thedrifter
12-25-02, 08:04 AM
41 Independent Commando RM, commanded by Lt. Col. D.B. Drysdale, was formed on 16th August 1950 at Bickleigh Camp. Initially the unit comprised three separate groups; volunteers from UK establishments who were flown out by BOAC to Japan in plain clothes; some volunteer sailors and marines from the British Pacific Fleet, these were already in training when the UK contingent arrived and formed a rifle section known as the Fleet Volunteers; and a reinforcement draft destined for 3 Commando Brigade, aboard the troopship Devonshire, which was diverted to Japan by air via the Philippines.
The unit assembled at Camp McGill, a US Army post at Takehama near the US Naval Base of Yokosuka. 41 Commando was to be under US Naval operational command and was supplied, armed and equipped by the Americans. The first task was to train each component, as it arrived, on US weapons (Appendix A) and raiding techniques (Appendix B).
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EARLY RAIDS
Background
With a bold stroke of military genius the C in C UN Command, General Douglas MacArthur, reversed the fortunes of the beleaguered UN forces by withdrawing the Ist Provisional USMC Brigade from the Pusan perimeter to form the 1st US Marine Division (I Mar Div) at sea with two Regimental Combat Teams (or Brigade Groups) and HQ elements brought from the States. This fine Division made an amphibious landing at Inchon on 17 September 1950 and went on to seize the South Korean capital of Seoul. Simultaneously United Nations forces broke out of the Pusan perimeter. North Korean resistance started to collapse and their forces began to withdraw North of the 38th parallel.
41 Commando's Operations
As each part of 41 Independent Commando became operational it was despatched on operations. First POUNDFORCE comprising mainly the Fleet Volunteers, 14 men under command of Lt E G D Pounds, left in HMS WHITESAND BAY to support the Inchon landings with a diversionary raid, as part of a US Army Raiding battalion on the West coast on 12/13 September. Subsequently the force joined 1 Mar Div for the Inchon landings on 17 September penetrating as far as Kimpo airfield before rejoining to participate in C and D Troops' raids.
67 personnel of A and B Patrol, later to be organized into B Troop, accompanied by Lt Col Drysdale, raided the East Coast railway on 2 October from the troop carrying submarine USS PERCH (1526 tons); a converted Balao class submarine with its torpedo tubes removed to make space for 110 troops. A cylindrical hangar abaft the conning tower carried a small power craft which could tow the rubber boats. On this raid anti tank mines laid under the rails were heard to detonate during the withdrawal. Regrettably a Royal Marine was killed during this raid.
125 men and five officers of C & D Troops, under command Of the 2i/c, Major D L St. M Aldridge, embarked in the Assault Personnel Destroyers USS BASS and WANTUCK (1400 tons). Each carried four Landing Craft and had accommodation for 162 in the troop space.
This force made two separate raids also against the East Coast railway on 5 & 6 October 1950. The Assault Engineers laid two tons of charges on each raid under culverts and bridges and in tunnels. A Korean railway guard was killed and so, sadly, was a Royal Marines Corporal whilst leaving the beach on the second raid.
The journalist and MP, Tom Driberg, accompanied both these raids as a war correspondent and wrote a consolidated account in Reynolds News, a now defunct Sunday newspaper.
On return from these raids 41 Independent Commando was re-organized (Appendix C) and some useful unit and sub unit training was conducted on the excellent field firing ranges on the slopes of Mount Fuji.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ATTACHMENT TO THE FIRST MARINE DIVISION
Background
Following the Inchon landings the lst Marine Division was withdrawn and made two amphibious landings on the East coast in pursuit of the NKPA. at Wonsan and at Hungnam. From there, the Division under command of X Corps (Lt Gen Almond USA) advanced 78 miles into the mountains to the Village of Yudam-ni on the Western arm of the Chosin Reservoir. (8th Army, including the 27 and 29 Brigades, later the British Commonwealth Division, operated on the West of the peninsula).
In its "Home by Christmas" euphoria the UN Command chose to disregard the ominous signs of Chinese intervention. Fierce attacks by Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) were reported against over extended UN units from late October but these ceased early in November as the Chinese reinforced and regrouped. Aerial reconnaissance showed massive troop movements across the Yalu River and China announced she would not stand idly by and watch her Communist neighbour overrun.
In the light of subsequent events a digression is relevant here to consider the attributes of the new enemy. The Chinese soldier crossed the Yalu armed initially with an assortment of Japanese, Russian and US (Ex Nationalist) weapons and carrying some 80 rounds of ammunition and four days rations. Thereafter he was independent of routine re-supply. He wore a thick reversible yellow and white quilted cotton uniform and crepe soled canvas shoes. Inured to hardship, indoctrinated with Communism, and by a "hate America" campaign, and courageous to the point of being suicidal he made a formidable adversary.
This peasant army hid by day and made long approach marches by night. Adept at infiltration, mass attacks, almost invariably at night, were conducted by "pepper potting" (small scale fire and movement) forward and exploiting every weakness and advantage. Co-ordination was achieved by bugles, whistles and flares.
The rapid advance of the UN Forces reduced opportunities for raiding and 41 Independent Commando was shipped to Hungnam where it arrived on 15 November 1950, to be placed under command of 1 Mar Div and issued with cold weather clothing (Appendix A). The intention was for the Commando, which (less a small rear party left in Japan) only mustered 235, to be used as an additional Reconnaissance Company to protect the left flank during the advance from Yudm-ni.
