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thedrifter
12-19-02, 11:27 AM
By Lisa Burgess, Stars and Stripes
European edition, Thursday, December 19, 2002



First in a two-part series

ARLINGTON, Va. — Saddam Hussein will use weapons of mass destruction if U.S. troops attack Iraq, possibly as early as the first day of the campaign, U.S. intelligence officials said Wednesday.

“Saddam is preparing a scorched-earth policy,” a U.S. intelligence officer told Pentagon reporters. “He believes that whatever we say at this point, [the U.S. military] is coming to kill him.

“Whenever he believes he’s about to die, he’ll use [weapons of mass destruction, or WMD],” the official said. “If that’s on Day 1 [of a war], if he believes he’s going to fall, he’s going to use it.”

Not only will Hussein use WMD inside Iraq, “we believe he may use them against Israel and other Arab States, with Kuwait as a very likely target,” the official said. “He hates Kuwait, and this is not only about defending his regime, it’s about revenge.”

The official making this assessment was one of two U.S. government intelligence officials who provided reporters with an unclassified, highly detailed description of Iraq’s current military capabilities, including conventional and nonconventional forces, and assessments of how Saddam Hussein may use those forces if attacked.

The U.S. government’s most senior officials have heard the same briefing, with the addition of classified details, said one analyst.

U.S. intelligence analysts are convinced that Saddam Hussein has significant biological weapons capabilities, as well as chemical weapons, and the means to deploy both.

“Our estimate is that there is a lot of stuff near the forces that would use them in central Iraq,” one official said. “We don’t have the smoking gun, but that’s beside the point.” The United Nations “has already laid out the facts that Saddam has the gun.”

That “gun” includes 50 conventional Scud warheads, which could be converted to deliver chemical or biological agents; 16 botulin-toxin Scud warheads; five anthrax Scud warheads; 157 biological bombs to include anthrax, gas gangrene and botulin toxin; and more than 6,000 chemical and biological munitions; and 550 mustard-gas shells, all of which Iraq admitted to owning, but told the U.N. in 1991 they were destroyed.

Iraq never provided evidence that destruction actually occurred, the official said. “No photos, no fragments, nothing.”

The analysts don’t believe Saddam has managed to put together a working nuclear weapon, but has most of the components in place, minus the key — enriched uranium.

“Fissile material is the long pole in the tent,” one official said. “If they get that, they can make one in a year or less.”

Delivery methods for chemical and biological agents “would run the gamut,” the officials said.

First, “Saddam is hiding a covert Scud missile force,” an official said.

Most of the Scuds are al-Husseins, with an effective range of 400 miles, “but he may have 900-kilometer [560-mile] al-Habas, which could hit Israel from the outskirts of Baghdad,” one official said.

In addition, Saddam has violated U.N. rules and developed two new missiles in the past year, one with an effective range of 125 miles and a second whose range “is perhaps as much as 300 kilometers [187.5 miles],” the official said.

Each variety of the new missile totals “a small number of launchers and about a dozen airframes, all of which are WMD-capable,” one official said.

Recently, Iraq also developed a new unmanned aerial vehicle that can deliver chemical and biological agents, one of the officials said.

Sempers,

Roger

thedrifter
12-20-02, 08:26 AM
By Lisa Burgess, Stars and Stripes
European edition, Friday, December 20, 2002



Second in a two-part series

ARLINGTON, Va. — If the United States goes to war with Iraq, it will face an untrained, poorly equipped force that will retreat into the cities to fight among hapless civilians, according to U.S. intelligence officials.

“The Iraqi military as a whole has not been able to modernize” since the Gulf War, a U.S. intelligence officer told Pentagon reporters. The force “suffers from equipment shortages, manpower shortages, desertions … a lot of serious problems.”

“It’s essentially a hollow army,” said the official, who was one of two intelligence officials who provided unclassified, highly detailed description of Iraq’s military capabilities Wednesday.

Given the unusual nature of the briefing, reporters expressed concerns the Pentagon was using the press to deliver a message to Saddam Hussein or to influence public opinion. But Pentagon officials said the briefings were in response to media queries.

“We have had numerous requests for information on Iraq’s capabilities from the media,” Pentagon spokesman Lt. Col. Dave Lapan told Stars and Stripes on Thursday.

Officials would not say how the information was gathered.

“If we say who the source is, we’d be giving classified information,” one official said.

Although Saddam intends to stop at nothing to remain in power, his conventional forces are weak, according to the “order of battle” information provided by the officials [see graphic].

Iraq’s army has about 375,000 soldiers, less than one-third the size of the army U.S. forces saw in the Gulf War, they said.

Poorly armed and trained, most of Iraq’s infantry “are static cannon fodder,” one official said.

Poor training and equipment also is the rule for the air force.

