thedrifter
12-19-05, 08:43 AM
AT WAR
Reporting for Duty
The U.S. military tells Iraqis the truth, and some call it a "scandal."
BY JOHN R. GUARDIANO
Monday, December 19, 2005 12:01 a.m. EST
The latest Iraq "scandal" the politicians and the media have discovered is the U.S. military's alleged covert purchase of favorable articles in the Iraqi press. This alleged "propaganda campaign . . . violates fundamental principles of Western journalism," reports the New York Times.
This is not surprising, insofar as Iraq does not yet enjoy "Western journalism." Journalists there are murdered, blackmailed and bribed. They and their families are routinely threatened and coerced by terrorist/insurgents. Newspapers often serve as propaganda arms of various political and religious factions. The widely viewed Arab network Al-Jazeera works diligently to promote terrorism and undermine Iraq by disseminating lies, distortions and misinformation.
In light of this reality, the U.S. military has a choice: It can accept this deleterious state of affairs, play by Marquess of Queensberry rules, and wait decades for the emergence of "Western journalism." The result would be a heady propaganda win for the terrorist/insurgents, a prolonged conflict, and more unnecessary violence and death. Or the U.S. military can work within Iraq's present-day constraints to try to ensure that Iraqis hear the truth about what is happening in their country.
The U.S. military wisely has decided to pursue the latter course of action. But contrary to the Times and other self-anointed paragons of journalistic virtue, this is nothing new. I know because while serving as a Marine in Iraq in April 2003, I volunteered to write newspaper articles and radio and television scripts for dissemination in-country. Yes, I was a not-so-covert Iraqi journalist.
I say not-so-covert because everyone--U.S. Marines and Iraqis alike--knew who I was and what I was doing. It was not a secret. But I seriously doubt that anyone in Washington knew of our activities. We never sought high-level approval. Ours was a tactical decision made on the ground in response to the threat that we faced.
After major combat operations had ended in April 2003, it quickly became apparent to us Marines that ours was as much a war of information and ideas as a war of guns and bullets. We had won every military engagement; our difficulties lay with the popular Iraqi perceptions that the ex-Baathists, Saddam loyalists and Sunni overlords were lying low and would soon return to power after we Americans had left--which would happen soon, ordinary Iraqis were told. Moreover, blatant lies were spread about our supposed misdeeds: that Marines became Marines after they had murdered a family member; that we were raping Iraqi women and plundering Iraq's oil riches.
It is obviously more difficult to secure the cooperation of a people to rebuild their country if they are intimidated and misled about what you are doing and why you are doing it. That's why we founded our own Iraqi newspaper--which we clearly labeled as such--and that's why we broadcast radio and television clips.
The radio clips were given to the local radio station in Al Hilla, which aired them as they saw fit. As for television, an enterprising young Harvard graduate and physics major, Marine Corps Lt. Seth Moulton, founded his own television show, "Moulton and Mohamed." (Lt. Moulton, incidentally, is no conservative, but he was a fine Marine Corps officer. His presence in the Marines may show that there is more ideological diversity within the U.S. military than on the typical college faculty or newsroom.)
"Moulton and Mohamed" featured the lieutenant and his translator, who ventured into town together and reported--truthfully--on what was happening. New medical supplies today arrived at the hospital and a destroyed elementary school was rebuilt. The local Iraqi town council met to discuss how to increase the output and availability of electricity. The Americans provided jobs to 300 Iraqis, who now have been tasked with cleaning up the Babil Province.
National Public Radio heard of our efforts and sent one of its reporters to visit us from Baghdad. Ivan Watson and his producer courageously trekked 60 miles to Al Hilla, where Mr. Watson interviewed Lt. Moulton and me. His report aired on "All Things Considered" on Aug. 25, 2003.
"Public relations initiatives," Mr. Watson informed NPR's listeners, "include this TV show called 'Moulton and Mohammed'--or the 'M&M show.' It's a half-hour program on U.S.-Iraqi cooperation, hosted by Lt. Seth Moulton and translator Mohammed Fawzi. The production standards are crude, and yet the show has turned one of the hosts [Lt. Moulton] into a minor celebrity."
Everything we wrote, published, aired and disseminated was factual and accurate. I can tell you that was true in 2003; according to the U.S. military, it is also true today. Iraqis are better informed, not less informed or misinformed, because of U.S. military information operations.
