thedrifter
05-09-05, 04:55 AM
05.03.2005
The USS San Francisco Incident
The Crew Should Not Stand Alone
By Raymond Perry
Our youth, in taking their oath of enlistment, recognize clearly that they may be called upon to give their lives. As professionals, they ask that if they are called that it not be wasted.
Machinist's Mate 2nd Class Joseph A. Ashley was a noble example of a dedicated sailor who gave his life.
Without warning, his life was snatched from him on what should have been a milk run to Brisbane, Australia. The crew of the nuclear attack submarine USS San Francisco was relaxing after a long and arduous post-overhaul shakedown, pre-deployment workup, and homeport shift to the nether reaches of the Pacific. A tough and demanding time in the life of this warship was behind the crewmen.
Probably for the first time in over a year, San Francisco's crew was truly relaxing. Their future operations were distant, they had passed their exams (Reactor Safeguards, Tactical Readiness, & Pre-deployment Certification), and they felt that they had proven themselves. For once, coffee was not the fuel of their next watch.
But, there were several layers in the failure of MM2 Ashley's chain of command that set the stage for tragedy. In these failures to heed the demands of the seaman's profession, his life became forfeit.
In our land forces, such things as "friendly fire" happen where one's own forces simply err and believe that they are shooting at valid targets only to kill one of their own. Army Ranger Spc. Pat Tillman was an example of this. In the sea services, friendly fire is far more rare, but the sea exacts its own price and can be extraordinarily unforgiving of error, incapacity or neglect.
In a previous article ("The Navigator's Paradox," DefenseWatch Feb. 1, 2005), I noted that the navigation team onboard the San Francisco knew exactly where they were. They knew their position with a precision unknown to seamen just a few decades ago. Yet, they still ran into an underwater seamount.
There are those who would dismiss the grounding as a pure "act of God" with the San Francisco's commander and crew having zero responsibility to foresee or avoid the seamount. Precise and worldwide cartography is expensive, so the mapmakers can produce and update charts only as they are able.
The profession of the sea has built in cautions and methods whereby navigators are enjoined to do certain things that ensure safety. When passing near hazards or making landfall on an unknown coast, these procedures will tend to keep the ship safe. Only in the last decade have navigators begun to shrink this margin of safety to just a few miles instead of the ship, rather than the tens of miles once used.
There are procedures for ships that note errors on charts to send messages to the mapmakers advising them of errors or conflicts so that the cartographers can improve them. Two as-yet unanswered questions from the mishap on Jan. 8 are: How many submarines have transited this part of The Carolines archipelago and noted erroneous soundings? And did any of them file a message with the mapmakers as required?
In moving three submarines to a new homeport in Guam, did the Pacific Submarine Force Commander ask his Staff Oceanographer to review charts near Guam and update those that needed updating?
There is an indication among submariners in Internet chatroom discussions that the San Francisco's ill-fated trip marked the first-time use of this specific passage through the Carolines as a submarine transit route. It is appropriate for a peacetime operational commander to route submarines through various passages to give his crews experience. Doing so builds an institutional memory that may be quite useful if warfare erupts. When war or conflict finally comes is not the time to have to explore new operational routes.
Was the San Francisco's operational chain of command doing this as they chose the route through the Carolines? If this was a new route, did either Submarine Squadron Fifteen or Submarine Group Seven take any action to prepare the ship for a first-time transit of this passage?
In the end, this was not an open-ocean transit of those waters. There was, at best, a 30-mile-wide, potentially clear path between islands and known submerged pinnacles. The geology of mountain forming is such that this seamount has been there for eons. The discolored waters noted on several other charts on board San Francisco should have raised a question in the navigation team, but did not.
Some submarine vets have privately asserted that the submarine's assistant navigator was one of the "best in the force." Likewise, they have described Cmdr. Kevin Mooney, the San Francisco's commanding officer, as a "rising star."
Yet, it is clear that they and others aboard the submarine made a fatal error of omission: For want of the professional caution of stationing a few additional watches and taking some extra soundings for a few tens of miles along their track, the San Francisco struck a seamount in waters that clearly called for caution.
Investigators conducting the Mishap Investigation noted some unease among the navigation party members with the track. Seafaring tradition is clear on this: they had to find and identify the cause of this unease. For this error, San Francisco's navigation team paid a career price and some are lucky that more serious legal actions were not taken.
However, the external chain of command for the San Francisco – from submarine squadron to submarine group commander – also bears responsibility.
In an article in The New London Day on Apr. 22 ("Navy Report: San Francisco Crew Was Weak In Navigation"), reporter Robert Hamilton discussed the conclusions of the Mishap Investigation Report, which was critical of both the ship and its external chain of command.
