military science

[wrbones]

http://catalog.arizona.edu/1995-97/deptsncourses/mlsnsmla.html


There are a number of threads and posts on this site that would otherwise be considered under the heading of military science. Don't neglect them because of the title of this thread. There is a wealth of information for both the 'amateur' and the professional.

[wrbones]

http://www.library.ucsb.edu/subj/military.html


you'll drool over this one folks.....

[wrbones]

http://directory.google.com/Top/Science/Technology/Military_Science/

[wrbones]

http://www.ac.by/science/military.html

[wrbones]

This should give you an idea of which areas to study.....

http://216.239.37.100/search?q=cache:q5qJoiGB6CwC:www.loc.gov/catdir/cpso/lcco/lcco_u.pdf+military+science&hl=en&ie=UTF-8#2

[wrbones]

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/browse/-/14450/ref%3Dbr%5Fbx%5Fc%5F2%5F4/104-6534428-6102344

[wrbones]

http://bubl.ac.uk/link/m/militaryscience.htm

[wrbones]

This list was compiled by an author. It looks like it might be worth the trouble to take a look at.



THE TRIGGER Digital Reference Library
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--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


The MAGTF Weak Link - Rear Area Security

CSC 1984

SUBJECT AREA National Security


THE MAGTF WEAK LINK -
REAR AREA SECURITY






Submitted to
United States Marine Corps
Command and Staff College
Quantico, Virginia
in Partial Fulfillment of Requirements
for Written Communication




Major B. M. Youngs
United States Marine Corps

April 6, 1984

THE MAGTF WEAK LINK -
REAR AREA SECURITY


Outline


Thesis statement: To be victorious in future conflicts the
Marine Corps must increase its awareness
of the threat to rear areas, improve
training methods in rear area security
and organize the MAGTF with adequate
resources to provide for its rear area
security.


I. Introduction

II. The Threat
A. World War II historical examples
B. Airborne, Reconnaissance and Division Units
C. Recent Developments - OMG, Air Assault Brigades
and Spetsnaz

III. Current Doctrine
A. Army view - FM 31-85 and FM 100-5
B. Marine Corps view - LFM 02 and FMFM 6-1
C. Problem areas in Marine Corps doctrine

IV. Proposals
A. Threat awareness
B. Combat training for CSS personnel
C. Establish a rear area security force

V. Conclusion

THE MAGTF WEAK LINK - REAR AREA SECURITY


It is generally accepted that the U. S. Marine Corps must

be capable of defeating enemies that will outnumber it in

future conflicts. The next conflict will indeed provide the

Marine Corps with significant challenges and questions. A

major issue is the question of rear area security: Who pro-

vides it and how should it be accomplished? Presently, rear

area security has no clearly articulated doctrine.

"An army marches on its stomach,"1 and indeed it may have

in 1814 when Napoleon allegedly wrote these words, but surely

even the brilliant Napoleon would be amazed were he to see all

the logistical support required by our Marine Air Ground Task

Force (MAGTF). In his last posture statement as Commandant

of the Marine Corps, General R. H. Barrow stated, "The Marine

Corps remains ready to respond to all missions....forward

deployed Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTF's) are the root

source of our versatility, flexibility and readiness."2

The capability of the Marine Corps to win future con-

flicts will depend largely upon not only how well we fight,

but more importantly, how well we can logistically sustain

ourselves. MAGTF's are by their nature equipment heavy and

require large logistic support systems. The MAGTF rear area,

from which the logistic support operates, is potentially our

"achilles heel".

Rear area security has been a continuing problem for

armies throughout history. Today is no different; the capa-

bility of the Soviet Union to inflict damage to our rear

areas is a serious threat. Those threats and actions within

the MAGTF rear area which impede or deny the orderly flow of

supplies and services to the forward maneuver elements affect

directly the ability of those maneuver elements to accomplish

their mission.

The U. S. Army's FM 100-5, Operations, considered to be

the capstone publication for U. S. maneuver warfare, specifi-

cally warns:


"Just as we plan to fight in the enemy's rear
area, so he plans to fight in ours. The enemy
will carefully coordinate his attack in our
rear area with his actions in the main battle
area....the object of these rear area attacks
is to destroy critical links, to cause disrup-
tion, and to degrade the capability of forces
dedicated to support or reinforce the main
effort."3

To be victorious in future conflicts, the Marine Corps must

increase its awareness of the threat to rear areas, improve

training methods in rear area security and organize the MAGTF

with adequate resources to provide for its rear area security.

Perhaps at the outset, some terms should be defined.

The rear area is the area in the rear of the combat and

forward areas.4 Rear area security (RAS) is defined as those

measures taken prior to, during, and/or after an enemy

airborne attack, sabotage action, infiltration, guerrilla

action, and/or initiation of psychological or propaganda

warfare to minimize the effects thereof.5 Rear area protec-

tion (RAP) includes all measures taken to prevent interrup-

tions of combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS)

operations.6

A historical review of rear area operations reveals that

the Soviet Union has traditionally been successful in

employing forces in the enemy's rear area. These rear area

operations were conducted to disrupt or destroy enemy combat

support and combat service support operations and as economy

of force measures to force enemy commanders to divert tactical

or frontline units in defense of their rear areas. Successful

rear area operations in military history serve to emphasize

the importance and magnitude of the rear area security

problem.

In 1943, two nights prior to the Russian counteroffensive,

Russian partisan forces cut the German rail lines of communi-

cations in over 8,400 places. This operation rendered nearly

7,000 miles of rail lines useless for the needed movement of

German reinforcements during the critical phase of the German

defense. Also, in Byelorussia, during the summer of 1944 the

Russian Army organized a partisan force of over 370,000 men;

to counter this problem, the German Army was forced to employ

nearly 13 divisions in a rear area security role.7

More recently, in Vietnam, essential manpower requirements

were pulled from combat support and combat service support

units to occupy static defensive positions. Armored combat

power and air assets were diverted from offensive operations

to provide convoy security and line of communication (LOC)

security. Even with the dedication of vast combat resources,

the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong guerrillas succeeded in

harrassing, disrupting and, on occasion, destroying rear area

support operations.

continued

[wrbones]

continued

These historical examples have pointed out some interesting

and supportive facts about rear area operations: (1) rear area

security has often failed to receive command attention propor-

tionate to the threat; (2) rear area operations have histori-

cally been an effective tactic; (3) rear area operations are

relatively constant and are conducted to disrupt logistical

support, to withdraw combat troops from operations against

opposing regular forces, and to commit reserves to the extent

that they cannot influence regular operations.

The Soviet Army has had tremendous experience with rear

area operations and is cognizant of their effectiveness.

Having stated the historical significance of rear area opera-

tions, it is now appropriate to examine briefly the threat

imposed by our most likely enemy in future conflicts.

