thedrifter
03-05-05, 07:26 AM
03-02-2005
The ‘New’ Crisis with North Korea
By William F. Sauerwein
North Korea is like arthritis: It never goes away, but manages to always flare up during bad weather. Stand by for bad weather.
The North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950 brought this previously obscure part of the world to everyone’s attention. Since that time, North Korea has created many problems, with potentially even greater problems lurking in the shadows. While many “experts” claim North Korea merely seeks the world’s attention, the implications of this problem go much deeper.
The Korean peninsula assumed a strategic importance during the late 19th Century. Though independent, Korea remained under the influence of China, itself crumbling from external pressure and internal corruption. Russia coveted Korea as partially fulfilling its dream of an all-weather naval base for expanding the tsarist empire. Japan, a rising power, saw Korea as a stepping-stone to the vast natural resources of the Asian mainland.
At the turn of the 20th Century, Japan defeated both of these countries, emerging as the “owner” of Korea, Taiwan and several other Pacific islands. Korea became Japan’s staging area for attacking China in the 1930s, before World War II as a whole erupted. When the Soviet Union declared war against Japan in 1945, it attacked Japanese forces in both Manchuria and Korea.
This ancient fact is relevant since China, Japan and Russia are three members of the ongoing six-nation talks to attempt dissuading North Korea from deploying nuclear weapons. Just how much these nationalistic agendas color the negotiations remains to be seen. Since Japan’s defeat 60 years ago this year, its imperialistic designs may have been squashed. But what about China and Russia?
Both China and the Soviet Union approved North Korea’s invasion of South Korea in 1950. America’s enunciated foreign policy before the invasion had placed Korea outside of our “defensive perimeter” in northeast Asia. I firmly believe that had the United States not intervened, what is today the South Korean port of Pusan would have become a Soviet military installation.
The 1953 armistice did not end the Korean War, and defending the demilitarized zone (DMZ) has long required substantial American forces. Since then, peace talks for ending the war have taken place on a recurring basis while new acts of hostility by North Korea have regularly derailed them.
These hostilities continue to this day in the form of North Korea’s public attempts at nuclear blackmail.
Hostilities intensified during the Vietnam War, when our resources were directed toward that conflict. The Korean War Project website describes this “DMZ War” in detail, including the many casualties in the years since 1953.
North Korea also “rattled” its “sabers” during Operation Desert Storm until we decisively defeated the Iraqi military. With the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, it looked like North Korea would soon follow suit.
By 1993, many experts portrayed North Korea as an “economic basket case,” predicting its collapse in six months. However, North Korea soon “rattled its sabers” again, announcing its intentions for pursuing nuclear weapons. Then-President Bill Clinton initially talked tough, and deployed additional American troops for this crisis.
But former President Jimmy Carter rushed to Pyongyang and conducted an “unauthorized” negotiation with North Korean leaders. He assured them that the United States intended no imminent military response, and negotiated the “Agreed Framework of 1994.” Clinton hailed this as achieving “a vital and long-time American objective; an end to nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula.”
In a 1995 article for the online magazine FrontPageMagazine.com, Ben Johnson and Lt. Col. Gordon Cucullu called the Clinton administration’s response nothing short of appeasement. For our part of the deal, we agreed to provide light-water nuclear reactors, food and fuel oil. North Korea’s initial response was to divert ten thousand metric tons of the fuel oil to China’s army.
In return, North Korea was given ten years to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. It was also given five years for turning over its existing stockpile of plutonium. That was 1994. It is now 2005 and we see how well they honored their agreement.
U.S. officials in fact knew all along that North Korea was continuing to violate the 1994 this agreement, but chose to ignore it. In 1997, a congressional-commissioned panel headed by Donald Rumsfeld warned of North Korea’s violations, in particular, their campaign to develop ballistic missile capabilities.
North Korea launched a Taepo-dong rocket in August 1998, the second stage of which flew over Japan’s Honshu Island before crashing. The third stage supposedly carried a small satellite, which experts believe was destroyed before reaching orbit. In response, Clinton reopened bilateral talks, and paid North Korea $15 million in aid.
Even before the current phase of this crisis reached a head, the question arose: With these flagrant violations, why must we “reassure” North Korea of our intentions? It is they who have broken existing agreements. They should be the ones assuring us, not the other way around. The point is now moot.
