thedrifter
03-12-05, 07:33 AM
Holding the Line at Camp Carroll: The Battle of Mike’s Hill
by Larry S. Williams
A blocked main supply route isolates Camp Carroll during this battle in January 1968.
Even if GEN William C. Westmoreland was not literally rubbing his hands together in expectant glee, he certainly had a noticeable bounce in his step as he marched through his headquarters and studied the battle maps of Vietnam during the first weeks of January 1968.
Military Assistance Command Vietnam intelligence analysis had recently identified a “crossover point” that had reportedly occurred in the fall of 1967. The North Vietnamese Army (NVA) had reached that statistical moment when their battlefield losses exceeded their replacement ability and for a warrior trained in attrition, GEN Westmoreland savored the sweet smell and imminent taste of victory.
Now he needed a massive land battle akin to the European campaigns of the previous two world wars. He sought one decisive military clash designed to drop the enemy to its knees, and he felt he knew precisely where that battle was going to be.
Convinced his nemesis, the brilliant GEN Vo Nguyen Giap, was about to repeat the strategy that in 1954 had defeated the French at Dien Bien Phu, Westmoreland reviewed all fresh battlefield developments. He concluded that the war would be won or lost at an isolated Marine outpost hunkered deep in the northernmost I Corps tactical zone at a place called Khe Sanh. Accordingly, the general ordered the whole of I Corps reinforced. He reshuffled his deck of military assets, and by mid-January nearly 50 maneuver battalions—half of all U.S. combat troops—had trucked, flown, or humped their way into the northern zone.
During this same period, signs of a mounting enemy presence increased. GEN Giap instructed large North Vietnamese combat formations to slip over the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and take up positions along strategic fronts. A cat and mouse game unfolded, and Westmoreland grew more obsessed with his plan.
The Order of Battle
The 3d Marine Division (3d MarDiv) cut a defensive east/west line across Vietnam just south of the DMZ hinged on a series of fortified combat bases that hugged a 63-kilometer span of National Route 9.
The strategy produced interlocking bands of artillery fire that were anchored in the east by Dong Ha and the divisional headquarters, then stretched west to within 2 kilometers of Laos where the line ended in the mist-shrouded Army special forces camp at Lang Vei.
Along this route five strategic outposts unified the line: Cam Lo, Camp Carroll, the Rockpile, Ca Lu, and the focus of Westmoreland’s attention, Khe Sanh. This line had been in the making for more than 2 years, yet it yawned gaps big enough for whole divisions to pass through.
The ground rode level between Dong Ha and Cam Lo. But trucking farther westward toward Camp Carroll, the terrain grew rugged. A succession of ridges and steep hills jutted to elevations of over 1,600 feet.
Camp Carroll sat perched on a high plateau and served as the linchpin of the Marine artillery shield. The artillery batteries worked under the operational control of the 1st Battalion, 12th Marines (1/12). Equipped with 16 guns and reinforced by U.S. Army 175mm long-range guns, the Marines directed artillery fire into almost any grid coordinate from the South China Sea to Laos, as well as into North Vietnam. An 80-gun artillery fan faced the north and hammered the enemy.
GEN Giap wore his poker face the day he studied the buildup of Marine forces along the DMZ. A master of Soviet tactics, he decided to call and raise. He positioned his heavy artillery pieces just beyond the range of the most common guns in the Marine Corps’ fire bases, the 105mm and 155mm artillery.
He knew publicly stated U.S. policy prevented American forces from entering North Vietnam. The Marines would not penetrate north of the Ben Hai River.
Holding these political and military restrictions like a trump card, the general dug in his Soviet 152mm guns and his 130mm field pieces precisely where U.S. ground observation was limited. He employed Soviet missiles and antiaircraft weapons systems to hinder aerial observation. He felt confident that his most powerful guns were now capable of suppressing Marine artillery fire with near impunity.
