yellowwing
03-17-06, 05:27 PM
RUSSIA'S SECRET OPERATIONS (http://www.bu.edu/iscip/vol12/felgenhauer.html)
Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology, and Policy
Perspective
Volume XII, Number 1 (September - October 2001)
by PAVEL FELGENHAUER
During more than 70 years of Soviet rule, the authorities seldom admitted that servicemen were regularly sent abroad to fight in different local armed conflicts. Only the participation of Soviet troops in the war in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989 was reported at the time, not decades after.
There were, of course, occasional hints concerning Soviet military advisers deployed in Egypt, Syria, Vietnam, Cuba and other countries, and rumors circulated inside the USSR of Russian servicemen killed or wounded in action by Israeli and American fire. But only after the demise of the Soviet Union did concrete information become public on casualties and detailed descriptions of combat missions undertaken by Russian soldiers in local wars.
In 1993 a report on previously secret statistics of Russian military casualties, Grif Sekretnosti Sniat, was published by the Russian defense ministry (general editor: Col-Gen G.F. Krivosheev). Greenhill Books published the translation of this book, Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century, in 1997.
In 2000 a study was published by the defense ministry's Institute of Military History, titled Russia (USSR) in Local Wars and Military Conflicts of the Second Half of the 20th Century (general editor: Maj-Gen V.A. Zolotarov). It appears to be a most comprehensive and detailed study, containing not only casualty figures, but also descriptions of Soviet forces' combat operations in secret wars, deployment patterns, evaluation of military hardware performance, etc.
The first major secret Soviet combat military engagements abroad were the participation in the Spanish Civil War from 1936 to 1939 (3,000 servicemen were deployed, 158 were lost in action) and in China against Japanese forces from 1937 to 1939 (3,665 deployed, 195 lost). Russian military involvement in these conflicts had been disclosed in Soviet times, but only long after the events. Russian generals and other officers assumed Spanish and Chinese names; they were issued local military uniforms and ordered to avoid capture at all costs, including suicide.
Such a pattern of deployment became a rule during the Cold War. In 1970 during the "War of Attrition," a 12,000-strong Soviet expeditionary air defense corps was sent to Egypt to help fight the Israeli air force. None of the officers or troops was told the ultimate destination before they docked in Alexandria, Egypt. The level of secrecy was such that generals, other officers and troops were disguised as civilians, their transport ships supposedly were carrying "farming equipment," the ship captains were allowed to open an envelope containing information on their final destination only after they reached the Eastern Mediterranean, and strict orders were issued to shoot to kill any serviceman who jumped overboard while the transport ships were passing the Bosporus.
Of course, Western intelligence services knew there were Soviet combat troops in the conflict area, but it was impossible to prove this publicly, because there were no prisoners. (Russian pilots were forbidden to fly close to enemy-occupied territory.) In most of such conflicts the Soviet Union provided large amounts of arms, military equipment and ammunition. Russian technicians and specialists trained Koreans, Vietnamese, Arabs and others to use Russian arms. Soviet generals served as advisers, helping local military staffs to deploy forces armed with modern weapons. Soviet combat troops were deployed mostly on temporary bases -- to help train local staff and to perform combat duties until the locals' training was completed, so that modern weapons could be put into action immediately to tilt the military balance.
In the Korean War the Soviet Union deployed the 64th air defense corps, with over 300 fighter jets, over 400 pilots, 2 artillery air defense divisions, and ground staff -- up to 40,000 in all. The 64th was given the task of challenging US air supremacy over the Korean peninsula, but pilots were ordered to fight only defensive battles and not to fly near the front line. From 1950 to 1953 the 64th lost 335 fighter jets and 125 pilots. Overall, Russian casualties in the Korean War are estimated at 316 dead. The US lost some 55,000 men and 1,182 airplanes.
In other local conflicts Russia lost much fewer men than in Korea. From 1964 to 1973, 6,359 Soviet generals and other officers "visited" Vietnam. Soviet-guided surface-to-air missile (SAM) regiments were deployed to encounter US warplanes. Thirteen Soviet servicemen were lost in action during these years. In Indochina the US lost over 60,000 men and 8,612 aircraft.
In Egypt Russia lost 25 military advisers and 35 combat personnel. In Syria and accompanying Syrian troops into Lebanon from 1956 to 1991, Russia lost 3 generals, 39 other officers, 1 non-commissioned officer and 1 private. In Nicaragua no Soviet soldiers were killed in action.
In each of these wars other parties (including Chinese "volunteers" in Korea, Cuban "volunteers" in Angola and in Ethiopia) were engaged in serious ground fighting and suffered heavy casualties. The Soviet Union provided the hardware and the money, and also used local conflicts to test new weapons in action. (In Vietnam the Russians for the first time used modern plastic explosives for diversionary attacks on US bases.) Soviet specialists in the battle zones reported back to Moscow on technical mishaps and the performance of Western weapon systems. Military designers in Russia improved their weapons based on these reports and modernized armaments often were sent promptly to the front.
Soviet military intelligence-gathering teams collected new Western military hardware. In 1968 a new supersonic US F-111A fighter-bomber was shot down near Hanoi and Russian specialists scrutinized its remains. In 1999 the Yugoslav military shot down a US F-117A stealth fighter and Russian military personnel reportedly also had a chance to investigate its debris.
Russian military involvement in local wars until the 1980s may be considered to be mostly successful. The casualties were relatively low -- much lower than those of the United States. The American military suffered significant losses during the Vietnam War; the Soviets managed to gather important intelligence information and technical data.
