gunnyg
10-30-02, 04:11 PM
From: Stars and Stripes, European Edition (Quoted in AIM Newsletter of
30 Oct 02)
Letter to Stars and Stripes magazine on Gen. Wesley Clark (Ret.)
By Col. George Jatras (Ret.)
October 17, 2002
The article "Still no decision on Kosovo medal" (Oct. 8) said
"Pentagon brass" ensured a waiver was granted so that Gen. Wesley Clark
received the Kosovo Campaign Medal, the first one minted, at his
retirement ceremony in 2000. The waiver was necessary because Gen.
Clark's service didn't meet the criteria for the award, even though he
led the international alliance in its "78-day blitz" against Yugoslavia.
An earlier article, "Army can't explain how Clark got medal" (June 16,
2001) said, "The Army is at a loss to explain who granted a waiver
awarding retired Gen. Wesley Clark the Kosovo Campaign Medal," and that,
"After four months of repeated queries, Army officials say they're still
not sure who approved the medal."
To date, we still don't know who granted Gen. Clark the waiver. I
guess that's one of the unsolvable mysteries of that era, like law firm
billing records. In the meantime, as the story said, thousands of others
who supported the campaign at bases in England, Spain, Germany, Turkey
and even the United States are still waiting to learn if waivers for
their eligibility will be approved.
As a Vietnam combat veteran who had "awards and decorations" as
an additional duty, I can understand the intricacies of determining who
deserves the medal. Given the scope of the campaign, virtually everyone
in the military, active and Reserve, contributed in some way. If the
criterion is based on a combat zone defined as "in and around the
Balkans," Gen. Clark certainly does not deserve the medal, even given
that vague definition of the combat zone. Gen. Clark led the campaign
from Mons, Belgium. If the waiver was based on Gen. Clark's contribution
to the campaign being more important than that of the ground support
troops at places such as Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany, or Whiteman Air
Base, Mo., then maybe we should look at just what his contribution was.
In his book "Waging Modern War," Gen. Clark wrote about his fury
to learn that Russian peacekeepers had entered the airport at Pristina,
Kosovo, before British or American forces. In the article "The guy who
almost started World War III," (Aug. 3, 1999), The Guardian (U.K.)
wrote, "No sooner are we told by Britain's top generals that the
Russians played a crucial role in ending the west's war against
Yugoslavia than we learn that if NATO's supreme commander, the American
General Wesley Clark, had had his way, British paratroopers would have
stormed Pristina airport, threatening to unleash the most frightening
crisis with Moscow since the end of the Cold War. 'I'm not going to
start the third world war for you', General Sir Mike Jackson, commander
of the international KFOR peacekeeping force, is reported to have told
Gen. Clark when he refused to accept an order to send assault troops to
prevent Russian troops from taking over the airfield of Kosovo's
provincial capital."
Gen. Clark's buddy in Kosovo was Hashim Thaci, the leader of the
Kosovo Liberation Army, which, according to the Belfast News Letter
(Northern Ireland) of July 30, is engaged in sex slavery, prostitution,
murder, kidnapping and drugs. The Daily Telegraph reported on Feb. 19
that "European drug squad officers say Albanian and Kosovo Albanian
dealers are ruthlessly trying to seize control of the European heroin
market, worth up to $27 billion a year, and have taken over the trade in
at least six European countries."
Another Clark buddy was Agim Ceku, who commanded Croatia's army
during "Operation Storm," when ethnic Serbs were driven out of their
ancestral homes in the Krajina region of Croatia in 1995 in what
columnist Charles Krauthammer described in Newsweek on April 5, 1999, as
"the largest ethnic cleansing of the entire Balkans wars." This is the
same Gen. Ceku who commanded the KLA.
The shortsightedness of Gen. Clark's consorting with KLA thugs,
whom he is largely responsible for putting into power in Kosovo, is
borne out by the Washington Times article "Kosovo Albanian attitudes
change; Some see U.N., NATO as foes." (Sept. 21). It said, "Where once
NATO troops were greeted with cheers, those cheers have now changed to
anger and occasionally violent protests since the arrest of several
leaders of the former Kosovo Liberation Army."
As for his ability as a military leader, Gen. Clark failed on two
counts - the air campaign and his plan for a ground campaign. While the
questionable effectiveness of the air campaign was not solely his
responsibility, his acquiescence to the strategy and his cover-up of the
results detailed in the Newsweek story "Kosovo Cover Up" (May 15, 2000)
are testimony to his dedication to power and career. As for a ground
war, which Gen. Clark admits that he favored, he insists that he could
have conducted a successful ground war in Kosovo by sending Apache
helicopters and ground troops through the mountain passes between
Albania and Kosovo, a plan which was described to me by an Apache pilot
as a "hare-brained" idea. Gen. Clark planned to support the Apaches with
"50,000 Albanian troops," a statement he personally made to me at a
Washington, D.C., book signing. There's no doubt that a ground war with
the might of 19 NATO nations eventually would have been successful. But
at what cost and why? To feed Gen. Clark's ego and ambition!
If Gen. Clark had had his way, we might have gone to war with
Russia, or at least resurrected vestiges of the Cold War. And we
certainly would have had hundreds if not thousands of casualties in an
ill-conceived ground war.
Col. David Hackworth, in his 1999 commentary "Defending America,"
wrote of Clark: "Known by those who've served with him as the 'Ultimate
Perfumed Prince,' he's far more comfortable in a drawing room discussing
political theories than hunkering down in the trenches where bullets fly
and soldiers die."
In my opinion, Gen. Clark is the kind of general we saw too often
during the Vietnam War and hoped never to see again in a position of
responsibility for the lives of our GIs and the security of our nation.
That it happened once again we can thank that other Rhodes scholar from
Arkansas.
