thedrifter
12-01-05, 02:36 PM
Getting Out Without Victory Is Not An Option Part I
by Michael Gifford
SFTT
There's been a lot said in the news recently regarding plans for bringing our troops home from Iraq. As an Operation Iraqi Freedom vet, one who's experienced all the joys post-war Iraq has to offer, I thought I'd weigh in with a introspective examination of the war there.
I hate it as much as anyone, the names and pictures of soldiers in the news who've made the ultimate sacrifice. We've all seen it--so many times--the smiling pictures of young men and women on television or in the papers; photos of their last night out with friends in the States, of their weddings, or posing with their small children back home. Most of the time it's a picture of a complete stranger, but once in a while, it's a picture of someone I know. Those are some the toughest nights for me, recognizing the photo of a friend who was killed in their second or third tour in Iraq. I'm a hawk when it comes to the war on terror, but even I start to wonder if it's worth it, this war we're fighting.
The bottom line is this--I don't think the troops are coming home anytime soon. And given Iraq's strategic importance, we'll always have troops there in some capacity.
Any sensible American knows the risks we face if we were to leave Iraq prematurely, and the public officials who run on a platform that call for an immediate withdrawal are either very misinformed or aren't making priorities regarding a sound withdrawal plan. I question the motive of the political naysayers who think that we just can't win this war and need to leave immediately. Instead of taking a good look at what's actually required to achieve our aims in Iraq and bring our troops home, they look to capitalize on the judgments made in the court of public opinion--"if so many Americans are tired of the war and think we should leave Iraq now, maybe I can score some points by saying the same." Wrong answer! A hasty pullout is only a short-term solution, and will only serve to embolden the major terrorists overseas at the expense of our reputation.
While I don't always agree with it, the fact is that public opinion plays a major role in determining a war's outcome. The United States needs a strategy--away from the black and white headlines--that can ensure we achieve our aims in Iraq and subsequently withdraw our troops, without both dividing our nation and losing another 2000 soldiers in the process.
I see the names of the dead on the news, and it saddens me to no end. But then I remember what's already been done, and the real progress we've made. The TV is full of bad news, but what you don't see are the thousands of kids who still chase HUMVEEs and wave at soldiers more than two years after the invasion. You don't see the lines of determined young men looking to enlist in the Iraqi Police and military, defying the threats to life, limb and family to serve their country, and not just for a paycheck. You don't see the patriotic Iraqis who risk their lives to travel to our bases and offer US troops life-saving information. You don't see the freedom of the press has returned to Iraq--some calling for the support our presence--along with significant increases in both Internet and satellite television access, which will help to lend an opposing view to the dogma that most Iraqis are force-fed by their religious leaders. You don't see ordinary Iraqis--the shopkeepers and salesmen--picking up arms and fighting the insurgents that have threatened them. You don't see the irrepressible, irreversible waves of liberty that are settling in on the Iraqi people.
Americans don't live in a "marathon" culture. We're not exactly built for patience--in our nation of instant emails, fast food and quarterly profit reports, we've grown used to the immediate gratification some say has come to define our society. It all has to happen right now. The relatively "quick" conflicts we've fought over the past 20 years have spoiled us, and have us expecting that a few bombing campaigns or missile strikes will quickly bring conflict to an end. We wiped our collective brows as a nation after Desert Storm and the air campaign in Bosnia, relieved that casualties were minimal and we didn't become too involved. This is not to be the case in Iraq, and people have to wake up to the fact that we're going to be there a while.
But the level of our involvement in post-war activities is what may determine success or failure--from a military, democratic and public opinion point of view.
L. Just capturing and killing insurgents is not going to bring peace to iraq. America needs a strong, conclusive plant with a viable exit stratagy that doesn't smell of cut and run. Photo: Michael Gifford
We're finding ourselves moving from a war of liberation to a conflict of attrition, involving factors that we, as Americans, cannot afford to get involved with. The rifts in the Iraqi culture--a growing source of the violence we find ourselves caught dead center in the middle of -- will not go away quickly, and the pursuit of a free Iraq will never be without some degree of strife, violence and civil war. We have to be able to accept that. If we let ourselves be drawn into every tribal dispute--and it's deceptively easy to do--you can forget about leaving Iraq successfully.
