thedrifter
03-11-05, 06:22 AM
Joe Buff: The Undiscovered Country
March 10, 2005
"I never saw it coming" is a frequent lament among people who've been caught by surprise in a car crash. The corporate management buzzword for the same sort of ruined day, when a business calamity approaches and then clobbers its unseeing victim, is called being "blindsided." Nations get blindsided too. For national populations, the ultimate calamity is having to cope with an unexpected aggressor's act of war. December 7, 1941, and September 11, 2001 are two cases in point of how recognizing precursor red-flags for what they are, and preparing to deflect or absorb the impending hard impact, can defy the best minds and best gadgetry in each U.S. generation.
It's thought-provoking to realize that, in barely two more months -- before this coming Memorial Day -- as much time will have passed since 9/11/01 as the entire duration of America's formally declared involvement in World War II. It doesn't feel like so long. Maybe that's because the Global War on Terror is such a different sort of conflict compared to W.W.II. More likely it's because of the lesser intensity. But some of the many distinctions between the two wars, I believe, are really red herrings. There are fundamental similarities, lurking not far beneath the veneer of the differences. The facts of their comparability carry important lessons that Americans at large appear to not be learning. This missed self-education, the duty of every responsible leader and each concerned citizen, could cost us dearly if we don't close the knowledge and insight gaps rather soon. My premise for this essay is that history does indeed repeat itself, and thus by analogy errors of the past, if recognized as such and projected forward, will help us not make the same mistakes again. I'll save what I think are the biggest lessons for last.
I mentioned red herrings. Let's clean some fish.
World War II as FDR and Truman fought it had no articulate exit strategy, beyond the vague demand for "unconditional surrender." World War II, in its day, was an asymmetric war -- levels of technology, layouts of geography, belligerent ideology, all were very imbalanced between the Allies and the Axis. Nuclear proliferation was a serious issue then, too: Germany, Japan, and the USSR had their own atomic bomb projects during the war. And speaking of Allies and Axis, the coalitions on both sides in that contest were distrustful of their partners, amorally manipulative in their supposedly collaborative planning, and deeply selfish in their near-term actions and post-war aims.
The U.S. spoiled the UK's and France's last chance to rebuild their Third World empires, even as Stalin consolidated a new empire of his own. We didn't do this from pure altruism -- commercial interests, and vying to project diplomatic power, were key drivers behind our policy of self-determination for liberated peoples. Nor could we claim to have invented the latter idea. The seeds of emergent nationalism, and also of ethnic-religious strife, had been planted much earlier than 1945. They were sprouting from the Middle East to the Indian subcontinent to Southeast Asia, to the Muslim enclaves in the southern USSR and the Balkans -- and beyond -- well before V-J Day.
During World War II, the U.S. became so fixated on winning the war that it didn't look past the end of its nose at the real costs in money and blood of winning and maintaining the subsequent peace. The Marshall Plan and the long occupations were the least of it. After "major combat" was over, disarmament and budget cuts were swift, even precipitate. Then came the real shockeroos. The Korean War, on the UN side, was fought at the start with World War II weapons and weary or poorly trained troops, while the communists -- supplied by Stalin -- were in some ways a step or two ahead.
So transformation was declared. What this meant, back then, seems to have depended on whom you asked: Nuclear weapons made conventional arms irrelevant, and therefore unnecessary. Jet fighters would duel from now on only with missiles, no more with guns. Aircraft carriers were obsolete. Submarines were a solution in search of a problem that wasn't there -- or was it?
The result of this was terrible unpreparedness, all over again, for the next big hot war, Vietnam. At the beginning Navy pilots were in for a shock -- the now-famous Top Gun school resulted directly from an unacceptably unfavorable dogfight friend-versus-bandit kill ratio. Precision-guided weapons (smart bombs) made their debut in profusion, yet the number of bullets and tons of munitions needed per enemy soldier killed actually skyrocketed -- so badly that there were temporary shortages even of dumb iron bombs. Worst of all, perhaps, the mindset of the enemy was misunderstood. For North Vietnam, the fight was about reunification and liberation against a decades-long series of foreign meddlers, of which the U.S. simply happened to be the last. I'd argue that Ho Chi Minh and General Giap used the USSR as much as, or more than, the Kremlin used them.
The situation in America now is alarmingly similar, in today's terms, to some of these red herrings and pitfalls and pratfalls of battles and campaigns past. I use "campaign" as an intentional double meaning, covering both the military and the political spheres, because just as in World War II, and exactly as Clausewitz said two hundred years ago, warfighting and politics are inextricably intertwined.
Which would seem to suggest that we're setting ourselves up to be blindsided all over again. We didn't see the Cold War coming, though Churchill and Patton did. North Korea's attack, and then Red China joining in, were completely unexpected. Vietnam was tragically underestimated. The prelude events to al Qaeda's assault on September 11, 2001 were lying in plain sight.