Undoubtedly, there are those who doubt that the Marine Corps

will ever be engaged in combat against Soviet or Warsaw Pact

forces. They may be correct. However, a cursory review of

Marine Corps contingency plans reveals the possibility of

Marines supporting naval campaigns in Norway or protecting

critical choke points, i.e., the La Peruse Straits or

guarding U. S. availability to Middle East oil assets. The

fact remains, there are numerous instances where Marines

could reasonably find themselves facing Soviet or Warsaw

Pact forces or their trained surrogates.8 If the Marine Corps

does fight Soviet forces or their surrogates, it will be

facing a definite threat to its rear areas and must be

prepared to engage and defeat this threat.

The lessons of World War II are still vivid in the minds

of the Soviet military hierarchy. The two principles of war

which seem to dominate Soviet military doctrine are:

offensive and mass. Western strategists and tacticians are

continuously working on methods to defeat or counter these

Soviet capabilities.

The immediate question should be, "What is the threat

today?" The principles of war, economy of force (the recipro-

cal of mass) and the offensive, are the driving factors in the

importance of rear area operations as a force multiplier in

Soviet doctrine today.

The evolution of Soviet doctrine for the employment of

ground forces developed rapidly in post World War II. Soviet

conventional ground forces were trained and equipped to

maneuver motorized rifle and tank units in seizing objectives

deep in the enemy rear areas. Soviet doctrine continues to

emphasize the offensive and high-speed penetration of enemy

defenses and combat formations to seize deep objectives.

The Soviet desant concept9 advocates employing forces

in the enemy rear areas or flanks. This concept is a consol-

idation of Soviet thinking in the employment of airborne,

heliborne, and amphibious forces in economy of force opera-

tions to disrupt the enemy rear area. The desant concept is

an accessory to the principle of the offensive because its

primary purpose is to support the advance of the Soviet

regular ground forces.

The Soviet forces involved in rear area operations would

be drawn primarily from three sources: airborne units, long-

range reconnaissance units from tank and motorized rifle

units, and designated combined arms units (also called forward

detachments) from tank and motorized rifle units.10

The Soviet Union maintains the world's largest airborne

force which is organized into seven active divisions.11 The

most important feature of these airborne divisions and their

subordinate units is that, once landed, they are a light-

armor mechanized force. The BMD is the airborne equivalent

of the Soviet Infantry combat fighting vehicle BMP, and, as

such, provides Soviet airborne forces a significant mobility

and firepower capability.

Soviet doctrine assigns three basic missions to airborne

forces: (1) strategic; (2) operational; and (3) tactical.12

The primary difference in these missions is the depth of

operation and the nature of the objectives. Of importance

to this paper are the operational and tactical missions.

Operational missions in support of the Front (largest Soviet

fighting organization) are executed under the control of the

Front commander. These missions include seizing bridgeheads,

airfields, road junctions, as well as destruction of enemy

logistical facilities. Operating in the enemy rear areas,

these units prevent the effective and timely employment of

reserve forces and generally disrupt the enemy's offensive

and defensive posture. Standard procedure for operational

missions of this nature would involve dropping a regimental-

sized unit up to 300km beyond the FEBA in support of a Front

offensive. Ground forces linkup would occur within two to

three days with the airborne forces.

The tactical mission concept includes battalion to

regimental-sized operations up to 100km beyond the FEBA in

support of an Army offensive. Linkup in these operations is

planned within 48 hours. The tactical mission has objectives

similar to operational missions, but on a smaller scale.

Tactical long-range reconnaissance units are found in

reconnaissance battalions of motorized rifle and tank

divisions, The mission of these units is to conduct ground

reconnaissance of the enemy rear area up to 100km beyond the

FEBA. These battalions are capable of operating in an area

of 50-60km wide on three or four axes. Six to eight armored

reconnaissance squads, each consisting of two to three BRDM's

and/or BMP-R's and motorcycles, are used. Their primary

mission is reconnaissance, but they may attack small targets

of opportunity or even conduct sabotage operations against

logistic units. In addition, long-range reconnaissance

patrols are often flown by helicopter. They can operate

throughout a rear area to locate both reserve force and

command post locations and to recon possible avenues of

approach.13

continued

[wrbones]

continued


The special combined arms unit, also called a forward

detachment, is typically composed of a motorized rifle

battalion with tanks, self-propelled artillery, and air

defense weapons. This detachment is a small, highly mobile

and firepower intensive unit. These forward detachments take

advantage of a gap in the enemy front and penetrate deep into

the enemy rear area. The objectives of these small independent

units vary according to the situation. These detachments are

key elements in the successful linkup with airborne and heli-

copter forces.14 How valid a threat is a forward detachment?

According to Victor Suvorov, author of Inside the Soviet Army,

one battalion in each Soviet regiment is held ready to assume

the mission of a forward detachment at all times.15

In conjunction with the Soviet forces previously mentioned

three additional organizations have been recently identified

as having the primary mission of operating in an enemy's rear

area. The three organizations are: the Spetsnaz; Air Assault

Brigades; and the Operational Maneuver Group (OMG).

The Spetsnaz are the special purpose or unconventional

warfare forces of the Soviet Union. Each Combined Arms Army

and Tank Army has a Spetsnaz Company totalling approximately

105 personnel. Depending upon its assigned mission, the

company can operate as an entity or it can be fragmented into

smaller groups and teams. In addition, each Front has a

Spetsnaz Brigade of approximately 1300 highly-skilled, elite

troops.16 Spetsnaz troops are all volunteers and are superbly

trained to operate in a clandestine manner behind enemy lines.

The Soviets consider that Spetsnaz operations can only be

successful if they take place simultaneously on a massive

scale with other operations. Spetsnaz units are placed in

areas where there are numerous high-value targets (i.e.,

command posts, logistical facilities).

The Soviet Air Assault Brigades represent a significant

increase in the Front level combat capability. These brigades

have a combination of battalions which are parachute and BMD-

equipped. The air assault brigade is capable of undertaking

a myriad of missions because of its unique structure, mobility,

and firepower. The brigade consists of three battalions with

approximately 2,500 personnel; the battalions are employed by

airborne drop or by helicopter. The missions assigned the

heliborne battalions include neutralization of command posts,

seizure of key terrain, and destruction of logistics sites.17

Soviet doctrine for the employment of heliborne forces states

that those forces can be inserted anywhere in the tactical

depth of the enemy's defense or combat formations up to 50km

from friendly forces.

The Operational Maneuver Group (OMG) appears to be a

large one-way raiding force, composed of infantry, tanks,

artillery, air defense and a heavy air assault component.18

The Soviets believe that successful OMG operations could

severely disrupt the enemy rear area, thereby increasing the

chances of maintaining the rapid advance of Army and Front

level forces. The OMG is a specially tailored combat force

with no fixed structure. The OMG has three main missions,

all of which are directed at the enemy's rear area: (1)

destruction of enemy weapons systems; (2) destruction of the

enemy's in-depth defense or offensive combat formation

(actions by the OMG would include destruction of command and

control positions, logistics assets and surprise attacks on

flank and rear area units); (3) seizure of deep key terrain

and critical objectives.

