thedrifter
07-15-06, 07:16 AM
VIETNAM: 40 YEARS AGO
Operation Hastings: The War Moves North
Story by Otto J. Lehrack
In the early summer of 1966, nearly 285,000 Americans were in Vietnam, and more were on the way. What had once been, in the hopes of Washington policy-makers, a small operation of a couple of battalions of Marines to forestall the collapse of an ally against international communism was now the largest scale deployment of U.S. forces since the Korean War.
Until that summer, most North Vietnamese forces came down the notorious Ho Chi Minh Trail. Screened behind the rugged western mountains along Vietnam’s border with Laos, the trail began in 1959 as a series of footpaths over which transport troops moved like ants, ferrying a steady stream of supplies on their backs and on their bicycles, which were rigged to carry hundreds of pounds of arms and supplies while the driver walked alongside keeping the rig upright.
The trail, the major artery of invasion, ran nearly the entire length of South Vietnam, and branches of it pumped the blood of men and materiel into the muscle of the enemy’s war effort.
A new phase in the war began in March 1966 when two North Vietnamese regiments overran the U.S. Special Forces/South Vietnamese camp in the A Shau Valley in western Thua Thien province, the second northernmost province of South Vietnam. The enemy killed more than half of the 400 defenders, and most of the survivors owed their lives to a rescue under fire by Lieutenant Colonel Charles House’s Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM) 163.
Once they secured the A Shau Valley as a logistics base and sanctuary, the enemy upped the ante again and began using the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), the demarcation line between North and South Vietnam, as an invasion corridor to send division-size units directly into the northern provinces of their southern neighbor.
By early June, Marine reconnaissance teams were sighting large numbers of North Vietnamese soldiers near the village of Cam Lo in the eastern part of Quang Tri province, and in the first few days of July, 14 of 18 Marine reconnaissance teams had to be extracted almost immediately after insertion because of enemy pressure. This activity, captured documents and prisoner interrogation reports made it clear that regulars of Major General Nguyen Vang’s North Vietnamese Army (NVA) 324B Division were south of the DMZ and looking for a fight.
The enemy’s objective was to “liberate” the two northern provinces from South Vietnam and create a serious strategic and political defeat for the United States and the South Vietnamese. The targeted territory included the former imperial capital of Hue; its loss to the communists would be a major propaganda victory for their side.
Lieutenant General Lewis W. Walt, holder of two Navy Crosses and commander of all Marine forces in Vietnam, was ordered by his boss, U.S. Army General William Westmoreland, to send a minimum of seven battalions to stop and, if possible, destroy the 324B. LtGen Walt turned to his Third Marine Division commander, MajGen Wood Kyle, who formed Task Force Delta and appointed his deputy, Brigadier General Lowell English, as commander.
The senior Marines and their ARVN counterparts met in the small town of Dong Ha on 11 July to plan the operation. Dubbed “Hastings,” the operation would involve nearly 8,500 Marines, 3,500 South Vietnamese and more than 12,000 of the enemy. For their extraordinary heroism during Operation Hastings, three Marines would be awarded the Medal of Honor.
The South Vietnamese were assigned the region around the more populated and flatter areas astride Route 1, the national north-south highway that runs the entire length of Vietnam. For the first time in the war, the Marines would fight inland in the densely jungled mountains. Their objective was the Ngan Valley, a major infiltration corridor for the 90th Regiment, 324B Division. This narrow basin lay 25 miles from the coast and just south of the DMZ.
On D-day, 15 July, A-4 Skyhawks and F-4 Phantoms pounded the Ngan Valley and burned off a small landing zone with napalm. Once the aviators were clear, the artillerymen of Major Samuel Morrow’s 3d Bn, 12th Marine Regiment hammered the LZ again just before 20 helicopters from HMM-164 and -165 brought the first wave of LtCol Sumner Vale’s 3/4 into LZ Crow.
The landing was opposed lightly, but tragedy quickly developed. Two of the helicopters tangled blades and crashed in the small LZ. A third, pulling up to avoid the first two, hit a tree. All three choppers were beyond repair and were destroyed later. Adding to the airmen’s woes, the enemy shot down another helicopter that evening, killing 12 Marines and a corpsman. The Marines soon dubbed the place “Helicopter Valley.”
