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thedrifter
05-10-05, 12:27 PM
May 16, 2005

Flawed body armor
Corps recalls more than 5,000 vests that experts rejected — but some remain in the field

By Christian Lowe
Times staff writer


The Marine Corps issued to nearly 10,000 troops body armor that government experts urged the Corps to reject after tests revealed critical, life-threatening flaws in the vests.
In all, the Marine Corps accepted about 19,000 Interceptor outer tactical vests from Point Blank Body Armor Inc. that failed government tests due to “multiple complete penetrations” of 9mm pistol rounds, failing scores on other ballistic or quality-assurance tests, or a combination of the two.

“Since these are lifesaving pieces of equipment and are being used in support of the Iraq war, I urge immediate action since this technical office has little confidence in the performance of the items to provide the contracted levels of protection as defined in the performance specification,” wrote ballistics expert James MacKiewicz in a memorandum rejecting two lots of vests on July 19, 2004.

MacKiewicz is responsible for verifying that each production lot of Marine vests meets protective requirements and other quality standards. He works at the Army Soldier Systems Center in Natick, Mass., and has 18 years of experience with ballistics and armor systems.

A second government agency, the Defense Contract Management Agency, backed Natick’s conclusion and also recommended against the waivers.

“Anything less than full compliance for a safety item such as the [Interceptor body armor] is unacceptable,” DCMA wrote in a 2004 memo recommending that the Corps reject the vests.

But according to documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act and interviews with officials at Natick, the Marine Corps and Point Blank, the service rejected that advice. Instead, the Marine program manager responsible for fielding the vests, Lt. Col. Gabriel Patricio, and Point Blank’s chief operating officer, Sandra Hatfield, signed waivers that allowed the Corps to buy and distribute vests that failed to meet the Corps’ minimum standards and specifications.

Faced with the imminent publication of this story, the result of an eight-month investigation by Marine Corps Times, the Marine Corps on May 4 issued a Corpswide message recalling 5,277 Interceptor vests from 11 lots that failed government ballistic performance tests — slightly more than half the total vests issued to Marines from questionable lots.

The Corps has not said what it intends to do with the more than 4,000 other vests the testers urged to be rejected that are now being worn by Marines. Nor has it said what it will do with the remaining 10,000 that it accepted over the objections of the test labs but which haven’t been fielded.

Despite signed waivers acknowledging that the vests were substandard, the Marine Corps questioned the accuracy of the government test results all along. The Corps pulled samples from some of the challenged lots and had them tested at a private, commercial lab.

Patricio and other officials with Marine Corps Systems Command at Quantico, Va., said the second tests show that the vests meet safety standards and do not put Marines at increased risk of injury.

“I did not ignore warnings or advice from my staff. I simply looked at all the factors involved as the program manager and made the decision that I needed to make based on all the information that I had,” Patricio said in a May 3 telephone interview. “The decision was mine and within my immediate authority as program manager” to waiver and accept the rejected vests. Patricio recently retired from the Corps and now works as an independent acquisitions consultant.

While each vest has a unique serial number on it, Point Blank would not provide a list of serial numbers from the lots Natick said should be rejected. Point Blank said that information was “proprietary.”

Corps officials initially would not provide lot or serial number data to Marine Corps Times; when Patricio was asked in the May 3 interview if he could locate the vests and recall them if ordered to do so, a Corps spokesman abruptly ended the interview and hung up.

But a day later, the Marine Corps listed the serial numbers that correspond to the 11 production lots in a Corpswide message the service is calling a “precautionary recall.”

The message did not state how Marines could determine whether their vest belongs to one of the nine other production lots that didn’t pass muster at Natick.

The Corps faces serious challenges in even locating the vests it plans to pull back. Because lot numbers, serial numbers and other manufacturing data are handwritten on body armor labels, the writing is sometimes smeared, faded or otherwise illegible.

The commander of Marine Corps Systems Command, Brig. Gen. William Catto, refused to be interviewed. But in a written statement, he acknowledged that problem, saying “every effort will be made to locate the waived vests, with the understanding that some may not be detectable due to normal wear and tear or other reasons associated with deployed conditions.”

