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thedrifter
12-23-02, 10:16 AM
THE BATTLE FOR TARAWA

Professor Dirk A. Ballendorf

University of Guam

Tarawa was a brawl, the nastiest kind of close quarter fighting between two dedicated, relentless, and ruthless forces. Eventual success at the Battle of Tarawa made it appear to some that the amphibious doctrine was already "a firmly established doctrine" and was the reason the Americans succeeded in capturing Betio. (Shaw, 156) Others think the battle validated the doctrine, when it was really the after-*action assessment and adjusting that would validate the doctrine in future battles. But in this first battle of the atoll war something else was validated, actually revalidated. The Battle of Tarawa revalidated the individual Marine and the Marine tradition, and it was these, which won the battle despite the failures and weaknesses of the amphibious doctrine and thus saved the doctrine from discredit. To recognize the real achievement at Tarawa, the reader needs to cover a brief history of the development of the amphibious doctrine. Next study a capsule summary of the six parts which make -up the doctrine. Then go into a detailed examination of the failures, collapse, or weakness of each doctrinal part, which accrued either before or during the battle. Finally, the American public, and military commanders in other services will present the reader the evidence, which indicates how and why individual Marines, in almost a super human effort, achieved victory thus saving the doctrine from disrepute.

In the two decades before the United States entered World War Two, the United States Marine Corps carved a niche for itself in the military establishment by being the only force to develop and prepare for amphibious warfare. It was not an easy nor short path for the very small Marine Corps, but the doctrine was completed and the organization ready for the supreme test of amphibious warfare in the Pacific. The exact start can be placed at July 23, 1921 when the Marine Commandant, Major General John A. Lejeune officially approved a plan of operation submitted by Major Earl Ellis which became the keystone of Marine Corps strategic planning for a Pacific war. From this beginning the Marines then began to develop and test their concepts of amphibious warfare. After fleet exercises in 1922 and 1925, the Marines opened two Expeditionary Force bases, one in Quantico, Virginia and the other in San Diego California. In 1929, a Joint Army -Navy Board directive acknowledged the Marines role to act as an amphibious assault force. This directive established the United States Marine Corps as the only small, well -trained amphibious assault force to seize and occupy overseas bases, thus guaranteeing the Corps' future. (Isley & Crowl, 24 -33)

The year 1933 is considered the crucial turning point in the pre -war years. With the end of the Nicaraguan deployment, time and concentration was placed on training and indoctrination of amphibious warfare. Major General Russell, Assistant Commandant, suggested to the Commandant that a Fleet Marine Force be created, which was approved by the Navy Department. Russell then drew up a set of general rules governing the Fleet Marine Force which the navy Department authorized in general order No. 241 on December 8, 1933. This committed the Marines to the doctrine that its paramount mission in wartime was to serve the Fleet by seizing bases. By 1934, the curriculum was established at the Marine Corps Schools in Quantico. The next step was to prepare a manual of landing operations. By order of the Commandant, classes were halted at Quantico on November 14, 1933 and the entire staff began to assemble a manual for landing operations. The result was a breakthrough document of farsightedness. The Marine Corps Schools published the Tentative Manual for Landing Operations in 1934. It served as the guidebook for all landing operations until the our break of the war. The foundation of Marine doctrine used in the Pacific War was set. "The amphibious doctrine of the United States Marines underwent no basic change during World War II." (Isley & Crowl, 4) With the curriculum set, manual written, and the amphibious force established with its role set and approved, the United States Marine Corps had created a cadre of specialized men ready when work broke out. (Isley & Crowl, 33 -36)

The Tentative Manual for Landing Operations attempted to take the most complicated and difficult military task, an amphibious assault, and provide practical solutions. The manual broke down amphibious warfare into six component parts, each representing a peculiar feature of this type of combat. (Isley & Crowl, 37) These are 1) command relations, 2) naval gunfire support, 3) aerial support, 4) the ship -to -shore movement, 5) securing the bridgehead, and 6) logistics, including loading, unloading and distribution of supplies and equipment. (Isley & Crowl, 37)

Each area had unique problems and had to be handled with clear-cut solutions coordinated between naval and landing forces. The key solution for each part is summarized. The command relations needed a clear chain of command affecting the landing force and the various naval support groups. At times it must take into consideration service rivalries, which could impact decisions. Naval gunfire support had to deliver when the landing operations is at its most vulnerable, just before and during the landing. (Isley & Crowl, 38) The Manual called for concise communication at key moments.

A system of communication between ship and shore had to be organized. (Isley & Crowl, 39) This could be achieved with fire control parties consisting of ship's personnel and artillery or infantry personnel to coordinate naval gunfire with land movements. (Isley & Crowl, 39) Aerial support's most important function must be to neutralize strong points in the beach defenses. (Isley & Crowl, 40) The ship -to -shore movement is the beginning of the attack. It should proceed as soon as the naval fire lifts. The boats should be dispatched as quickly as possible and troops should be disembarked expeditiously in a prearranged plan so as to avoid breaking up the integrity of smaller troop units. (Isley & Crowl, 42) A secure beachhead is defined as, "a zone contiguous to the beach the possession of which permits the continuous landing of troops, equipment and supplies without serious interference from the enemy, and ensures the maneuver space and the terrain features requisite for a further advance." (Isley & Crowl, 42) Logistics may be the most mundane area but one of the most crucial. "One of the most essential conditions for successful landing operations is the proper loading of the vessels carrying troops and their supplies." (Isley & Crowl, 43) The "combat unit loading," and then the prompt transfer of the equipment to the troops on land at the precise time they are needed is essential.

For about two decades before the outbreak of the Second World War the marines had been establishing themselves as specialists in amphibious warfare. (Isley & Crowl, 3) A detailed doctrine of amphibious warfare had been evolved, experimented with, improved and found to be sound in its main principles. (Isley & Crowl, 71) The remaining test was the ultimate one of battle. (Isley & Crowl, 71) It would be an atoll somewhere in the Pacific. It would inevitably be somewhere in the Central Pacific. Not until the summer of 1943 did anyone know that all the long twenty years of hard work, and countless hours of preparation was to be aimed at Tarawa in the Gilbert Islands. "Tarawa, in short, was the testing ground for the amphibious assault." (Isley & Crowl, 192)

Seizure of the Gilberts was a necessary preliminary to entering the Marshalls. (Isley & Crowl, 192) Thus the Gilberts campaign was largely instigated by Nimitz as an essential means of obtaining a jump off position for entering the Marshalls. (Isley & Crowl, 198) Operation Galvanic was thus aimed at taking Tarawa Atoll with its largest airfield in the island group. (Great Battles of World War II, 135) The Second Marine Division launched its invasion on November 20? 1943. By the end of the first day, "the whole invasion was in deep trouble." (Hoyt, 89) Eric Hammel went even further saying, "This landing was an unrelieved disaster." (Hammel, 31) Samuel Morison determined that, "as early as 1200 to 1400 the situation ashore was very critical." (Morison, 305) Eric Hammel described the situation on Tarawa at the end of the first day for the Marines:

http://www.uog.edu/faculty/ballendo/tarawa.htm


Sempers,

Roger