It should be readily apparent that the Soviet threat to

rear area security is quite significant. Soviet operations

in the rear area will not of themselves be of sufficient scale

to bring about a Soviet victory. One major function of all

the forces mentioned is to reduce the enemy's capacity to

resist, thus making it easier for the main attacking forces

to accomplish their missions.

Having described the Soviet threat to rear areas, it would

be appropriate to review what current doctrine provides

the conduct of rear area security operations.

U. S. Army doctrine is found in FM 31-85, Rear Area

Protection (RAP) Operations. Though issued in 1970, it does

provide a basic philosophy of RAS and eight principles which

are still valid: austerity, command, economy of force, inte-

grated protection, offensive, responsiveness, supervision, and

priority of risks.19

The cornerstone of Army doctrine is FM 100-5, Operations,

which provides information on Rear Area Protection and gives

a concise and meaningful resume of the threat as it is

projected and adequately outlines responsibilities for rear

and combat operations (RACO).

Very little mention is to be found in any Marine Corps

FMFMs or Operational Handbooks (OH's) about rear area security

operations. The "cornerstone document" of the Marine Corps

MAGTF, FMFM 0-1, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Doctrine, makes

no mention of rear area security or rear area combat opera-

tions. It is this author's impression that the problem of

rear area security has been wished away by continually denying

the existence of a formidable threat and by giving the

responsibility for rear area security to the CSS commander;

the CSS commander, however, does not have the means to accom-

plish this mission.

continued

[wrbones]

continued

Having described the Soviet threat to rear areas, it would

be appropriate to review what current doctrine provides

the conduct of rear area security operations.

U. S. Army doctrine is found in FM 31-85, Rear Area

Protection (RAP) Operations. Though issued in 1970, it does

provide a basic philosophy of RAS and eight principles which

are still valid: austerity, command, economy of force, inte-

grated protection, offensive, responsiveness, supervision, and

priority of risks.19

The cornerstone of Army doctrine is FM 100-5, Operations,

which provides information on Rear Area Protection and gives

a concise and meaningful resume of the threat as it is

projected and adequately outlines responsibilities for rear

and combat operations (RACO).

Very little mention is to be found in any Marine Corps

FMFMs or Operational Handbooks (OH's) about rear area security

operations. The "cornerstone document" of the Marine Corps

MAGTF, FMFM 0-1, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Doctrine, makes

no mention of rear area security or rear area combat opera-

tions. It is this author's impression that the problem of

rear area security has been wished away by continually denying

the existence of a formidable threat and by giving the

responsibility for rear area security to the CSS commander;

the CSS commander, however, does not have the means to accom-

plish this mission.

The subject of rear area security in an amphibious

operation is addressed in Landing Force Manual (LFM)02,

Doctrine for Landing Forces. The overall responsibility for

the security of the rear area of the landing force is the

commander of the landing force (CLF). He is responsible for

the integration of local security plans into the overall area

plan. This is clearly oriented for defensive operations.

Rear area security is also addressed in FMFM 6-1, The

Marine Division. This source discusses in detail the concept

of rear area security, the planning procedures and responsi-

bilities for rear area security, forces available and organi-

zation of forces for rear area security. Even though the

above areas are addressed, the primary focus of the information

provided is on amphibious landing and defensive situations;

nothing is mentioned about security for logistic elements

during offensive operations.

The MAGTF is not a permanent organization; it is task

organized for a specific mission. Forward deployed MAGTF's

are capable of rapid response to a number of contingencies

and provide a measured application of power to prescribed

contingency situations. The composition of MAGTF's may vary,

but the organizational structure will include a single command

element with a ground combat element, aviation combat element,

and combat service support element as subordinate co-equal

elements.20

The Marine Corps is tasked with responding to contin-

gencies throughout the world against numerous possible

adversaries. The most significant threat is the Soviet Union

and its combined arms force. If the Marine Corps is to

survive and win future conflicts against combined arms threats,

we must utilize all our combat assets. The Marine Corps

Combined Arms Task Force (MCATF) is the employment of tank

assets with infantry to accomplish a specific mission.21

The MCATF is anticipated to operate independently for long

periods and should be more or less self-sufficient. Because

the MCATF is a mechanized operation, it is characterized by

the rapid pace of operations and a reliance on machines; it,

therefore, implies increased logistical requirements and

combat service support operations take on increased importance.

As stated previously, the MCATF's are formed from the

MAGTF, primarily from the ground combat element (GCE), but

also contain two other elements, the combat service support

element (CSSE) and the air combat element (ACE). The ACE may

provide helicopter support to the MCATF and also a detachment

to the CSSE. The MAGTF CSSE provides service support

direclty to the MCATF or forms a Mobile Combat Service Support

Detachment (MCSSD) to move with and support the MCATF.

In 1977 a series of exercises were initiated after the

Commandant of the Marine Corps approved the concept of mobile

assault regiments which would be task-organized as needed

(MCATF's).22 In January 1981, a MCATF-Phase IV exercise was

conducted at Twenty-Nine Palms, California. The Phase IV

exercise was to validate and improve the current MCATF

doctrine. A major deficiency identified during the exercise

was the sustainability, survivability and mobility of the CSS

forces.23


"Supply lines are particularly sensitive,
since all petrol and ammunition, indispensable
requirements for the battle, must pass along
them. Hence everything possible must be done
to protect one's own supply lines and to upset
or better still, cut the enemy's. Operations
in the enemy's supply [rear] area will lead
immediately to his breaking off the battle
elsewhere, since as I have indicated supplies
are the fundamental premise of the battle and
must be given the priority of protection."24


continued

[wrbones]

continued

As Rommel pointed out, the security of the lines of

communications and logistics elements is a key factor to

survivability on the battlefield. It is obvious that the

MCATF today must devote attention to protecting its logistics

tail.

Other findings from the Phase IV exercise which indicate

problems for MCATF's in future conflicts are:

1. Security forces must be provided and trained in the

protection of CSS elements.

2. A command and control capability is required by the

MCSSD in order to request supporting arms and to

coordinate an attachment of security forces if separated

from the maneuver element (GCE).

3. In mechanized operations there will likely be no

secure rear area. Sinde CSS elements will continue to

be forward to react to CSS requirements, these elements

(MCSSD) are vulnerable to encountering enemy, especially

specialized units with missions to attack rear areas.25

After examining the threat to rear areas and comparing the

threat to present Marine Corps doctrine and philosophy, the

following problem areas surfaced:

1. The "threat" to rear areas is not perceived as a

significant problem.

2. CSS personnel do not receive sufficient combat

training to defend themselves effectively.

3. The plan to use combat forces from Marine Corps

forward maneuver units as rear area security severely

reduces forward combat power.

4. Plans to effect rear area security normally occurs

only when units are in a defensive posture.

5. The plan to use the reserve force as the rear area

security force relegates the effectiveness of the

reserve force employment.