It is important to understand that this report comprised a complete investigation in its own right and it is not a "quick review" of the accident as erroneously described by a Pacific Fleet spokesman. This investigation was performed under the auspices of the Naval Safety Center. As a safety investigation, it may not be used in any legal proceeding in any manner and such probes historically prompt witnesses and those involved to be more forthright and open in responding to questions.
The other investigation the Navy is conducting is a JAG Manual investigation. This is a formal and legal proceeding where people have rights in responding to investigators such as the protection against self-incrimination. Further, those with a clear interest in the proceedings may be designated as a "party to the investigation." This brings legal standing and representation during the process.
Hamilton's article, which reviews and discusses the Mishap Investigation Report in some detail, probably presents as clear a picture of actions taken on the San Francisco and failures of supporting organizations as can be obtained.
It showed that there were clear failures of San Francisco's chain of command.
First, and most seriously, there were clear indicators of a serious shortfall in navigational skill on the submarine. This had been noted in inspections of various kinds over the course of the previous year. A Squadron Commander is responsible for certifying and maintaining the operational readiness of his assigned units. It is clear from the Mishap Investigation Report that the squadron had made no effort to upgrade navigational skills on the San Francisco. Neither did the sub's parent command take action to ensure the sub performed a self-upgrade.
Second, neither Submarine Squadron Fifteen nor Submarine Group Seven above it felt any urgency to meet their own requirement to deliver the approved "Subnote" to the ship three to five before departure. A requirement like this ensures sufficient time for the ship to plan its transit.
Third, there seem to be no answers to key questions surrounding the planned trip. With this submarine being new to operating from Guam, did Submarine Squadron Fifteen take time to discuss the pending transit to Australia? Was there a discussion of navigational "gotchas" to ease the way for the San Francisco? If this was a first-time transit of this particular passage, what preparation did the squadron or submarine group provide?
It is clear that San Francisco's supporting cast did not measure up any better than the ship. San Francisco's commanding officer at the time of the collision, Cmdr. Mooney (who lost his command as a result), should not be the only senior officer to stand tall at admiral's mast.
MM2 Joseph Ashley represented the best of what the American people want in their soldiers and sailors. He was a dedicated professional, working hard in his assigned duty onboard the USS San Francisco. His loss should reverberate through the Submarine Force.
Well done, good and faithful sailor, well done.
Ellie
The USS San Francisco Incident
The Crew Should Not Stand Alone
By Raymond Perry
Our youth, in taking their oath of enlistment, recognize clearly that they may be called upon to give their lives. As professionals, they ask that if they are called that it not be wasted.
Machinist's Mate 2nd Class Joseph A. Ashley was a noble example of a dedicated sailor who gave his life.
Without warning, his life was snatched from him on what should have been a milk run to Brisbane, Australia. The crew of the nuclear attack submarine USS San Francisco was relaxing after a long and arduous post-overhaul shakedown, pre-deployment workup, and homeport shift to the nether reaches of the Pacific. A tough and demanding time in the life of this warship was behind the crewmen.
Probably for the first time in over a year, San Francisco's crew was truly relaxing. Their future operations were distant, they had passed their exams (Reactor Safeguards, Tactical Readiness, & Pre-deployment Certification), and they felt that they had proven themselves. For once, coffee was not the fuel of their next watch.
But, there were several layers in the failure of MM2 Ashley's chain of command that set the stage for tragedy. In these failures to heed the demands of the seaman's profession, his life became forfeit.
In our land forces, such things as "friendly fire" happen where one's own forces simply err and believe that they are shooting at valid targets only to kill one of their own. Army Ranger Spc. Pat Tillman was an example of this. In the sea services, friendly fire is far more rare, but the sea exacts its own price and can be extraordinarily unforgiving of error, incapacity or neglect.
In a previous article ("The Navigator's Paradox," DefenseWatch Feb. 1, 2005), I noted that the navigation team onboard the San Francisco knew exactly where they were. They knew their position with a precision unknown to seamen just a few decades ago. Yet, they still ran into an underwater seamount.
There are those who would dismiss the grounding as a pure "act of God" with the San Francisco's commander and crew having zero responsibility to foresee or avoid the seamount. Precise and worldwide cartography is expensive, so the mapmakers can produce and update charts only as they are able.
The profession of the sea has built in cautions and methods whereby navigators are enjoined to do certain things that ensure safety. When passing near hazards or making landfall on an unknown coast, these procedures will tend to keep the ship safe. Only in the last decade have navigators begun to shrink this margin of safety to just a few miles instead of the ship, rather than the tens of miles once used.