While it's vital to destroy those responsible for terror, being drawn into any of these internal conflicts would be a huge mistake, as would trying to "seek and destroy" every anti-Coalition fighter in Iraq.
These are two areas where the American military has to draw the line. We have to rethink our military priorities in Iraq. It's not a question of whether or not we should be there, but what it is we're doing there.
So how do we proceed in Iraq militarily now that we have Saddam, the major threat to our national security? How do we balance between the continued campaigns against our national enemies like al-Zarqawi, while maintaining, and in some cases earning, the respect of the people we intended to liberate? And how do we know where to draw the line between crushing the threat of organized radical Islam and just defeating a local military enemy without drifting into becoming local peacekeepers?
The Bush Administration has pointed out that we'd much rather be fighting terrorists on the ground in the Middle East than here in the US. In a way, that's true--by smashing up Al Qaeda's major leadership pretty good since 9/11 in Iraq and Afghanistan, we've put a hell of a dent in the way they do business. Morale's down, money's tight, and there's a lot of "in fighting" among their leadership. All great stuff, but the definition of terrorist is starting to broaden, and that's beginning to pose a problem.
There are literally thousands of low-level former military and foreign fighters in Iraq that have access to cheap explosives and weapons. They now fit the definition of "terrorist." But are they a terrorist threat to the United States, or just a nuisance to our military and the people of Iraq? Sure, I'd love to see them all dead and gone, but I don't want to lose another 2000 soldiers going after a few punks who don't have the capability to take part in major violence on the US or its allies, or severely disrupt Iraq's ability to stabilize.
So just how do we go about achieving our aims in Iraq while avoiding a fight with every two-bit jackass with an AK and a beef with the United States? Here are five areas we have to focus on.
Step 1: Give the Iraqi Police and Army whatever the hell they need.
I spent 6 months training the police of the restive Al Anbar Province of Iraq in the winter and spring of 2004, and that was after 6 months of fighting in the streets along side them. For the few first months, we were wondering why they were deserting in huge numbers, why they were running from firefights. I realized very quickly that we were asking them these questions from inside our armored humvees and from behind our bulletproof vests. No wonder these guys were turning tail and running! I put myself in their shoes, and started to see just how bad they had it.
And then came the body armor--my God, you should have seen the looks on their faces when we issued them new bulletproof vests in the winter of 2003. We went as far as to show them the actual test plates from the vests we were issuing--the plates that we took out to the range and shot--proving that they were able to stop both 9mm and AK47 rounds. A few weeks after their issue, I heard reports from Fallujah that the Iraqi police were really showing some cajones - much, much more confidence. Their excitement continued to grow with the issuing of better quality ammunition, the Russian-made stuff. The rounds they'd been using had been provided by the Coalition and were made in Iraq--a nice gesture, but a very cheap bullet. All too often, they would explode in their rifles and cause them to jam.
Better equipment is necessary for the Iraqi police to do their jobs, which often involves dealing with a great amount of paramilitary activity. Let's face it, these guys aren't handing out traffic tickets--they're basically an extension of the Iraqi Army. Their morale began to increase with the equipment we began to provide. And once we began to outfit them with better uniforms, leather jackets and patches, you could really see their pride begin to swell. And anyone who's worked with the Iraqi Police or Army knows that pride is a huge factor in their morale.
New uniforms and leather jackets aren't the keys to destroying the insurgency, but it shows we give a damn about making sure they're safe and professional looking. We need to capitalize on their new confidence in a big way, using the force multipliers ( the military term for morale builders) that they so desperately need. It's a start, but we shouldn't end it there--trading in their defenseless blue and white Nissan pickup trucks for armored vehicles is the next big step. Start protecting them better, and you might see more progress and less desertion.
History's shown us that our presence will be taken advantage of in Iraq again and again. It's not a perfect situation, but if the police are even somewhat cooperative and functioning, they can serve as a buffer between us and every wannabe jihadist in and around Iraq's cities. It may help to stop our vicious cycle of losing troops in the pursuit of every gunman who's looking to make trouble. And that brings me to my second point.
