thedrifter
03-22-06, 07:09 AM
Army Revisits Vietnam War -- More Intellectual Dishonesty, or Search for Truth?
By Roger Charles
March 21, 2006
If there was any doubt about the basic intellectual dishonesty that continues to permeate the US Army as an institution, that doubt was removed yesterday when the Wall Street Journal ran a long puff piece titled, "As Iraq War Rages, Army Re-Examines Lessons of Vietnam." (The two sub-leads summarize keys points: "Recent Books Pan Doctrine Of Overwhelming Power When Fighting Guerrillas," and "A Gift for Donald Rumsfeld.")
The article, more than likely spoon fed by Army flacks to a willing but naïve reporter, examines a potentially serious topic -- the current infatuation of senior Army leadership, such as the on-scene commander in Iraq, General George Casey, with this book and two other books dealing with the Vietnam war, "A Better War," by Col. Lewis Sorley and "Dereliction of Duty," by Col. H.R. McMaster.
What's both intriguing and revealing is the absence of any reference to the seminal book on the Army's failures in Vietnam, a book written not by some intellectual officer studying the Vietnam war from a series of library stacks and research centers, but rather by an officer who wrote of his personal experiences on the killing fields of the third Indochina war. This officer was arguably our Army's most successful tactical combat leader of the Vietnam War -- the one officer who clearly understood the nature of the war and succeeded in out gee-ing the gee (out guerrilla the guerrillas).
Of course, I refer to Col. David Hackworth's memoir, "About Face: the Odyssey of an American Warrior." (Hack's "The Vietnam Primer," and "Steel My Soldiers' Hearts," are also most instructive for anyone truly interested in "lessons learned, or perhaps more accurately stated, "lessons ignored.")
The three books touted by Jaffe are heavy on perspective from the "pol-mil" world, and bureaucratic politics along the E-ring and in MACV (Military Assistance Command, Vietnam) headquarters in Saigon. (Author's note: I've only read/studied McMaster's book, and it is a great work, a classic. But, it's not going to help that company or battalion commander in Ramadi. I've relied on book review for the summaries of the Nagl and Sorely books - both excellent works, but not the tactical guide that Hack's writings are.)
Hack's writings on the other hand focused on the grunt-level perspective and topics that meant life or death to the stout-hearted young Americans in the Southeast Asian War Games.
Hack dealt with issues such as (to name just three):
-- Why and how the piece of **** (POS) M-16 rifle was foisted onto 11B's who died with cleaning rods in their muddy hands?
-- Why future four-star Bernard Rogers lived as a one-star in an air conditioned trailer while his troops hunkered down in monsoon rains with only an e-tool and a rubber poncho?
-- Why ticket punching and prostitution of the awards system became routine for the Perfumed Princes, and their wannabes, the Perfumed Princelings.
Hack's list of Army leadership failures was long and incisive, and the Courtney Massingale's of the Vietnam era never forgave Hack. Likewise, today's Perfumed Princes cannot face the ugly truth that Hack's unsparing and honest exposure of vainglorious ambition run amok is the best description of what ailed the Army then.
The constructive criticism that Hack provided could have/should have served as the best prescription of how to make the US Army well, but that would have required acknowledging the systemic problems deeply entrenched in the leadership of this critical institution. Such candid introspection continues to be a challenge too tough for the Army brass
As the readers of Defense watch well know, the debacles with today's life-or-death issues such as up-armoring Humvees and second-rate body armor were merely a time-delayed replay of a dysfunctional Army acquisition system that is unchanged since Hack described it.
The same corrupt and self-protecting system that produced the M-16 was guaranteed to produce a years-long delay in getting proper armor on the main tactical vehicle in Iraq. This same corrupt and self-protecting system also spent hundreds of millions of dollars to produce demonstrably inferior body armor, all the while liberally distributing generous annual performance bonuses to the career civilian "scientists" and "engineers" inside the rotten Army laboratories, arsenals and research centers.
This gaggle of time-serving bureaucrats, and their Perfumed Prince overseers did perfect one item - the ability to pretend to be concerned about fielding the "world's-best" gear for America's Grunts. Congressional members and staffers could rest easy. The designated liars had assured them that all was well. Off on the next junket to St. Andrews...
