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thedrifter
11-01-02, 08:04 AM
http://www.mca-marines.org/Leatherneck/hook.jpg

In the early fighting for the Hook, these leathernecks and corpsmen awaited the word to move out into "no man's land" fronting the Hook. The situation deteriorated as the Chinese launched massive human wave assaults in their attempts to eliminate the Marine salient. (USMC photo)

Korea 1952


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By Maj Allan C. Bevilacqua, USMC (Ret)

Salient: "a salient angle or part, as the central outward-projecting edge of a bastion or an outward projection in a battle line." – Webster's Unabridged Dictionary

For the men defending it, a salient is bad news. More men are required to defend a salient than to hold a straight line. Jutting out into enemy territory, the defenders are forced to adopt a fire plan that causes their fires to diverge outward fanlike, making concentrated fire difficult. On the other hand, the enemy outside the salient is able to direct converging fire into it, making maximum use of concentration of fire. The defender of a salient easily can feel that he is being shot at from every direction. Any salient violates the axiom that "the main line of resistance (MLR) should not have sharp angles or salients."

Located at the far right of the First Marine Division's sector of the Jamestown Line, hard by the division's junction with the British Commonwealth Division, the Hook in October of 1952 was just such a salient. Looking like an upside-down letter "U," the Hook marked the northernmost portion of the MLR before the line dropped sharply to the southeast to meet the British Commonwealth Division at the Samichon Gang (River). "Exposed" is a word that comes to mind when considering the Hook.


Why defend it? There was no other terrain that could be defended. Korea is a country of hills, and the MLR had to take advantage of those hills where they were found. Major General M. M. Austin-Roberts-West, commanding general of the British Commonwealth Division, summed up the importance of the Hook: "Had the Hook been lost, a withdrawal of four thousand yards would have been necessary."


The loss of the Hook and a withdrawal of more than two miles would drive a deep wedge between the 1stMarDiv and the British Commonwealth Division. The Chinese would be dangerously close to the Imjin River and the Wonsan-Seoul Corridor, the only natural east-west terrain corridor in all of Korea. The road to Seoul would be wide open. That was exactly what the Chinese had in mind. However, they would have to do something they had never before attempted. They would have to attack the MLR itself. The Hook was a piece of bad news that had to be held.


In the last days of October that job fell to Colonel Thomas C. Moore Jr.'s Seventh Marine Regiment, a regiment that was strung out mighty thinly. From the burned-out village of Toryom, the regiment's left boundary, to the junction with the British Commonwealth Division on the right, the MLR stretched for 10,000 yards, a frontage more appropriate for a division. Col Moore was forced to deploy all three of his battalions on line, with only a single company held as regimental reserve. Holding the most critical sector, the Hook and its vicinity, was Lieutenant Colonel Leo J. Dulacki's 1st Battalion.


Across the way were two Chinese regiments, the 356th and 357th of the 119th Division, some 7,000 men in all. Backing up these two regiments were an estimated 10 battalions of artillery, fielding 120 guns ranging from 76 mm to 152 mm. More than 60 percent of all Chinese artillery on the Western Front was deployed opposite the 7th Marines. The Chinese artillerymen were supplied abundantly with shells of all calibers. While Marines were held to a daily ration of hundreds of rounds, the Chinese were able to expend thousands.


They began doing just that on 23 Oct., pouring volley after volley into the Hook and its two forward outposts, Ronson and Warsaw. The constant shelling went on for the next two days, the beginning of more than 34,000 rounds … 34,000 rounds! … the Chinese would fire during the fighting for the Hook.


The Marine defenses were reduced to rubble. Trenches were obliterated, bunkers collapsed, protective wire shredded. Hunkering down under constant shellfire all day, the defenders of Ronson, Warsaw and the Hook, assisted by Korean Service Corps workers, labored throughout the nights, digging out trench lines, rebuilding bunkers, stringing wire.


Faster than the defensive positions could be rebuilt, they were blown apart. After three days of never-ending shelling there were no discernable defenses left, only small groups of Marines crouching in shell craters and the blasted remnants of trenches and fighting holes.

Shortly after 1800 on 26 Oct., massed ranks of Chinese infantry threw themselves at Ronson, Warsaw and the Hook. The lone Marine squad from Captain Paul B. Byrum's "Charlie" Company, 1st Bn, 7th Marines holding Ronson had no chance. All contact with Ronson was lost 20 minutes after the assault began. None of the Marines on Ronson were seen ever again.


Warsaw, defended by Second Lieutenant John Babson Jr.'s 3d Platoon from Capt Frederick C. McLaughlin's Able/1/7, held out a bit longer. Assailed by the 9th Co, 3d Bn, 357th Regt, the understrength platoon on Warsaw struck back viciously. Still, the Marine numbers on Warsaw were finite. The Chinese, on the other hand, were able to feed more and more men into the fight.


By 1820, 2dLt Babson was forced to call for "box me in" fires as the Chinese assaulted Warsaw from all directions. At 1907, as a relief force was about to be sent forward, Warsaw reported enemy troops in what was left of the forward bunkers. Fighting was hand to hand, Marines battling Chinese with rifles, pistols, grenades, fighting knives, entrenching tools and bare fists.


Three minutes later LtCol Dulacki's headquarters received the message, "We're being overrun" from 2dLt Babson. Shortly after that Babson requested VT (variable time) airbursts directly over Warsaw. That was the last word from Warsaw.

http://www.mca-marines.org/Leatherneck/HookArch.htm

Sempers,

Roger

Barndog
11-01-02, 10:45 AM
A lil FYI - my Korean Bro Ken - Sgt Ken (as Joe T - 0311) calls him ... in fact we're all gettin together today around 1400 for beers.
Ken fought in the Hook. I am truly honored to have Marines like Ken, my Father and Joe T around.

Semper fvcking FI