Step 2: Lessen our conventional profile in Iraq's cities while increasing our intelligence involvement around Iraq.
The U.S. military can't stay as involved as it is now, in the conventional sense, indefinitely. Especially if we start to draw down troop levels. But I often question the tactical point behind some of our conventional activity now. Our current course of conventional action is in question. Take, for instance, the "presence patrol." Combat units often send out patrols -- HUMVEEs, tanks or Bradleys--to drive around an area. When soldiers are injured or killed patrolling a random neighborhood in Iraq, I start asking myself, is it worth it? Are we looking for anything or anyone specific, or are we just picking fights? Would the people that initiated the attack ever have been a threat to our military if we hadn't gone traipsing through their little neighborhoods? I'm not saying we should be backing down from fights, but we shouldn't go out looking for trouble at all costs, either. I'm convinced that some insurgents aren't insurgents at all, just antagonists, local punks who don't pose a major threat to our military--just to those who decided to come into their neighborhood.
When I was in Iraq, it seemed that our patrol missions had no tactical intention (with the exception of those patrols of our main supply routes, or MSRs, in order to make travel safe for other units coming through the area. In that case, we were like State Police patrolling a highway). In our case, it went something like this--we'd patrol, get hit with an improvised explosive device (IED) and then ambushed, shoot back, look for our attackers, question people, and start the cycle all over again in some other area. Half the time, the guys attacking us were Bush League (no pun intended) "insurgents," ones that only posed a threat to whatever military unit happened to be driving by at the time. It seemed we were just getting sucked into these lethal "cat and mouse" games. We were taking the fight to our enemy, but they were enemies who didn't have the ability to take the fight to us.
In Part II Gifford will finish his analysis and offer some final observations from a guy who has been there.
Contributing Editor Mike Gifford is currently an inactive reservist with the US Army in Chicago, IL. A graduate of Union College (New York) and former intelligence officer, he's currently working on a book that chronicles his experiences in Iraq with the Military Police Corps. All profits will be donated to families of those killed or injured serving in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. Gifford can be reached at giff94@hotmail.com. Send Feedback responses todwfeedback@yahoo.com.
Ellie
by Michael Gifford
SFTT
There's been a lot said in the news recently regarding plans for bringing our troops home from Iraq. As an Operation Iraqi Freedom vet, one who's experienced all the joys post-war Iraq has to offer, I thought I'd weigh in with a introspective examination of the war there.
I hate it as much as anyone, the names and pictures of soldiers in the news who've made the ultimate sacrifice. We've all seen it--so many times--the smiling pictures of young men and women on television or in the papers; photos of their last night out with friends in the States, of their weddings, or posing with their small children back home. Most of the time it's a picture of a complete stranger, but once in a while, it's a picture of someone I know. Those are some the toughest nights for me, recognizing the photo of a friend who was killed in their second or third tour in Iraq. I'm a hawk when it comes to the war on terror, but even I start to wonder if it's worth it, this war we're fighting.
The bottom line is this--I don't think the troops are coming home anytime soon. And given Iraq's strategic importance, we'll always have troops there in some capacity.
Any sensible American knows the risks we face if we were to leave Iraq prematurely, and the public officials who run on a platform that call for an immediate withdrawal are either very misinformed or aren't making priorities regarding a sound withdrawal plan. I question the motive of the political naysayers who think that we just can't win this war and need to leave immediately. Instead of taking a good look at what's actually required to achieve our aims in Iraq and bring our troops home, they look to capitalize on the judgments made in the court of public opinion--"if so many Americans are tired of the war and think we should leave Iraq now, maybe I can score some points by saying the same." Wrong answer! A hasty pullout is only a short-term solution, and will only serve to embolden the major terrorists overseas at the expense of our reputation.
While I don't always agree with it, the fact is that public opinion plays a major role in determining a war's outcome. The United States needs a strategy--away from the black and white headlines--that can ensure we achieve our aims in Iraq and subsequently withdraw our troops, without both dividing our nation and losing another 2000 soldiers in the process.