(It's worth noting that even with this haven of taxpayer supported featherbedding, the following US Army weapons were imported from allied nations, and not a product of the US Army "scientists and engineers" -- the 120mm mortar (Finland, by way of Israel), 81mm mortar (Great Britain), and Abrams' tank 120mm gun (Germany). Of course, the 9mm Beretta pistol proves that foreign design is not enough to guarantee a good product, but the point is that even the POS Beretta was evaluated and procured by the Army acquisition system as "best available.")
What made the Wall Street Journal article particularly insulting to Hack's legacy of self-less service to the troops he loved, was a report from a long-time SFTT supporter currently serving in Iraq. This absolutely reliable Soldier reported that in a replay of lessons unlearned from our Vietnam experience, Operation Swarmer was a bust due to non-existant OPSEC:
"Operation Swarmer was compromised by the Iraqis. As soon as Iraqi units left their barracks, their soldiers and local police watching movements were on cell phones. Orders are not even issued to Iraqi units until 1 hr prior to loading onto trucks and slicks. The insurgents were tipped off. People we interviewed in the area stated the insurgent cells and cell leaders abruptly left 3 hrs before we even arrived. This operation was an exercise in PR on how well the Iraqi forces are taking the fight to the enemy, but had little operational success."
Now, I'm sure Hack is watching, and along with many of us Vietnam vets, hoping that the Army planners for this operation knew that such compromise was a certainty, and took steps to take advantage of this reality. For example, let's hope that US SpecOps teams were inserted into the area along likely escape routes so that when the High Value Targets were flushed out of their lairs by the cell phone calls (the Iraqi equivalent of Vietnamese boys on their water buffalos beating on bamboo sticks), our studs were waiting.
For valid OPSEC reasons, Gen. Casey's command did not, and should not announce that the above counter-measure, or some equivalent tactic, was in fact employed.
And while we're in the hopeful mode, let's hope that the cell phone calls were intercepted and recorded by the US "big ears" which will use the intel to identify the callers. If this happened, our operators should have a treasure trove of "actionable intelligence" to support appropriate action against the Quislings in Iraqi security forces.
For even more valid reasons, Gen. Casey's command should let the results speak for themselves. If there's a sudden drop in insurgent activity in the area of the operation, and this drop proves more than transitory, the SpecOps guys did have their turkey shoot.
But, given the failure to come up with effective counter-measures to the ubiquitous IED's after two and a half years of increasing carnage being inflicted upon US troops, I'm more hopeful than confident that Hack's maxim of "out-geeing the gee" may have actually guided the tactical planners on Operation Swarmer.
If the operational planners were being guided by the experiences cited in the books in the Wall Street Journal article, then our on-scene observer is probably, and unfortunately, correct - Operation Swarmer was merely a PR ploy ordered up from Washington to show a few seconds of video clips of Iraqi soldiers being ferried into combat by US Blackhawk helicopters.
Nearly three years ago Hack called for the Army to institute a version of the "Retired Executives" program - to take some of the true gunfighters that do exist among the Army's retired general officers, and send them to Baghdad as military advisors to the senior commanders. Men such as retired lieutenant generals Hal Moore and Hank Emerson could have been immensely valuable to the on-scene commanders. (There is generally a Foreign Service Officer from the State Department assigned, so why not a Military Advisor, other than for the admission that the assigned Army commander is human and not the omniscient lord of the cosmos portrayed by his PAO?)
Had a Hal Moore, or a Hank Emerson been advising Gen. Casey, I would not be relying on hope that Operation Swarmer was a major tactical success. I'd be damn confident that the murderous bastards in the area of operations had just suffered a major tactical disaster, and that many virgins were being distributed to this newest batch of martyrs.
SFTT President Roger Charles is an Annapolis graduate, a retired USMC Lt. Col. who commanded an infantry platoon in I Corps during the Vietnam War, is the winner of the prestigious Peabody Award for news coverage, and was a protégée's of the late Col. David H. Hackworth. Rog can be contacted at sfttpres@aol.com.
