Sparrowhawk
12-15-02, 12:50 PM
Sept. 11 attacks aided by disjointed intelligence
By Jim Gibbons
Jim Gibbons, a member of Congress from Nevada's 2nd Congressional District, was a member of the Joint Congressional Intelligence Inquiry Committee, which investigated the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. The panel released its findings last week.
Consider the components of an orchestra. Each section -- the strings, the woodwinds, brass and percussion -- has the same objective: to make music. Each component does the same thing: It produces noise. Even with the finest individual musicians, the group can't hope to get together and produce a symphony without a conductor to lead and a song to play. The U.S. intelligence community faced a similar situation leading up to September 2001.
The intelligence-gathering departments of the CIA, FBI, military and law enforcement agencies in the United States all had the same goal: to protect American lives and resources. Each of these departments had a similar task: collect and analyze data. My colleagues and I on the Joint Congressional Intelligence Inquiry Committee sought to learn the full story of the intelligence community's actions prior to the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. Our report, released this week, shows a picture of a disjointed national intelligence system that needs a single conductor to lead the band in the same song when facing the threat of terrorism.
The findings of our report show missed opportunities to possibly disrupt the attack, but nowhere did we find a "smoking gun" or one, single clue that pointed directly to the Sept. 11 attacks. Despite the diligent efforts of individuals in our intelligence agencies, the intelligence community could not bring all of the pieces together. And, while some pieces were there, the whole picture is only visible in hindsight.
Throughout the intelligence community, systematic gaps contributed to the difficulty of fusing the information that was available. The strategy, communications and personnel gaps demonstrate the need for a strong, central figure to direct both our international and domestic intelligence efforts.
The efforts of the people of the various intelligence agencies were commendable leading up to the attacks, but scattered and ineffectively shared information among the agencies made prevention of the attack less likely.
Our recommendations will empower the national intelligence community to fill these gaps. First and foremost, we call for the creation of a "director of national intelligence" to be the single leader over all of the U.S. national intelligence programs in an effort to create an intelligence community that works together toward a common goal. The joint inquiry found (as others have before) that the current diffusion of authority and accountability makes it difficult for the U.S. intelligence community to work effectively. Our nation needs one person to orchestrate the efforts of the various intelligence-collection agencies.
Additionally, our report reiterates the need for an aggressive intelligence component within our coordinated strategy to combat terrorism. Increasing the ability of human sources to penetrate terrorist organizations and networks remains a critical priority. This means putting more people in the field, providing them the resources to accomplish their mission and building up their language capabilities.
Another committee recommendation called for the FBI to make specific performance improvements. Congress and the administration will need to consider whether the mission to collect and analyze domestic-intelligence information should be given to a separate (or even a new) federal agency. The FBI has many obstacles to overcome, and many question its ability to perform national law enforcement and also meet its domestic-intelligence responsibilities.
I am skeptical about creating a new agency for domestic intelligence. A department that exists only to collect domestic intelligence could pose a threat to the privacy of American citizens. An agency that exists only for the sake of spying, with no law enforcement goal, is not necessarily the right answer. With the right tools and resources, the FBI can meet its dual responsibilities. Congress and the FBI director must continue to transform the agency to meet the threat of terrorism.
The 1990s was a "risk averse" period, during which time the intelligence community often did not perform aggressively enough, though this was by no means the fault of the dedicated men and women of the intelligence agencies' rank-and-file. The administration simply was not focused on intelligence or terrorism (even though the threat of terrorism was present). As a result, the intelligence community during the 1990s was underfinanced, understaffed and underappreciated. The joint inquiry report shows that we can no longer ignore the needs of our intelligence community. Our nation must commit significant resources to our intelligence agencies.
The threat of terrorism is not going away. We must provide the structural and technical resources for our intelligence community to work as a coordinated unit to root terrorism out, wherever it may hide. Much work lies ahead of us to rebuild from the 1990s and to reorganize the intelligence community to meet the threats of the 21st century. Yet the work must be done to make the disjointed intelligence community a coordinated orchestra that can protect the American people from another terrorist tragedy.
