thedrifter
12-25-05, 07:24 AM
What Our NCOs Are Saying
Combat-Veteran Marines Relay Experiences
At Lessons-Learned Conference
By E. W. Powers
In July 2005, Lieutenant General James N. Mattis, Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Va., directed the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned to conduct a Noncommissioned Officers Lessons Learned Conference in order to gather lessons from front-line combat leaders.
Sixteen NCOs (14 sergeants and two corporals) from around the Corps, all with combat leadership experience, attended the conference, providing a rich cross section of capabilities and skills. They included both aviation and ground NCOs who had served in either Operation Enduring Freedom or Operation Iraqi Freedom, or both. This article is based on the candid comments of these NCO small-unit leaders who have fought the battles, supported the forces and led our Marines through some of the most challenging missions our Corps has ever faced.
Here is what they had to say:
Entry-Level Training
All entry-level training should emphasize “decivilianizing” and instilling aggressiveness and toughness. Recruiting quality people is important. Even though there are only a few years of time in service difference between the NCOs and their newly joined Marines, there is a “generation gap” with different attitudes and expectations.
There should be more repetition and demonstrated mastery of basic infantry skills before leaving the School of Infantry, either the Infantry Training Battalion or the Marine Combat Training Bn.
The Squad Leader’s Course currently conducted around the Corps should be expanded and/or modified to ensure the course fulfills the current professional military education requirement for NCOs who successfully complete the course.
Personnel: Ideal Fill Window
The NCOs expressed the same opinions as ground combat element or combat service support element commanders who attended previous lessons-learned conferences on the question as to how soon a unit should be manned prior to going into a combat zone: 180 days prior to deployment is ideal, 90 days is barely adequate, but 120 days is best to provide training and still accomplish all the tasks and responsibilities, such as leave periods, powers of attorney, family preparation, etc., that are part of deployment preparation.
The NCOs from one battalion reported that they joined more than 400 new Marines straight from SOI during the training cycle in preparing for deployment to Iraq. One NCO summed it up nicely, saying, “Units need to be stable with all personnel on board for a time equal to their predeployment training cycle.”
Predeployment training time promotes familiarity and confidence with personalities and capabilities, leading to increased unit cohesion that results in increased combat effectiveness with fewer casualties.
The Fleet Assistance Program, which drains manpower to support installation operations, should be eliminated for Marines going through the training cycle for deployment. The NCOs understand the need to man billets at bases and stations; however, they firmly believe that predeployment training and establishing unit cohesion are more important than providing “bodies” to functions that are not essential to combat preparation.
Predeployment Training
The quality and effectiveness of directed predeployment training exercises, such as Mojave Viper, the Revised Combined Arms Exercise (RCAX) at the Marine Corps Air-Ground Task Force Training Command in Twentynine Palms, Calif.; Stability and Support Operations; and Desert Talon, are excellent. The problem is that not all units attend all of the training evolutions. In those units that did undergo the training, not all individual Marines received the training.
The NCOs noted that many noninfantry Marines participated in urban combat and experienced numerous engagements while conducting convoy operations without ever having undergone the training opportunities. Crew-served weapons training is a must for all Marines because many of them will have to employ those weapons in combat.
More emphasis is needed on basic marksmanship training before and during deployment. Marksmanship skills are perishable and need to be aggressively maintained.
Predeployment training instructors need to be updated at least every 90 days on current tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) and possible missions to make sure that follow-on units receive the best training possible. More emphasis should be placed on patrolling, armor-infantry integrated operations, motorized infantry operations and ambush reaction drills.
The NCOs also affirmed that there should be more emphasis on platoon and squad operations since these smaller units tend to be the units of action in Iraq.
A basic convoy operations course was conducted at March Air Reserve Base, Calif., and at RCAX, but both were infantrycentric and either omitted or ignored the combat-support Marines who actually conduct the majority of convoy operations. This seemed to be a case of support units having to provide normal, day-to-day support during predeployment training, so they did not receive training that would later prove essential. Much of the driving in theater was at night, requiring training in blackout procedures and driving with night-vision devices.
