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thedrifter
11-23-02, 11:06 AM
DoD Decals - "Red Badge of Courage Admission"
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By Paul Purcell, Board Member of SFTT.ORG

It's come to our attention that Department Of Defense decals have gone missing from a multitude of personally owned vehicles. This has not been happening in one particular location either. Theft reports of these base-entry stickers have filtered in from a number of areas across the country.

We don't know to what extent this has been reported or dealt with, but we felt it was important enough to put the word out as a warning, a brainstorm topic, and a request for action.

Two possible reasons exist as to why this is happening; the least of which is simple anti-military and/or anti-impending-war vandalism. Simply put, it may be a loosely networked group of people who put the notion on a website somewhere that removing these stickers from vehicles would be a passive form of protest and a thorn in the side of the vehicle's military owner.

The second and more urgent theory is that Al Qaeda, or other terror group(s), are collecting these decals in order to gain admission to military facilities.

Let's focus on this second theory for a bit and discuss a few suggestions on how to deal with this potential threat. Some of the items mentioned will also take care of the problem if it's simple vandalism.

First we have to consider the fact that not all installations have been hit as hard as others. Therefore, reports are not filtering up as they should and consequently the reactions of the powers that be, especially since the passage of the Homeland Security bill is causing everyone to focus on all the new restructuring, will be slow to take place. It may also be that the only bases aware of this potential threat are the ones that have experienced an actual decal theft.

Next we have to assume that whoever is doing this may be smart enough to collect only one or two decals from any particular jurisdiction in order to stay below their radar. This would still provide enough ID for a vehicle or two to gain access to a number of restricted military installations.

Thirdly, we have to wonder what their reason is for wanting base access. To answer that, recently intercepted Al Qaeda internet chatter and other indicators seem to indicate that something is being planned for some time in December. We have no official word on this, but indications do exist. So what better way to disrupt any sort of reaction than to create a distraction in the very midst of our seemingly secure military installations?

So what do we do? How do we fight this?

First, let's all pass the word to our military and our state and federal congressional reps. Awareness is key. We're going to do all we can at this end, but we need your help as well. Nothing beats the shotgun approach. As always, remember to send at least two types of communications for each idea you want to get across. I usually send a fax, an email, and make a phone call!

Don't stop with congressional reps and officials. If you have contact with anyone involved in any form of base security, pass the word to them that they should keep an extra eye on those coming and going from their posts. As with most positive things that happen, it's going to be someone in a hands-on position who took a little initiative and used their brains and guts to make a judgement call that saves the day.

Second, we should all remain vigilant. We should take this to be a warning and should not wait for Tom Ridge to make an official adjustment to his color-coded threat board. We're all smart enough to know something may be up, and we're all stable and grounded enough to be fully aware without creating the least bit of stress or panic. We should not only look for individuals trying to steal decals, but we should also be aware of any other suspicious activity that would be indicative of a pending strike.

Lastly, yet just as important, let's look at a few ways to stall these decal thefts and prevent them in the future.

The decals reported stolen have been the external, on-the-bumper decals that can be easily "sweated" off. For bases that will allow it, a clear adhesive laminate sheet, one that extends an inch or two beyond the edges of the decal, should be placed over the decal making it much more difficult to remove.


The decal system should be redesigned to be an inside-the-windshield type with adhesive that cannot be removed without destroying the sticker. The sticker should also contain some sort of non-counterfietable safety feature(s) such as a hologram.


Until the changes in decals can be made, all military installations should at least require a picture ID. As security levels rise, the ID should be accompanied by a password (changed daily), and maybe even a signed pass. (As technology increases, we tend to forget the simple things that are still effective and can be immediately implemented without spending a cent.)


Military ID in general should be redesigned to be non-counterfeitable. This could be done with the addition of a barcode, hologram, computer chip, coded magnetic strip, and any number of biometric identifiers. (We posed similar suggestions for civilian ID in an issue of "Paul's Corner" at http://www.sftt.org/pc_05142002.html)


We should remember that decal and ID theft are not limited to military installations. In fact, the largest number of ID thefts are coming from airports and seaports. Both are working on correcting the potential problems associated with this ID theft, but we all need to remain aware and to pass this article along to anyone in a security position at any sensitive infrastructure site, from the military on down.
Keep us posted on this one. Let us know what you've done to pass the word (send this article if you'd like) and the kinds of reactions you've gotten. Also let us know if you hear of decal thefts happening after 11-18-02 or of any other suspicious activity that might lend credence to the possibility of a December attack.

Thanks for your help.


Sempers,

Roger


http://www.sftt.org/