Once the 3/4 leathernecks were on the ground, Marine helicopters brought LtCol Arnold Bench’s 2/4 into another LZ, about three miles to the northeast. Bench’s mission was to drive the enemy down the valley into 3/4’s blocking positions. The battalion alighted and began sweeping to the southwest, but the double- and triple-canopy vegetation and steam-bath heat slowed their progress to a crawl.
Back near LZ Crow, LtCol Vale designated “India” Co as perimeter security and sent “Lima” and “Kilo” companies out to establish positions from which they could cut off escape routes from the valley.
First Lieutenant William Healy’s Lima Co moved a kilometer west against token resistance to occupy Hill 200. Captain Robert Modrzejewski’s Kilo Co had a harder task. Its objective was 1,800 meters away, and the path was infested with snipers and large numbers of freshly dug fighting holes. En route the Marines uncovered a 200-bed bamboo hospital and a small-arms ammunition cache. They killed the enemy guards and moved on. Another fight in late afternoon near the Ngan River cost them three Marines, and Capt Modrzejewski was ordered to pull back 200 meters from the river and establish night positions.
After dark, the communists pinned the battalion headquarters and India Co in an attack by small arms, mortars and machine guns. The command group and India Co returned the fire, which continued until about 2000 hours despite repeated countermeasures by Marine air and artillery. The fire ceased suddenly, and 45 minutes later a reinforced enemy company attacked Kilo Co’s night position. In the moonless night the Marines heard and even smelled the enemy as they attacked, but only glimpsed them in the wavering light of flares. The North Vietnamese kept the pressure up for three hours before withdrawing.
At first light Capt Modrzejewski’s Marines counted 25 enemy bodies in front of their position, some only five yards away.
To the northeast, 2/4’s advance was stalled, and it set in night positions about a mile short of its objective. LtCol Bench received permission to divert from his original route and proceed the next morning along easier terrain bordering the river, in order to reach 3/4 the following day. He did so, and they finally linked up by midmorning.
BGen English sent LtCol J. D. Spaulding’s 2/1 into LZ Robin, about 3,000 meters east-northeast of Crow where it could readily reinforce the two battalions of the 4th Marines.
In the meantime Capt Modrzejewski struggled to get his company across the Ngan River. Unable to find and neutralize the carefully camouflaged far-bank positions, he once more dug in for the night. That night, 16 July, the NVA tried once more to overrun Kilo Co. Three violent attacks in as many hours were thrown back by the Marines with outstanding support from their artillery and a flare ship that stayed on station. The Marines were dangerously low on ammunition when the enemy broke off the attack. Daylight revealed 79 enemy bodies in front of their lines, and the Marines estimated that they killed an additional 50 to 75.
Earlier that day a detachment of 1st Force Reconnaissance Co rappelled onto a towering escarpment six miles south of the Ngan Valley. From this matchless vantage point, which would go down in Marine lore as the “Rockpile,” they called in artillery on groups of enemy moving through the area. Their sightings prompted BGen English to send LtCol Spaulding’s 2/1 sweeping along the river valley east of the Rockpile in the Cam Lo River Valley. This battalion and LtCol Van Bell’s 1/1 moved along Route 9 past Cam Lo village and turned north through the valley to drive the enemy up toward the DMZ.
BGen English changed his plans and on 18 July ordered 2/4 and 3/4 to new positions northeast of LZ Crow. Kilo/3/4, serving as LZ security as the column moved out, came under attack by as many as 1,000 enemy soldiers. The initial assault separated Staff Sergeant John McGinty’s 1st Platoon from the others, and his Marines bore the worst of it.
Advancing with grim determination behind walking mortars, the enemy nearly overran them. When the battle further fragmented McGinty’s platoon, he ran through intense fire to his isolated Marines. McGinty found 20 of his men wounded and his corpsman dead. He reloaded magazines for the wounded and directed their fire against human-wave tactics, personally killing five of the enemy at point-blank range.
Capt Modrzejewski, unable to maneuver his other two platoons to McGinty’s assistance, called in air and artillery. Soon, he was beset with an attack against his own position. For hours the enemy threw everything it had against Kilo Co, but the Marines fought them off each time. Although wounded, Capt Modrzejewski directed his company with exceptional skill and courage, at one point crawling 200 meters to bring needed ammunition to his Marines.