One of our problems is that too many “experts” want to continue this appeasement strategy. Former presidential candidate John Kerry promised to “renew” the bilateral negotiations, and this policy is still supported by Democratic Party leaders. Such dissension among our leaders merely encourages North Korea’s intransigence and that of our other enemies as well.
For those believing the North Koreans are “reasonable,” I suggest you access their news service, the Korean Central News Agency. It is replete with anti-American propaganda, and there is no mention of finding “common ground.” Nor do they mention the aid we have already provided them. Instead, the North Korean government blames us for the suffering of their people.
More disturbing, South Korean leaders in recent years have favored this appeasement because of threats from Pyongyang of unleashing a “sea of fire” across the DMZ. Many South Koreans see the United States as an unreliable ally because of past appeasement, and are working for the best accommodation with the North. It further sees the meager U.S. forces primarily focused on the global war against terrorism.
We must not delude ourselves. Any war in Korea will be significantly a ground war. The mountainous terrain hinders the effectiveness of air and artillery support and other technology. North Korea has proved adept at burrowing into these mountains, tunneling under the DMZ and camouflaging its strategic facilities. Such facilities can only be neutralized through bloody ground combat, which remains our major weakness.
Of the 33,000 U.S. troops in South Korea, the only ground combat force is the 2nd Infantry Division, which had only three of its four brigades in-country. Because of manpower demands, the division’s 2nd Brigade deployed to Iraq in July 2004, and will not be coming back. Following its Iraq deployment, the unit will redeploy to Fort Carson, Colo.
The 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii is the general reserve for the Pacific region (Korea). Its 1st Brigade redeployed to Fort Lewis, Wash., in May 1995. Its 2nd Brigade is currently redeploying from Iraq and the 3rd Brigade is deploying to Afghanistan.
Other ground forces in the Pacific region include the III Marine Expeditionary Force and 3rd Marine Division in Japan, some of whom were involved in the Indonesian tsunami relief.
North Korea’s strategy is simple: to capture as much of South Korea as possible before significant American forces arrive in theater. They have a 1.5 million active duty force, most at bases within hours of the DMZ, and enjoy the element of surprise. Given our current level of commitments and shortage of ground troops, we would be hard-pressed to eject them.
Suppose that North Korea’s ballistic missiles then disrupt our lines of communication from Japan? Japan, under missile attack, may make concessions to North Korea, forcing us to accept defeat in Korea. Such a setback could affect our prestige across the entire region.
The good news is that North Korea is limited in its capabilities by its geography. Currently it lacks the naval capacity for outflanking the DMZ, but it can infiltrate saboteurs. If it did conquer South Korea, it could go no farther without the buildup of significant naval assets.
We could effectively blockade North Korea from the outside world (except for its common border with China and Russia). China saved North Korea in 1950; would it save them again, risking a war with us? It is no secret that China regards us as the major impediment to its designs in the South China Sea.
China is viewed as our long-term adversary, and its defense budget continues increasing at double-digit annual rates. Beijing’s emphasis is on “information technology,” including space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and defeating our satellites. Furthermore, China is steadily improving its air and naval capabilities, particularly “blue water” assets.
China’s 2.5 million active duty forces must be considered when addressing North Korea. It seems logical that if China wanted North Korea calmed, it would have no trouble persuading the isolated rogue regime. Therefore, China may be provoking this confrontation with the goal of ultimately removing our threat to their ambitions.
China’s Korean War intervention in 1950 profoundly affected our decisions in Asia throughout the Cold War. It further affected the aggressions of North Korea against us during the same time.
I believe that North Korea does not seriously anticipate an attack from the United States or South Korea. It uses this rhetoric for domestic propaganda and the continuing oppression of its people. Therefore, North Korea freely threatens its neighbors, except China, with no fear of repercussions. Unfortunately, that threat now includes nuclear weapons, potentially upsetting the regional balance of power. Our own self-delusion and record of appeasement since the early 1990s has further helped create a much more dangerous situation.
Our weakened military situation in this region hinders chances for any real diplomatic success. Under cover of this diplomacy, North Korea and China will continue building their military strength and at some point, a military confrontation will become unavoidable.
It is imperative that we must possess the military strength for meeting that confrontation. We cannot afford to allow our fixation on Iraq and the war against terror to blind us to an emerging threat that is far graver than those two conflicts.
William F. Sauerwein is a Contributing Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at mono@gtec.com. Please send Feedback responses to dwfeedback@yahoo.com.
