thedrifter
04-19-06, 07:52 AM
Opening up Iran--how hard?
by Thomas P.M. Barnett
People seem to think that a "grand bargain" is required on Iran. I don't know where this requirement comes from. I don't believe I've ever used the phrase, or ever proposed "giving" or "selling" the bomb to Iran. And yet, I get this feedback about how hard it is to "cut a deal."
What I have written is that we just need to simply end our opposition, doing so within talks where we push for recognition of Israel, the two-state solution, a more open form of their meddling/support in Iraq (one cannot expect them not to "meddle," when hell, we've got over 100k troops there . . . you know . . . sort of meddling).
What happens if we can't get some of those gives in return?
No need to wait, though.
To open up Iran is not our decision, it's the decision of the Iranian people. What holds this up is the regime's ability to cite America's opposition and isolation strategy as reason for the fortress mentality--just like Castro has done in Cuba for decades.
How we end Iran's isolation is simply to drop the isolation strategy. We stop making the nuclear issue everything in our relationship with Iran. We end the sanctions. We don't need to cut any particular trade deal state-to-state. Stuff will simply happen between Iran and the world, first and foremost with Europe. We re-establish diplomatic relations so we can talk about security issues of great common concern, like the future of Afghanistan and Iraq. We start slowly, through confidence-building security measures, to generate mil-mil ties (impossible, i know, except we've done it with "enemies" time and time again in the past). And over time, we bring Iran into a larger understanding of secuirty in the Guif and Middle East.
Again, I know this is all "impossible" with a regime totally dedicated to fomenting revolution throughout the region, but we've done this before with countries--like the Soviet Union, like China.
What we have going with Iran right now plays into the hands of the hardliners and helps to make it easier for them to resist domestic pressures for reform. We need a foreign policy that taps that domestic pressure for change. Instead, we force that public to choose between nationalism and perceived international humiliation ("How come Israel and Pakistan and India can all have nukes and we are barred from doing so?").
In the end, the denial strategy of arms control simply does not work. When countries wanted the bomb, they've always gotten the bomb. When they are on the fence and see a better deal in economic connectivity with the outside world, like so many middling powers faced over the past 20 years,, they typically choose the connectivity and bag the effort on the bomb. That list of states is very long. The "increasing" pool of proliferators is the same old, same old list of former Soviet or Chinese client states.
Nothing changes in global security affairs with this strategy, except Iran's isolation. Ending Iran's isolation is the prerequisite for positive change. We can try to get there through regime change or change within the regime. I know we can't manage the former, so the question is how best to trigger the latter?
This I know: we continue this fruitless path of isolation we end up with an isolated, ****ed-off, antagonistic Iran with nukes and the mullahs still firmly in control in ten years. We also have to live with a regional great power that is constantly thwarting our efforts at fostering positive change throughout the region.
This strategy either gets us a lot of nothing or a lot of nothing plus a lot of dead U.S. soldiers and Marines.
I say, don't fight the inevitable. We managed this trick several times in the past. No reason why we can't manage it again here and now . . . and get on to what we really need to focus on--North Korea and locking in China at today's prices.
Ellie
by Thomas P.M. Barnett
People seem to think that a "grand bargain" is required on Iran. I don't know where this requirement comes from. I don't believe I've ever used the phrase, or ever proposed "giving" or "selling" the bomb to Iran. And yet, I get this feedback about how hard it is to "cut a deal."
What I have written is that we just need to simply end our opposition, doing so within talks where we push for recognition of Israel, the two-state solution, a more open form of their meddling/support in Iraq (one cannot expect them not to "meddle," when hell, we've got over 100k troops there . . . you know . . . sort of meddling).
What happens if we can't get some of those gives in return?
No need to wait, though.
To open up Iran is not our decision, it's the decision of the Iranian people. What holds this up is the regime's ability to cite America's opposition and isolation strategy as reason for the fortress mentality--just like Castro has done in Cuba for decades.
How we end Iran's isolation is simply to drop the isolation strategy. We stop making the nuclear issue everything in our relationship with Iran. We end the sanctions. We don't need to cut any particular trade deal state-to-state. Stuff will simply happen between Iran and the world, first and foremost with Europe. We re-establish diplomatic relations so we can talk about security issues of great common concern, like the future of Afghanistan and Iraq. We start slowly, through confidence-building security measures, to generate mil-mil ties (impossible, i know, except we've done it with "enemies" time and time again in the past). And over time, we bring Iran into a larger understanding of secuirty in the Guif and Middle East.
Again, I know this is all "impossible" with a regime totally dedicated to fomenting revolution throughout the region, but we've done this before with countries--like the Soviet Union, like China.
What we have going with Iran right now plays into the hands of the hardliners and helps to make it easier for them to resist domestic pressures for reform. We need a foreign policy that taps that domestic pressure for change. Instead, we force that public to choose between nationalism and perceived international humiliation ("How come Israel and Pakistan and India can all have nukes and we are barred from doing so?").
In the end, the denial strategy of arms control simply does not work. When countries wanted the bomb, they've always gotten the bomb. When they are on the fence and see a better deal in economic connectivity with the outside world, like so many middling powers faced over the past 20 years,, they typically choose the connectivity and bag the effort on the bomb. That list of states is very long. The "increasing" pool of proliferators is the same old, same old list of former Soviet or Chinese client states.
Nothing changes in global security affairs with this strategy, except Iran's isolation. Ending Iran's isolation is the prerequisite for positive change. We can try to get there through regime change or change within the regime. I know we can't manage the former, so the question is how best to trigger the latter?
This I know: we continue this fruitless path of isolation we end up with an isolated, ****ed-off, antagonistic Iran with nukes and the mullahs still firmly in control in ten years. We also have to live with a regional great power that is constantly thwarting our efforts at fostering positive change throughout the region.
This strategy either gets us a lot of nothing or a lot of nothing plus a lot of dead U.S. soldiers and Marines.
I say, don't fight the inevitable. We managed this trick several times in the past. No reason why we can't manage it again here and now . . . and get on to what we really need to focus on--North Korea and locking in China at today's prices.
Ellie