“And when they do fly, it’s stick-and-rudder stuff, not tactical training,” he said.

In order to bolster his forces, Saddam may choose to tap civilians to form new units, one official said.

That’s what the Iraqi president did in 1990-91, the officials said, when 11 of his 70 army divisions were “scraped together” from draftees, including four “elite” Republican Guard units.

“But the real limitation to throwing together rat-bag divisions is equipment [shortages],” one official said. “If he tries to roll [draftees] out, so much the better, because reservists in Iraq will be the weak link. They’ll be a negative for Saddam, not a gain.”

Most of Saddam’s forces, and his best air defense systems, are in the center of Iraq, well away from the “no-fly” zones that U.S. and British pilots have patrolled since the end of the Gulf War.

In order to take advantage of this centralized concentration of military forces, Saddam “intends to fight a defense-in-depth campaign,” one of the officials said. “He’s not going to defend the border, because they know they can’t stop us there.”



A look at Iraq's military capabilities


Stars and Stripes
European edition, Friday, December 20, 2002



Because his conventional troops are poorly equipped, unmotivated, and badly led, Saddam Hussein may have no choice but to "fight dirty." In addition to quickly resorting to chemical or biological weapons, the Iraqi dictator could take the fight to the cities or even attack his own people to discourage defections. Here's a look at his conventional forces:

Air Defense

Air defense radar and surface-to-air missile systems:

¶ SA-3 batteries: 24

¶ SA-6 batteries: 10

¶ SA-2 batteries: 22, including 13 modified SA-2s.

Other equipment: Fiber-optic communications system that links most of Iraq. Unknown numbers of mobile air defenses ("shoot-and-scoot" systems). Anti-aircraft artillery ("triple A") and man-portable shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles. Soviet-made aerial observer network and passive detection system. May also have purchased and received advanced "Kolchuga" air defense system from Ukraine.

Location of assets: Most air defense assets are in Central Iraq, out of reach of US and British aircraft patrolling the Northern and Southern no-fly zones.

Capabilities assessment: Iraq is capable of maintaining an accurate radar picture of its skies at high- and medium-altitudes; some degradation of capabilities at low altitudes.

Republican Guard

Republican Guard Divisions: 6

Republican Guard Soldiers: 80,000 to 90,000

Special Republic Guard (Saddam’s most elite forces): 12,500

Current Location of Republican Guards: three divisions in and around Baghdad, two divisions in Northern Iraq to control Kurdish population; one division southeast of Baghdad

Capabilities Assessment: Most units close to 100 percent manning strength. Units control all of Iraq’s remaining T-72 tanks.

Air Force

Number of combat aircraft: 300

Types of aircraft: Most are MiG-21s; some F-1s, MiG-25s, and MiG-29s.

Air-capable aircraft: At any given time, 60 to 80 percent of aircraft are flyable. Of these, a smaller subset is fully mission-capable

Number of pilots: N/A

Pilot flying training hours per year: 20 to 50 (US military combat pilots typically fly that many hours each month).

Unmanned aerial vehicles: Yes, a new drone whose purpose appears to be reconnaissance but that is capable of delivering chemical and biological agents. UAV’s flight range includes Israel.

Note: Saddam Hussein has a special distrust of his Air Force, due to repeated coup plots on the part of Air Force senior leaders, including a major 1995 attempt that almost succeeded.

Special Forces

Number of Special Forces Brigades: Two (down from four in 1990-91)

Number of Soldiers per Special Forces Brigade: 1,800 to 3,000

Current Location of SF Brigades: One in Baghdad, one west of Baghdad

Capabilities: Advanced infantry tactics, some night-vision and night-fighting capabilities.

Long-Range Missiles

Missile forces include:

¶ Scuds — al-Husseins (effective range of 400 miles) and possibly al-Habas (560 miles)

¶ Al-Samud missiles (estimated effective range 125 miles)

Ground Forces

Total Number of Army Divisions: 23 (down from 70 in 1990-91): six are Republican Guard; 11 are infantry; six are heavy armor.

Number of soldiers per division: approx. 10,000

Total Number of Ground Forces: 375,000

Capabilities Assessment: All soldiers are conscripts. Units suffer from manpower and equipment shortages; desertions appear high. Some infantry divisions manned at less than 50-percent strength; heavy divisions are generally better manned and supplied with 70 to 90 percent of necessary heavy equipment, such as tanks.

All units: Many divisions lack reconnaissance, medical, military police, and other units that would make them field-capable. Trucks and support vehicles in especially short supply – some units posses 30 to 40 percent of trucks required at the brigade and division levels. Due to spot shortages of ammunition, little live-fire training is conducted. Very minimal night-fighting capabilities.

Source: U.S. government intelligence officials, Dec. 18 briefing to reporters.


Sempers,

Roger