If the media and the politicians have their way, the U.S. military will be denied this key tool of 21st-century warfare. Yet what is urgently needed in Iraq and elsewhere is more and better information operations. What is won on the battlefield today can be lost in the media tomorrow.
The U.S. military understands this, but has yet to develop the same level of skill, cunning and sophistication within its public affairs teams as it has within its ground combat forces. The former consider themselves professionals; the latter warriors--and therein lies the problem.
Warriors win wars, professionals make us feel good. Military public affairs officers may satisfy and placate our media and political class, but they are doing too little to help us win in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. They have yet to realize that they are, or at least ought to be, 21st-century frontline troops. That's why they shun information operations, which instead are administered mostly by military intelligence units. (Our efforts were an exception, the spontaneous work of several enterprising Marine grunts and civil affairs personnel with no military intelligence support or genesis.)
The administration of information operations by military intelligence units is a serious mistake. Intelligence personnel have little understanding of journalism. They don't understand the complex ways that genuine news can both inform and motivate. They risk confusing propaganda with journalism. And they bring with them professional baggage that might cloud their judgment and render their work suspect and ineffective.
The U.S. military need its intelligence units to concentrate on intelligence operations. Military public affairs units, meanwhile need to understand that there is a premium now on the battlefield for their skills. Indeed, they have a major role to play in winning the war in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere; and they must embrace, not shun, that role. This will require a marked change in their modus operandi; but any successful military--and the U.S. military is the most successful in the history of the world--always adapts to changing times.
America has one great advantage over the enemy: The truth is on our side. It exposes and weakens them while strengthening and supporting us. Thus, we have no need for dishonest propaganda. We do need, though, to strongly propagate the truth about American intentions, actions and results.
The global war on Islamofascism ultimately is a two-front conflict that must be waged both domestically and overseas. In that sense, we are, as Shakespeare explained, the masters of our fates; but only if we recognize that that is so.
The U.S. can and will win in Iraq, but only if we win the larger-scale media war. Correcting misperceptions--in Baghdad and Washington, New York and Tikrit--is not somebody else's job; it is the job of the U.S. military. For unless the truth is widely known and shared, no military victory in the 21st century can ever be complete.
Mr. Guardiano is an Arlington, Va.-based journalist. He served in Iraq in 2003 as a field radio operator with the Marine Corps Reserve's Fourth Civil Affairs Group.
Ellie
Reporting for Duty
The U.S. military tells Iraqis the truth, and some call it a "scandal."
BY JOHN R. GUARDIANO
Monday, December 19, 2005 12:01 a.m. EST
The latest Iraq "scandal" the politicians and the media have discovered is the U.S. military's alleged covert purchase of favorable articles in the Iraqi press. This alleged "propaganda campaign . . . violates fundamental principles of Western journalism," reports the New York Times.
This is not surprising, insofar as Iraq does not yet enjoy "Western journalism." Journalists there are murdered, blackmailed and bribed. They and their families are routinely threatened and coerced by terrorist/insurgents. Newspapers often serve as propaganda arms of various political and religious factions. The widely viewed Arab network Al-Jazeera works diligently to promote terrorism and undermine Iraq by disseminating lies, distortions and misinformation.
In light of this reality, the U.S. military has a choice: It can accept this deleterious state of affairs, play by Marquess of Queensberry rules, and wait decades for the emergence of "Western journalism." The result would be a heady propaganda win for the terrorist/insurgents, a prolonged conflict, and more unnecessary violence and death. Or the U.S. military can work within Iraq's present-day constraints to try to ensure that Iraqis hear the truth about what is happening in their country.
The U.S. military wisely has decided to pursue the latter course of action. But contrary to the Times and other self-anointed paragons of journalistic virtue, this is nothing new. I know because while serving as a Marine in Iraq in April 2003, I volunteered to write newspaper articles and radio and television scripts for dissemination in-country. Yes, I was a not-so-covert Iraqi journalist.
I say not-so-covert because everyone--U.S. Marines and Iraqis alike--knew who I was and what I was doing. It was not a secret. But I seriously doubt that anyone in Washington knew of our activities. We never sought high-level approval. Ours was a tactical decision made on the ground in response to the threat that we faced.
After major combat operations had ended in April 2003, it quickly became apparent to us Marines that ours was as much a war of information and ideas as a war of guns and bullets. We had won every military engagement; our difficulties lay with the popular Iraqi perceptions that the ex-Baathists, Saddam loyalists and Sunni overlords were lying low and would soon return to power after we Americans had left--which would happen soon, ordinary Iraqis were told. Moreover, blatant lies were spread about our supposed misdeeds: that Marines became Marines after they had murdered a family member; that we were raping Iraqi women and plundering Iraq's oil riches.