The NCOs expressed a concern that there was too much emphasis on IED recognition and not enough on immediate actions. A common theme was “A 30-minute PowerPoint brief is not enough to prepare Marines for convoy ops or IED threats.”
Videotaping predeployment training for playback and analysis as well as the use of the Special Effects Small-Arms Marking System (SESAMS) rounds to create realism were outstanding. The SESAMS rounds actually strike Marines, and “pain equals memory” to reinforce lessons better than any other training aid.
Combat medical training is excellent, and hands-on training should be increased. There should be continuous, ongoing training with assigned corpsmen for familiarity with their equipment and supplies and to maintain the close, personal relationships developed between corpsmen and Marines in the field.
Changes in first aid, such as the tourniquet becoming the first choice in wound treatment due to the kinds of wounds experienced in Iraq, reached the field quickly, thus showing responsiveness to lessons learned.
Communication remains a problem: there is never enough equipment, on-the-move/over-the-horizon communications is challenging, and resupply does not keep up with demand for parts and batteries. Communications Marines seemed to be overly tasked and, for newly assigned Marines, undertrained.
The personal role radio (PRR) and very high frequency (VHF) communications worked well in urban operations. The Multi-Band Inter/Intra Team Radio was useful, but not as much as the PRR. Marines received many systems with no training, but if given a choice between new and better equipment with no training or relying on older, less capable equipment, they want the new equipment.
Hygiene could almost be summed up in two words: “baby wipes.” They were the most critical element of personal hygiene in the desert. The Marines also stressed the need for continual hygiene training and continual enforcement by medical personnel and small-unit leaders.
Language and cultural awareness were crucial to success. The NCOs support universal language training, but think the Corps needs to be selective in who gets trained. Language skills must constantly be practiced to maintain and improve them.
Predeployment training TTPs for vehicle checkpoints were considered quite good. Their opinion was that units effectively using the TTPs had few problems with misidentifying vehicles as hostile.
Weapons
The key to successful employment of all weapons, individual or crew-served, is following the fundamentals covered in training, such as weapons cleaning. Nearly every case of malfunction with the M16A2 or M16A4 rifles was a result of improper care and cleaning, especially of the magazine and ammunition. The harsh climate and constant sand and dust in the desert made it difficult to keep weapons properly cleaned. The 3-point sling is a critical piece of equipment in urban fighting for the M16, M4 and the shotgun.
The M4 was the weapon of choice for urban combat. Because of its size, it was easier to maneuver and had the same characteristics of the larger M16A4.
All amphibious assault vehicle, light armored vehicle and tank crewmen should be issued the M4, which was preferred even over the current M9 pistol. The M4 provides greater firepower than the service pistol. Also, combat vehicle crewmen performed infantry missions on numerous occasions, so it makes sense to be armed with a more suitable infantry weapon.
Vehicles should be armed with the M240 machine gun, and machine-gunners should receive training in “hip shooting” because this was often the preferred method of employment in urban areas.
The M249 squad automatic weapon had problems with the safety and lock mechanisms. It required a lot of maintenance, and there were too few spare barrels.
The shotgun, particularly the Benelli M4 Super 90 combat shotgun system with collapsible stock, was well liked. It could breach almost any door and was used extensively.
Everyone should be issued a sidearm, but not the M9 9 mm service pistol because it lacks stopping power. Marines need flexible holster solutions, like adjustable drop-down holsters and/or shoulder holsters, for individual tastes and scenarios.
Nearly all of the NCOs (all of the infantry NCOs) had received training in enemy weapons prior to combat operations. They used captured AK47s from time to time, particularly when they perceived a need to fire through walls or ceilings.