It should be noted that Maj. Gen. O.P. Smith, commanding 1 Mar Div, had misgivings over the X Corps plan to push him further out on a limb and into a winter campaign in the mountains. However he managed to concentrate his division along the narrow single track road which was to become his vital Main Supply Route (MSR). He was thus in a better position to extricate his Division when the inevitable happened.
http://www.rt66.com/~korteng/SmallArms/41RMCpub.htm
Sempers,
Roger
The unit assembled at Camp McGill, a US Army post at Takehama near the US Naval Base of Yokosuka. 41 Commando was to be under US Naval operational command and was supplied, armed and equipped by the Americans. The first task was to train each component, as it arrived, on US weapons (Appendix A) and raiding techniques (Appendix B).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
EARLY RAIDS
Background
With a bold stroke of military genius the C in C UN Command, General Douglas MacArthur, reversed the fortunes of the beleaguered UN forces by withdrawing the Ist Provisional USMC Brigade from the Pusan perimeter to form the 1st US Marine Division (I Mar Div) at sea with two Regimental Combat Teams (or Brigade Groups) and HQ elements brought from the States. This fine Division made an amphibious landing at Inchon on 17 September 1950 and went on to seize the South Korean capital of Seoul. Simultaneously United Nations forces broke out of the Pusan perimeter. North Korean resistance started to collapse and their forces began to withdraw North of the 38th parallel.
41 Commando's Operations
As each part of 41 Independent Commando became operational it was despatched on operations. First POUNDFORCE comprising mainly the Fleet Volunteers, 14 men under command of Lt E G D Pounds, left in HMS WHITESAND BAY to support the Inchon landings with a diversionary raid, as part of a US Army Raiding battalion on the West coast on 12/13 September. Subsequently the force joined 1 Mar Div for the Inchon landings on 17 September penetrating as far as Kimpo airfield before rejoining to participate in C and D Troops' raids.
67 personnel of A and B Patrol, later to be organized into B Troop, accompanied by Lt Col Drysdale, raided the East Coast railway on 2 October from the troop carrying submarine USS PERCH (1526 tons); a converted Balao class submarine with its torpedo tubes removed to make space for 110 troops. A cylindrical hangar abaft the conning tower carried a small power craft which could tow the rubber boats. On this raid anti tank mines laid under the rails were heard to detonate during the withdrawal. Regrettably a Royal Marine was killed during this raid.
125 men and five officers of C & D Troops, under command Of the 2i/c, Major D L St. M Aldridge, embarked in the Assault Personnel Destroyers USS BASS and WANTUCK (1400 tons). Each carried four Landing Craft and had accommodation for 162 in the troop space.
This force made two separate raids also against the East Coast railway on 5 & 6 October 1950. The Assault Engineers laid two tons of charges on each raid under culverts and bridges and in tunnels. A Korean railway guard was killed and so, sadly, was a Royal Marines Corporal whilst leaving the beach on the second raid.
The journalist and MP, Tom Driberg, accompanied both these raids as a war correspondent and wrote a consolidated account in Reynolds News, a now defunct Sunday newspaper.
On return from these raids 41 Independent Commando was re-organized (Appendix C) and some useful unit and sub unit training was conducted on the excellent field firing ranges on the slopes of Mount Fuji.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ATTACHMENT TO THE FIRST MARINE DIVISION
Background
Following the Inchon landings the lst Marine Division was withdrawn and made two amphibious landings on the East coast in pursuit of the NKPA. at Wonsan and at Hungnam. From there, the Division under command of X Corps (Lt Gen Almond USA) advanced 78 miles into the mountains to the Village of Yudam-ni on the Western arm of the Chosin Reservoir. (8th Army, including the 27 and 29 Brigades, later the British Commonwealth Division, operated on the West of the peninsula).
In its "Home by Christmas" euphoria the UN Command chose to disregard the ominous signs of Chinese intervention. Fierce attacks by Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) were reported against over extended UN units from late October but these ceased early in November as the Chinese reinforced and regrouped. Aerial reconnaissance showed massive troop movements across the Yalu River and China announced she would not stand idly by and watch her Communist neighbour overrun.
In the light of subsequent events a digression is relevant here to consider the attributes of the new enemy. The Chinese soldier crossed the Yalu armed initially with an assortment of Japanese, Russian and US (Ex Nationalist) weapons and carrying some 80 rounds of ammunition and four days rations. Thereafter he was independent of routine re-supply. He wore a thick reversible yellow and white quilted cotton uniform and crepe soled canvas shoes. Inured to hardship, indoctrinated with Communism, and by a "hate America" campaign, and courageous to the point of being suicidal he made a formidable adversary.
This peasant army hid by day and made long approach marches by night. Adept at infiltration, mass attacks, almost invariably at night, were conducted by "pepper potting" (small scale fire and movement) forward and exploiting every weakness and advantage. Co-ordination was achieved by bugles, whistles and flares.
The rapid advance of the UN Forces reduced opportunities for raiding and 41 Independent Commando was shipped to Hungnam where it arrived on 15 November 1950, to be placed under command of 1 Mar Div and issued with cold weather clothing (Appendix A). The intention was for the Commando, which (less a small rear party left in Japan) only mustered 235, to be used as an additional Reconnaissance Company to protect the left flank during the advance from Yudm-ni.
It should be noted that Maj. Gen. O.P. Smith, commanding 1 Mar Div, had misgivings over the X Corps plan to push him further out on a limb and into a winter campaign in the mountains. However he managed to concentrate his division along the narrow single track road which was to become his vital Main Supply Route (MSR). He was thus in a better position to extricate his Division when the inevitable happened.
http://www.rt66.com/~korteng/SmallArms/41RMCpub.htm
Sempers,
Roger