Sparrowhawk
11-21-02, 01:24 PM
BATTLE AT FINGER LAKE (copyright)
By
Lawrence E. Wilson
I am writing this article for two reasons. First, in response to an editorial by Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr. (Ret.) in Vietnam Magazine, to “set the record straight,” which should be “the ambition of all who served there as well.” Secondly, to provide an eyewitness account of an under-reported battle by the Platoon Commander’s recollection of what transpired and how a platoon of Marines lived up to the tradition of “Uncommon Valor was a Common Virtue.”
On November 21, 1967, at approximately 0300 I was in command of the First Platoon, India Company, 3rd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division participating in a company sized sweep into a platoon sized blocking position in Arizona Territory, Quang Nam Province, South Vietnam. We normally operated out of Liberty Bridge, but were now part of Operation Foster, which commenced on November 13, 1967, with the mission of conducting “search and destroy operations in the northeastern portion of the Arizona area to destroy or capture enemy forces, supplies and equipment, located therein.”
In the dark, I lead my platoon into our assigned position along the Line of Departure, which was just across a stream in a slight depression, in the middle of a rice paddy between Phu An (1) and Phu Binh (3), as shown on the map in Photo . The platoon was on line along the bottom of the depression, facing towards Phu Binh (3) and the lake to the right of that village, which became known as Finger Lake. The right flank of the platoon was next to a paddy dike trail which proceeded perpendicular to us from Phu An (1) to the base of Finger Lake, not to be confused with the trail depicted on the map which proceeds from Phu An (1) to Phu Binh (3).
Prior to positioning my platoon, the Second Platoon executed a night march to a blocking position just beyond Phu Binh (2) and before Finger Lake curves to the left. They faced us and their left flank was Finger Lake itself. I felt compassion for the men of that platoon for having to make this type of a maneuver, in the dark, after what they went through just two days before.
From the moment our company executed the “helicopter-borne assault into LZ SPARROW” near Giang Hoa (2), on November 13, 1967, until November 19, 1967, we made very little contact with the enemy. In fact, we were beginning to think that Operation Foster was going to be just a “walk in the sun.” However, that came to an abrupt end on November the 19th.
We had been primarily operating out of Phu Long (1) and (2) and into Phu An (1) along the trail from Phu Long (2), but we did not venture along the trail from Phu An (1) to the base of Finger Lake. We eventually evacuated over 7,000 villagers from these villages, but again did not approach Finger Lake. When we did encounter minor skirmishes with the enemy, it was to the left of Phu Long (2) and towards Phu An (1). However, on November 19th a squad from the Second Platoon, which was on patrol near Phu An (1) decided to cross the rice paddy along the dike trail leading to the base of Finger Lake. The enemy waited until the entire squad was on the dike when they opened up with automatic weapons and machine gun fire. The squad was decimated and the remainder of the Second Platoon, under the command of Lieutenant Boyd Faithful immediately responded to their aid, approaching the dike from the rice paddy to its right.
Lt. Faithful and his radioman were seriously wounded and pinned down in the paddy, along with the remainder of his platoon. The entire Second Platoon was involved, suffering four KIA’s and numerous seriously wounded, including the Platoon Commander. The squad members on the dike were either killed or seriously wounded. Lt. Faithful was evacuated and would never return.
Second Platoon was seriously impacted and somewhat shaken by the magnitude of its loss, an entire squad and its beloved Commander. The men truly loved Lt. Faithful and it was evident that this was a mutual feeling. The leadership of the platoon then fell to one Sergeant Gus, who did an admirable job, but definitely was also experiencing the trauma of the events on November 19th. In assisting in recovering the wounded, dead and silencing the enemy fire, my platoon suffered approximately 10 WIA’s.
In any event, Second Platoon was sent into the blocking position described above on November 21st. The paddy dike on the right flank of my platoon was the same one, which claimed the lives and wounded of the Second Platoon Squad and at a time just before daybreak, made an eerie image to us all. Supposedly on the other side of this dike, further to my right was to be the remainder of India Company, which included the Company Commander, his Command Group, the Third Platoon and a platoon detached to our company from Mike Company, 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines. The plan was for all three platoons and the Company Command Group, under the leadership of the Company Commander, to sweep along Finger Lake towards the blocking Second Platoon, or what remained of that platoon.
However, as the glow of daybreak was just about to begin, at a time when a silhouette could barely be detected against the sky, I noticed movement to my right, just out of the corner of my eye. I was kneeling behind my platoon, just about the center of the line when I detected this movement. My first impression was that the movement was that of a human moving along the paddy dike on my right flank, towards the tree line at the base of Finger Lake. As I turned and squinted closer, I determined that indeed it was the movement of a group of humans and by the nature of their movement, it didn’t appear to be Marines.