The Army also buys body armor from Point Blank, but service officials said they have bought several versions of the Point Blank vest and that they never accepted vests from lots that failed testing.

Facing two upcoming seven-month rotations of about 25,000 leathernecks to Iraq and ongoing deployments to Afghanistan, field commanders urged Systems Command to supply their units with vests, command officials said.

“At this critical moment, are we sure these are bad lots? Are these lots that we’re sure we do not want to put into the fight? … That’s a judgment call,” said Lt. Col. Shawn Reinwald, director of combat equipment and support systems for Systems Command. Reinwald was Patricio’s boss briefly after joining Systems Command in late 2004.

“Had we had a lot of schedule to play with, we might have slowed down. … The schedule was bearing down on us.”

Deployment demands

The judgment call fell to Patricio, who over 10 months last year would waive and accept at least 20 lots of outer tactical vests that didn’t pass muster with government testers.

Systems Command did not inform field commanders about the waivers when the equipment was distributed, Reinwald said.

Patricio said he briefed Catto in February 2004 when the first waivers were issued, as well as in subsequent meetings on procurement of various types of armor to protect Marines and their equipment from the growing threat of insurgent attacks in Iraq.

In his written statement, Catto said he agreed with the decision to issue the waivers.

“I concurred with the program manager’s decision to waive the 11 lots in order to rapidly replace the PASGT flaks with a superior, advanced body-armor system,” Catto said in the statement. “Due to the massive deployment associated with [Operation Iraqi Freedom], this was considered to be an urgent need, and was deemed to be in the best interest of deployed Marines at that time.”

Both Reinwald and Patricio said the notion of redistributing Interceptor vests already fielded among deploying forces was considered, but deemed too difficult to execute in time for the deployments.

“This was one of these situations where they’re screaming for these OTVs [and] these guys have to get them,” Reinwald said. “At that time, we had the operational requirement that we didn’t have the schedule to play with.”

The waivers came at a time when U.S. forces were facing increased risk from roadside bombs, ambushes and intense urban combat. The military rushed to field the Interceptor armor to all its troops, not just those typically involved in close combat, pushing the vests to the field as quickly as they were produced.

Systems Command officials responsible for developing and issuing the Interceptor vests argue that since the vest is worn in concert with the armor insert plates, the combined system offers more protection than the older personnel armor system for ground troops, or PASGT, that it replaced.

The Interceptor outer vest protects the wearer against 9mm rounds and shrapnel; a pair of armor insert plates offer additional protection against small-arms fire up to 7.62mm. Interceptor affords 10 percent greater protection against shrapnel threats than the PASGT vests, according to Army officials.

All vests stand some chance of failing, but the vests issued to Marines from waivered lots have a greater chance of being penetrated than vests that met Natick’s test criteria, experts there said.

“You have an increased risk of ballistic incident — statistically” with these vests, said Bob Kinney, director of the individual protection office at Natick. Kinney has worked on individual protection equipment such as chemical and biological defense suits and body armor at Natick for more than two decades.

The Marine Corps has been buying its Interceptor body armor vests through the Army’s Soldier Systems Center since 1999. Natick manages the contract and tests random samples of each production lot at Aberdeen Test Center, Md., to ensure the vests meet specifications. Aberdeen is the Army’s chartered agency for ballistic quality assurance verification. The Army does not conduct its testing at Aberdeen, however, instead using commercial labs because of their independence from the service and the speed with which they deliver test results.

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thedrifter
05-10-05, 12:27 PM
The Marine Corps’ assertion that the 19,000 vests meet ballistic specifications is based in part on results from additional tests conducted at a private test lab, H.P. White of Street, Md.

Systems Command subjected some of the rejected lots — a batch comprising about 8,000 vests — to additional testing at H.P. White and obtained results that command officials said were satisfactory.

But the ballistics experts at Natick recommended against fielding any vests until they could identify and resolve the larger issue behind the vests’ declining quality.

“Based on ballistic test data and previously identified quality assurance failures, I do not recommend acceptance of these lots and do not recommend acceptance of future lots until this issue is resolved,” MacKiewicz wrote in an August 24, 2004, memo failing two lots.