By Jim Gibbons
Jim Gibbons, a member of Congress from Nevada's 2nd Congressional District, was a member of the Joint Congressional Intelligence Inquiry Committee, which investigated the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. The panel released its findings last week.
Consider the components of an orchestra. Each section -- the strings, the woodwinds, brass and percussion -- has the same objective: to make music. Each component does the same thing: It produces noise. Even with the finest individual musicians, the group can't hope to get together and produce a symphony without a conductor to lead and a song to play. The U.S. intelligence community faced a similar situation leading up to September 2001.
The intelligence-gathering departments of the CIA, FBI, military and law enforcement agencies in the United States all had the same goal: to protect American lives and resources. Each of these departments had a similar task: collect and analyze data. My colleagues and I on the Joint Congressional Intelligence Inquiry Committee sought to learn the full story of the intelligence community's actions prior to the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. Our report, released this week, shows a picture of a disjointed national intelligence system that needs a single conductor to lead the band in the same song when facing the threat of terrorism.
The findings of our report show missed opportunities to possibly disrupt the attack, but nowhere did we find a "smoking gun" or one, single clue that pointed directly to the Sept. 11 attacks. Despite the diligent efforts of individuals in our intelligence agencies, the intelligence community could not bring all of the pieces together. And, while some pieces were there, the whole picture is only visible in hindsight.
Throughout the intelligence community, systematic gaps contributed to the difficulty of fusing the information that was available. The strategy, communications and personnel gaps demonstrate the need for a strong, central figure to direct both our international and domestic intelligence efforts.
The efforts of the people of the various intelligence agencies were commendable leading up to the attacks, but scattered and ineffectively shared information among the agencies made prevention of the attack less likely.
Our recommendations will empower the national intelligence community to fill these gaps. First and foremost, we call for the creation of a "director of national intelligence" to be the single leader over all of the U.S. national intelligence programs in an effort to create an intelligence community that works together toward a common goal. The joint inquiry found (as others have before) that the current diffusion of authority and accountability makes it difficult for the U.S. intelligence community to work effectively. Our nation needs one person to orchestrate the efforts of the various intelligence-collection agencies.
Additionally, our report reiterates the need for an aggressive intelligence component within our coordinated strategy to combat terrorism. Increasing the ability of human sources to penetrate terrorist organizations and networks remains a critical priority. This means putting more people in the field, providing them the resources to accomplish their mission and building up their language capabilities.
Another committee recommendation called for the FBI to make specific performance improvements. Congress and the administration will need to consider whether the mission to collect and analyze domestic-intelligence information should be given to a separate (or even a new) federal agency. The FBI has many obstacles to overcome, and many question its ability to perform national law enforcement and also meet its domestic-intelligence responsibilities.
I am skeptical about creating a new agency for domestic intelligence. A department that exists only to collect domestic intelligence could pose a threat to the privacy of American citizens. An agency that exists only for the sake of spying, with no law enforcement goal, is not necessarily the right answer. With the right tools and resources, the FBI can meet its dual responsibilities. Congress and the FBI director must continue to transform the agency to meet the threat of terrorism.
The 1990s was a "risk averse" period, during which time the intelligence community often did not perform aggressively enough, though this was by no means the fault of the dedicated men and women of the intelligence agencies' rank-and-file. The administration simply was not focused on intelligence or terrorism (even though the threat of terrorism was present). As a result, the intelligence community during the 1990s was underfinanced, understaffed and underappreciated. The joint inquiry report shows that we can no longer ignore the needs of our intelligence community. Our nation must commit significant resources to our intelligence agencies.
The threat of terrorism is not going away. We must provide the structural and technical resources for our intelligence community to work as a coordinated unit to root terrorism out, wherever it may hide. Much work lies ahead of us to rebuild from the 1990s and to reorganize the intelligence community to meet the threats of the 21st century. Yet the work must be done to make the disjointed intelligence community a coordinated orchestra that can protect the American people from another terrorist tragedy.