Optical aids and improved gun sights were important for combat success. Aiming lights, target pointers/illuminators, infrared pointers and optical sights, such as the Advanced Combat Optical Gunsight, were excellent. They caused an enormous increase in lethality and the ability to positively identify targets. There were occasional problems at night due to self-generated light washout, particularly with automatic weapons. All these capabilities need to be integrated into one system while keeping it light and simple.
Individual Equipment
Reduce the combat load of Marines: “Ounces equals pounds and pounds equals pain.” Equipment must be integrated to fit the individual Marine, and the Marine Corps should buy the best equipment available, especially when it is available as a commercial off-the-shelf item.
Boots are getting better and better, and the NCOs were satisfied with the improved jungle-desert boot. They would still like to see lighter boots. Some Marines purchased their own civilian-style hiking boots.
The new Gentex™ lightweight helmet system and the small-arms protective insert plates, including the additional shoulder/
upper arm and crotch protection, were great. The Marines think it would be better to put the opening/closing fasteners on the side of the body armor to present continuous protection for the chest.
Other good protective equipment includes knee and elbow pads, particularly the flexible polyurethane pads. The eye protection being issued is excellent. An innovative solution to the problem of fogging is cleaning the lenses with toothpaste.
Several NCOs reported being set afire during breaching operations, so they need fire-retardant clothing, particularly T-shirts, neck protection and some sort of face guard. The current utility uniform is OK except for its durability in combat.
There is a need for some sort of standard-issue fire-retardant glove, like those used by aircrew or mechanics.
Much of the night-vision equipment is aging and needs to be replaced. Drivers need devices that provide better depth perception. Every crew-served weapon should be equipped with a night-vision device.
There are too many different kinds of batteries for equipment. Too often, supply could not keep up with requests for batteries, so equipment was not available for use. Future requirements should also demand the use of common batteries.
Across the Marine air-ground task force, the average amount spent by each individual Marine was about $400, with infantry Marines spending slightly more. The most popular personal purchase items were GPS systems, packs and boots.
Tour Length
The current seven months deployed, seven months home rotation policy is “doable,” at least for the foreseeable future. Once Marines are deployed for the third combat tour (as many of these NCOs were preparing to do), they may well be adversely affected by the continual hazardous duty.
There is too much “flexibility” in deployment turnaround schedules. Scheduled deployment dates seemed to continually change, usually to leave earlier.
There were also changes in missions, such as preparing for a Marine expeditionary unit deployment and being sent to Iraq. There should be a mix of deployments and assignments from combat to noncombat, especially after completing three combat tours.
The No. 1 factor to counter the stresses of combat is unit cohesion. There needs to be decompression time set aside for returning units so that they can readjust from the stress of combat, communicate with each other and mentally prepare for the transition to garrison life.
Squad leaders and above should all be trained to recognize symptoms of post-combat stress and depression that could lead Marines to take their own lives.
Deployment and combat tours act as a great filter for those who truly want a career as a Marine. The hardship and stress make Marines carefully consider whether they are prepared to continue in the Marine Corps. The keys to retention are leadership, especially at the small-unit level, and unit cohesion to give Marines a sense of accomplishment and pride in carrying out their duties.
Wrap-Up
For more than 200 years, the key to the Marines’ success has been the performance of individual Marines and the NCOs who lead them. While the clime and place may change, the quality of our small-unit leaders has remained at an unbelievably high level.
The NCOs who attended this conference represented all the outstanding NCOs who have gone before them and those who serve our Corps so well today. Their comments and observations are vital to the Corps’ leadership in order to make those changes and improvements necessary to ensure the continued combat success of our Marines.
Editor’s note: E. W. Powers is a retired Marine colonel with more than 33 years of enlisted and commissioned service. He flew the A-4 Skyhawk and the F/A-18 Hornet and commanded at the battalion, squadron and group levels. He currently is a doctoral candidate serving as the deputy director at the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned in Quantico, Va. The complete text of the final report is available, for those with access, on the MCCLL unclassified Web site at www.mccll.usmc.mil.