[...Article Continues Discussion Afghanistan and Spetznaz Operations...]
Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology, and Policy
Perspective
Volume XII, Number 1 (September - October 2001)
by PAVEL FELGENHAUER
During more than 70 years of Soviet rule, the authorities seldom admitted that servicemen were regularly sent abroad to fight in different local armed conflicts. Only the participation of Soviet troops in the war in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989 was reported at the time, not decades after.
There were, of course, occasional hints concerning Soviet military advisers deployed in Egypt, Syria, Vietnam, Cuba and other countries, and rumors circulated inside the USSR of Russian servicemen killed or wounded in action by Israeli and American fire. But only after the demise of the Soviet Union did concrete information become public on casualties and detailed descriptions of combat missions undertaken by Russian soldiers in local wars.
In 1993 a report on previously secret statistics of Russian military casualties, Grif Sekretnosti Sniat, was published by the Russian defense ministry (general editor: Col-Gen G.F. Krivosheev). Greenhill Books published the translation of this book, Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century, in 1997.
In 2000 a study was published by the defense ministry's Institute of Military History, titled Russia (USSR) in Local Wars and Military Conflicts of the Second Half of the 20th Century (general editor: Maj-Gen V.A. Zolotarov). It appears to be a most comprehensive and detailed study, containing not only casualty figures, but also descriptions of Soviet forces' combat operations in secret wars, deployment patterns, evaluation of military hardware performance, etc.
The first major secret Soviet combat military engagements abroad were the participation in the Spanish Civil War from 1936 to 1939 (3,000 servicemen were deployed, 158 were lost in action) and in China against Japanese forces from 1937 to 1939 (3,665 deployed, 195 lost). Russian military involvement in these conflicts had been disclosed in Soviet times, but only long after the events. Russian generals and other officers assumed Spanish and Chinese names; they were issued local military uniforms and ordered to avoid capture at all costs, including suicide.
Such a pattern of deployment became a rule during the Cold War. In 1970 during the "War of Attrition," a 12,000-strong Soviet expeditionary air defense corps was sent to Egypt to help fight the Israeli air force. None of the officers or troops was told the ultimate destination before they docked in Alexandria, Egypt. The level of secrecy was such that generals, other officers and troops were disguised as civilians, their transport ships supposedly were carrying "farming equipment," the ship captains were allowed to open an envelope containing information on their final destination only after they reached the Eastern Mediterranean, and strict orders were issued to shoot to kill any serviceman who jumped overboard while the transport ships were passing the Bosporus.
Of course, Western intelligence services knew there were Soviet combat troops in the conflict area, but it was impossible to prove this publicly, because there were no prisoners. (Russian pilots were forbidden to fly close to enemy-occupied territory.) In most of such conflicts the Soviet Union provided large amounts of arms, military equipment and ammunition. Russian technicians and specialists trained Koreans, Vietnamese, Arabs and others to use Russian arms. Soviet generals served as advisers, helping local military staffs to deploy forces armed with modern weapons. Soviet combat troops were deployed mostly on temporary bases -- to help train local staff and to perform combat duties until the locals' training was completed, so that modern weapons could be put into action immediately to tilt the military balance.
In the Korean War the Soviet Union deployed the 64th air defense corps, with over 300 fighter jets, over 400 pilots, 2 artillery air defense divisions, and ground staff -- up to 40,000 in all. The 64th was given the task of challenging US air supremacy over the Korean peninsula, but pilots were ordered to fight only defensive battles and not to fly near the front line. From 1950 to 1953 the 64th lost 335 fighter jets and 125 pilots. Overall, Russian casualties in the Korean War are estimated at 316 dead. The US lost some 55,000 men and 1,182 airplanes.
In other local conflicts Russia lost much fewer men than in Korea. From 1964 to 1973, 6,359 Soviet generals and other officers "visited" Vietnam. Soviet-guided surface-to-air missile (SAM) regiments were deployed to encounter US warplanes. Thirteen Soviet servicemen were lost in action during these years. In Indochina the US lost over 60,000 men and 8,612 aircraft.
In Egypt Russia lost 25 military advisers and 35 combat personnel. In Syria and accompanying Syrian troops into Lebanon from 1956 to 1991, Russia lost 3 generals, 39 other officers, 1 non-commissioned officer and 1 private. In Nicaragua no Soviet soldiers were killed in action.
In each of these wars other parties (including Chinese "volunteers" in Korea, Cuban "volunteers" in Angola and in Ethiopia) were engaged in serious ground fighting and suffered heavy casualties. The Soviet Union provided the hardware and the money, and also used local conflicts to test new weapons in action. (In Vietnam the Russians for the first time used modern plastic explosives for diversionary attacks on US bases.) Soviet specialists in the battle zones reported back to Moscow on technical mishaps and the performance of Western weapon systems. Military designers in Russia improved their weapons based on these reports and modernized armaments often were sent promptly to the front.
Soviet military intelligence-gathering teams collected new Western military hardware. In 1968 a new supersonic US F-111A fighter-bomber was shot down near Hanoi and Russian specialists scrutinized its remains. In 1999 the Yugoslav military shot down a US F-117A stealth fighter and Russian military personnel reportedly also had a chance to investigate its debris.
Russian military involvement in local wars until the 1980s may be considered to be mostly successful. The casualties were relatively low -- much lower than those of the United States. The American military suffered significant losses during the Vietnam War; the Soviets managed to gather important intelligence information and technical data.
[...Article Continues Discussion Afghanistan and Spetznaz Operations...]