When U.S. air reconnaissance spotted the NVA shifting some 130 artillery pieces in the area north of the Ben Hai River, the Marines rushed to reinforce their artillery deployment to 180 tubes.
Nevertheless, Giap’s strategy clobbered the Marine artillery bases with little effective return fire. Then, while holding the Marine fire bases fixated on counterbattery missions, particularly at Camp Carroll, the general released his infantry to the attack.
The Opening Fray
On Saturday, 20 January, enemy units unleashed an almost simultaneous assault on both ends of the Marine defensive line. Communist troops maneuvered along the banks of the Cua Viet River channel east of Dong Ha, perpetrating an attack that halted all river traffic, effectively closing the logistical lifeline flowing from the Cua Viet port facility. That same morning, far to the west near Khe Sanh, India Company, 3/26 unknowingly fired the opening rounds in the battle Westmoreland had predicted. The longest, most controversial battle of the Vietnam War had now begun, while the Marines found themselves in a scramble.
With the presence of large North Vietnamese forces along the eastern DMZ, and a buildup of forces in the west around Khe Sanh, the 3d MarDiv’s ability to concentrate its forces in any one area was limited. The division was spread out from its Quang Tri base in the south to Con Thien and Gio Linh in the north, Khe Sanh in the west, and the Cua Viet in the east.
Giap seemed pleased with the unfolding situation. His attacks on both Marine flanks produced the desired results. He tossed out his next card and ordered an assault straight up the middle.
A U.S. “Rough Rider” convoy pulled out of Dong Ha early Wednesday morning, 24 January. Consisting of three trucks and a jeep mounted with a quad .50 caliber machinegun, the Marine complement trundled west, looking forward to completing their routine artillery resupply mission and rolling through the gates of Camp Carroll by the first hours of the afternoon. Around 1030, however, elements of the elite 320th NVA Division, 64th Regiment, hastily made last-minute camouflage adjustments and checked their fields of fire. The first trap in Giap’s resolute attempt to isolate Camp Carroll and sever the main supply route was about to snap shut.
Nervous North Vietnamese eyes stared into a deep valley at a curve along Route 9 where any passing convoy had to slow before turning onto the Camp Carroll access road. Silently, the soldiers waited—listening, alone in their thoughts. Then just before 1400, a distant whine and clank of Marine vehicles signaled a column’s approach. The Marine convoy rumbled forward, ultimately passing into the NVA kill zone. As the vehicles reduced speed and geared down in preparation for the turn toward camp, anxious faces seemed relieved to begin the final 3-kilometer stretch home. Words of hot chow began to circulate.
Then all hell broke loose. Small arms and machinegun fire sprayed all four vehicles. Recoilless rifles bucked trucks off their wheels as they absorbed the impact of accurate fire. Wrecked machines plumed smoke, and the convoy rolled to a listless, floppy stop. Mortar rounds trounced the pinned down Marines. Cries from the wounded echoed through a din of explosions and automatic weapons fire. Reeling Marines dismounted without delay. They found what cover they could and returned fire. The quad .50 caliber machinegun remained serviceable and pelted death at the invisible attackers. The fury of fire crouched enemy heads and bought enough time for the bushwhacked Marines to get a call off for assistance.
Within minutes the 4th Marines, newly headquartered at Camp Carroll, launched a reaction force. A platoon from Hotel Company, 2/9 joined two tanks from Bravo Company, 3d Tank Battalion, along with two Army M42 dusters from Charley Battery, 1/44. The column roared from camp under the command of Capt Daniel W. Kent seated high in the turret of the lead tank.
The enemy anticipated the reinforcements and waited to spring the second trap of the day. When the Marine convoy drew near, a recoilless rifle blasted the lead vehicle, killing Capt Kent and immobilizing his rescue force. The Marines reacted with the full punch of their remaining firepower. Even so, locked in the kill zone, they were compelled to call for additional support.
A second relief force clamored out of Dong Ha while the Marines fought through the afternoon. Then, as sundown loomed, the sudden appearance in the sky of two UH–1E gunships persuaded the enemy to break contact. They slipped away pellmell, leaving three dead North Vietnamese soldiers behind.