Ellie
Combat-Veteran Marines Relay Experiences
At Lessons-Learned Conference
By E. W. Powers
In July 2005, Lieutenant General James N. Mattis, Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Va., directed the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned to conduct a Noncommissioned Officers Lessons Learned Conference in order to gather lessons from front-line combat leaders.
Sixteen NCOs (14 sergeants and two corporals) from around the Corps, all with combat leadership experience, attended the conference, providing a rich cross section of capabilities and skills. They included both aviation and ground NCOs who had served in either Operation Enduring Freedom or Operation Iraqi Freedom, or both. This article is based on the candid comments of these NCO small-unit leaders who have fought the battles, supported the forces and led our Marines through some of the most challenging missions our Corps has ever faced.
Here is what they had to say:
Entry-Level Training
All entry-level training should emphasize “decivilianizing” and instilling aggressiveness and toughness. Recruiting quality people is important. Even though there are only a few years of time in service difference between the NCOs and their newly joined Marines, there is a “generation gap” with different attitudes and expectations.
There should be more repetition and demonstrated mastery of basic infantry skills before leaving the School of Infantry, either the Infantry Training Battalion or the Marine Combat Training Bn.
The Squad Leader’s Course currently conducted around the Corps should be expanded and/or modified to ensure the course fulfills the current professional military education requirement for NCOs who successfully complete the course.
Personnel: Ideal Fill Window
The NCOs expressed the same opinions as ground combat element or combat service support element commanders who attended previous lessons-learned conferences on the question as to how soon a unit should be manned prior to going into a combat zone: 180 days prior to deployment is ideal, 90 days is barely adequate, but 120 days is best to provide training and still accomplish all the tasks and responsibilities, such as leave periods, powers of attorney, family preparation, etc., that are part of deployment preparation.
The NCOs from one battalion reported that they joined more than 400 new Marines straight from SOI during the training cycle in preparing for deployment to Iraq. One NCO summed it up nicely, saying, “Units need to be stable with all personnel on board for a time equal to their predeployment training cycle.”
Predeployment training time promotes familiarity and confidence with personalities and capabilities, leading to increased unit cohesion that results in increased combat effectiveness with fewer casualties.
The Fleet Assistance Program, which drains manpower to support installation operations, should be eliminated for Marines going through the training cycle for deployment. The NCOs understand the need to man billets at bases and stations; however, they firmly believe that predeployment training and establishing unit cohesion are more important than providing “bodies” to functions that are not essential to combat preparation.
Predeployment Training
The quality and effectiveness of directed predeployment training exercises, such as Mojave Viper, the Revised Combined Arms Exercise (RCAX) at the Marine Corps Air-Ground Task Force Training Command in Twentynine Palms, Calif.; Stability and Support Operations; and Desert Talon, are excellent. The problem is that not all units attend all of the training evolutions. In those units that did undergo the training, not all individual Marines received the training.
The NCOs noted that many noninfantry Marines participated in urban combat and experienced numerous engagements while conducting convoy operations without ever having undergone the training opportunities. Crew-served weapons training is a must for all Marines because many of them will have to employ those weapons in combat.
More emphasis is needed on basic marksmanship training before and during deployment. Marksmanship skills are perishable and need to be aggressively maintained.
Predeployment training instructors need to be updated at least every 90 days on current tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) and possible missions to make sure that follow-on units receive the best training possible. More emphasis should be placed on patrolling, armor-infantry integrated operations, motorized infantry operations and ambush reaction drills.
The NCOs also affirmed that there should be more emphasis on platoon and squad operations since these smaller units tend to be the units of action in Iraq.
A basic convoy operations course was conducted at March Air Reserve Base, Calif., and at RCAX, but both were infantrycentric and either omitted or ignored the combat-support Marines who actually conduct the majority of convoy operations. This seemed to be a case of support units having to provide normal, day-to-day support during predeployment training, so they did not receive training that would later prove essential. Much of the driving in theater was at night, requiring training in blackout procedures and driving with night-vision devices.
