thedrifter
03-03-05, 07:10 AM
02-26-2005
On Moral Leadership and Exit Strategies
By Raymond Perry
Recent articles published in The Wall Street Journal highlight key elements of this nation’s actual exit strategy in Iraq. Debate over our future course in Iraq had been swirling all last year during the election campaign as our soldiers died day by day, causing some confusion as to whether we actually did have such a strategy.
Despite the confusion, this nation has had an Iraqi exit strategy, however poorly voiced by our national leaders. It’s not hard to find if you know where to look.
In his Feb. 18 Journal article, “Iwo Jima,” Arthur Herman described the supreme commitment of the Marines on Iwo Jima 60 years ago as they faced a determined enemy who knew full well that their war was already lost. The mission of the Japanese defenders was to create, in correspondent Robert Sherrod’s words, “a nightmare in hell” for the attacking U.S. Marines.
Places like “Bloody Gorge” stand as stark testimony in the memories of those Marines who survived it. Such names of small pieces of Iwo Jima punctuate the ferocity and willingness to die of Japanese soldiers. To be sure, there were many indications in previous Pacific battles that this kind of bloodletting was in the offing.
Herman noted that totalitarian leaders use such bestial brutality to cause free peoples to cower, thus claiming a false moral superiority. The Japanese Bushido warrior ethic of a thousand years claimed ultimate victory as its justification. Nevertheless, they lost.
But, again as Herman pointed out, free societies can afford only one response: To stand tall and outlast all such comers. The U.S. Marine Memorial in Arlington, Va., modeled after Joe Rosenthal’s historic Iwo Jima flag-raising photograph, stands in powerful testimony to the fact that this nation, when angered, can and will pursue such enemies relentlessly.
In an earlier Wall Street Journal article on Feb. 8, “When Officers Aren’t Gentlemen”, author Mark Bowden describes the experience of Maj. James Lechner, a veteran of the 1993 Mogadishu “Black Hawk Down” battle where Lechner sustained a grievous wound in street fighting. Lechner is now advising an Iraqi Army unit, the 7th Battalion. He expends his greatest effort on leadership.
It is a quietly spoken issue in military leadership circles that units can never be better than their officers, particularly the commanding officer. The dedication, courage, and professional performance of the soldiers notwithstanding, officers make a defining difference that cannot be overcome in the long run.
In his latest book, “Born Fighting,” author and former Navy Secretary James Webb, himself a decorated Marine Officer, notes the critical contribution made by the Scots-Irish tradition born north of Hadrian’s Wall many centuries ago. In a large emigration to North America in the 1700s, these people brought with them a tradition of warrior leadership that colors our military to this day.
The essence of Webb’s book is that the obligation of the leaders to their warriors is greater than that of the warriors to their leaders.
In Iraq, the ghost of Saddam Hussein still pervades the Iraqi Army. He infused a leadership based on privilege with little obligation and even less responsibility. Creating an officer corps that does not take leave just prior to a major battle (as observed by Maj. Lechner) but instead one that understands the value of a spirited non-commissioned officer cadre, and one who is willing to make decisions accepting the responsibility that comes with power and privilege, is critical to Iraq’s future against the terrorist insurgents.
Lechner observed that the Iraqi soldiers themselves are capable of all the skills necessary to success on the battlefield, but effective leadership from the Iraqi officers is a far more ephemeral thing, and critical in the end.
An article in The Wall Street Journal this week by Greg Jaffe, “A Marine Captain Trains Iraqi Colonel To Take Over Fight,” illustrates just as crystal clear the changes that Iraqi Officers must sustain. Just as clear is that they are capable of doing so. But vanquishing ghosts can be a long and tough battle.
In his recent book “Washington’s Crossing,” author David Hackett Fisher describes George Washington weeping as he observed from the Palisades of New Jersey, the slaughter without quarter of his troops in Brooklyn as he evacuated his tattered forces from New York City.