Relief for Kilo Co came that afternoon when Lima Co fought its way through the enemy. The two companies, with their supporting arms, gained fire superiority and were able to uncover McGinty’s platoon, which had only 10 Marines who were still alive and unwounded. Kilo Co was down to about 80 effectives. Capt Modrzejewski and SSgt McGinty would be awarded the Medal of Honor for their heroism on Operation Hastings. Following this action, Kilo/3/4 was withdrawn from the fight, and the remainder of the battalion took up blocking positions.
Also on 18 July LtCol Edward Bronars’ 3/5 was lifted into the Hastings area. The Special Landing Force, 3/5 went ashore near the coast two days earlier and was then sent into the Hastings area. Capt Harold Pettingill’s Mike/3/5 met resistance northwest of LZ Crow and overran a force of NVA, killing 21 of them. Lima/3/5 landed in trace, and the two companies moved southwest through a valley north of Dong Ha Mountain where they uncovered and destroyed enemy supply stores and facilities.
In the meantime, India, Kilo and the battalion command group landed at LZ Dove to the southeast. They, too, found large quantities of enemy equipment: explosives, mines, uniforms and propaganda leaflets.
On the morning of the 20th, following extensive air strikes on the position, 2/4 made a hard hump over very difficult terrain to overrun the suspected position of the 324B Division command post. It was defended only lightly, but was fortified, indicating that it had, indeed, been a CP of major importance.
On the 24th, LtCol Bronars ordered Capt Samuel Glaize’s India/3/5 to the top of Hill 362 to establish a radio relay station. Except for the steep terrain, the Marines had little difficulty gaining the top of the hill. Once there, Capt Glaize sent a platoon down the forward slope to put in defenses. The NVA were waiting in the 60- to 90-foot jungle growth and badly battered the platoon.
Lance Corporal Richard Pittman traded his M14 rifle for an M60 machine gun, picked up several belts of ammunition and went after the enemy. He single-handedly destroyed several NVA automatic-weapons positions, braving both small-arms and mortar fire to do so.
Reaching the position where the leading Marine had fallen wounded, Pittman was confronted by a charge of 30 to 40 of the enemy. Disregarding the danger, he established a position in the middle of the trail and took on the enemy force. When his gun became disabled, he continued firing with an abandoned submachine gun, then a pistol from a fallen Marine and finally with his last hand grenade. It was just enough to stop the enemy advance and save his comrades.
LCpl Pittman was later awarded the Medal of Honor. The 3/5 Marines continued in sporadic contact with the enemy until withdrawn by helicopter to USS Princeton (LPH-5) on 30 July.
There was no significant contact for the remainder of Operation Hastings, although the operation did not officially end until 3 Aug. As they always do, Marine supporting arms played a significant role. Maj Morrow’s 3/12 fired more than 34,000 rounds, Marine Phantoms and Skyhawks flew more than 100 sorties per day, and the helicopter squadrons logged an astounding 10,000 sorties in less than three weeks.
The Marines lost 126 KIA and 448 WIA, but killed nearly 800 communist soldiers and wounded many more. The 324B Division was badly hurt and was sent limping back across the DMZ.
Hastings was a victory for the Marines, but the North Vietnamese were not through. As they rebuilt the 324B Division, they sent other units south to do battle. The coming months brought more Marine operations to the DMZ. Operation Prairie would be next and was on the near horizon.
An unintended result of Hastings was the establishment of two new outposts in northern I Corps, Dong Ha and Cam Lo. Soon two more, Con Thien and Gio Linh, would be added to form the quadrangle that the Marines will always remember as “Leatherneck Square.”
Editor’s note: Otto Lehrack, a retired Marine infantry officer, has authored three books about Marines at war: “No Shining Armor: The Marines at War in Vietnam”; “The First Battle: Operation Starlite and the Beginning of the Blood Debt in Vietnam,” published in 2004, and now available in paperback; and “America’s Battalion: Marines in the First Gulf War,” published in 2005. The books may be purchased online at www.mca-marines.org, or from Marine Corps Association bookstores. Leatherneck appreciates the photo research efforts of Lena Kaljot, History Division, Marine Corps University.