The NCOs expressed a concern that there was too much emphasis on IED recognition and not enough on immediate actions. A common theme was “A 30-minute PowerPoint brief is not enough to prepare Marines for convoy ops or IED threats.”
Videotaping predeployment training for playback and analysis as well as the use of the Special Effects Small-Arms Marking System (SESAMS) rounds to create realism were outstanding. The SESAMS rounds actually strike Marines, and “pain equals memory” to reinforce lessons better than any other training aid.
Combat medical training is excellent, and hands-on training should be increased. There should be continuous, ongoing training with assigned corpsmen for familiarity with their equipment and supplies and to maintain the close, personal relationships developed between corpsmen and Marines in the field.
Changes in first aid, such as the tourniquet becoming the first choice in wound treatment due to the kinds of wounds experienced in Iraq, reached the field quickly, thus showing responsiveness to lessons learned.
Communication remains a problem: there is never enough equipment, on-the-move/over-the-horizon communications is challenging, and resupply does not keep up with demand for parts and batteries. Communications Marines seemed to be overly tasked and, for newly assigned Marines, undertrained.
The personal role radio (PRR) and very high frequency (VHF) communications worked well in urban operations. The Multi-Band Inter/Intra Team Radio was useful, but not as much as the PRR. Marines received many systems with no training, but if given a choice between new and better equipment with no training or relying on older, less capable equipment, they want the new equipment.
Hygiene could almost be summed up in two words: “baby wipes.” They were the most critical element of personal hygiene in the desert. The Marines also stressed the need for continual hygiene training and continual enforcement by medical personnel and small-unit leaders.
Language and cultural awareness were crucial to success. The NCOs support universal language training, but think the Corps needs to be selective in who gets trained. Language skills must constantly be practiced to maintain and improve them.
Predeployment training TTPs for vehicle checkpoints were considered quite good. Their opinion was that units effectively using the TTPs had few problems with misidentifying vehicles as hostile.
Weapons
The key to successful employment of all weapons, individual or crew-served, is following the fundamentals covered in training, such as weapons cleaning. Nearly every case of malfunction with the M16A2 or M16A4 rifles was a result of improper care and cleaning, especially of the magazine and ammunition. The harsh climate and constant sand and dust in the desert made it difficult to keep weapons properly cleaned. The 3-point sling is a critical piece of equipment in urban fighting for the M16, M4 and the shotgun.
The M4 was the weapon of choice for urban combat. Because of its size, it was easier to maneuver and had the same characteristics of the larger M16A4.
All amphibious assault vehicle, light armored vehicle and tank crewmen should be issued the M4, which was preferred even over the current M9 pistol. The M4 provides greater firepower than the service pistol. Also, combat vehicle crewmen performed infantry missions on numerous occasions, so it makes sense to be armed with a more suitable infantry weapon.
Vehicles should be armed with the M240 machine gun, and machine-gunners should receive training in “hip shooting” because this was often the preferred method of employment in urban areas.
The M249 squad automatic weapon had problems with the safety and lock mechanisms. It required a lot of maintenance, and there were too few spare barrels.
The shotgun, particularly the Benelli M4 Super 90 combat shotgun system with collapsible stock, was well liked. It could breach almost any door and was used extensively.
Everyone should be issued a sidearm, but not the M9 9 mm service pistol because it lacks stopping power. Marines need flexible holster solutions, like adjustable drop-down holsters and/or shoulder holsters, for individual tastes and scenarios.
Nearly all of the NCOs (all of the infantry NCOs) had received training in enemy weapons prior to combat operations. They used captured AK47s from time to time, particularly when they perceived a need to fire through walls or ceilings.