There are procedures for ships that note errors on charts to send messages to the mapmakers advising them of errors or conflicts so that the cartographers can improve them. Two as-yet unanswered questions from the mishap on Jan. 8 are: How many submarines have transited this part of The Carolines archipelago and noted erroneous soundings? And did any of them file a message with the mapmakers as required?
In moving three submarines to a new homeport in Guam, did the Pacific Submarine Force Commander ask his Staff Oceanographer to review charts near Guam and update those that needed updating?
There is an indication among submariners in Internet chatroom discussions that the San Francisco's ill-fated trip marked the first-time use of this specific passage through the Carolines as a submarine transit route. It is appropriate for a peacetime operational commander to route submarines through various passages to give his crews experience. Doing so builds an institutional memory that may be quite useful if warfare erupts. When war or conflict finally comes is not the time to have to explore new operational routes.
Was the San Francisco's operational chain of command doing this as they chose the route through the Carolines? If this was a new route, did either Submarine Squadron Fifteen or Submarine Group Seven take any action to prepare the ship for a first-time transit of this passage?
In the end, this was not an open-ocean transit of those waters. There was, at best, a 30-mile-wide, potentially clear path between islands and known submerged pinnacles. The geology of mountain forming is such that this seamount has been there for eons. The discolored waters noted on several other charts on board San Francisco should have raised a question in the navigation team, but did not.
Some submarine vets have privately asserted that the submarine's assistant navigator was one of the "best in the force." Likewise, they have described Cmdr. Kevin Mooney, the San Francisco's commanding officer, as a "rising star."
Yet, it is clear that they and others aboard the submarine made a fatal error of omission: For want of the professional caution of stationing a few additional watches and taking some extra soundings for a few tens of miles along their track, the San Francisco struck a seamount in waters that clearly called for caution.
Investigators conducting the Mishap Investigation noted some unease among the navigation party members with the track. Seafaring tradition is clear on this: they had to find and identify the cause of this unease. For this error, San Francisco's navigation team paid a career price and some are lucky that more serious legal actions were not taken.
However, the external chain of command for the San Francisco – from submarine squadron to submarine group commander – also bears responsibility.
In an article in The New London Day on Apr. 22 ("Navy Report: San Francisco Crew Was Weak In Navigation"), reporter Robert Hamilton discussed the conclusions of the Mishap Investigation Report, which was critical of both the ship and its external chain of command.
It is important to understand that this report comprised a complete investigation in its own right and it is not a "quick review" of the accident as erroneously described by a Pacific Fleet spokesman. This investigation was performed under the auspices of the Naval Safety Center. As a safety investigation, it may not be used in any legal proceeding in any manner and such probes historically prompt witnesses and those involved to be more forthright and open in responding to questions.
The other investigation the Navy is conducting is a JAG Manual investigation. This is a formal and legal proceeding where people have rights in responding to investigators such as the protection against self-incrimination. Further, those with a clear interest in the proceedings may be designated as a "party to the investigation." This brings legal standing and representation during the process.
Hamilton's article, which reviews and discusses the Mishap Investigation Report in some detail, probably presents as clear a picture of actions taken on the San Francisco and failures of supporting organizations as can be obtained.
It showed that there were clear failures of San Francisco's chain of command.
First, and most seriously, there were clear indicators of a serious shortfall in navigational skill on the submarine. This had been noted in inspections of various kinds over the course of the previous year. A Squadron Commander is responsible for certifying and maintaining the operational readiness of his assigned units. It is clear from the Mishap Investigation Report that the squadron had made no effort to upgrade navigational skills on the San Francisco. Neither did the sub's parent command take action to ensure the sub performed a self-upgrade.
Second, neither Submarine Squadron Fifteen nor Submarine Group Seven above it felt any urgency to meet their own requirement to deliver the approved "Subnote" to the ship three to five before departure. A requirement like this ensures sufficient time for the ship to plan its transit.
Third, there seem to be no answers to key questions surrounding the planned trip. With this submarine being new to operating from Guam, did Submarine Squadron Fifteen take time to discuss the pending transit to Australia? Was there a discussion of navigational "gotchas" to ease the way for the San Francisco? If this was a first-time transit of this particular passage, what preparation did the squadron or submarine group provide?
It is clear that San Francisco's supporting cast did not measure up any better than the ship. San Francisco's commanding officer at the time of the collision, Cmdr. Mooney (who lost his command as a result), should not be the only senior officer to stand tall at admiral's mast.
MM2 Joseph Ashley represented the best of what the American people want in their soldiers and sailors. He was a dedicated professional, working hard in his assigned duty onboard the USS San Francisco. His loss should reverberate through the Submarine Force.
Well done, good and faithful sailor, well done.
Ellie