Ellie
Operation Hastings: The War Moves North
Story by Otto J. Lehrack
In the early summer of 1966, nearly 285,000 Americans were in Vietnam, and more were on the way. What had once been, in the hopes of Washington policy-makers, a small operation of a couple of battalions of Marines to forestall the collapse of an ally against international communism was now the largest scale deployment of U.S. forces since the Korean War.
Until that summer, most North Vietnamese forces came down the notorious Ho Chi Minh Trail. Screened behind the rugged western mountains along Vietnam’s border with Laos, the trail began in 1959 as a series of footpaths over which transport troops moved like ants, ferrying a steady stream of supplies on their backs and on their bicycles, which were rigged to carry hundreds of pounds of arms and supplies while the driver walked alongside keeping the rig upright.
The trail, the major artery of invasion, ran nearly the entire length of South Vietnam, and branches of it pumped the blood of men and materiel into the muscle of the enemy’s war effort.
A new phase in the war began in March 1966 when two North Vietnamese regiments overran the U.S. Special Forces/South Vietnamese camp in the A Shau Valley in western Thua Thien province, the second northernmost province of South Vietnam. The enemy killed more than half of the 400 defenders, and most of the survivors owed their lives to a rescue under fire by Lieutenant Colonel Charles House’s Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM) 163.
Once they secured the A Shau Valley as a logistics base and sanctuary, the enemy upped the ante again and began using the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), the demarcation line between North and South Vietnam, as an invasion corridor to send division-size units directly into the northern provinces of their southern neighbor.
By early June, Marine reconnaissance teams were sighting large numbers of North Vietnamese soldiers near the village of Cam Lo in the eastern part of Quang Tri province, and in the first few days of July, 14 of 18 Marine reconnaissance teams had to be extracted almost immediately after insertion because of enemy pressure. This activity, captured documents and prisoner interrogation reports made it clear that regulars of Major General Nguyen Vang’s North Vietnamese Army (NVA) 324B Division were south of the DMZ and looking for a fight.
The enemy’s objective was to “liberate” the two northern provinces from South Vietnam and create a serious strategic and political defeat for the United States and the South Vietnamese. The targeted territory included the former imperial capital of Hue; its loss to the communists would be a major propaganda victory for their side.
Lieutenant General Lewis W. Walt, holder of two Navy Crosses and commander of all Marine forces in Vietnam, was ordered by his boss, U.S. Army General William Westmoreland, to send a minimum of seven battalions to stop and, if possible, destroy the 324B. LtGen Walt turned to his Third Marine Division commander, MajGen Wood Kyle, who formed Task Force Delta and appointed his deputy, Brigadier General Lowell English, as commander.
The senior Marines and their ARVN counterparts met in the small town of Dong Ha on 11 July to plan the operation. Dubbed “Hastings,” the operation would involve nearly 8,500 Marines, 3,500 South Vietnamese and more than 12,000 of the enemy. For their extraordinary heroism during Operation Hastings, three Marines would be awarded the Medal of Honor.
The South Vietnamese were assigned the region around the more populated and flatter areas astride Route 1, the national north-south highway that runs the entire length of Vietnam. For the first time in the war, the Marines would fight inland in the densely jungled mountains. Their objective was the Ngan Valley, a major infiltration corridor for the 90th Regiment, 324B Division. This narrow basin lay 25 miles from the coast and just south of the DMZ.
On D-day, 15 July, A-4 Skyhawks and F-4 Phantoms pounded the Ngan Valley and burned off a small landing zone with napalm. Once the aviators were clear, the artillerymen of Major Samuel Morrow’s 3d Bn, 12th Marine Regiment hammered the LZ again just before 20 helicopters from HMM-164 and -165 brought the first wave of LtCol Sumner Vale’s 3/4 into LZ Crow.
The landing was opposed lightly, but tragedy quickly developed. Two of the helicopters tangled blades and crashed in the small LZ. A third, pulling up to avoid the first two, hit a tree. All three choppers were beyond repair and were destroyed later. Adding to the airmen’s woes, the enemy shot down another helicopter that evening, killing 12 Marines and a corpsman. The Marines soon dubbed the place “Helicopter Valley.”