So, what major threat are we failing to notice this time? In what ways are the fundamental changes in our military structure and manning, now underway, undercutting us inadvertently going into the future? If we optimize to fight terrorists, will opportunist, ambitious Third-Generation nation-states see our vulnerabilities and become our next mortal foes? And if so, who will it be that launches the next blindsiding attack on our soil or on our vital interests abroad? If history is any guide, the culprit might not be on the present list of "usual suspects." Democracies don't start wars, and the fledgling spread of democracy is terrific indeed, but democracy can be one phase of a pendulum that swings -- look at Russia and South America, or the Weimar Republic for that matter.
I name our next major nation-level war opponent "the undiscovered country." They might be watching and scheming already, preparing, seeking an edge. Across the entire past century, the end of big war forever has been proclaimed with fanfare, often. The announcement was later proven wrong too frequently to be convincing now. And I'm not into conspiracy theories for sport or paranoia. The incredibly vast extent of Dr. Khan's nuclear underground is a real-world conspiracy if ever there was one, its full reach probably still not unmasked.
When clearing a minefield, it's wise to assume that the first booby-trap you find will not be the last. When checking your basement floor joists for termites, odds are the first sign of damage you see is only the beginning. If your cell phone drops the connection in the middle of a call, experience shows that it's likely to again once you redial.
The same goes for enemy states, conspiracies, and wars: Things that occur, recur. And complacency kills -- always.
We as a nation need to put a higher premium on searching for and deterring that undiscovered country; better intell gathering, and special operations forces aplenty, must perform key roles in this indications and warnings task. We also need to lift our gaze beyond the Fourth Generation wars we're currently fighting.
Fifth Generation War will be the most dangerous combat ever, for our way of life and possibly for the survival of humanity, precisely because we don't yet know what shape it will take or where the threat will come from. It will almost certainly break out as a come-as-you-are surprise party held entirely on the enemy's terms. Superb jets and missiles and dangerous subs are for sale in numbers on the world arms market. Tactical nukes are fast becoming the Great Equalizers against Uncle Sam. Robots and information warfare alone won't beat a determined adversary. Thomas Jefferson's blunder of going for cheap coastal gun boats instead of expensive ocean-going battleships was a direct contributor to America having to fight the War of 1812 -- are our naval acquisition plans, so much in flux inside the Beltway and up and down the Northeast Coast, setting us up for a War of 2012? Non-lethal weapons represent a major advance for civilization, but non-lethal war is a hollow promise, a myth.
Shakespeare's Hamlet used "the undiscovered country" to mean death itself. Think about this hard, because Macbeth said that "when troubles come they come not singly, but in battalions."
Ellie
March 10, 2005
"I never saw it coming" is a frequent lament among people who've been caught by surprise in a car crash. The corporate management buzzword for the same sort of ruined day, when a business calamity approaches and then clobbers its unseeing victim, is called being "blindsided." Nations get blindsided too. For national populations, the ultimate calamity is having to cope with an unexpected aggressor's act of war. December 7, 1941, and September 11, 2001 are two cases in point of how recognizing precursor red-flags for what they are, and preparing to deflect or absorb the impending hard impact, can defy the best minds and best gadgetry in each U.S. generation.
It's thought-provoking to realize that, in barely two more months -- before this coming Memorial Day -- as much time will have passed since 9/11/01 as the entire duration of America's formally declared involvement in World War II. It doesn't feel like so long. Maybe that's because the Global War on Terror is such a different sort of conflict compared to W.W.II. More likely it's because of the lesser intensity. But some of the many distinctions between the two wars, I believe, are really red herrings. There are fundamental similarities, lurking not far beneath the veneer of the differences. The facts of their comparability carry important lessons that Americans at large appear to not be learning. This missed self-education, the duty of every responsible leader and each concerned citizen, could cost us dearly if we don't close the knowledge and insight gaps rather soon. My premise for this essay is that history does indeed repeat itself, and thus by analogy errors of the past, if recognized as such and projected forward, will help us not make the same mistakes again. I'll save what I think are the biggest lessons for last.
I mentioned red herrings. Let's clean some fish.
World War II as FDR and Truman fought it had no articulate exit strategy, beyond the vague demand for "unconditional surrender." World War II, in its day, was an asymmetric war -- levels of technology, layouts of geography, belligerent ideology, all were very imbalanced between the Allies and the Axis. Nuclear proliferation was a serious issue then, too: Germany, Japan, and the USSR had their own atomic bomb projects during the war. And speaking of Allies and Axis, the coalitions on both sides in that contest were distrustful of their partners, amorally manipulative in their supposedly collaborative planning, and deeply selfish in their near-term actions and post-war aims.
The U.S. spoiled the UK's and France's last chance to rebuild their Third World empires, even as Stalin consolidated a new empire of his own. We didn't do this from pure altruism -- commercial interests, and vying to project diplomatic power, were key drivers behind our policy of self-determination for liberated peoples. Nor could we claim to have invented the latter idea. The seeds of emergent nationalism, and also of ethnic-religious strife, had been planted much earlier than 1945. They were sprouting from the Middle East to the Indian subcontinent to Southeast Asia, to the Muslim enclaves in the southern USSR and the Balkans -- and beyond -- well before V-J Day.
