thedrifter
12-04-05, 11:16 AM
It won't be easy turning Iraqis into a real army
Ellis Henican
December 4, 2005
And now, it all comes down to this: Can the ragtag Iraqi Army ever be molded into a crack fighting force, ready to face a dogged insurgency?
And how long is that going to take?
Mike Zacchea has some thoughts on that. A 37-year-old major in the U.S. Marine Reserves, he has something that no war-debating politician in Washington has: actual experience training a new Iraqi brigade.
The progress is real, he says. And more is possible. Just don't expect the job to be done any time soon.
"Some people compare this to the rapid expansion of the U.S. military during World War II," Zacchea, back from Iraq now and living quietly in Hicksville, was saying at week's end.
"But that's not the right analogy," he said. "It's more like the U.S. Continental Army. High desertion rates. Pay problems. A lack of equipment and uniforms. Extremely limited logistical support. A history of graft and corruption.
"I liked to teach the Iraqi soldiers about American history. I'd say, 'Everything you are going through, we went through in 1776.'"
Only this time, the enemy doesn't line up in neat columns or wear red uniforms. And the colonists never faced RPGs or suicide bombs.
A kid from Sayville and a graduate of St. Anthony's High School, Zacchea spent 12 years as an active-duty Marine. He was sent to Somalia and Haiti and, less dangerously, the Garden City recruiting office. In March of last year, he put on hold his marriage plans and financial-service career when he and nine other Marines were sent to train the 5th Battalion of the 3rd Brigade of the 5th Division of the new Iraqi Army.
"It was Kurds and Arabs, Sunni and Shia, speaking different languages with generations of bad blood between them," he said. "You would not say that our success was guaranteed. Somehow, we had to turn these guys into a unit that could be led into battle together. We had no building. No uniforms. No weapons. No ammunition. No boots. We had to beg, borrow and steal."
What Zacchea and his fellow trainers did have was the Marine Corps Recruit Training Guide. So at a base near the Iranian border, they created their own little Parris Island boot camp.
They taught weapons handling, marching and basic combat skills. But the real challenge, Zacchea said, was teaching the Iraqis to think and act like modern soldiers.
"We built the recruits' confidence through a series of small victories and bonding exercises," he said. Obstacle courses. Intra-battalion soccer matches. Calling the men "recruits" - instead of "soldiers" - until they'd earned the name. Plus hours of target practice.
"Everybody in Iraq has an AK-47 in the house," Zacchea said. "Celebratory gunfire is a way of life. But they don't always aim so well."
Many of the Iraqi commanders had picked up terrible habits in the old Iraqi army.
"We had to stop the NCOs from beating the recruits," he said. "We had to say, 'That's not how we do things anymore.'"
The message didn't always take. But over time, Zacchea said, his men began to show real signs of progress. There was a growing esprit de corps. Some even shaved their heads to look like American Marines.
"But it was always two steps forward, one step back," he said, as the time came to actually fight.
Navigating bomb-strewn supply lines. Raiding insurgent-infiltrated mosques. Patrolling the dicey streets of Taji. Joining the bloody assault on Fallujah.
The transition to genuine soldiering was never entirely smooth.
One hundred men deserted on the eve of Taji. One hundred and twenty split before the Fallujah attack, although many of them did return.
"On balance, they did well," Zacchea said. "But every Iraqi is constantly making a risk-reward calculation in his head. As soon as the risk outweighs the reward, that opens up a whole range of options - desertion, sabotage, betrayal."
Every lesson had to be taught over and over again.
"There was a riot in the battalion one day," he said. "Guys were yelling and chanting, while the officers were back in their tent, eating and sleeping. I went berserk. I took all their food and threw it out."
That brought cheers from the lower ranks.
"Then, on the day before the Fallujah assault, one of the company commanders, a Kurdish officer, deserted with the assault plan. I had to explain" to U.S. military higher-ups.
The bottom line for the future of the new Iraqi Army?
"Is it gonna happen fast or as easily as the administration thinks? No," Zacchea said. "There are still real, serious problems. It's gonna be more than a year, more than two or three. I think seven years is a reasonable estimate to build a capable Iraqi army. It can definitely happen."
But will the American public wait that long?
Zacchea wonders.
