International forces expand security role

[thedrifter]

May 29, 2006
International forces expand security role
ISAF troops will have security duties, but won’t join search for terrorists

By Christian Lowe
Times staff writer

The end of the Corps’ commitment to the Afghanistan mission comes as the allied forces of NATO are increasing their presence in that country by about 60 percent.

During a December 2005 NATO foreign ministerial conference at the organization’s headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, officials agreed to boost NATO’s contribution to the Afghanistan International Stabilization and Assistance Force by about 6,000 troops, boosting international presence to an estimated 15,000.

The ministers also agreed to expand ISAF support into the volatile south, the birthplace of the Taliban, and later into the eastern provinces that border the suspected al-Qaida sanctuary of Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province.


“ISAF stability operations will be used to create an environment required to enable reconstruction and nation-building activities to continue,” according to an outline of the plan provided by Navy Cmdr. Cappy Surette, spokesman for the Pentagon’s European Command liaison office.

The revised NATO plan “recognizes the primacy of the Afghan government and the paramount importance of continued, coherent and consistent development of Afghan political institutions and security capacity,” the outline states.

So far, 26 allies and 10 non-NATO countries contribute forces to the ISAF mission, which has already assumed security duties in the northern provinces of Afghanistan — including the cities of Mazar-e-Sharif, Kunduz and Bamian — and the western provinces that border Iran.

ISAF will assume control of security operations in the southern provinces — which include the cities of Kandahar and Lashkar Gah — this summer, Surette said.

The ISAF forces will not be used for counterterrorist operations, Surette added.

The task of hunting down al-Qaida and allied fighters will be the exclusive mission of U.S. and coalition troops commanded by Combined Joint Task Force 76.

ISAF missions in Afghanistan will include:

• Conducting stability and security operations in coordination with Afghan national security forces.

• Supporting Afghan government programs to disarm illegally armed groups.

• Supporting Afghan government and internationally sanctioned counternarcotics efforts within limits, but not participating in poppy eradication or destruction of processing facilities, or taking military action against producers.

• Supporting humanitarian-assistance operations coordinated by Afghan government agencies.

A portion of the forecasted 16,500 American forces stationed in eastern Afghanistan by this summer are due to fold into the ISAF mission following NATO’s assumption of security duties in the southern provinces, Surette added.

The counterterrorist missions concentrated in the eastern provinces still will be run by U.S. commanders, he said.

Ellie

[thedrifter]

May 29, 2006 <br />
A mission ends <br />
As Army, NATO troops take over in Afghanistan, Marines reflect on a tour that ‘you never forget’ <br />
<br />
By Christian Lowe <br />
Times staff writer <br />
<br />
<br />
They were members of the...

[thedrifter]

May 29, 2006
Working hand in hand
U.S., Afghan forces capitalize on allies’ strengths, but barriers remain

By Greg Grant
Special to the Times


Logar province, Afghanistan — On a recent spring day, U.S. armored Humvees and Afghan National Army pickup trucks crested the 9,000-foot Khowst-to-Gardez pass, rumbling along on the single dirt road that links U.S. bases in the Afghan-Pakistan border region with the big air and logistics centers at Bagram and Kabul.

Beginning the long descent down the eastern slope, the patrol headed for a small village deep in the mountains. The villagers had reported large groups of armed men — Taliban insurgents, they suspected — moving on the remote trails used to smuggle weapons from Pakistan, said U.S. Army Lt. Dave Douchkoff, an infantry platoon commander in the 10th Mountain Division.

The patrol was a joint effort by U.S. and Afghan troops: something the American side should do more often, the U.S officers said. The Afghans bring unmatchable language and cultural skills; the Americans bring unmatched resources and the training and ethic of a professional fighting force.


“Working hand in hand with the Afghan army, with them more in the lead, is where we need to go in this war,” said Lt. Col. Richard Kaiser, a battalion commander in the 10th Mountain.

But many things make that difficult.

The Afghan people have a strong warrior tradition, exemplified by the mujahidin who savaged invading Russians, then turned on each other until the Taliban came to power in the 1990s. Skilled in individual and small-unit hit-and-run attacks, they lack the discipline and experience to form a professional military force, said U.S. Army Maj. Tim Byrne, one of the embedded trainers who live and work with the Afghan soldiers and act as mentors.

This manifests itself in frequent desertions, which reduce the nominally 26,000-strong Afghan National Army to a somewhat smaller force. Each Afghan battalion is supposed to number between 600 and 800 men, but one senior U.S. noncommissioned officer said the Afghan army battalions he works with are typically at 30 percent of their paper strength.

“When they move into an area that’s far from their homes, a lot of the guys just up and go back home. They don’t like moving away from their tribal areas,” said the NCO, who requested that his name not be used.

He also said drug use among the Afghan soldiers is a problem. Many go on missions while stoned on hashish, which is readily available in a country that is also the world’s largest supplier of opium.

Officer trouble

Byrne noted problems among the Afghan army officers.

Many came up in the Russian-trained Afghan Army, where they learned never to act on their own.

“They have to call their higher command to get approval to make even the simplest decisions; everything is top-down, with nobody willing to take any initiative,” Byrne said.

Many majors and colonels buy their assignments; it’s rumored that a battalion commander position goes for $5,000 — an investment quickly recouped by skimming the troops’ payroll, he said.

When the U.S. military delivers payroll cash once a month, “the local Afghan general takes some off the top, then the colonel takes some more,” Byrne said. “By the time the money gets down to the soldiers, they’re screwed.”

Skimming is one thing, but many Afghan soldiers fear their pay will halt altogether if the U.S. stops funding the payroll. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld recently told the Afghan government that the U.S. expects it to begin paying soldiers’ salaries. Any interruption in pay could trigger large-scale desertions, several U.S. officers said.

For all their faults, the U.S. officers said, the Afghan soldiers are essential to the counterinsurgency effort. Gathering intelligence or gaining the trust of the locals is nearly impossible without the Afghan soldiers around, Douchkoff said.

Most Afghans view the Americans as outsiders and occupiers — a perception Byrne attributed at least partially to the legacy left by the Russians, who bombed indiscriminately and sowed the mountains with so many mines that Afghans still lose life and limbs to the devices nearly every day.

Douchkoff said his platoon has become been much more effective than others in the area because he’s learned how to use Afghans to interact with the locals on a different level than the Americans.

He said he believes every American platoon in Afghanistan should have an Afghan platoon working alongside it. Other U.S. units are reluctant to use Afghan soldiers because of a lack of trust.

“They couldn’t be more wrong. These are the good guys,” he said.

Greg Grant is a staff writer for Defense News.