I see the names of the dead on the news, and it saddens me to no end. But then I remember what's already been done, and the real progress we've made. The TV is full of bad news, but what you don't see are the thousands of kids who still chase HUMVEEs and wave at soldiers more than two years after the invasion. You don't see the lines of determined young men looking to enlist in the Iraqi Police and military, defying the threats to life, limb and family to serve their country, and not just for a paycheck. You don't see the patriotic Iraqis who risk their lives to travel to our bases and offer US troops life-saving information. You don't see the freedom of the press has returned to Iraq--some calling for the support our presence--along with significant increases in both Internet and satellite television access, which will help to lend an opposing view to the dogma that most Iraqis are force-fed by their religious leaders. You don't see ordinary Iraqis--the shopkeepers and salesmen--picking up arms and fighting the insurgents that have threatened them. You don't see the irrepressible, irreversible waves of liberty that are settling in on the Iraqi people.
Americans don't live in a "marathon" culture. We're not exactly built for patience--in our nation of instant emails, fast food and quarterly profit reports, we've grown used to the immediate gratification some say has come to define our society. It all has to happen right now. The relatively "quick" conflicts we've fought over the past 20 years have spoiled us, and have us expecting that a few bombing campaigns or missile strikes will quickly bring conflict to an end. We wiped our collective brows as a nation after Desert Storm and the air campaign in Bosnia, relieved that casualties were minimal and we didn't become too involved. This is not to be the case in Iraq, and people have to wake up to the fact that we're going to be there a while.
But the level of our involvement in post-war activities is what may determine success or failure--from a military, democratic and public opinion point of view.
L. Just capturing and killing insurgents is not going to bring peace to iraq. America needs a strong, conclusive plant with a viable exit stratagy that doesn't smell of cut and run. Photo: Michael Gifford
We're finding ourselves moving from a war of liberation to a conflict of attrition, involving factors that we, as Americans, cannot afford to get involved with. The rifts in the Iraqi culture--a growing source of the violence we find ourselves caught dead center in the middle of -- will not go away quickly, and the pursuit of a free Iraq will never be without some degree of strife, violence and civil war. We have to be able to accept that. If we let ourselves be drawn into every tribal dispute--and it's deceptively easy to do--you can forget about leaving Iraq successfully.
While it's vital to destroy those responsible for terror, being drawn into any of these internal conflicts would be a huge mistake, as would trying to "seek and destroy" every anti-Coalition fighter in Iraq.
These are two areas where the American military has to draw the line. We have to rethink our military priorities in Iraq. It's not a question of whether or not we should be there, but what it is we're doing there.
So how do we proceed in Iraq militarily now that we have Saddam, the major threat to our national security? How do we balance between the continued campaigns against our national enemies like al-Zarqawi, while maintaining, and in some cases earning, the respect of the people we intended to liberate? And how do we know where to draw the line between crushing the threat of organized radical Islam and just defeating a local military enemy without drifting into becoming local peacekeepers?
The Bush Administration has pointed out that we'd much rather be fighting terrorists on the ground in the Middle East than here in the US. In a way, that's true--by smashing up Al Qaeda's major leadership pretty good since 9/11 in Iraq and Afghanistan, we've put a hell of a dent in the way they do business. Morale's down, money's tight, and there's a lot of "in fighting" among their leadership. All great stuff, but the definition of terrorist is starting to broaden, and that's beginning to pose a problem.
There are literally thousands of low-level former military and foreign fighters in Iraq that have access to cheap explosives and weapons. They now fit the definition of "terrorist." But are they a terrorist threat to the United States, or just a nuisance to our military and the people of Iraq? Sure, I'd love to see them all dead and gone, but I don't want to lose another 2000 soldiers going after a few punks who don't have the capability to take part in major violence on the US or its allies, or severely disrupt Iraq's ability to stabilize.
So just how do we go about achieving our aims in Iraq while avoiding a fight with every two-bit jackass with an AK and a beef with the United States? Here are five areas we have to focus on.
Step 1: Give the Iraqi Police and Army whatever the hell they need.
I spent 6 months training the police of the restive Al Anbar Province of Iraq in the winter and spring of 2004, and that was after 6 months of fighting in the streets along side them. For the few first months, we were wondering why they were deserting in huge numbers, why they were running from firefights. I realized very quickly that we were asking them these questions from inside our armored humvees and from behind our bulletproof vests. No wonder these guys were turning tail and running! I put myself in their shoes, and started to see just how bad they had it.