By Roger Charles
March 21, 2006
If there was any doubt about the basic intellectual dishonesty that continues to permeate the US Army as an institution, that doubt was removed yesterday when the Wall Street Journal ran a long puff piece titled, "As Iraq War Rages, Army Re-Examines Lessons of Vietnam." (The two sub-leads summarize keys points: "Recent Books Pan Doctrine Of Overwhelming Power When Fighting Guerrillas," and "A Gift for Donald Rumsfeld.")
The article, more than likely spoon fed by Army flacks to a willing but naïve reporter, examines a potentially serious topic -- the current infatuation of senior Army leadership, such as the on-scene commander in Iraq, General George Casey, with this book and two other books dealing with the Vietnam war, "A Better War," by Col. Lewis Sorley and "Dereliction of Duty," by Col. H.R. McMaster.
What's both intriguing and revealing is the absence of any reference to the seminal book on the Army's failures in Vietnam, a book written not by some intellectual officer studying the Vietnam war from a series of library stacks and research centers, but rather by an officer who wrote of his personal experiences on the killing fields of the third Indochina war. This officer was arguably our Army's most successful tactical combat leader of the Vietnam War -- the one officer who clearly understood the nature of the war and succeeded in out gee-ing the gee (out guerrilla the guerrillas).
Of course, I refer to Col. David Hackworth's memoir, "About Face: the Odyssey of an American Warrior." (Hack's "The Vietnam Primer," and "Steel My Soldiers' Hearts," are also most instructive for anyone truly interested in "lessons learned, or perhaps more accurately stated, "lessons ignored.")
The three books touted by Jaffe are heavy on perspective from the "pol-mil" world, and bureaucratic politics along the E-ring and in MACV (Military Assistance Command, Vietnam) headquarters in Saigon. (Author's note: I've only read/studied McMaster's book, and it is a great work, a classic. But, it's not going to help that company or battalion commander in Ramadi. I've relied on book review for the summaries of the Nagl and Sorely books - both excellent works, but not the tactical guide that Hack's writings are.)
Hack's writings on the other hand focused on the grunt-level perspective and topics that meant life or death to the stout-hearted young Americans in the Southeast Asian War Games.
Hack dealt with issues such as (to name just three):
-- Why and how the piece of **** (POS) M-16 rifle was foisted onto 11B's who died with cleaning rods in their muddy hands?
-- Why future four-star Bernard Rogers lived as a one-star in an air conditioned trailer while his troops hunkered down in monsoon rains with only an e-tool and a rubber poncho?
-- Why ticket punching and prostitution of the awards system became routine for the Perfumed Princes, and their wannabes, the Perfumed Princelings.
Hack's list of Army leadership failures was long and incisive, and the Courtney Massingale's of the Vietnam era never forgave Hack. Likewise, today's Perfumed Princes cannot face the ugly truth that Hack's unsparing and honest exposure of vainglorious ambition run amok is the best description of what ailed the Army then.
The constructive criticism that Hack provided could have/should have served as the best prescription of how to make the US Army well, but that would have required acknowledging the systemic problems deeply entrenched in the leadership of this critical institution. Such candid introspection continues to be a challenge too tough for the Army brass
As the readers of Defense watch well know, the debacles with today's life-or-death issues such as up-armoring Humvees and second-rate body armor were merely a time-delayed replay of a dysfunctional Army acquisition system that is unchanged since Hack described it.
The same corrupt and self-protecting system that produced the M-16 was guaranteed to produce a years-long delay in getting proper armor on the main tactical vehicle in Iraq. This same corrupt and self-protecting system also spent hundreds of millions of dollars to produce demonstrably inferior body armor, all the while liberally distributing generous annual performance bonuses to the career civilian "scientists" and "engineers" inside the rotten Army laboratories, arsenals and research centers.
This gaggle of time-serving bureaucrats, and their Perfumed Prince overseers did perfect one item - the ability to pretend to be concerned about fielding the "world's-best" gear for America's Grunts. Congressional members and staffers could rest easy. The designated liars had assured them that all was well. Off on the next junket to St. Andrews...