To make Marine Corps rear area security a distinct

advantage instead of the weak link it is presently, the

following proposals must be implemented, the threat posed

to rear areas is formidable. An education and threat aware-

ness training program must be instituted immediately. The

first step in solving a problem is acknowledging that the

problem exists. Acknowledgement that a rear area threat

exists in offensive operations as well as defensive operations

is mandatory.

CSS personnel comprise the majority of rear area manpower

assets. The CSS units' success and survival on the battle-

field will be directly proportional to the knowledge and

skills learned in basic infantry training and honed in subse-

quent field exercises. The present lack of field combat

training for CSS units is attributable to command desires to

keep CSS personnel involved in their primary jobs (i.e.,

mechanic, logistics clerk, etc.) and state that sufficient

time is unavailable for combat training: "It is not my

mission to fight." A reasonable balance of combat training

and military occupational specialty (MOS) training is required

to ensure that CSS personnel can survive and carry out their

battlefield missions.

Combat training for CSS personnel must receive a positive

endorsement at the highest command levels. One policy, if

instituted, which would have an immediate, positive impact

is to require all Marines (regardless of their MOS) to attend

infantry training school subsequent to recruit training. For

survival it is time to make the old adage "Every Marine is a

rifleman," a reality.

continued

[wrbones]

No longer can the Marine Corps plan to use forward combat

units as rear area security. This practice dilutes offensive

combat power and is now unfeasible when considering the

reduced size of the current infantry battalion. The infantry

battalion is now equipment-heavy and manpower-light; the

additional loss of manpower for rear area security cannot be

viable.


Also, because the Marine Corps will probably be fighting

a numerically superior foe, it must maintain a potent and

mobile reserve force. To assign a reserve force the secondary

or additional mission of rear area security essentially negates

the effectiveness of the force.

The present MAGTF structure does not possess adequate

capabilities to counter a rear area threat force effectively.

The time has arrived to stop insisting on the importance of

rear area security on one hand, while providing no units to

do the job on the other hand, or expecting the mission to be

accomplished by make shift units on an additional duty basis.

The MAGTF must establish a rear area security force (RASF)

with the specific task of rear area security.

Based upon a review of the current Marine Corps Force

Structure, the Military Police Company, Headquarters and

Service Battalion, Force Service Support Group (FSSG) must

be upgraded to battalion strength and be placed under the

direct control of FSSG commander. This new battalion would

then be Security Battalion, FSSG and would be structured with

a Headquarters and Service Company, a Military Police Company

and three security companies. Such a structure would

facilitate rear area security for deployed MAGTF's (i.e.,

MAU, MAB and MAF) as follows:

1. Provide a continual capability to prevent interrup-

tion of CSS operations by a hostile force.

2. Provide one unit capable of planning, rehearsing

and executing detailed and simple plans for rear area

security.

3. Provide the capability to mass and position combat

power at any location in the MAGTF rear area.

4. Provide a single commander, responsible to the MAGTF

commander, the responsibility of maintaining rear area

security throughout the MAGTF rear area.

The Security Battalion, specifically the security

companies, must have increased manpower and firepower assets

to accomplish its mission. Because of the significant armor

threat, organic weapons must include antitank weapons (TOW,

Dragon), machine guns (.50 caliber and possibly the new

Mark-19, 40mm), and an organic mortar capability. This RASF

must also have mobility for its mission with either the Light-

Armored Vehicle (LAV) or the high mobility multipurpose wheeled

vehicle (HMMWV). Although the HMMWV lacks armor protection,

it still remains survivable because of its high mobility and

speed.

The proposals provided herein do not resolve all the

questions concerning the critical issue of rear area security

The fact remains, however, that Marine Corps units have rear

areas which are logistically "heavy" and the potential threat

to these areas will not be diminished.

The security problems associated with rear areas are

significant but can be overcome. By acknowledging the threat

and its capabilities, through proper initial/continued combat

training of CSS personnel and proper employment of the RASF,

the Marine Corps can successfully frustrate the enemy's

attempts to disrupt its rear area operations.

Haphazard methods, insufficient and poorly trained

forces, and indifferent attitudes are open invitations for

disaster. These proposals will not diminish a MAGTF's

offensive capability, but they will enhance its overall

survivability and thereby provide the opportunity for greater

successes.

continued

[wrbones]

continued

FOOTNOTES


1John Bartlett (ed.), Familiar Quotations (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1955), p. 400.

2General R. H. Barrow,"Congress and the Corps CMC FY-84
Posture Statement," Marine Corps Gazette, April, 1983, p. 47.

3U.S., Department of the Army, Operations, FM 100-5
(Washington: Headquarters Department of the Army, 1982),
p. 14-1.

4Department of Defense, Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms, JCS Pub 1 (Washington, D.C.: The Joint Chiefs
of Staff, June 1979), p. 285.

5Ibid, p. 285.

6U.S., Department of the Army, Rear Area Protection (RAP)
Operations, FM 31-85 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, July 1970), p. 2-3.

7Lt.Col. L. M. Marr, USA, "Rear Area Security," Military
Review, May, 1951, p. 61.

8CWO2Bryan N. Lavender, USMC, "The Threat to Rear Areas"
unpublished paper (MCDEC, Quantico, Va.), January, 1984, p.
1-1.

9C. N. Donnelly, "Operations in the Enemy Rear, Soviet
Doctrine and Tactics," International Defense Review, January,
1980, p. 37.

10Ibid, pp. 37-39.

11Maj. J. H. Brusstar, USA, The Soviet Airborne Forces
(Washington, D.C.: Defense Intelligence Agency, 1 February,
1982), p. 3.

12Ibid, pp. 3-4.

13Donnelly, op.cit., p. 38.

14Lavender, op.cit., p. 1-4.

15Ibid., p. 1-5.

16Viktor Suvorov, "Spetsnaz: The Soviet Union's Special
Forces," Military Review, March, 1984, pp. 31-35.

17Maj. R. E. Bort, "Air Assault Brigades: New Element
in the Soviet Desant Force Structure," Military Review,
October, 1983, pp. 22-25.

18C. J. Dick,"Soviet Operational Manoeuvre Groups - a
closer look," International Defense Review, August, 1983,
pp. 770-776.

19FM 31-85, pp. 3-1 - 3-2.

20U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Doctrine,
FMFM 0-1 (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, United States Marine
Corps, August, 1979), pp. 2-2 - 2-3.

21MCDEC, USMC, Mechanized Combined Arms Task Forces
(MCATF), OH 9-3A (Quantico, March, 1980), pp. 3-7.

22U.S. Marine Corps, Decisions and Designs, Inc. for the
Marine Corps Development and Education Command, Post-Exercise
Evaluation for the Mechanized Combined Arms Task Force - Phase
IV Operation, p. ES-1.

23Ibid, p. 61.

24Edwin Rommel, The Rommel Papers, edited by B.H. Liddell
Hart (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1953), p. 197.

