What Happens After the Israeli Invasion?

[fontman]

What Happens After the Israeli Invasion?
By Peter Brookes
Real Clear Politics

Days of shelling and bombing haven't ended the rocket attacks or secured their soldiers' release, so, unless Hezbollah--or its sponsors in Beirut, Damascus or Tehran blink--an Israeli invasion of Lebanon is a good bet.

The Israelis probably haven't made a "go/no-go" decision on another military foray into Lebanon yet, especially with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice inbound to the region Sunday, but its marshalling of forces on the border sends an unmistakable signal.

With both the 1982 invasion (that went all the way to Beirut) and 1996 operation showing Israel's willingness to fight, the Israeli buildup--while eliminating surprise-- generates political pressure on Hezbollah's sponsors and other influential regional players.

But what if Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert gives the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) the green light to go north?

Sure, it makes sense for Israel to move into Hezbollah territory in southern Lebanon, flushing out its fighters, destroying its terrorist infrastructure and securing its weapons caches, especially the 10,000-15,000 rockets believed under Hezbollah's control.

Even a limited Israeli incursion into southern Lebanon could create a "buffer zone," pushing Hezbollah fighters and some rockets (e.g., Katyusha/Kassam) back out of range of the Israeli border and population centers.

Unfortunately, the IDF operation won't likely lead to the rescue of the kidnapped Israeli soldiers, who undoubtedly have been whisked away to Beirut, Damascus or even Tehran as pawns for future use.

But what happens after that? Surviving Hezbollah fighters will disappear into the shadows, retreating north or into Syria to conduct an asymmetric conventional/terrorist campaign against the IDF, assisted by Damascus and Tehran.

And the Lebanese government? On Thursday, Lebanon's defense minister, Elias Murr, said if Israel invades Lebanon: "The Lebanese army will resist and defend [Lebanon] and will prove that it is an army that deserves respect."

The defense minister fails to point out is that his Lebanese army--like the government-- is weak, divided along Muslim-Christian sectarian lines and has, not surprisingly, stood aside in the past during IDF operations against Hezbollah.

Perhaps the biggest strategic question is Syria. While Syria would be smart to avoid taking Israel head-on, in light of the recent IDF "flyover" of the presidential palace, Damascus will certainly support Hezbollah operations with arms and intelligence.

Moreover, Damascus might see a unique opportunity to send Syrian troops back into neighboring Lebanon--just over a year after they left--especially if it sees that things are bogging down diplomatically or militarily for the IDF.

Iran is sure to continue to provide support for its Lebanese Shia cousins in their mutual effort to destroy Israel, including providing arms, logistics, financing and its paramilitary Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps advisors.

Tehran also benefits from the conflict, keeping its nuclear program out of the headlines, slowing any United Nations Security Council action, and providing Tehran with leverage in dealing with the international community, especially the United States.

If Israel intervenes in Lebanon, it will likely be punitive and limited, ideally leading to a robust international stabilization force that will prevent Hezbollah from using southern Lebanon as a staging ground for attacking Israel--or anywhere else.

But things will likely get worse--before they get worse; Dealing with Hezbollah is guaranteed to be nightmarish for the IDF. And the "evil twins" Iran and Syria will ensure to add death and destruction to any possible diplomatic or military solution.

Peter Brookes is a columnist for The New York Post , a Heritage Foundation senior fellow and author of "A Devil's Triangle: Terrorism, WMD and Rogue States."

[mlurtsema]

To hear the pundits on television, we are witnessing the beginning of WWIII. Perhaps that is the case. Perhaps it is just wishful thinking or hyperbole to get better ratings on TV. It certainly seems that the situation is likely to escalate...and perhaps things will escalate enough that Syria and Iran will be sorted out.

[fontman]

One of the only folks I trust on television news is Mr. Bill O'Reilly.

The rest can go pound sand, IMHO.

:evilgrin:

[10thzodiac]

One of the only folks I trust on television news is Mr. Bill O'Reilly.

The rest can go pound sand, IMHO.

:evilgrin:


SEMPER FI

:thumbup:

[mlurtsema]

Personally, I don't like any of them on television. and, I don't like the Hush-Bimbo very much either -- I do like Michael Savage, although sometimes he probably goes too far. Probably to balance out all of the media morons.

[horselady]

Israel's Unnecessary War

By Daniel Pipes




Yes, you read that correctly

For 45 years, 1948-93, Israel's strategic vision, tactical brilliance, technological innovation, and logistical cleverness won it a deterrence capability. A deep understanding of the country's predicament, complemented by money, will power, and dedication, enabled the Israeli state systematically to burnish its reputation for toughness.

The leadership focused on the enemy's mind and mood, adopting policies designed to degrade his morale, with the goal of inducing a sense of defeat, a realization that the Jewish state is permanent and cannot be undone. As a result, whoever attacked the Israel state paid for that mistake with captured terrorists, dead soldiers, stalled economies, and toppled regimes.

By 1993, deciding that (1) they had enough of war and (2) they could end the war on their own terms, Israelis experimented with such exotica as "the peace process" and "disengagement." They permitted their enemies to create a quasi-governmental structure (the "Palestinian Authority") and to amass hoards of armaments (Hizbullah's nearly 12,000 Katyushas in southern Lebanon). They shamelessly traded captured terrorists for hostages.

In this mish-mash of appeasement and retreat, Israel's enemies rapidly lost their fears, coming to see Israel as a paper tiger. As a result, Palestinians and others rediscovered their earlier enthusiasm to eliminate Israel.

To undo this damage of thirteen years requires Israel returning to the slow, hard, expensive, frustrating, and boring work of deterrence. That means renouncing the foolish plans of compromise, the dreamy hopes for good will, the irresponsibility of releasing terrorists, the self-indulgence of weariness, and the idiocy of unilateral withdrawal.

Deterrence cannot be reinstated in a week, through a raid, a blockade, or a round of war. It demands unwavering resolve, expressed over decades. For the current operations to achieve anything for Israel beyond emotional palliation, they must presage a profound change in orientation. They must prompt a major rethinking of Israeli foreign policy, a junking of the Oslo and disengagement paradigms in favor of a policy of deterrence leading to victory.

In other words, the import of hostilities underway is not what has been destroyed in Lebanon nor what the U.N. Security Council resolves; it is what the Israeli public learns, or fails to learn.

http://www.JewishWorldReview.com | July 19, 2006 / 23 Tamuz, 5766

[mlurtsema]

You cannot negotiate with people who see negotiation as a form of weakness to be exploited. You cannot negotiate with people who do not recognize your right to exist. You cannot negotiate with people who are willing to blow themselves up to kill you.

[Stanley Hroszow]

Do you not know in the end Israel wins all of that region.

[horselady]

"There will only be peace in this region when
the Arabs can love their children more than
they hate Israelis." ---Golda Meir

[mlurtsema]

People have been killing each other in that region for 5,000 years that we know about. The secretary of states intentions aside, I don't see peace starting to break out all over that region now.