I asked my radio operator to contact the Company Commander, advise him of what I saw and ask if any of his Marines were moving on the dike. He replied that I was probably seeing members of the platoon I was to link up with, but it just didn’t ring true to me. Just at that moment I observed more groups of four to six people moving the same direction along the dike. I passed the word down the line and asked if those next to the dike were able to determine if they were Marines moving or not. The word came back that they were not Marines, but were in fact enemy soldiers.
I again contacted the Company Commander to report this and he advised that if they were really the enemy, we should let them go because they were moving into the direction of our intended sweep and we would get them when we moved out. I told him that I did not believe we were connected with any of his units on the other side of the dike and was concerned that they may be too far to our right.
As daylight broke, I realized that we were out in the open and there were no Marines to our right across the dike. It appeared that the movement of enemy troops had subsided, so I decided to get us out of the open. I moved the platoon to the right, across the dike and just into the tree line at the foot of Finger Lake.
Almost immediately after we got into position I heard an enemy soldier coming down the trail from the tree line towards us. He was calling out in Vietnamese and apparently trying to link up with one of his buddies, who was most likely following behind him when the soldier calling out crossed the dike, prior to our movement across the dike. However, due to our movement, his buddy delayed and now this one soldier was trying to link up with his brethren. I couldn’t see the enemy soldier, due to the thickness of the shrubbery ahead of us. But I could tell that the dike lead into the tree line and continued as a trail. I felt that if he walked into my view, I would kill him, but this wouldn’t have been too smart, since there would have been enemy both in front and behind us. But I couldn’t help feeling a desire for revenge, since these were probably members of the same unit, which attacked Second Platoon and my platoon on the 19th.
To this day, I can still see the enemy crossing that dike and realize what perfect targets they would have been if we had been in an ambush position, parallel to the trail instead of on line perpendicular to the dike, where one shot could have gone through all of us. Many nights before I fall to sleep I recall this incident and wish I would have opened up on them, but of course that would probably have resulted in a catastrophe. Still, on November the 19th we had not seen the enemy which caused so many casualties, and now I had many of them in my sights. Maybe we will get them on our sweep, I thought. Maybe Second Platoon can exact some revenge when we push the enemy into them.
When the Company Commander gave the word to move out on our sweep, we tried to move through the shrubbery on line, but found it too dense and had to break down to fireteam sized units in order to proceed. I don’t believe that we ever linked up with any of the other Marine units on our right flank as we proceeded on the sweep. (continued)
By
Lawrence E. Wilson
I am writing this article for two reasons. First, in response to an editorial by Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr. (Ret.) in Vietnam Magazine, to “set the record straight,” which should be “the ambition of all who served there as well.” Secondly, to provide an eyewitness account of an under-reported battle by the Platoon Commander’s recollection of what transpired and how a platoon of Marines lived up to the tradition of “Uncommon Valor was a Common Virtue.”
On November 21, 1967, at approximately 0300 I was in command of the First Platoon, India Company, 3rd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division participating in a company sized sweep into a platoon sized blocking position in Arizona Territory, Quang Nam Province, South Vietnam. We normally operated out of Liberty Bridge, but were now part of Operation Foster, which commenced on November 13, 1967, with the mission of conducting “search and destroy operations in the northeastern portion of the Arizona area to destroy or capture enemy forces, supplies and equipment, located therein.”
In the dark, I lead my platoon into our assigned position along the Line of Departure, which was just across a stream in a slight depression, in the middle of a rice paddy between Phu An (1) and Phu Binh (3), as shown on the map in Photo . The platoon was on line along the bottom of the depression, facing towards Phu Binh (3) and the lake to the right of that village, which became known as Finger Lake. The right flank of the platoon was next to a paddy dike trail which proceeded perpendicular to us from Phu An (1) to the base of Finger Lake, not to be confused with the trail depicted on the map which proceeds from Phu An (1) to Phu Binh (3).
Prior to positioning my platoon, the Second Platoon executed a night march to a blocking position just beyond Phu Binh (2) and before Finger Lake curves to the left. They faced us and their left flank was Finger Lake itself. I felt compassion for the men of that platoon for having to make this type of a maneuver, in the dark, after what they went through just two days before.
From the moment our company executed the “helicopter-borne assault into LZ SPARROW” near Giang Hoa (2), on November 13, 1967, until November 19, 1967, we made very little contact with the enemy. In fact, we were beginning to think that Operation Foster was going to be just a “walk in the sun.” However, that came to an abrupt end on November the 19th.