25USMC, Decisions and Designs, Inc., op.cit., pp. 97-99.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Barrow, R.H., "Congress and the Corps CMC FY-84 Posture State-
ment," Marine Corps Gazette, April, 1983.

Bartlett, John, ed. Familiar Quotations. Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1955.

Bort, R.E., "Air Assault Brigades: New Element in Soviet
Desant Force Structure," Military Review, October, 1983.

Brusstar, J.H., ed. The Soviet Airborne Forces. Washington,
D.C.: Defense Intelligence Agency, 1 February, 1982.

Department of Defense, Dictionary of Military and Associated
Terms, JCS Pub 1. Washington, D.C., Headquarters,
Department of the Army, 1979.

Dick, C.J., "Soviet Operational Manoeuvre Groups - a closer
look,'" International Defense Review, August, 1983.

Donnelly, C.N., "Operations in the Enemy Rear, Soviet Doctrine
and Tactics," International Defense Review, January, 1980.

Lavender, B.N., "The Threat to Rear Areas," unpublished
professional article, MCDEC, Quantico, Va., January, 1984.

Marr, L.M., "Rear Area Security," Military Review, May, 1951.

MCDEC, USMC, Mechanized Combined Arms Task Forces (MCATF),
OH 9-3A, Quantico, March, 1980.

MCDEC, USMC, Fleet Marine Force IP 1-4, Quantico, December,
1982.

Rommel, Edwin, The Rommel Papers, edited by B.H. Liddell Hart.
New York: Harcourt, Bruce and Company, 1953.

Saunders, W.N., "Logistic Support for Mechanized Units," Marine
Corps Gazette, December, 1982.

Suvorov, Viktor, "Spetsnaz: The Soviet Union's Special Forces,"
Military Review, March, 1984.

U.S Department of the Army. Rear Area Protection (RAP)
Operations, FM 31-85. Washington, D.C., July, 1970.

U.S. Department of the Army. Armored and Mechanized Division
Operations, FM 71-100. Washington, D.C., September, 1978.

U.S. Department of the Army. Operations, FM 100-5. Washington,
D.C., 1982.

U.S. Department of the Army. Soviet Army Operations. U.S.
Army Intelligence and Security Command, Washington, D.C.,
April, 1978.

U.S. Marine Corps. The Marine Division, FMFM 6-1. Washington,
D.C., March, 1978.

U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Air-Ground Task Force Doctrine, FMFM
0-1. Washington, D.C., August, 1979.

U.S. Marine Corps. Doctrine for Landing Forces, LFM 02 Final
Draft. Quantico, Va., August, 1971.

U.S. Marine Corps, Decisions and Designs, Inc. Post-Exercise
Evaluation for the Mechanized Combined Arms Task Force -
Phase IV Operations, MCDEC, Quantico, Va., August, 1981.

[wrbones]

Academic Courses/Handouts <br />
<br />
LAND NAVIGATION <br />
Instruction in this subject is designed to enable the officer student to read maps and aerial photographs, use the compass, and navigate on land in...

[wrbones]

continued

TACTICS
Instruction in this subject provides the officer student, regardless of the MOS subsequently assigned, with the basic knowledge necessary for a company grade officer to conduct small unit offensive and defensive operations. Performance-oriented training enables the officer student to apply the knowledge acquired in the classroom to simulated combat situations. Included is instruction and application in the planning and conduct of combat patrols, helicopter borne operations, tank-infantry tactics, mechanized operations, military operations in urban terrain, and an introduction to rifle company operations.
B0301 & B0301a THEORY OF WAR
B0303 &B0303A CONDUCT OF WAR
B0305 OPERATIONAL TERMS AND SYMBOLS
B0305.1 OPERATIONAL TERMS AND SYMBOLS: PROGRAMMED TEXT
B0305.2 OPERATIONAL TERMS AND SYMBOLS: PROGRAMMED TEXT
B0305.3 OPERATIONAL TERMS AND SYMBOLS: PROGRAMMED TEXT
B0305.4 OPERATIONAL TERMS AND SYMBOLS: PROGRAMMED TEXT
B0307 MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE CONCEPTS
B0317.1 INITIAL FIRETEAM/SQUAD TACTICS (FIELD EXERCISE)
B0319.2 MARINE BATTLE SKILLS TRAINING 3: CONTINUING ACTION (FIELD EXERCISE)
B0322 DEVELOPMENT OF COMMANDER'S INTENT
B0324 TACTICAL PLANNING I
B0356 TACTICAL PLANNING II
B0326 COMBAT ORDERS I
B0328 INTRODUCTION TO PATROLLING
B0330 CONDUCT OF THE PATROL 1
B0332 CONDUCT OF THE PATROL 2
B0333 CONDUCT OF THE PATROL 3
B0334 COMBAT ORDERS II
B0337 DEFENSIVE FUNDAMENTALS I
B0339 DEFENSIVE FUNDAMENTALS II
B0339.8 DEFENSIVE SANDTABLE EXERCISE (STEX PACKET)
B0349 DEFENSIVE FUNDAMENTALS II
B0350 URBAN PATROLLING I
B0351 URBAN PATROLLING II
B0354 OFFENSIVE FUNDAMENTALS I
B0355 REAR AREA SECURITY I
B0355.1 REAR AREA SECURITY II
B0355.2 REAR AREA SECURITY III
B0358 COMBAT ORDERS III
B0360 NIGHT ATTACK
B0363 INTRODUCTION TO COUNTERMECHANIZED OPERATIONS
B0363.8 COUNTERMECHANIZED OPERATIONS (STEX)
B0376 MOVEMENT TO CONTACT
B0382 MECHANIZED OPERATIONS
B0386 MILITARY OPERATIONS ON URBAN TERRAIN

SUPPORTING ARMS
Instruction in this subject is designed to provide the officer student with an understanding of the capabilities of supporting arms and the basic principles of fire support planning and coordination.
B0815 INTRODUCTION TO SUPPORTING ARMS
B0829 FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION MEASURES
B0831 FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING AND PROCESSING
B0833 CALL FOR FIRE

WEAPONS
Instruction in this subject is designed to provide the officer student with an understanding of the characteristics, capabilities, techniques of fire, employment, preventative maintenance procedures, and inspection techniques for weapons employed at the small unit level in all Fleet Marine Force organizations.
B2200 WEAPONS HANDLING AND SAFETY (M9 SERVICE PISTOL & M16A2 SERVICE RIFLE)
B2107 INTRODUCTION TO WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT
B2109 M203 GRENADE LAUNCHER
B2111 M249 SQUAD AUTOMATIC WEAPONS (SAW)
B2113 MECHANIZED & COUNTER MECHANIZED WEAPONS
B2121 M240G MEDIUM MACHINE GUN
B2127 INTRODUCTION TO MACHINE GUN EMPLOYMENT
B2135 MACHINE GUN PRAC APP (M2 .50CAL & MK19 HEAVY MACHINE GUNS