Ellie
The ‘New’ Crisis with North Korea
By William F. Sauerwein
North Korea is like arthritis: It never goes away, but manages to always flare up during bad weather. Stand by for bad weather.
The North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950 brought this previously obscure part of the world to everyone’s attention. Since that time, North Korea has created many problems, with potentially even greater problems lurking in the shadows. While many “experts” claim North Korea merely seeks the world’s attention, the implications of this problem go much deeper.
The Korean peninsula assumed a strategic importance during the late 19th Century. Though independent, Korea remained under the influence of China, itself crumbling from external pressure and internal corruption. Russia coveted Korea as partially fulfilling its dream of an all-weather naval base for expanding the tsarist empire. Japan, a rising power, saw Korea as a stepping-stone to the vast natural resources of the Asian mainland.
At the turn of the 20th Century, Japan defeated both of these countries, emerging as the “owner” of Korea, Taiwan and several other Pacific islands. Korea became Japan’s staging area for attacking China in the 1930s, before World War II as a whole erupted. When the Soviet Union declared war against Japan in 1945, it attacked Japanese forces in both Manchuria and Korea.
This ancient fact is relevant since China, Japan and Russia are three members of the ongoing six-nation talks to attempt dissuading North Korea from deploying nuclear weapons. Just how much these nationalistic agendas color the negotiations remains to be seen. Since Japan’s defeat 60 years ago this year, its imperialistic designs may have been squashed. But what about China and Russia?
Both China and the Soviet Union approved North Korea’s invasion of South Korea in 1950. America’s enunciated foreign policy before the invasion had placed Korea outside of our “defensive perimeter” in northeast Asia. I firmly believe that had the United States not intervened, what is today the South Korean port of Pusan would have become a Soviet military installation.
The 1953 armistice did not end the Korean War, and defending the demilitarized zone (DMZ) has long required substantial American forces. Since then, peace talks for ending the war have taken place on a recurring basis while new acts of hostility by North Korea have regularly derailed them.
These hostilities continue to this day in the form of North Korea’s public attempts at nuclear blackmail.
Hostilities intensified during the Vietnam War, when our resources were directed toward that conflict. The Korean War Project website describes this “DMZ War” in detail, including the many casualties in the years since 1953.
North Korea also “rattled” its “sabers” during Operation Desert Storm until we decisively defeated the Iraqi military. With the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, it looked like North Korea would soon follow suit.
By 1993, many experts portrayed North Korea as an “economic basket case,” predicting its collapse in six months. However, North Korea soon “rattled its sabers” again, announcing its intentions for pursuing nuclear weapons. Then-President Bill Clinton initially talked tough, and deployed additional American troops for this crisis.
But former President Jimmy Carter rushed to Pyongyang and conducted an “unauthorized” negotiation with North Korean leaders. He assured them that the United States intended no imminent military response, and negotiated the “Agreed Framework of 1994.” Clinton hailed this as achieving “a vital and long-time American objective; an end to nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula.”
In a 1995 article for the online magazine FrontPageMagazine.com, Ben Johnson and Lt. Col. Gordon Cucullu called the Clinton administration’s response nothing short of appeasement. For our part of the deal, we agreed to provide light-water nuclear reactors, food and fuel oil. North Korea’s initial response was to divert ten thousand metric tons of the fuel oil to China’s army.
In return, North Korea was given ten years to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. It was also given five years for turning over its existing stockpile of plutonium. That was 1994. It is now 2005 and we see how well they honored their agreement.
U.S. officials in fact knew all along that North Korea was continuing to violate the 1994 this agreement, but chose to ignore it. In 1997, a congressional-commissioned panel headed by Donald Rumsfeld warned of North Korea’s violations, in particular, their campaign to develop ballistic missile capabilities.
North Korea launched a Taepo-dong rocket in August 1998, the second stage of which flew over Japan’s Honshu Island before crashing. The third stage supposedly carried a small satellite, which experts believe was destroyed before reaching orbit. In response, Clinton reopened bilateral talks, and paid North Korea $15 million in aid.
Even before the current phase of this crisis reached a head, the question arose: With these flagrant violations, why must we “reassure” North Korea of our intentions? It is they who have broken existing agreements. They should be the ones assuring us, not the other way around. The point is now moot.