(It's worth noting that even with this haven of taxpayer supported featherbedding, the following US Army weapons were imported from allied nations, and not a product of the US Army "scientists and engineers" -- the 120mm mortar (Finland, by way of Israel), 81mm mortar (Great Britain), and Abrams' tank 120mm gun (Germany). Of course, the 9mm Beretta pistol proves that foreign design is not enough to guarantee a good product, but the point is that even the POS Beretta was evaluated and procured by the Army acquisition system as "best available.")
What made the Wall Street Journal article particularly insulting to Hack's legacy of self-less service to the troops he loved, was a report from a long-time SFTT supporter currently serving in Iraq. This absolutely reliable Soldier reported that in a replay of lessons unlearned from our Vietnam experience, Operation Swarmer was a bust due to non-existant OPSEC:
"Operation Swarmer was compromised by the Iraqis. As soon as Iraqi units left their barracks, their soldiers and local police watching movements were on cell phones. Orders are not even issued to Iraqi units until 1 hr prior to loading onto trucks and slicks. The insurgents were tipped off. People we interviewed in the area stated the insurgent cells and cell leaders abruptly left 3 hrs before we even arrived. This operation was an exercise in PR on how well the Iraqi forces are taking the fight to the enemy, but had little operational success."
Now, I'm sure Hack is watching, and along with many of us Vietnam vets, hoping that the Army planners for this operation knew that such compromise was a certainty, and took steps to take advantage of this reality. For example, let's hope that US SpecOps teams were inserted into the area along likely escape routes so that when the High Value Targets were flushed out of their lairs by the cell phone calls (the Iraqi equivalent of Vietnamese boys on their water buffalos beating on bamboo sticks), our studs were waiting.
For valid OPSEC reasons, Gen. Casey's command did not, and should not announce that the above counter-measure, or some equivalent tactic, was in fact employed.
And while we're in the hopeful mode, let's hope that the cell phone calls were intercepted and recorded by the US "big ears" which will use the intel to identify the callers. If this happened, our operators should have a treasure trove of "actionable intelligence" to support appropriate action against the Quislings in Iraqi security forces.
For even more valid reasons, Gen. Casey's command should let the results speak for themselves. If there's a sudden drop in insurgent activity in the area of the operation, and this drop proves more than transitory, the SpecOps guys did have their turkey shoot.
But, given the failure to come up with effective counter-measures to the ubiquitous IED's after two and a half years of increasing carnage being inflicted upon US troops, I'm more hopeful than confident that Hack's maxim of "out-geeing the gee" may have actually guided the tactical planners on Operation Swarmer.
If the operational planners were being guided by the experiences cited in the books in the Wall Street Journal article, then our on-scene observer is probably, and unfortunately, correct - Operation Swarmer was merely a PR ploy ordered up from Washington to show a few seconds of video clips of Iraqi soldiers being ferried into combat by US Blackhawk helicopters.
Nearly three years ago Hack called for the Army to institute a version of the "Retired Executives" program - to take some of the true gunfighters that do exist among the Army's retired general officers, and send them to Baghdad as military advisors to the senior commanders. Men such as retired lieutenant generals Hal Moore and Hank Emerson could have been immensely valuable to the on-scene commanders. (There is generally a Foreign Service Officer from the State Department assigned, so why not a Military Advisor, other than for the admission that the assigned Army commander is human and not the omniscient lord of the cosmos portrayed by his PAO?)
Had a Hal Moore, or a Hank Emerson been advising Gen. Casey, I would not be relying on hope that Operation Swarmer was a major tactical success. I'd be damn confident that the murderous bastards in the area of operations had just suffered a major tactical disaster, and that many virgins were being distributed to this newest batch of martyrs.
SFTT President Roger Charles is an Annapolis graduate, a retired USMC Lt. Col. who commanded an infantry platoon in I Corps during the Vietnam War, is the winner of the prestigious Peabody Award for news coverage, and was a protégée's of the late Col. David H. Hackworth. Rog can be contacted at sfttpres@aol.com.