The memo is one of many that MacKiewicz drafted from as early as January 2003, warning of poor ballistic test results and recommending the Marine Corps solve the problem before shipping any more vests to its troops.

It is unclear whether any Marine casualties in Iraq have resulted from shrapnel or bullets that have penetrated vests distributed from the lots in question. A data sample from the Navy/Marine Corps Combat Trauma Registry provided by the Marine Corps shows that of 692 Marines wounded in Iraq between March 2004 and January 2005, eight were struck on the vest, and only two were penetrated: a fragment from a rocket-propelled grenade and shrapnel from a roadside bomb.

The Interceptor body armor has been credited across the services with saving thousands of lives.

The Army and Marine Corps fielded Interceptor body armor in limited quantities during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and ramped up production and fielding for Operation Iraqi Freedom and its aftermath. By the time the Iraq war began in March 2003, the Corps had distributed 131,300 vests and 71,000 armor plates. As of November of that year, an additional 12,200 vests and 12,400 plates had been distributed.

One beneficiary of that increased production: Point Blank Body Armor, a subsidiary of New York-based DHB Industries, which has expanded dramatically to meet the demand. In less than three months in early 2004, the company opened two new manufacturing plants in Florida, expanding its operations to meet the Army and Marines’ demand for more than 1 million vests.

Buying vests and armor

As program manager, it fell to Patricio to purchase more than 190,000 Interceptor vests and armor plates for the Corps.

During his tenure at Systems Command, the logistics officer handled at least two high-profile acquisition programs.

Patricio led the development of the new pixel-pattern combat utility uniform that debuted to rave reviews in January 2002. Later, he oversaw the pack evaluation process that yielded the new Individual Load Bearing Equipment rucksack. That pack, the Corps’ replacement for the failed Modular, Lightweight Load-bearing Equipment, or MOLLE, system, was unveiled in August 2003. “This is a guy who can get things done,” said Reinwald of Patricio.

And that’s just what the Corps needed in late 2003.

Facing mounting pressure to acquire body armor quickly because of upcoming deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, and armed with the final orders to close out the Corps’ vest procurement plan, Patricio had little maneuver room on the vest program.

The first vest failures had come to light in mid-January 2003, as officials with Point Blank notified Marine contract officers of problems at their Oakland Park, Fla., test facility. Hatfield told Marine Corps Times the failures stemmed from improper testing equipment at their ballistic lab.

Over the next year, Natick officials assumed responsibility for testing vests from Point Blank as they investigated why the original failures occurred.

In December 2003, contract officers and testers discovered that multiple vests from two other lots failed ballistic tests, this time at the Aberdeen facility.

Vests from lots 69-9 and 69-12 suffered multiple penetrations of 9mm bullets at speeds below 1,525 feet per second. When gauging performance of a vest against that contract benchmark, testers expect that rounds will penetrate half of the time.

Those penetrations were of particular concern because previous tests yielded passing results at an average velocity of 1,620 feet per second, well above the contract benchmark, according to a document written by Mike Codega, a technical representative at Natick who worked with MacKiewicz on the Marine vest program. Also a point of concern was the complete penetration of a vest from lot 69-12. This one was below 1,450 feet per second, a speed at which no vest penetration should occur.

“I recommended we do more testing to validate or to confirm or to find out what happened,” MacKiewicz said in an April 8 interview at Natick. “And as I continued to test, I got more failures … it continued, it didn’t stop. Which is strange because we had had about four years of experience where we had no problem whatsoever.”

In further tests of lots 69-9 and 69-12, as well as four additional lots, MacKiewicz and his colleagues noticed a continued decline in the Point Blank armor’s ballistic strength. Some of the vests were also showing deep indentations — though not penetrations — at speeds that, taken together with the full penetrations in earlier lots and the fact that the indentations were deeper than they should have been, prompted testers to raise a red flag.

“It shouldn’t have happened … because it was a known system for four years and the results were very high” during previous tests on earlier lots, MacKiewicz said. “To get results that low was very concerning — it was odd to us.”