By the time the Dong Ha relief column arrived, Marine casualties were heavy—8 dead, 44 wounded. All vehicles in the original convoy, plus the two dusters and Capt Kent’s lead tank, required towing and so were left along the road. The fresh Marines assisted with the evacuation of the set upon troops. Then all hustled up the road to Camp Carroll.
Enter Darting Star
The 3d MarDiv commander, MajGen Rathvon McC. Tompkins, received the ambush reports and paced in his headquarters bunker at Dong Ha. The situation was dire. The North Vietnamese could not be allowed to deny access to Camp Carroll. The commander keyed his radio handset and transferred the battle-toughened 3/4 into the valley with orders to clear the ambush site and reopen Route 9.
LtCol Lee Bendell, battalion commander, call sign Darting Star, arrived at the ambush site at 1900 and found the earlier relief force had already evacuated the wounded and, he concluded, all of the dead. With darkness falling, and moving with only one of the battalion’s companies, Mike Company, the colonel established a nighttime defensive perimeter along a ridgeline overlooking Route 9. He positioned his force to screen Camp Carroll from the NVA patrols and there passed the night.
At dawn, 25 January, Mike Company, under Capt Raymond Kalm, began to sweep the valley. They reached the ambush site to discover four Marine dead from the previous day’s action. They dealt with the bodies, then cautiously proceeded to move west to east. While patrolling near the still abandoned vehicles scattered along the road, automatic weapons fire tore through their ranks. Two Marines lay dead, killed instantly. Two more fell wounded. But Mike Company was prepared to earn their pay. They gained fire superiority and attacked with aggressive fire team maneuvers. The end of the brief action eliminated nine enemy soldiers. One NVA light machinegun was captured. Darting Star then ordered Capt Kalm to advance his company to a small hill just north of Route 9 about 1,000 meters east of the contact site, set up a defensive perimeter, and wait while the battalion’s two remaining rifle companies choppered in.
continued.....
by Larry S. Williams
A blocked main supply route isolates Camp Carroll during this battle in January 1968.
Even if GEN William C. Westmoreland was not literally rubbing his hands together in expectant glee, he certainly had a noticeable bounce in his step as he marched through his headquarters and studied the battle maps of Vietnam during the first weeks of January 1968.
Military Assistance Command Vietnam intelligence analysis had recently identified a “crossover point” that had reportedly occurred in the fall of 1967. The North Vietnamese Army (NVA) had reached that statistical moment when their battlefield losses exceeded their replacement ability and for a warrior trained in attrition, GEN Westmoreland savored the sweet smell and imminent taste of victory.
Now he needed a massive land battle akin to the European campaigns of the previous two world wars. He sought one decisive military clash designed to drop the enemy to its knees, and he felt he knew precisely where that battle was going to be.
Convinced his nemesis, the brilliant GEN Vo Nguyen Giap, was about to repeat the strategy that in 1954 had defeated the French at Dien Bien Phu, Westmoreland reviewed all fresh battlefield developments. He concluded that the war would be won or lost at an isolated Marine outpost hunkered deep in the northernmost I Corps tactical zone at a place called Khe Sanh. Accordingly, the general ordered the whole of I Corps reinforced. He reshuffled his deck of military assets, and by mid-January nearly 50 maneuver battalions—half of all U.S. combat troops—had trucked, flown, or humped their way into the northern zone.
During this same period, signs of a mounting enemy presence increased. GEN Giap instructed large North Vietnamese combat formations to slip over the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and take up positions along strategic fronts. A cat and mouse game unfolded, and Westmoreland grew more obsessed with his plan.
The Order of Battle
The 3d Marine Division (3d MarDiv) cut a defensive east/west line across Vietnam just south of the DMZ hinged on a series of fortified combat bases that hugged a 63-kilometer span of National Route 9.