One of our problems is that too many “experts” want to continue this appeasement strategy. Former presidential candidate John Kerry promised to “renew” the bilateral negotiations, and this policy is still supported by Democratic Party leaders. Such dissension among our leaders merely encourages North Korea’s intransigence and that of our other enemies as well.
For those believing the North Koreans are “reasonable,” I suggest you access their news service, the Korean Central News Agency. It is replete with anti-American propaganda, and there is no mention of finding “common ground.” Nor do they mention the aid we have already provided them. Instead, the North Korean government blames us for the suffering of their people.
More disturbing, South Korean leaders in recent years have favored this appeasement because of threats from Pyongyang of unleashing a “sea of fire” across the DMZ. Many South Koreans see the United States as an unreliable ally because of past appeasement, and are working for the best accommodation with the North. It further sees the meager U.S. forces primarily focused on the global war against terrorism.
We must not delude ourselves. Any war in Korea will be significantly a ground war. The mountainous terrain hinders the effectiveness of air and artillery support and other technology. North Korea has proved adept at burrowing into these mountains, tunneling under the DMZ and camouflaging its strategic facilities. Such facilities can only be neutralized through bloody ground combat, which remains our major weakness.
Of the 33,000 U.S. troops in South Korea, the only ground combat force is the 2nd Infantry Division, which had only three of its four brigades in-country. Because of manpower demands, the division’s 2nd Brigade deployed to Iraq in July 2004, and will not be coming back. Following its Iraq deployment, the unit will redeploy to Fort Carson, Colo.
The 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii is the general reserve for the Pacific region (Korea). Its 1st Brigade redeployed to Fort Lewis, Wash., in May 1995. Its 2nd Brigade is currently redeploying from Iraq and the 3rd Brigade is deploying to Afghanistan.
Other ground forces in the Pacific region include the III Marine Expeditionary Force and 3rd Marine Division in Japan, some of whom were involved in the Indonesian tsunami relief.
North Korea’s strategy is simple: to capture as much of South Korea as possible before significant American forces arrive in theater. They have a 1.5 million active duty force, most at bases within hours of the DMZ, and enjoy the element of surprise. Given our current level of commitments and shortage of ground troops, we would be hard-pressed to eject them.
Suppose that North Korea’s ballistic missiles then disrupt our lines of communication from Japan? Japan, under missile attack, may make concessions to North Korea, forcing us to accept defeat in Korea. Such a setback could affect our prestige across the entire region.
The good news is that North Korea is limited in its capabilities by its geography. Currently it lacks the naval capacity for outflanking the DMZ, but it can infiltrate saboteurs. If it did conquer South Korea, it could go no farther without the buildup of significant naval assets.
We could effectively blockade North Korea from the outside world (except for its common border with China and Russia). China saved North Korea in 1950; would it save them again, risking a war with us? It is no secret that China regards us as the major impediment to its designs in the South China Sea.
China is viewed as our long-term adversary, and its defense budget continues increasing at double-digit annual rates. Beijing’s emphasis is on “information technology,” including space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and defeating our satellites. Furthermore, China is steadily improving its air and naval capabilities, particularly “blue water” assets.
China’s 2.5 million active duty forces must be considered when addressing North Korea. It seems logical that if China wanted North Korea calmed, it would have no trouble persuading the isolated rogue regime. Therefore, China may be provoking this confrontation with the goal of ultimately removing our threat to their ambitions.
China’s Korean War intervention in 1950 profoundly affected our decisions in Asia throughout the Cold War. It further affected the aggressions of North Korea against us during the same time.
I believe that North Korea does not seriously anticipate an attack from the United States or South Korea. It uses this rhetoric for domestic propaganda and the continuing oppression of its people. Therefore, North Korea freely threatens its neighbors, except China, with no fear of repercussions. Unfortunately, that threat now includes nuclear weapons, potentially upsetting the regional balance of power. Our own self-delusion and record of appeasement since the early 1990s has further helped create a much more dangerous situation.
Our weakened military situation in this region hinders chances for any real diplomatic success. Under cover of this diplomacy, North Korea and China will continue building their military strength and at some point, a military confrontation will become unavoidable.
It is imperative that we must possess the military strength for meeting that confrontation. We cannot afford to allow our fixation on Iraq and the war against terror to blind us to an emerging threat that is far graver than those two conflicts.
William F. Sauerwein is a Contributing Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at mono@gtec.com. Please send Feedback responses to dwfeedback@yahoo.com.
Ellie