/3, located close by, received indirect fire resulting in multiple casualties. Phase IIIA of Operation AL FAJR ended when RCT–1 and RCT–7 completed an initial sweep through Fallujah.

Phase IIIB: Search and Attack in Zone
Phase IIIB began with the 1st MarDiv focused on a deliberate effort to clear the city of insurgents who had escaped detection and been bypassed. Concurrent with this effort, the infantry battalions began to select sites within the city for company-sized firm bases. An effort also ensued to begin to reduce the multiple large arms caches emplaced by insurgents in the city.

The main effort in reducing enemy caches was explosive ordnance disposal (EOD). During planning before the battle the decision was made to consolidate MSSG–31’s two EOD teams into the existing general support pool operating from CSSB–1. During Phase IIIA these teams had operated in a combination of direct support of infantry battalions and general support to the regiments and AO Raleigh. Now, with the initial sweep of the city completed, MSSG–31 EOD was combined with MSSG motor transport, military police, and engineers to form Task Force Cache (TF Cache).

Weapons caches discovered in the city ranged from a few rounds of Cold War-vintage rockets to huge caches consisting of truckloads of ordnance, explosive making materials, and weapons. In keeping with the “no better friend, no worse enemy” mantra of the 1st MarDiv, a conscious decision was made by RCT–7 to remove caches to be reduced outside the city. This was beyond the scope and capabilities of a couple of EOD technicians. It required tremendous manpower as well as coordination between RCT–7, the battalion on the ground, and MSSG–31.

TF Cache received its taskings from RCT–7, traveling throughout the city to sites where the enemy had stored large caches of arms and munitions. Under EOD’s careful supervision, these dangerous munitions were hand loaded, one piece at a time, onto waiting trucks; transported out of the city; and destroyed by controlled detonation. TF Cache operated for many days reducing the largest caches found by RCT–7. Many smaller caches were simply reduced in place by EOD.

Throughout the remainder of RCT–7’s operations in the city, MSSG–31 pushed increasing amounts of sustainment into Falljuah, delivering supplies to battalion designated firm base for further distribution to the companies. Class I supplements, such as fruit, sodas, and cereal, were pushed along with cases of MREs. The iron mountain paid dividends. Supply support pushes from the 1st FSSG only slowed the first few days of the battle, but the items on hand kept support responsive.

MSSG–31’s maintenance effort throughout the battle was steady and sustainable. That much of anticipated maintenance requirement did not emerge was likely a result of the minimized wheeled vehicle use in the city. Maintenance did perform multiple recovery missions, reinforcing this skill as valuable to maintain.

Removal of rubble was required during Phase IIIB to improve mobility along the city streets and to reduce the threat of IEDs by removing locations where these devices could be concealed. MSSG–31 was augmented by Army engineers from the 120th Engineer Combat Battalion assigned to the MEF Engineer Group for this effort.

Supporting RCT–7 remained the main effort for MSSG–31 during the battle for Fallujah. However, MSSG–31 provided other support around AO Raleigh as directed by CSSG–11. These taskings included providing daily water support to the Jordanian Hospital on the outskirts of Fallujah and CSS to the mortuary affairs unit located in the “potato factory,” fuel support to RCT–7 firm base at Camp Bahria, two continuous months of field shower support and mobile electric power to BLTs 1/3 and 1/8, and the transportation of Iraqi units to and from Fallujah. MSSG–31 Marines and corpsmen also augmented the detention facility aboard Camp Fallujah, the group’s surgeon reinforced Bravo Surgical, disbursers were assigned to BLT 1/3 to make solatia payments, and Marines from supply and landing support platoons manned expeditor teams with the supply management unit at the FSSG in Taqaddum, Iraq. On 11 December 2004, the battlespace was adjusted and RCT–7 assumed AO Raleigh outside the city of Fallujah, maintaining pressure on the now off balance enemy.

Coda
The iron mountain. A significant factor in MSSG–31’s success in supporting RCT–7 during Operation AL FAJR was the existence of the iron mountain of supplies located on Camp Fallujah. A historical strength of the Marine Corps’ unique, amphibious shipping-based, expeditionary nature has been the capability to bring our own supplies to the fight. We must recognize the independence and self-sufficiency this brings to the Marine Corps in the constant competition for strategic lift. The Marine Corps is not expeditionary without organic sustainment.

Focus on the basics. The 31st MEU and MSSG–31 are unique among MEUs. The 31st MEU(SOC) is always forward deployed, working in rhythm with the unit deployment program infantry battalion. There was little time allotted, compared to a typical MEU(SOC), for training. A focus on the basics, from the skills of the individual Marine to the basics of CSS, was the key to success. Excellence in basics at the individual Marine level keeps Marines alive and wins battles. The basics of established logistics processes as they apply to supported and supporting units make sense and work on the battlefield. Our logistics schools should emphasize this fact.

Logistics planning. Effective logistics does not just happen. Logistics requirements must be anticipated. Constant communications and close coordination with operators are the keys to success. Without logistics planning, execution would be ineffective and operations would quickly grind to a halt. Good plans enhance flexibility because they lead logistics planners to recognize and adjust for the fog and friction of war through the development of branch plans and sequels.

When MSSG–31 commenced its 23d deployment cycle since the reestablishment of the 31st MEU(SOC) in Okinawa in 1992, nobody could have anticipated Operation AL FAJR and MSSG–31’s subsequent role as the CSSE for RCT–7 in the battle for Fallujah. Well-trained Marines and sailors will always rise to the task when challenged, and the success of MSSG–31 in supporting RCT–7 is directly attributable to their adaptability, drive, and professionalism.

Ellie