The strategy produced interlocking bands of artillery fire that were anchored in the east by Dong Ha and the divisional headquarters, then stretched west to within 2 kilometers of Laos where the line ended in the mist-shrouded Army special forces camp at Lang Vei.
Along this route five strategic outposts unified the line: Cam Lo, Camp Carroll, the Rockpile, Ca Lu, and the focus of Westmoreland’s attention, Khe Sanh. This line had been in the making for more than 2 years, yet it yawned gaps big enough for whole divisions to pass through.
The ground rode level between Dong Ha and Cam Lo. But trucking farther westward toward Camp Carroll, the terrain grew rugged. A succession of ridges and steep hills jutted to elevations of over 1,600 feet.
Camp Carroll sat perched on a high plateau and served as the linchpin of the Marine artillery shield. The artillery batteries worked under the operational control of the 1st Battalion, 12th Marines (1/12). Equipped with 16 guns and reinforced by U.S. Army 175mm long-range guns, the Marines directed artillery fire into almost any grid coordinate from the South China Sea to Laos, as well as into North Vietnam. An 80-gun artillery fan faced the north and hammered the enemy.
GEN Giap wore his poker face the day he studied the buildup of Marine forces along the DMZ. A master of Soviet tactics, he decided to call and raise. He positioned his heavy artillery pieces just beyond the range of the most common guns in the Marine Corps’ fire bases, the 105mm and 155mm artillery.
He knew publicly stated U.S. policy prevented American forces from entering North Vietnam. The Marines would not penetrate north of the Ben Hai River.
Holding these political and military restrictions like a trump card, the general dug in his Soviet 152mm guns and his 130mm field pieces precisely where U.S. ground observation was limited. He employed Soviet missiles and antiaircraft weapons systems to hinder aerial observation. He felt confident that his most powerful guns were now capable of suppressing Marine artillery fire with near impunity.
When U.S. air reconnaissance spotted the NVA shifting some 130 artillery pieces in the area north of the Ben Hai River, the Marines rushed to reinforce their artillery deployment to 180 tubes.
Nevertheless, Giap’s strategy clobbered the Marine artillery bases with little effective return fire. Then, while holding the Marine fire bases fixated on counterbattery missions, particularly at Camp Carroll, the general released his infantry to the attack.
The Opening Fray
On Saturday, 20 January, enemy units unleashed an almost simultaneous assault on both ends of the Marine defensive line. Communist troops maneuvered along the banks of the Cua Viet River channel east of Dong Ha, perpetrating an attack that halted all river traffic, effectively closing the logistical lifeline flowing from the Cua Viet port facility. That same morning, far to the west near Khe Sanh, India Company, 3/26 unknowingly fired the opening rounds in the battle Westmoreland had predicted. The longest, most controversial battle of the Vietnam War had now begun, while the Marines found themselves in a scramble.
With the presence of large North Vietnamese forces along the eastern DMZ, and a buildup of forces in the west around Khe Sanh, the 3d MarDiv’s ability to concentrate its forces in any one area was limited. The division was spread out from its Quang Tri base in the south to Con Thien and Gio Linh in the north, Khe Sanh in the west, and the Cua Viet in the east.
Giap seemed pleased with the unfolding situation. His attacks on both Marine flanks produced the desired results. He tossed out his next card and ordered an assault straight up the middle.
A U.S. “Rough Rider” convoy pulled out of Dong Ha early Wednesday morning, 24 January. Consisting of three trucks and a jeep mounted with a quad .50 caliber machinegun, the Marine complement trundled west, looking forward to completing their routine artillery resupply mission and rolling through the gates of Camp Carroll by the first hours of the afternoon. Around 1030, however, elements of the elite 320th NVA Division, 64th Regiment, hastily made last-minute camouflage adjustments and checked their fields of fire. The first trap in Giap’s resolute attempt to isolate Camp Carroll and sever the main supply route was about to snap shut.