We had been primarily operating out of Phu Long (1) and (2) and into Phu An (1) along the trail from Phu Long (2), but we did not venture along the trail from Phu An (1) to the base of Finger Lake. We eventually evacuated over 7,000 villagers from these villages, but again did not approach Finger Lake. When we did encounter minor skirmishes with the enemy, it was to the left of Phu Long (2) and towards Phu An (1). However, on November 19th a squad from the Second Platoon, which was on patrol near Phu An (1) decided to cross the rice paddy along the dike trail leading to the base of Finger Lake. The enemy waited until the entire squad was on the dike when they opened up with automatic weapons and machine gun fire. The squad was decimated and the remainder of the Second Platoon, under the command of Lieutenant Boyd Faithful immediately responded to their aid, approaching the dike from the rice paddy to its right.
Lt. Faithful and his radioman were seriously wounded and pinned down in the paddy, along with the remainder of his platoon. The entire Second Platoon was involved, suffering four KIA’s and numerous seriously wounded, including the Platoon Commander. The squad members on the dike were either killed or seriously wounded. Lt. Faithful was evacuated and would never return.
Second Platoon was seriously impacted and somewhat shaken by the magnitude of its loss, an entire squad and its beloved Commander. The men truly loved Lt. Faithful and it was evident that this was a mutual feeling. The leadership of the platoon then fell to one Sergeant Gus, who did an admirable job, but definitely was also experiencing the trauma of the events on November 19th. In assisting in recovering the wounded, dead and silencing the enemy fire, my platoon suffered approximately 10 WIA’s.
In any event, Second Platoon was sent into the blocking position described above on November 21st. The paddy dike on the right flank of my platoon was the same one, which claimed the lives and wounded of the Second Platoon Squad and at a time just before daybreak, made an eerie image to us all. Supposedly on the other side of this dike, further to my right was to be the remainder of India Company, which included the Company Commander, his Command Group, the Third Platoon and a platoon detached to our company from Mike Company, 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines. The plan was for all three platoons and the Company Command Group, under the leadership of the Company Commander, to sweep along Finger Lake towards the blocking Second Platoon, or what remained of that platoon.
However, as the glow of daybreak was just about to begin, at a time when a silhouette could barely be detected against the sky, I noticed movement to my right, just out of the corner of my eye. I was kneeling behind my platoon, just about the center of the line when I detected this movement. My first impression was that the movement was that of a human moving along the paddy dike on my right flank, towards the tree line at the base of Finger Lake. As I turned and squinted closer, I determined that indeed it was the movement of a group of humans and by the nature of their movement, it didn’t appear to be Marines.
I asked my radio operator to contact the Company Commander, advise him of what I saw and ask if any of his Marines were moving on the dike. He replied that I was probably seeing members of the platoon I was to link up with, but it just didn’t ring true to me. Just at that moment I observed more groups of four to six people moving the same direction along the dike. I passed the word down the line and asked if those next to the dike were able to determine if they were Marines moving or not. The word came back that they were not Marines, but were in fact enemy soldiers.
I again contacted the Company Commander to report this and he advised that if they were really the enemy, we should let them go because they were moving into the direction of our intended sweep and we would get them when we moved out. I told him that I did not believe we were connected with any of his units on the other side of the dike and was concerned that they may be too far to our right.
As daylight broke, I realized that we were out in the open and there were no Marines to our right across the dike. It appeared that the movement of enemy troops had subsided, so I decided to get us out of the open. I moved the platoon to the right, across the dike and just into the tree line at the foot of Finger Lake.
Almost immediately after we got into position I heard an enemy soldier coming down the trail from the tree line towards us. He was calling out in Vietnamese and apparently trying to link up with one of his buddies, who was most likely following behind him when the soldier calling out crossed the dike, prior to our movement across the dike. However, due to our movement, his buddy delayed and now this one soldier was trying to link up with his brethren. I couldn’t see the enemy soldier, due to the thickness of the shrubbery ahead of us. But I could tell that the dike lead into the tree line and continued as a trail. I felt that if he walked into my view, I would kill him, but this wouldn’t have been too smart, since there would have been enemy both in front and behind us. But I couldn’t help feeling a desire for revenge, since these were probably members of the same unit, which attacked Second Platoon and my platoon on the 19th.
To this day, I can still see the enemy crossing that dike and realize what perfect targets they would have been if we had been in an ambush position, parallel to the trail instead of on line perpendicular to the dike, where one shot could have gone through all of us. Many nights before I fall to sleep I recall this incident and wish I would have opened up on them, but of course that would probably have resulted in a catastrophe. Still, on November the 19th we had not seen the enemy which caused so many casualties, and now I had many of them in my sights. Maybe we will get them on our sweep, I thought. Maybe Second Platoon can exact some revenge when we push the enemy into them.
When the Company Commander gave the word to move out on our sweep, we tried to move through the shrubbery on line, but found it too dense and had to break down to fireteam sized units in order to proceed. I don’t believe that we ever linked up with any of the other Marine units on our right flank as we proceeded on the sweep. (continued)