Once the 3/4 leathernecks were on the ground, Marine helicopters brought LtCol Arnold Bench’s 2/4 into another LZ, about three miles to the northeast. Bench’s mission was to drive the enemy down the valley into 3/4’s blocking positions. The battalion alighted and began sweeping to the southwest, but the double- and triple-canopy vegetation and steam-bath heat slowed their progress to a crawl.
Back near LZ Crow, LtCol Vale designated “India” Co as perimeter security and sent “Lima” and “Kilo” companies out to establish positions from which they could cut off escape routes from the valley.
First Lieutenant William Healy’s Lima Co moved a kilometer west against token resistance to occupy Hill 200. Captain Robert Modrzejewski’s Kilo Co had a harder task. Its objective was 1,800 meters away, and the path was infested with snipers and large numbers of freshly dug fighting holes. En route the Marines uncovered a 200-bed bamboo hospital and a small-arms ammunition cache. They killed the enemy guards and moved on. Another fight in late afternoon near the Ngan River cost them three Marines, and Capt Modrzejewski was ordered to pull back 200 meters from the river and establish night positions.
After dark, the communists pinned the battalion headquarters and India Co in an attack by small arms, mortars and machine guns. The command group and India Co returned the fire, which continued until about 2000 hours despite repeated countermeasures by Marine air and artillery. The fire ceased suddenly, and 45 minutes later a reinforced enemy company attacked Kilo Co’s night position. In the moonless night the Marines heard and even smelled the enemy as they attacked, but only glimpsed them in the wavering light of flares. The North Vietnamese kept the pressure up for three hours before withdrawing.
At first light Capt Modrzejewski’s Marines counted 25 enemy bodies in front of their position, some only five yards away.
To the northeast, 2/4’s advance was stalled, and it set in night positions about a mile short of its objective. LtCol Bench received permission to divert from his original route and proceed the next morning along easier terrain bordering the river, in order to reach 3/4 the following day. He did so, and they finally linked up by midmorning.
BGen English sent LtCol J. D. Spaulding’s 2/1 into LZ Robin, about 3,000 meters east-northeast of Crow where it could readily reinforce the two battalions of the 4th Marines.
In the meantime Capt Modrzejewski struggled to get his company across the Ngan River. Unable to find and neutralize the carefully camouflaged far-bank positions, he once more dug in for the night. That night, 16 July, the NVA tried once more to overrun Kilo Co. Three violent attacks in as many hours were thrown back by the Marines with outstanding support from their artillery and a flare ship that stayed on station. The Marines were dangerously low on ammunition when the enemy broke off the attack. Daylight revealed 79 enemy bodies in front of their lines, and the Marines estimated that they killed an additional 50 to 75.
Earlier that day a detachment of 1st Force Reconnaissance Co rappelled onto a towering escarpment six miles south of the Ngan Valley. From this matchless vantage point, which would go down in Marine lore as the “Rockpile,” they called in artillery on groups of enemy moving through the area. Their sightings prompted BGen English to send LtCol Spaulding’s 2/1 sweeping along the river valley east of the Rockpile in the Cam Lo River Valley. This battalion and LtCol Van Bell’s 1/1 moved along Route 9 past Cam Lo village and turned north through the valley to drive the enemy up toward the DMZ.
BGen English changed his plans and on 18 July ordered 2/4 and 3/4 to new positions northeast of LZ Crow. Kilo/3/4, serving as LZ security as the column moved out, came under attack by as many as 1,000 enemy soldiers. The initial assault separated Staff Sergeant John McGinty’s 1st Platoon from the others, and his Marines bore the worst of it.
Advancing with grim determination behind walking mortars, the enemy nearly overran them. When the battle further fragmented McGinty’s platoon, he ran through intense fire to his isolated Marines. McGinty found 20 of his men wounded and his corpsman dead. He reloaded magazines for the wounded and directed their fire against human-wave tactics, personally killing five of the enemy at point-blank range.
Capt Modrzejewski, unable to maneuver his other two platoons to McGinty’s assistance, called in air and artillery. Soon, he was beset with an attack against his own position. For hours the enemy threw everything it had against Kilo Co, but the Marines fought them off each time. Although wounded, Capt Modrzejewski directed his company with exceptional skill and courage, at one point crawling 200 meters to bring needed ammunition to his Marines.