AVIATION
Instruction in this subject is designed to provide the officer student with an understanding of the primary and collateral missions of Marine aviation; to understand the coordination required in an air/ground mission and to prepare as well as execute the same. Additionally, aircraft and weapons systems identification are stressed.
B7543 INTRODUCTION TO MARINE AVIATION
B7545 CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (CAS) PROCEDURES
B7551 ASSAULT SUPPORT AND HELICOPTERBORNE OPERATIONS
B7557 HELICOPTER OPERATIONS

FIELD ENGINEERING
Instruction in this subject is designed to provide the officer student with an understanding of the principles of field engineering, to include military demolitions, emplacements/wire obstacles and mine/countermine operations that are common to all company grade officers.
B1315 COMBAT ENGINEERING
B1316 INTRODUCTION TO MINES
B1321.1 ENGINEERING SKILLS (FIELD EXERCISE)
B1341 ENGINEERS IN THE DEFENSE



MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (MOOTW)

B0212 INTRODUCTION TO MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (MOOTW)
B0213 INTRODUCTION TO TERRORISM
B0215 COUNTERINSURGENCY PRINCIPLES
B0216 COMBATING TERRORISM

PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT
This instruction is designed to provide the officer student with instruction in subject areas that contribute to personal and professional development.
B6613 UNIFORMS AND ACCESSORIES
B6622.1 FINANCIAL PLANNING
B6636.1 AUGMENTATION AND PROMOTION
B6670 STAFF ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTION
B6680 RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE OFFICER OF THE DAY AND FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERIOR GUARD
B6690 CUSTOMS AND COURTESIES
B6690.2 SERVICE ETIQUETTE

[wrbones]

Please make a tax-deductible donation to GlobalSecurity.org - Click Here <br />
<br />
<br />
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- <br />
<br />
<br />
The Ace's Rear Area Headache...

[wrbones]

continued <br />
&quot;As Marine units returned from China and Nicaragua, <br />
General Fuller saw an opportunity to integrate the <br />
old expeditionary forces into the fleets' organiza- <br />
...

[wrbones]

3. Terrain and Weather

a. Terrain (KOCOA)

(1) Key Terrain. What is key, both from enemy

and friendly viewpoint?

(2) Observation. Where can the enemy observe/

shoot me?

(3) Cover and concealment. Where can the enemy

move undetected and without harm from my fires?

(4) Obstacles. What obstacles can we use to deny

enemy capabilities?

(a) Barbed wire entanglements

(b) Mines

(c) Ditches

(d) Felled trees, logs

(e) Antivehicular

(5) Avenues of Approach. What are mechanized,

vertical, waterborne, motorized, and foot avenues of approach

into my position.

b. Weather. Best time for both enemy and friendly

patrols is during rainy, windy and wet weather.

4. Troops and Fire Support Available

a. Where can I get personnel to perform security

functions?


b. Where can I get close in fire support assets,

e.g., mortars, artillery, air, TOWs...?

5. Time and Space. How much area do I need to control?

How much time do I have to prepare my defenses?

6. Logistics. Can vehicles/helicopters resupply

airfield?

The ACE's estimate may determine that certain key areas

outside the airfield perimeter must be held by troops or

controlled by patrolling.

In addition to the ACE's estimate for providing security

to an airfield, he must organize the defense in such a way

that all members of a command know their assignments and

responsibilities.

To begin with, the primary goal is to allow those combat

operations that the MAGTF commander needs in support of his

scheme of maneuver to continue uninterrupted, while security

of the airfield is upheld.

As stated in this February 1989 article about the Air

Force's efforts in Air Base Operability.

"As it charts its many future requirements and their
associated systems, the Air Force has not neglected
the critical need to keep its air bases operating in
time of war. This "mission," like electronic
combat, strategic offensive action, and other
wartime business, carries with it a demand for
specialized top-flight "weapons."

These other technologies underline a number of new
system concepts proposed for possible future use.
They will enhance the defensive fighting positions
from which US base-defense troops would try to ward
off commandos seeking to disable a base."4


Now that the ACE Commander has considered and analyzed

METT-TS-L, he must turn to a unit to carry this operation

through. As I mentioned before MWSS has the task of security

of the airfield; in addition, one can see by Figure 1, that a

MWSS has the personnel and some, though not a lot of weapons

to provide this security.

Click here to view image

However, I would like now to propose a command structure

within a MWSS organization that can accomplish the task of

airfield security.

This command structure would be an ad hoc department and

would only be implemented for wartime or exercises which

require this mission to be performed. This department and

its forces/sections will form the security system for con-

tinued airfield operations and are below in Figure 2.



Click here to view image

The department would be headed by an OIC known as the

Airfield Security Officer (ASO). He is responsible for

implementing the commander's security policy and for the

direction of day-to-day security matters. Within this

department the ASO would be the central point for collecting

and disseminating all information concerning airfield

security.

To accomplish his mission he will:

- Provide required training to security forces.

- Issue necessary SOPs, directives and other such

instructions.

- Requisition essential equipment for security.

- Coordinate the flow of intelligence.6

The Interior Defense Force will man the fixed interior

guard position and will be augmented by a company-size

reaction force. The reaction force should be well trained in

both hostage and bomb incidents. This Interior Defense Force

is organized as a tactical unit and will utilize procedures


that are well established for defense operations. Their

functions include:

- Manning protective positions along the inner

perimeter.

- Engaging and neutralizing enemy attacking forces.

- Assist the military police force at ingress/egress

points.

- Plan and coordinate a tactical deception plan.

- Provide security at sensitive areas such as fuel

and storage dumps.

- Assist the exterior guard force in their obstacle

plan.

- Providing a reaction force in response to enemy

attack.

continued

[wrbones]

continued <br />
<br />
The Exterior Guard Force is responsible for providing <br />
<br />
physical security to control the outer perimeter area. This <br />
<br />
can be accomplished by patrolling and scouting ...

[wrbones]

US Marine Corps
FAST
Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Team

1 FAST conducting room clearing exercise (USMC Photo)

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The USMC's Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Teams (FAST), provide the both US Navy and Marine Corps with a dedicated force protection and anti-terrorist unit.
The late 70's and early 80's were a high water mark for US military counter/anti-terrorist efforts. A series of deadly attacks directed at Americans highlighted the requirement for security forces capable of countering terrorist threats against military units. The President issued a directive ordering US security agencies and all branches of the military to enhance their capabilities in this field.

In compliance with this directive, the USMC conducted an thorough evaluation of its security forces during the mid-eighties. Upon the studies completion, the Corps came to the conclusion that its current security procedures were inadequate to handle the security threats being posed against it. The Corps decided to form a new unit of highly trained Marines dedicated to defending both US Navy and Marine Corps assets from terrorist attack. The new unit was designated as the Fleet Anti-terrorism Security Team, or FAST.

Established in 1987, FAST Companies are equipped to perform security missions as directed by the Chief of Naval Operations. FAST Company Marines augment installation security when a threat condition is elevated beyond the ability of resident and auxiliary security forces. They are not designed to provide a permanent security force for the installation.