And then came the body armor--my God, you should have seen the looks on their faces when we issued them new bulletproof vests in the winter of 2003. We went as far as to show them the actual test plates from the vests we were issuing--the plates that we took out to the range and shot--proving that they were able to stop both 9mm and AK47 rounds. A few weeks after their issue, I heard reports from Fallujah that the Iraqi police were really showing some cajones - much, much more confidence. Their excitement continued to grow with the issuing of better quality ammunition, the Russian-made stuff. The rounds they'd been using had been provided by the Coalition and were made in Iraq--a nice gesture, but a very cheap bullet. All too often, they would explode in their rifles and cause them to jam.
Better equipment is necessary for the Iraqi police to do their jobs, which often involves dealing with a great amount of paramilitary activity. Let's face it, these guys aren't handing out traffic tickets--they're basically an extension of the Iraqi Army. Their morale began to increase with the equipment we began to provide. And once we began to outfit them with better uniforms, leather jackets and patches, you could really see their pride begin to swell. And anyone who's worked with the Iraqi Police or Army knows that pride is a huge factor in their morale.
New uniforms and leather jackets aren't the keys to destroying the insurgency, but it shows we give a damn about making sure they're safe and professional looking. We need to capitalize on their new confidence in a big way, using the force multipliers ( the military term for morale builders) that they so desperately need. It's a start, but we shouldn't end it there--trading in their defenseless blue and white Nissan pickup trucks for armored vehicles is the next big step. Start protecting them better, and you might see more progress and less desertion.
History's shown us that our presence will be taken advantage of in Iraq again and again. It's not a perfect situation, but if the police are even somewhat cooperative and functioning, they can serve as a buffer between us and every wannabe jihadist in and around Iraq's cities. It may help to stop our vicious cycle of losing troops in the pursuit of every gunman who's looking to make trouble. And that brings me to my second point.
Step 2: Lessen our conventional profile in Iraq's cities while increasing our intelligence involvement around Iraq.
The U.S. military can't stay as involved as it is now, in the conventional sense, indefinitely. Especially if we start to draw down troop levels. But I often question the tactical point behind some of our conventional activity now. Our current course of conventional action is in question. Take, for instance, the "presence patrol." Combat units often send out patrols -- HUMVEEs, tanks or Bradleys--to drive around an area. When soldiers are injured or killed patrolling a random neighborhood in Iraq, I start asking myself, is it worth it? Are we looking for anything or anyone specific, or are we just picking fights? Would the people that initiated the attack ever have been a threat to our military if we hadn't gone traipsing through their little neighborhoods? I'm not saying we should be backing down from fights, but we shouldn't go out looking for trouble at all costs, either. I'm convinced that some insurgents aren't insurgents at all, just antagonists, local punks who don't pose a major threat to our military--just to those who decided to come into their neighborhood.
When I was in Iraq, it seemed that our patrol missions had no tactical intention (with the exception of those patrols of our main supply routes, or MSRs, in order to make travel safe for other units coming through the area. In that case, we were like State Police patrolling a highway). In our case, it went something like this--we'd patrol, get hit with an improvised explosive device (IED) and then ambushed, shoot back, look for our attackers, question people, and start the cycle all over again in some other area. Half the time, the guys attacking us were Bush League (no pun intended) "insurgents," ones that only posed a threat to whatever military unit happened to be driving by at the time. It seemed we were just getting sucked into these lethal "cat and mouse" games. We were taking the fight to our enemy, but they were enemies who didn't have the ability to take the fight to us.
In Part II Gifford will finish his analysis and offer some final observations from a guy who has been there.
Contributing Editor Mike Gifford is currently an inactive reservist with the US Army in Chicago, IL. A graduate of Union College (New York) and former intelligence officer, he's currently working on a book that chronicles his experiences in Iraq with the Military Police Corps. All profits will be donated to families of those killed or injured serving in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. Gifford can be reached at giff94@hotmail.com. Send Feedback responses todwfeedback@yahoo.com.
Ellie