It is obviously more difficult to secure the cooperation of a people to rebuild their country if they are intimidated and misled about what you are doing and why you are doing it. That's why we founded our own Iraqi newspaper--which we clearly labeled as such--and that's why we broadcast radio and television clips.
The radio clips were given to the local radio station in Al Hilla, which aired them as they saw fit. As for television, an enterprising young Harvard graduate and physics major, Marine Corps Lt. Seth Moulton, founded his own television show, "Moulton and Mohamed." (Lt. Moulton, incidentally, is no conservative, but he was a fine Marine Corps officer. His presence in the Marines may show that there is more ideological diversity within the U.S. military than on the typical college faculty or newsroom.)
"Moulton and Mohamed" featured the lieutenant and his translator, who ventured into town together and reported--truthfully--on what was happening. New medical supplies today arrived at the hospital and a destroyed elementary school was rebuilt. The local Iraqi town council met to discuss how to increase the output and availability of electricity. The Americans provided jobs to 300 Iraqis, who now have been tasked with cleaning up the Babil Province.
National Public Radio heard of our efforts and sent one of its reporters to visit us from Baghdad. Ivan Watson and his producer courageously trekked 60 miles to Al Hilla, where Mr. Watson interviewed Lt. Moulton and me. His report aired on "All Things Considered" on Aug. 25, 2003.
"Public relations initiatives," Mr. Watson informed NPR's listeners, "include this TV show called 'Moulton and Mohammed'--or the 'M&M show.' It's a half-hour program on U.S.-Iraqi cooperation, hosted by Lt. Seth Moulton and translator Mohammed Fawzi. The production standards are crude, and yet the show has turned one of the hosts [Lt. Moulton] into a minor celebrity."
Everything we wrote, published, aired and disseminated was factual and accurate. I can tell you that was true in 2003; according to the U.S. military, it is also true today. Iraqis are better informed, not less informed or misinformed, because of U.S. military information operations.
If the media and the politicians have their way, the U.S. military will be denied this key tool of 21st-century warfare. Yet what is urgently needed in Iraq and elsewhere is more and better information operations. What is won on the battlefield today can be lost in the media tomorrow.
The U.S. military understands this, but has yet to develop the same level of skill, cunning and sophistication within its public affairs teams as it has within its ground combat forces. The former consider themselves professionals; the latter warriors--and therein lies the problem.
Warriors win wars, professionals make us feel good. Military public affairs officers may satisfy and placate our media and political class, but they are doing too little to help us win in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. They have yet to realize that they are, or at least ought to be, 21st-century frontline troops. That's why they shun information operations, which instead are administered mostly by military intelligence units. (Our efforts were an exception, the spontaneous work of several enterprising Marine grunts and civil affairs personnel with no military intelligence support or genesis.)
The administration of information operations by military intelligence units is a serious mistake. Intelligence personnel have little understanding of journalism. They don't understand the complex ways that genuine news can both inform and motivate. They risk confusing propaganda with journalism. And they bring with them professional baggage that might cloud their judgment and render their work suspect and ineffective.
The U.S. military need its intelligence units to concentrate on intelligence operations. Military public affairs units, meanwhile need to understand that there is a premium now on the battlefield for their skills. Indeed, they have a major role to play in winning the war in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere; and they must embrace, not shun, that role. This will require a marked change in their modus operandi; but any successful military--and the U.S. military is the most successful in the history of the world--always adapts to changing times.
America has one great advantage over the enemy: The truth is on our side. It exposes and weakens them while strengthening and supporting us. Thus, we have no need for dishonest propaganda. We do need, though, to strongly propagate the truth about American intentions, actions and results.
The global war on Islamofascism ultimately is a two-front conflict that must be waged both domestically and overseas. In that sense, we are, as Shakespeare explained, the masters of our fates; but only if we recognize that that is so.
The U.S. can and will win in Iraq, but only if we win the larger-scale media war. Correcting misperceptions--in Baghdad and Washington, New York and Tikrit--is not somebody else's job; it is the job of the U.S. military. For unless the truth is widely known and shared, no military victory in the 21st century can ever be complete.
Mr. Guardiano is an Arlington, Va.-based journalist. He served in Iraq in 2003 as a field radio operator with the Marine Corps Reserve's Fourth Civil Affairs Group.
Ellie