The Marine Corps uses FAST Companies to protect forces when a threat level requires it. Each company is well grounded in basic infantry skills.

FAST Companies are primarily designed to conduct defensive combat operations, military security operations, and rear area security operations. They also can be tailored for specific tasks from the Chief of Naval Operations. They also ensure nuclear material on submarines is not compromised when the vessels are docked.

Dedicated, armed, combat-trained cadre
Task organized and equipped to perform security missions of short duration
Augment installation security when the threat condition has been elevated beyond the capability of the permanent security force
Train installation security forces in antiterrorism and weapons marksmanship
Assist the base security officer in the preparation of base defense and other security plans
Requested by combatant and fleet commanders-in-chief
Deploy only upon approval of the Chief of Naval Operations
Since their inception FAST Company marines have seen a heavy operations tempo, being deployed to participate in numerous training, security, and combat operations.
In 1989 elements of 1st FAST were deployed to Rodman Naval Station, Panama as a response to a number of incursions by unknown intruders *(the intruders were believed to be members of a Cuban special operations unit who were attempting to sabotage US POL stockpiles located on the base)*. 1 FAST immediately commenced operations, conducting security patrols around the base perimeter, and establishing ambush positions along known avenues of approach. The FAST marines were successful in deterring further incursions, and on a number of occasions they took intruders, attempting to gain entry to the base, under fire.

On December 21, 1989 the US launched Operation Just Cause, the invasion of Panama. US forces were to secure the country and remove Panamanian military strongman, and the countries defacto leader, from power. Although primarily a US Army, and special operation forces mission, a select number of USMC units were to participate. One of the USMC units selected for the operation was 1st FAST Co.

1st FAST had been operating in Panama for some time providing security at US naval installations; conducting training exercises; and gearing up for any possible terrorist attack directed at USMC or USN facilities in Panama. 1st FAST along with a detachment form the 2nd Light Armored Infantry (LAI) Battalion, another new USMC unit, were to conduct several joint combat missions together. The 2nd LAI det. provided speed, armored protection, and heavy firepower, while 1 FAST provided CQB skills necessary for operating in the tight confines of an urban environment.

During Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield FAST Marines provided additional security to US naval installations in Bahrain.

In January 1991, The US Navy and Marines conducted Operation Sharp Edge, the noncombatant evacuation operation of US and foreign nationals from Liberia. FAST was deployed to relieve the Marine Amphibious Readiness Group that was providing security at the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia, Liberia.

Shortly after the conclusion of Vigilant Warrior, USCENTCOM found itself involved once again in Somalia, this time to cover the withdrawal of UNOSOM II in accordance with a United Nations decision to pull its forces out of that war ravaged country. After the withdrawal of US forces on 25 March 1994, the United States maintained a liaison office in Mogadishu in an attempt to further the process of political reconciliation in Somalia. Security for this office was provided by a Fleet Anti terrorist Security Team (FAST) platoon. As conditions in Mogadishu deteriorated, the liaison office relocated to Nairobi and the FAST platoon redeployed to Mombasa, Kenya, on 15 September 1994, with FAST redeploying to home station three days later.

FAST Platoons also provided security support for the transfer of Cuban migrants from Panama holding areas to Guantanamo Bay during Operation Safe Passage from January to February 1995.

Following the 1996 bombing of a UASF barracks in Saudi Arabia, FAST Marines responded. Elements of FAST Company arrived on the scene and secured several buildings within 10 hours.

During Operation Fairwinds in late 1996, FAST Platoons provided security for Navy Sea Bees and USAF Civil Engineers, work sites, camp sites, and convoys in Haiti.

There are currently two FAST companies, and training unit. 1st FAST Co. is located on Naval Operations Base (NOB), Norfolk, Virginia, and 2nd FAST Co. which is located at Naval Weapons Station, Yorktown, Virginia. Both units operate under the control of the Marine Corps Security Force Battalion located on Naval Air Station, Norfolk, Virginia, The Security Force Battalion Training Company is located on Naval Security Group Activity (NSGA), Northwest, in Chesapeake, Virginia. Each company includes 321 Marines, task-organized based upon mission:


Headquarters element.
Four or five "guard" platoons (one officer and 49+ enlisted men).
Weapons platoon (29-man MG section, 7-man 60mm Mortar section and 13 man SMAW section).
Each platoon has 2-man HQ and 3 16+ man squads (divided into Team Leader and two guard teams).
Each company has Designated Marksmen (DM) who has received specialized marksmanship training at the USMC Designated Marksman School on Dam Neck Naval Training Center in Virginia Beach, Virginia.
All Marines assigned to FAST must have completed the following training:
SOI (School of Infantry).
Security Force School -(NSGA-North West, Chesapeake, VA) (22 Days-Longer for NCOs and officers) - Teaches Combat Marksmanship (shotgun and pistol - all Security Forces are dual armed), Room Clearing, etc.
FAST Training (5 weeks)-(NSGA- NSGA North West, Chesapeake, VA) Additional training in Close Quarters Battle, submachine gun employment (MP-5), etc.
During their many training exercises FAST makes extensive use of Simunition. Simunition is like paintball ammunition, but it can be fired from weapons normally used by the unit instead of plastic guns.
The USMC has seen fit to equip its FAST units with a wide array of weapons, and equipment to help them accomplish their mission. The FAST units arsenal is known to include M-16A2 rifles (some rifles have been fitted with sniper scopes for the units designated marksmen), M-16A2/M-203 40mm grenade launchers, Berretta M-9 9mm pistols (some with attached tactical lights), HK MP-5 9mm SMGs, Colt 9mm SMGs, Remington 870 shotguns, M-249 5.56mm Squad Automatic Weapons (SAWs), M-60 7.62mm GPMGs, Browning .50 Cal. HMGs, MK-19 40mm HMGs ( automatic grenade launchers), 60mm mortars, AT-4 88mm, and SMAW Anti -tank rockets.


Unoffical FAST patch

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Special Operations.Com

USMC Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST)


Unit Profile

U.S. Marine Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST) Company

Dedicated, armed, combat-trained cadre
Task organized and equipped to perform security missions of short duration
Augment installation security when the threat condition has been elevated beyond the capability of the permanent security force
Train installation security forces in antiterrorism and weapons marksmanship
Assist the base security officer in the preparation of base defense and other security plans
Requested by combatant and fleet commanders-in-chief
Deploy only upon approval of the Chief of Naval Operations

Established in 1987, FAST Company is comprised of 500+ Marines equipped to perform security missions as directed by the Chief of Naval Operations. FAST Company Marines augment installation security when a threat condition is elevated beyond the ability of resident and auxiliary security forces. They are not designed to provide a permanent security force for the installation.

FAST Company is primarily designed to conduct defensive combat operations, military security operations, and rear area security operations. It also can be tailored for specific tasks from the Chief of Naval Operations. They also ensure nuclear material on submarines is not compromised when the vessels are docked.