When presented with the evidence of failures and the testers’ worries, Patricio questioned Aberdeen’s test procedures. In late 2003, in an effort to determine whether testing methodology there was to blame, Patricio brought in H.P. White, the commercial ballistics testing company, to review those same lots.

An Aberdeen Test Center spokeswoman declined to comment on doubts about the testing results and methodology expressed by Point Blank and the Marine Corps.

In reviewing results from both facilities, Patricio wondered why samples from the same lot were passing at H.P. White and at Point Blank’s test site but not at Aberdeen, according to Patricio’s waiver request for lots 69-9 and 69-12 and other documents.

“H.P. White and the contractor’s range have produced passing results for the lots in question while ATC’s data fails the lots,” Patricio wrote in a Feb. 2, 2004, memo explaining his waiver of lots 69-9 and 69-12. “This matter will not be resolved until the Natick technical representatives are able to make a determination regarding the underlying factors of the conflicting data.”

In the memo, Patricio pointed the finger at Aberdeen’s test procedures and asked MacKiewicz and his team to evaluate testing at all three locations to “determine the causes of the discrepancies and correct the inconsistencies.”

“Failing or passing anything — that’s a matter of some testing procedures and interpretations,” Patricio said in the May 3 interview.

Point Blank officials agree with Patricio, saying the vests did not fail follow-up tests at independent labs and were therefore safe to field.

Hatfield, however, refused to name any of the sources who she said verified the performance of the failed lots.

“We see no reason to be concerned that the quality has deteriorated or that the performance has deteriorated in any fashion,” said Hatfield, Point Blank’s chief operating officer, in an April 20 interview at her Pompano Beach production facility in Florida.

Natick officials who investigated the test procedures at Aberdeen and H.P. White found no differences in the test procedures that would cause such divergent test results.

“No issues … relating to instrumentation, test procedure or test facility set-up was found,” Codega wrote in the memo reviewing the failure of lots 69-9 and 69-12.

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thedrifter
05-10-05, 12:27 PM
In fact, said H.P. White President Donald Dunn in an interview, in many cases his test facility fails products that Aberdeen Test Center has previously passed, arguing that his testing procedures are...

thedrifter
05-10-05, 08:45 PM
Marines Insist Vests Offer Designed Protection <br />
American Forces Press Service <br />
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WASHINGTON, May 10, 2005 – The Marine Corps flatly rejects charges that the protective vests issued to thousands of...

thedrifter
05-15-05, 06:07 AM
Corps: recalled armor passed ultimate test -- combat
Submitted by: MCB Camp Pendleton
Story Identification #: 2005512164935
Story by Sgt. Luis R. Agostini



MARINE CORPS BASE CAMP PENDLETON, Calif. (May 12, 2005) -- More than 5,000 units of body armor issued last year to Marines deploying to Operation Iraqi Freedom were indeed substandard -- but were combat-worthy enough to save lives on the battlefield, according to Marine Corps statements issued in the past week.

While acknowledging that more than 5,000 units of body armor issued to Marines headed for Iraq last year yielded "lower than contracted test results," the vests protected Marines on the battlefield and constituted a "significant improvement" over previous generations of protective armor, the statements from Marine Corps Systems Command asserted.

Not one Camp Pendleton-based Marine or sailor deployed to the war on terrorism last year without sufficient body armor, a I Marine Expeditionary Force supply officer said Tuesday.

Lt. Col. David C. Blasko, a supply operations officer with I MEF, echoed Marine Corps Systems Command officials in response to a Marine Corps Times article reporting that some troops deployed to Iraq with substandard body armor.

After a recent precautionary recall of 5,277 sets of body armor, I MEF will inventory outer tactical vests issued to Marines and sailors who deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom last year.

"Initially, we outfitted about 26,000 personnel for OIF (with body armor), which constitutes 52,000 SAPI plates. The MEF had about 17,000 SAPI plates from (the previous deployment to Iraq), when we started preparing for (last year's deployment)," Blasko said.

The outer tactical vest is the base component of the Interceptor Body Armor System that also includes Small Arms Protective Inserts (SAPI) that protect against direct fire from assault rifles, and the Armor Protection Enhancement System (APES), which guards the neck, arms and groin.