During World War II, the U.S. became so fixated on winning the war that it didn't look past the end of its nose at the real costs in money and blood of winning and maintaining the subsequent peace. The Marshall Plan and the long occupations were the least of it. After "major combat" was over, disarmament and budget cuts were swift, even precipitate. Then came the real shockeroos. The Korean War, on the UN side, was fought at the start with World War II weapons and weary or poorly trained troops, while the communists -- supplied by Stalin -- were in some ways a step or two ahead.
So transformation was declared. What this meant, back then, seems to have depended on whom you asked: Nuclear weapons made conventional arms irrelevant, and therefore unnecessary. Jet fighters would duel from now on only with missiles, no more with guns. Aircraft carriers were obsolete. Submarines were a solution in search of a problem that wasn't there -- or was it?
The result of this was terrible unpreparedness, all over again, for the next big hot war, Vietnam. At the beginning Navy pilots were in for a shock -- the now-famous Top Gun school resulted directly from an unacceptably unfavorable dogfight friend-versus-bandit kill ratio. Precision-guided weapons (smart bombs) made their debut in profusion, yet the number of bullets and tons of munitions needed per enemy soldier killed actually skyrocketed -- so badly that there were temporary shortages even of dumb iron bombs. Worst of all, perhaps, the mindset of the enemy was misunderstood. For North Vietnam, the fight was about reunification and liberation against a decades-long series of foreign meddlers, of which the U.S. simply happened to be the last. I'd argue that Ho Chi Minh and General Giap used the USSR as much as, or more than, the Kremlin used them.
The situation in America now is alarmingly similar, in today's terms, to some of these red herrings and pitfalls and pratfalls of battles and campaigns past. I use "campaign" as an intentional double meaning, covering both the military and the political spheres, because just as in World War II, and exactly as Clausewitz said two hundred years ago, warfighting and politics are inextricably intertwined.
Which would seem to suggest that we're setting ourselves up to be blindsided all over again. We didn't see the Cold War coming, though Churchill and Patton did. North Korea's attack, and then Red China joining in, were completely unexpected. Vietnam was tragically underestimated. The prelude events to al Qaeda's assault on September 11, 2001 were lying in plain sight.
So, what major threat are we failing to notice this time? In what ways are the fundamental changes in our military structure and manning, now underway, undercutting us inadvertently going into the future? If we optimize to fight terrorists, will opportunist, ambitious Third-Generation nation-states see our vulnerabilities and become our next mortal foes? And if so, who will it be that launches the next blindsiding attack on our soil or on our vital interests abroad? If history is any guide, the culprit might not be on the present list of "usual suspects." Democracies don't start wars, and the fledgling spread of democracy is terrific indeed, but democracy can be one phase of a pendulum that swings -- look at Russia and South America, or the Weimar Republic for that matter.
I name our next major nation-level war opponent "the undiscovered country." They might be watching and scheming already, preparing, seeking an edge. Across the entire past century, the end of big war forever has been proclaimed with fanfare, often. The announcement was later proven wrong too frequently to be convincing now. And I'm not into conspiracy theories for sport or paranoia. The incredibly vast extent of Dr. Khan's nuclear underground is a real-world conspiracy if ever there was one, its full reach probably still not unmasked.
When clearing a minefield, it's wise to assume that the first booby-trap you find will not be the last. When checking your basement floor joists for termites, odds are the first sign of damage you see is only the beginning. If your cell phone drops the connection in the middle of a call, experience shows that it's likely to again once you redial.
The same goes for enemy states, conspiracies, and wars: Things that occur, recur. And complacency kills -- always.
We as a nation need to put a higher premium on searching for and deterring that undiscovered country; better intell gathering, and special operations forces aplenty, must perform key roles in this indications and warnings task. We also need to lift our gaze beyond the Fourth Generation wars we're currently fighting.
Fifth Generation War will be the most dangerous combat ever, for our way of life and possibly for the survival of humanity, precisely because we don't yet know what shape it will take or where the threat will come from. It will almost certainly break out as a come-as-you-are surprise party held entirely on the enemy's terms. Superb jets and missiles and dangerous subs are for sale in numbers on the world arms market. Tactical nukes are fast becoming the Great Equalizers against Uncle Sam. Robots and information warfare alone won't beat a determined adversary. Thomas Jefferson's blunder of going for cheap coastal gun boats instead of expensive ocean-going battleships was a direct contributor to America having to fight the War of 1812 -- are our naval acquisition plans, so much in flux inside the Beltway and up and down the Northeast Coast, setting us up for a War of 2012? Non-lethal weapons represent a major advance for civilization, but non-lethal war is a hollow promise, a myth.
Shakespeare's Hamlet used "the undiscovered country" to mean death itself. Think about this hard, because Macbeth said that "when troubles come they come not singly, but in battalions."
Ellie