Following the bombing in Saudi Arabia, the threat condition was raised for installations and FAST Marines responded. Based upon site surveys at each location, the Task Force determined that tactics and techniques for protecting entry onto installations varied widely, even among those installations in the same Threat Condition. At Eskan Village, Riyadh, service members entering the base went through two checkpoints. The first was manned by Saudi forces, who checked all members, including U.S., host nation, and Third Country National citizens. The second check point was manned by U.S. forces, who also checked all people. This contrasted with Khobar Towers, where all base entry points were manned by both Saudi and U.S. forces. At Camp Doha, Kuwait, an initial checkpoint several kilometers from the base was manned by both Kuwaiti and U.S. military forces, while the base entry point was manned by armed contract security guards. At Ali Al-Salem Air Base, Kuwait, Bangladeshi military forces, contracted by the government of Kuwait, provided entry control. At the Sahara Residence, a billeting facility in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, entry was controlled by unarmed contract security guards, while at Manai Plaza in Bahrain, another billeting complex, entry was controlled by Marines from the U.S. Marine Corps Fleet Antiterrorist Security Team (FAST) and Bahrainian special forces troops. Entry control at the Administrative Support Unit Bahrain was provided by U.S. Navy and Bahrainian forces, with heavy weapons support from the Marine Fleet Antiterrorist Security Team.

FAST Company has proven itself in more than 70 special security missions and has been in the following operations: Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Sharp Edge (Liberia,) Just Cause (Panama,) Promote Liberty (Panama) and Safe Return in Haiti.

Operation SHARP EDGE in Jan 1991, USMC Fleet Antiterrorist Security Team (FAST) relieved the Marine Amphibious Readiness Group at U.S. Embassy in Monrovia, Liberia providing security.
Shortly after the conclusion of VIGILANT WARRIOR, USCENTCOM found itself involved once again in Somalia, this time to cover the withdrawal of UNOSOM II in accordance with a United Nations decision to pull its forces out of that troubled country. After the withdrawal of US forces on 25 March 1994, the United States maintained a liaison office in Mogadishu in an attempt to further the process of political reconciliation in Somalia. Security for this office was provided by a Fleet Antiterrorist Support Team (FAST) platoon from the Marine Corps Security Force Battalion. As conditions in Mogadishu deteriorated, the liaison office relocated to Nairobi and the FAST platoon redeployed to Mombasa, Kenya, on 15 September 1994, with the latter redeploying to home station three days later. President Clinton announced his decision late in 1994 that US forces would assist in the withdrawal of UNOSOM forces from Somalia.
FAST Platoons also provided security support for the transfer of Cuban migrants from Panama holding areas to Guantanamo Bay during Operation SAFE PASSAGE from January to February 1995.
During Operation FAIRWINDS in late 1996, FAST Platoons provided security for NMCB and USAF Engineer unit, work site, camp site, and convoys in Haiti.



Article

Marine Times
Published: 04-19-99
Category: NEWSLINES
Page: 16

A Marine's Life In The F.A.S.T. Lane

By C. Mark Brinkley


Warning: Marines interested in kicking down doors, shooting anything that moves and taking no prisoners should not join FAST platoons.

They don't do that here.

"We are a specialty team, in that we do one thing and we do it well," said Capt. Andrew Petrucci, physical security officer for Marine Corps Security Forces Battalion in Norfolk, Va. "People hear 'specialty team' and then instantly associate it with Chuck Norris and Rambo."

That's a bad characterization of the Marine Corps' high-speed, high-profile Fleet Antiterrorism Security Teams.

"We're not door-kickers by any stretch of the imagination," Petrucci said. "We emphasize 'deter, detect and defend' against terrorist attacks."

That means that FAST teams usually deploy quickly to a high-threat region to enhance the security already there, such as the Marine Security Guard force at an overseas embassy.

Or, it could mean flying to Alaska to guard a nuclear submarine against sabotage, as was the case in March, when FAST Marines participated in Exercise Northern Edge.

Becoming FAST

That may sound like the mission statement for a run-of-the-mill security force, but FAST puts a different twist on it.

Most Marines in the Corps' nine security force companies and two FAST companies are junior Marines locked into a two-year security forces contract. They each begin with infantry training, and are later sent to the basic security guard course in Chesapeake, Va.

Those selected for security force duty will deploy to their new homes and spend their time guarding a specific base or cache of weapons.

But those selected for FAST platoons -- and Marine officials say it really is the luck of the draw -- receive even more security guard training at the company and platoon levels, and spend their time guarding anything they are told to look after.

Responding FAST

Because they are spread across the globe, FAST Marines can be sent anywhere in the world within 24 hours. The length of their stay is determined by the mission, Marine officials said, but the average FAST Marine spent about 150 days on the road in 1998.

"If you like to deploy and go out with real bullets, this is the job for you," Petrucci said.

But don't go expecting to go on offense.

FAST officials are quick to point out that their anti-terrorism job doesn't involve counter-terrorism missions -- like crashing through skylights, Delta Force-style, to rescue hostages and kill terrorists -- but instead includes preventing such incidents.

"We are defensive in nature," Petrucci said. "Site security is our bread and butter."

Occasionally, as with the embassy bombings in Africa last year, FAST Marines are asked to help get a bad situation back under control.

The 1998 bombings left sensitive documents literally blown into the street, available for the taking of any passersby.

"You've only got so many Marine Security Guards there," said one FAST Marine. "At a time like that, they can't protect everything."

While the companies advertise little in the way of offense, about a dozen Marines from each platoon are typically trained in close-quarters combat, Marine officials said.

But putting those skills to use often means the defensive mission has failed.

"We're like a mobile guard force," the FAST Marine said. "We go to a high-threat area and set up security, but we have to be ready for all types of situations. You never know what's going to happen out there."

Organizing FAST

FAST platoon commanders are usually captains from combat-arms fields, Petrucci said, and there is rarely a shortage of volunteers asking the monitors for the assignments.

Each platoon also has a staff non-commissioned officer, three or four sergeants and three or four corporals, all of whom usually come from the Fleet Marine Force.

Women may be assigned to Marine Corps Security Forces Battalion, but because they are excluded from most combat-arms MOSs, none serve in the FAST platoons.

All told, about 500 enlisted Marines and 20 officers are divided into 11 platoons -- six at 1st FAST Company in Norfolk and five at 2nd FAST Company in Yorktown, Va.

The FAST Deployment Program, very similar to the Unit Deployment Program that rotates Fleet Marine Force units to Okinawa Japan, keeps three platoons deployed to Bahrain, Italy and Japan.

Every six months, a platoon from 2nd FAST will relieve a platoon from 1st FAST -- or vice versa -- at each of the three locations.

Each deployed platoon supports the fleet commander, a Navy admiral, in that area.

Additionally, one platoon at each U.S. location is always on alert, Marine officials said, for the possibility of being called to action by the commander in chief of U.S. Atlantic Fleet.





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