Relief for Kilo Co came that afternoon when Lima Co fought its way through the enemy. The two companies, with their supporting arms, gained fire superiority and were able to uncover McGinty’s platoon, which had only 10 Marines who were still alive and unwounded. Kilo Co was down to about 80 effectives. Capt Modrzejewski and SSgt McGinty would be awarded the Medal of Honor for their heroism on Operation Hastings. Following this action, Kilo/3/4 was withdrawn from the fight, and the remainder of the battalion took up blocking positions.
Also on 18 July LtCol Edward Bronars’ 3/5 was lifted into the Hastings area. The Special Landing Force, 3/5 went ashore near the coast two days earlier and was then sent into the Hastings area. Capt Harold Pettingill’s Mike/3/5 met resistance northwest of LZ Crow and overran a force of NVA, killing 21 of them. Lima/3/5 landed in trace, and the two companies moved southwest through a valley north of Dong Ha Mountain where they uncovered and destroyed enemy supply stores and facilities.
In the meantime, India, Kilo and the battalion command group landed at LZ Dove to the southeast. They, too, found large quantities of enemy equipment: explosives, mines, uniforms and propaganda leaflets.
On the morning of the 20th, following extensive air strikes on the position, 2/4 made a hard hump over very difficult terrain to overrun the suspected position of the 324B Division command post. It was defended only lightly, but was fortified, indicating that it had, indeed, been a CP of major importance.
On the 24th, LtCol Bronars ordered Capt Samuel Glaize’s India/3/5 to the top of Hill 362 to establish a radio relay station. Except for the steep terrain, the Marines had little difficulty gaining the top of the hill. Once there, Capt Glaize sent a platoon down the forward slope to put in defenses. The NVA were waiting in the 60- to 90-foot jungle growth and badly battered the platoon.
Lance Corporal Richard Pittman traded his M14 rifle for an M60 machine gun, picked up several belts of ammunition and went after the enemy. He single-handedly destroyed several NVA automatic-weapons positions, braving both small-arms and mortar fire to do so.
Reaching the position where the leading Marine had fallen wounded, Pittman was confronted by a charge of 30 to 40 of the enemy. Disregarding the danger, he established a position in the middle of the trail and took on the enemy force. When his gun became disabled, he continued firing with an abandoned submachine gun, then a pistol from a fallen Marine and finally with his last hand grenade. It was just enough to stop the enemy advance and save his comrades.
LCpl Pittman was later awarded the Medal of Honor. The 3/5 Marines continued in sporadic contact with the enemy until withdrawn by helicopter to USS Princeton (LPH-5) on 30 July.
There was no significant contact for the remainder of Operation Hastings, although the operation did not officially end until 3 Aug. As they always do, Marine supporting arms played a significant role. Maj Morrow’s 3/12 fired more than 34,000 rounds, Marine Phantoms and Skyhawks flew more than 100 sorties per day, and the helicopter squadrons logged an astounding 10,000 sorties in less than three weeks.
The Marines lost 126 KIA and 448 WIA, but killed nearly 800 communist soldiers and wounded many more. The 324B Division was badly hurt and was sent limping back across the DMZ.
Hastings was a victory for the Marines, but the North Vietnamese were not through. As they rebuilt the 324B Division, they sent other units south to do battle. The coming months brought more Marine operations to the DMZ. Operation Prairie would be next and was on the near horizon.
An unintended result of Hastings was the establishment of two new outposts in northern I Corps, Dong Ha and Cam Lo. Soon two more, Con Thien and Gio Linh, would be added to form the quadrangle that the Marines will always remember as “Leatherneck Square.”
Editor’s note: Otto Lehrack, a retired Marine infantry officer, has authored three books about Marines at war: “No Shining Armor: The Marines at War in Vietnam”; “The First Battle: Operation Starlite and the Beginning of the Blood Debt in Vietnam,” published in 2004, and now available in paperback; and “America’s Battalion: Marines in the First Gulf War,” published in 2005. The books may be purchased online at www.mca-marines.org, or from Marine Corps Association bookstores. Leatherneck appreciates the photo research efforts of Lena Kaljot, History Division, Marine Corps University.
Ellie