Col. George Jatras (Ret.)
Sterling, Va
30 Oct 02)
Letter to Stars and Stripes magazine on Gen. Wesley Clark (Ret.)
By Col. George Jatras (Ret.)
October 17, 2002
The article "Still no decision on Kosovo medal" (Oct. 8) said
"Pentagon brass" ensured a waiver was granted so that Gen. Wesley Clark
received the Kosovo Campaign Medal, the first one minted, at his
retirement ceremony in 2000. The waiver was necessary because Gen.
Clark's service didn't meet the criteria for the award, even though he
led the international alliance in its "78-day blitz" against Yugoslavia.
An earlier article, "Army can't explain how Clark got medal" (June 16,
2001) said, "The Army is at a loss to explain who granted a waiver
awarding retired Gen. Wesley Clark the Kosovo Campaign Medal," and that,
"After four months of repeated queries, Army officials say they're still
not sure who approved the medal."
To date, we still don't know who granted Gen. Clark the waiver. I
guess that's one of the unsolvable mysteries of that era, like law firm
billing records. In the meantime, as the story said, thousands of others
who supported the campaign at bases in England, Spain, Germany, Turkey
and even the United States are still waiting to learn if waivers for
their eligibility will be approved.
As a Vietnam combat veteran who had "awards and decorations" as
an additional duty, I can understand the intricacies of determining who
deserves the medal. Given the scope of the campaign, virtually everyone
in the military, active and Reserve, contributed in some way. If the
criterion is based on a combat zone defined as "in and around the
Balkans," Gen. Clark certainly does not deserve the medal, even given
that vague definition of the combat zone. Gen. Clark led the campaign
from Mons, Belgium. If the waiver was based on Gen. Clark's contribution
to the campaign being more important than that of the ground support
troops at places such as Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany, or Whiteman Air
Base, Mo., then maybe we should look at just what his contribution was.
In his book "Waging Modern War," Gen. Clark wrote about his fury
to learn that Russian peacekeepers had entered the airport at Pristina,
Kosovo, before British or American forces. In the article "The guy who
almost started World War III," (Aug. 3, 1999), The Guardian (U.K.)
wrote, "No sooner are we told by Britain's top generals that the
Russians played a crucial role in ending the west's war against
Yugoslavia than we learn that if NATO's supreme commander, the American
General Wesley Clark, had had his way, British paratroopers would have
stormed Pristina airport, threatening to unleash the most frightening
crisis with Moscow since the end of the Cold War. 'I'm not going to
start the third world war for you', General Sir Mike Jackson, commander
of the international KFOR peacekeeping force, is reported to have told
Gen. Clark when he refused to accept an order to send assault troops to
prevent Russian troops from taking over the airfield of Kosovo's
provincial capital."
Gen. Clark's buddy in Kosovo was Hashim Thaci, the leader of the
Kosovo Liberation Army, which, according to the Belfast News Letter
(Northern Ireland) of July 30, is engaged in sex slavery, prostitution,
murder, kidnapping and drugs. The Daily Telegraph reported on Feb. 19
that "European drug squad officers say Albanian and Kosovo Albanian
dealers are ruthlessly trying to seize control of the European heroin
market, worth up to $27 billion a year, and have taken over the trade in
at least six European countries."
Another Clark buddy was Agim Ceku, who commanded Croatia's army
during "Operation Storm," when ethnic Serbs were driven out of their
ancestral homes in the Krajina region of Croatia in 1995 in what
columnist Charles Krauthammer described in Newsweek on April 5, 1999, as
"the largest ethnic cleansing of the entire Balkans wars." This is the
same Gen. Ceku who commanded the KLA.
The shortsightedness of Gen. Clark's consorting with KLA thugs,
whom he is largely responsible for putting into power in Kosovo, is
borne out by the Washington Times article "Kosovo Albanian attitudes
change; Some see U.N., NATO as foes." (Sept. 21). It said, "Where once
NATO troops were greeted with cheers, those cheers have now changed to
anger and occasionally violent protests since the arrest of several
leaders of the former Kosovo Liberation Army."
As for his ability as a military leader, Gen. Clark failed on two
counts - the air campaign and his plan for a ground campaign. While the
questionable effectiveness of the air campaign was not solely his
responsibility, his acquiescence to the strategy and his cover-up of the
results detailed in the Newsweek story "Kosovo Cover Up" (May 15, 2000)
are testimony to his dedication to power and career. As for a ground
war, which Gen. Clark admits that he favored, he insists that he could
have conducted a successful ground war in Kosovo by sending Apache
helicopters and ground troops through the mountain passes between
Albania and Kosovo, a plan which was described to me by an Apache pilot
as a "hare-brained" idea. Gen. Clark planned to support the Apaches with
"50,000 Albanian troops," a statement he personally made to me at a
Washington, D.C., book signing. There's no doubt that a ground war with
the might of 19 NATO nations eventually would have been successful. But
at what cost and why? To feed Gen. Clark's ego and ambition!
If Gen. Clark had had his way, we might have gone to war with
Russia, or at least resurrected vestiges of the Cold War. And we
certainly would have had hundreds if not thousands of casualties in an
ill-conceived ground war.
Col. David Hackworth, in his 1999 commentary "Defending America,"
wrote of Clark: "Known by those who've served with him as the 'Ultimate
Perfumed Prince,' he's far more comfortable in a drawing room discussing
political theories than hunkering down in the trenches where bullets fly
and soldiers die."
In my opinion, Gen. Clark is the kind of general we saw too often
during the Vietnam War and hoped never to see again in a position of
responsibility for the lives of our GIs and the security of our nation.
That it happened once again we can thank that other Rhodes scholar from
Arkansas.
Col. George Jatras (Ret.)
Sterling, Va