"Someone else will have to answer that," he said.
Ellie
Ellis Henican
December 4, 2005
And now, it all comes down to this: Can the ragtag Iraqi Army ever be molded into a crack fighting force, ready to face a dogged insurgency?
And how long is that going to take?
Mike Zacchea has some thoughts on that. A 37-year-old major in the U.S. Marine Reserves, he has something that no war-debating politician in Washington has: actual experience training a new Iraqi brigade.
The progress is real, he says. And more is possible. Just don't expect the job to be done any time soon.
"Some people compare this to the rapid expansion of the U.S. military during World War II," Zacchea, back from Iraq now and living quietly in Hicksville, was saying at week's end.
"But that's not the right analogy," he said. "It's more like the U.S. Continental Army. High desertion rates. Pay problems. A lack of equipment and uniforms. Extremely limited logistical support. A history of graft and corruption.
"I liked to teach the Iraqi soldiers about American history. I'd say, 'Everything you are going through, we went through in 1776.'"
Only this time, the enemy doesn't line up in neat columns or wear red uniforms. And the colonists never faced RPGs or suicide bombs.
A kid from Sayville and a graduate of St. Anthony's High School, Zacchea spent 12 years as an active-duty Marine. He was sent to Somalia and Haiti and, less dangerously, the Garden City recruiting office. In March of last year, he put on hold his marriage plans and financial-service career when he and nine other Marines were sent to train the 5th Battalion of the 3rd Brigade of the 5th Division of the new Iraqi Army.
"It was Kurds and Arabs, Sunni and Shia, speaking different languages with generations of bad blood between them," he said. "You would not say that our success was guaranteed. Somehow, we had to turn these guys into a unit that could be led into battle together. We had no building. No uniforms. No weapons. No ammunition. No boots. We had to beg, borrow and steal."
What Zacchea and his fellow trainers did have was the Marine Corps Recruit Training Guide. So at a base near the Iranian border, they created their own little Parris Island boot camp.
They taught weapons handling, marching and basic combat skills. But the real challenge, Zacchea said, was teaching the Iraqis to think and act like modern soldiers.
"We built the recruits' confidence through a series of small victories and bonding exercises," he said. Obstacle courses. Intra-battalion soccer matches. Calling the men "recruits" - instead of "soldiers" - until they'd earned the name. Plus hours of target practice.
"Everybody in Iraq has an AK-47 in the house," Zacchea said. "Celebratory gunfire is a way of life. But they don't always aim so well."
Many of the Iraqi commanders had picked up terrible habits in the old Iraqi army.
"We had to stop the NCOs from beating the recruits," he said. "We had to say, 'That's not how we do things anymore.'"
The message didn't always take. But over time, Zacchea said, his men began to show real signs of progress. There was a growing esprit de corps. Some even shaved their heads to look like American Marines.
"But it was always two steps forward, one step back," he said, as the time came to actually fight.
Navigating bomb-strewn supply lines. Raiding insurgent-infiltrated mosques. Patrolling the dicey streets of Taji. Joining the bloody assault on Fallujah.
The transition to genuine soldiering was never entirely smooth.
One hundred men deserted on the eve of Taji. One hundred and twenty split before the Fallujah attack, although many of them did return.
"On balance, they did well," Zacchea said. "But every Iraqi is constantly making a risk-reward calculation in his head. As soon as the risk outweighs the reward, that opens up a whole range of options - desertion, sabotage, betrayal."
Every lesson had to be taught over and over again.
"There was a riot in the battalion one day," he said. "Guys were yelling and chanting, while the officers were back in their tent, eating and sleeping. I went berserk. I took all their food and threw it out."
That brought cheers from the lower ranks.
"Then, on the day before the Fallujah assault, one of the company commanders, a Kurdish officer, deserted with the assault plan. I had to explain" to U.S. military higher-ups.
The bottom line for the future of the new Iraqi Army?
"Is it gonna happen fast or as easily as the administration thinks? No," Zacchea said. "There are still real, serious problems. It's gonna be more than a year, more than two or three. I think seven years is a reasonable estimate to build a capable Iraqi army. It can definitely happen."
But will the American public wait that long?
Zacchea wonders.
"Someone else will have to answer that," he said.
Ellie