Optical aids and improved gun sights were important for combat success. Aiming lights, target pointers/illuminators, infrared pointers and optical sights, such as the Advanced Combat Optical Gunsight, were excellent. They caused an enormous increase in lethality and the ability to positively identify targets. There were occasional problems at night due to self-generated light washout, particularly with automatic weapons. All these capabilities need to be integrated into one system while keeping it light and simple.
Individual Equipment
Reduce the combat load of Marines: “Ounces equals pounds and pounds equals pain.” Equipment must be integrated to fit the individual Marine, and the Marine Corps should buy the best equipment available, especially when it is available as a commercial off-the-shelf item.
Boots are getting better and better, and the NCOs were satisfied with the improved jungle-desert boot. They would still like to see lighter boots. Some Marines purchased their own civilian-style hiking boots.
The new Gentex™ lightweight helmet system and the small-arms protective insert plates, including the additional shoulder/
upper arm and crotch protection, were great. The Marines think it would be better to put the opening/closing fasteners on the side of the body armor to present continuous protection for the chest.
Other good protective equipment includes knee and elbow pads, particularly the flexible polyurethane pads. The eye protection being issued is excellent. An innovative solution to the problem of fogging is cleaning the lenses with toothpaste.
Several NCOs reported being set afire during breaching operations, so they need fire-retardant clothing, particularly T-shirts, neck protection and some sort of face guard. The current utility uniform is OK except for its durability in combat.
There is a need for some sort of standard-issue fire-retardant glove, like those used by aircrew or mechanics.
Much of the night-vision equipment is aging and needs to be replaced. Drivers need devices that provide better depth perception. Every crew-served weapon should be equipped with a night-vision device.
There are too many different kinds of batteries for equipment. Too often, supply could not keep up with requests for batteries, so equipment was not available for use. Future requirements should also demand the use of common batteries.
Across the Marine air-ground task force, the average amount spent by each individual Marine was about $400, with infantry Marines spending slightly more. The most popular personal purchase items were GPS systems, packs and boots.
Tour Length
The current seven months deployed, seven months home rotation policy is “doable,” at least for the foreseeable future. Once Marines are deployed for the third combat tour (as many of these NCOs were preparing to do), they may well be adversely affected by the continual hazardous duty.
There is too much “flexibility” in deployment turnaround schedules. Scheduled deployment dates seemed to continually change, usually to leave earlier.
There were also changes in missions, such as preparing for a Marine expeditionary unit deployment and being sent to Iraq. There should be a mix of deployments and assignments from combat to noncombat, especially after completing three combat tours.
The No. 1 factor to counter the stresses of combat is unit cohesion. There needs to be decompression time set aside for returning units so that they can readjust from the stress of combat, communicate with each other and mentally prepare for the transition to garrison life.
Squad leaders and above should all be trained to recognize symptoms of post-combat stress and depression that could lead Marines to take their own lives.
Deployment and combat tours act as a great filter for those who truly want a career as a Marine. The hardship and stress make Marines carefully consider whether they are prepared to continue in the Marine Corps. The keys to retention are leadership, especially at the small-unit level, and unit cohesion to give Marines a sense of accomplishment and pride in carrying out their duties.
Wrap-Up
For more than 200 years, the key to the Marines’ success has been the performance of individual Marines and the NCOs who lead them. While the clime and place may change, the quality of our small-unit leaders has remained at an unbelievably high level.
The NCOs who attended this conference represented all the outstanding NCOs who have gone before them and those who serve our Corps so well today. Their comments and observations are vital to the Corps’ leadership in order to make those changes and improvements necessary to ensure the continued combat success of our Marines.
Editor’s note: E. W. Powers is a retired Marine colonel with more than 33 years of enlisted and commissioned service. He flew the A-4 Skyhawk and the F/A-18 Hornet and commanded at the battalion, squadron and group levels. He currently is a doctoral candidate serving as the deputy director at the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned in Quantico, Va. The complete text of the final report is available, for those with access, on the MCCLL unclassified Web site at www.mccll.usmc.mil.
Ellie