The recall, initiated by the Quantico, Va.-based Marine Corps Systems Command, was a response to the Marine Corps Times article by Christian Lowe published Monday. It reported that the Corps knowingly issued substandard body armor to Marines and sailors deploying in support of the Global War on Terrorism. The article also cast doubt on whether the outer tactical vests can stop a 9mm round.

A May 9 statement from Marine Corps Systems Command "categorically maintains that these (outer tactical vests) are capable of defeating the 9mm threat for which they are designed."

The statement also explained the voluntary recall:

"Because we knew this article was forthcoming and would sow seeds of doubt in the minds of Marines in active combat, we concluded the only way to rapidly remove these doubts was to recall the vests in question."

The body armor "was urgently needed" and fielded when Marines were ordered back into Iraq in spring 2004, the statement said. The outer tactical vests replaced the outdated Personnel Armor System for Ground Troops (PASGT) flak jacket, according to the statement.

The vests were issued after testing to provide the "best available" protection as Marines rotated into harm's way, the statement read.

"This system is the most revolutionary personal protection system fielded to warriors in the past several decades," the statement asserted.

Marines should not return the body armor, which is still classified as "serviceable," until replacements are available, according to an All-Marine administrative message released May 4.

According to the statement, "present combat operations preclude us from retesting at this time to prove to our Marines these vests are effective. Therefore, we initiated the recall."

Of the approximately 19,000 vests the Marine Corps Times article addresses, 5,277 are subject to recall. Of the remaining 14,000 vests, 10,000 have never been accepted or fielded by the Marine Corps, according to the statement.

That leaves 4,000 vests, approximately 3,000 of which passed all quality and testing standards. The remaining 992 vests also passed all tests, but were withheld by a Marine Corps contracting officer because they were in the same production run as the recalled vests, according to the statement.

Despite the lab test failures, the armor in question proved vital in the biggest test of all -- combat -- officials said.

Just days before last November's offensive, Cpl. Joshua Miles, a squad leader with Company L, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, was hit by fragments from a mortar round during a security patrol on the outskirts of Fallujah, Iraq. Fragments from the mortar hit his flak jacket and Kevlar helmet, and went through the left arm sleeve of his uniform.

"It (body armor) is a great piece of gear. Marines have to make sure they are wearing the gear," Miles said.

"Operation Iraqi Freedom casualty data gathered from the Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner and the Navy/Marine Corps Combat Trauma Registry proves that the outer tactical vest ... is highly effective in reducing the number of lethal and nonlethal wounds to the chest and abdomen," the statement said.

For example, despite the increased number of casualties received by the 1st Force Service Support Group's Surgical/Shock Trauma Platoon during the height of Fallujah operations last November, most were saved, due in large part to body armor issued and worn by Marines, said Navy Lt. Charles L. Cather, one of the platoon's critical care nurses.

"If they weren't wearing their flak (vest) and Kevlar (helmet), they'd have all this damaged," said Cather, pointing to his head and chest.

The Marine Corps has issued more than 181,000 outer tactical vests to Marines in operating forces. The recalled outer tactical vests represent less than 3 percent of the total number fielded.

"The Marine Corps' first concern is the safety and physical protection of our individual Marines," the statement read.

Although known to do "more with less," the Corps wants to assure U.S. taxpayers that their sons and daughters are not sent into harm's way without sufficient gear, the statement read.

"We would expect the concerned mothers and fathers of America to want their sons and daughters to have the best possible protection available when they deployed and entered into combat," the statement read. "Consequently, we don't believe that they would have wanted their Marines to deploy to Iraq with the obsolete PASGT vest while we wait for a 100 percent solution when a 99.9 percent solution was at hand."

E-mail Sgt. Agostini at luis.agostini@usmc.mil.


http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/image1.nsf/Lookup/200551216556/$file/armor2_lowres.jpg

The Interceptor System, a personal body armor system, is comprised of the Outer Tactical Vest and the Small Arms Protective Inserts. The OTV was designed for use with SAPI plates and replaces the Personnel Armor System, Ground Troop Flak vest, more commonly known as the flak vest. Photo by: Marine Corps Systems Command


Ellie