Nervous North Vietnamese eyes stared into a deep valley at a curve along Route 9 where any passing convoy had to slow before turning onto the Camp Carroll access road. Silently, the soldiers waited—listening, alone in their thoughts. Then just before 1400, a distant whine and clank of Marine vehicles signaled a column’s approach. The Marine convoy rumbled forward, ultimately passing into the NVA kill zone. As the vehicles reduced speed and geared down in preparation for the turn toward camp, anxious faces seemed relieved to begin the final 3-kilometer stretch home. Words of hot chow began to circulate.
Then all hell broke loose. Small arms and machinegun fire sprayed all four vehicles. Recoilless rifles bucked trucks off their wheels as they absorbed the impact of accurate fire. Wrecked machines plumed smoke, and the convoy rolled to a listless, floppy stop. Mortar rounds trounced the pinned down Marines. Cries from the wounded echoed through a din of explosions and automatic weapons fire. Reeling Marines dismounted without delay. They found what cover they could and returned fire. The quad .50 caliber machinegun remained serviceable and pelted death at the invisible attackers. The fury of fire crouched enemy heads and bought enough time for the bushwhacked Marines to get a call off for assistance.
Within minutes the 4th Marines, newly headquartered at Camp Carroll, launched a reaction force. A platoon from Hotel Company, 2/9 joined two tanks from Bravo Company, 3d Tank Battalion, along with two Army M42 dusters from Charley Battery, 1/44. The column roared from camp under the command of Capt Daniel W. Kent seated high in the turret of the lead tank.
The enemy anticipated the reinforcements and waited to spring the second trap of the day. When the Marine convoy drew near, a recoilless rifle blasted the lead vehicle, killing Capt Kent and immobilizing his rescue force. The Marines reacted with the full punch of their remaining firepower. Even so, locked in the kill zone, they were compelled to call for additional support.
A second relief force clamored out of Dong Ha while the Marines fought through the afternoon. Then, as sundown loomed, the sudden appearance in the sky of two UH–1E gunships persuaded the enemy to break contact. They slipped away pellmell, leaving three dead North Vietnamese soldiers behind.
By the time the Dong Ha relief column arrived, Marine casualties were heavy—8 dead, 44 wounded. All vehicles in the original convoy, plus the two dusters and Capt Kent’s lead tank, required towing and so were left along the road. The fresh Marines assisted with the evacuation of the set upon troops. Then all hustled up the road to Camp Carroll.
Enter Darting Star
The 3d MarDiv commander, MajGen Rathvon McC. Tompkins, received the ambush reports and paced in his headquarters bunker at Dong Ha. The situation was dire. The North Vietnamese could not be allowed to deny access to Camp Carroll. The commander keyed his radio handset and transferred the battle-toughened 3/4 into the valley with orders to clear the ambush site and reopen Route 9.
LtCol Lee Bendell, battalion commander, call sign Darting Star, arrived at the ambush site at 1900 and found the earlier relief force had already evacuated the wounded and, he concluded, all of the dead. With darkness falling, and moving with only one of the battalion’s companies, Mike Company, the colonel established a nighttime defensive perimeter along a ridgeline overlooking Route 9. He positioned his force to screen Camp Carroll from the NVA patrols and there passed the night.
At dawn, 25 January, Mike Company, under Capt Raymond Kalm, began to sweep the valley. They reached the ambush site to discover four Marine dead from the previous day’s action. They dealt with the bodies, then cautiously proceeded to move west to east. While patrolling near the still abandoned vehicles scattered along the road, automatic weapons fire tore through their ranks. Two Marines lay dead, killed instantly. Two more fell wounded. But Mike Company was prepared to earn their pay. They gained fire superiority and attacked with aggressive fire team maneuvers. The end of the brief action eliminated nine enemy soldiers. One NVA light machinegun was captured. Darting Star then ordered Capt Kalm to advance his company to a small hill just north of Route 9 about 1,000 meters east of the contact site, set up a defensive perimeter, and wait while the battalion’s two remaining rifle companies choppered in.
continued.....