Later, as the fortunes of the Revolutionary Army turned for the better, Washington made a seemingly small decision to treat British and Hessian prisoners humanely. Given the inhumanity visited on his own troops, it would have seemed justified had he not done so. Yet he recognized the value to the nation and importance to the service of hewing to a high ethical standard. This decision also infuses our military to this day.
As we train the nascent Iraqi Army, we cannot instill such thinking directly. We can only lay the groundwork so that their officer corps can make similar choices when faced with them. This just takes time.
This is why the exit strategy ploy, as appealing as it is, represents either ignorance or rank sophistry. Building an army out of whole cloth takes time, people have to have the opportunity to screw up, and the culture of the nation and its expectations of the army are of great significance.
This nation has employed an effective exit strategy in the past. This is how it should be applied in Iraq:
* To be relentless in the pursuit of the insurgents;
* To establish key elements of the rule of law, particularly the secret ballot and an independent judiciary;
* To forge an effective and moral officer corps in the armed forces;
* To provide time so that the Iraqis may make these decisions for themselves.
However poorly voiced at the national level, this is our current national exit strategy in Iraq. It takes will and steadfastness. Totalitarian people will misunderstand evidence of our freedom to dissent as weakness. The bitterness of the politicking over “an exit strategy” continues to provide a glimmer of hope to the insurgents that they may yet pierce our steadfastness.
It is important that this nation recall the great value of a free people willing to face extraordinary brutality, saying, “Thus far and no farther.” Iwo Jima stands as a defining moment where a free people stood tall and outlasted brutality. The lessons of the Marines “nightmare in hell” long ago resonate throughout Iraq and wherever else our military wages war against the forces of totalitarianism and terror.
Lt. Raymond Perry USN (Ret.) is a DefenseWatch Contributing Editor. He can be reached at cos1stlt@yahoo.com. Please send Feedback responses to dwfeedback@yahoo.com.
Ellie
On Moral Leadership and Exit Strategies
By Raymond Perry
Recent articles published in The Wall Street Journal highlight key elements of this nation’s actual exit strategy in Iraq. Debate over our future course in Iraq had been swirling all last year during the election campaign as our soldiers died day by day, causing some confusion as to whether we actually did have such a strategy.
Despite the confusion, this nation has had an Iraqi exit strategy, however poorly voiced by our national leaders. It’s not hard to find if you know where to look.
In his Feb. 18 Journal article, “Iwo Jima,” Arthur Herman described the supreme commitment of the Marines on Iwo Jima 60 years ago as they faced a determined enemy who knew full well that their war was already lost. The mission of the Japanese defenders was to create, in correspondent Robert Sherrod’s words, “a nightmare in hell” for the attacking U.S. Marines.
Places like “Bloody Gorge” stand as stark testimony in the memories of those Marines who survived it. Such names of small pieces of Iwo Jima punctuate the ferocity and willingness to die of Japanese soldiers. To be sure, there were many indications in previous Pacific battles that this kind of bloodletting was in the offing.
Herman noted that totalitarian leaders use such bestial brutality to cause free peoples to cower, thus claiming a false moral superiority. The Japanese Bushido warrior ethic of a thousand years claimed ultimate victory as its justification. Nevertheless, they lost.
But, again as Herman pointed out, free societies can afford only one response: To stand tall and outlast all such comers. The U.S. Marine Memorial in Arlington, Va., modeled after Joe Rosenthal’s historic Iwo Jima flag-raising photograph, stands in powerful testimony to the fact that this nation, when angered, can and will pursue such enemies relentlessly.
In an earlier Wall Street Journal article on Feb. 8, “When Officers Aren’t Gentlemen”, author Mark Bowden describes the experience of Maj. James Lechner, a veteran of the 1993 Mogadishu “Black Hawk Down” battle where Lechner sustained a grievous wound in street fighting. Lechner is now advising an Iraqi Army unit, the 7th Battalion. He expends his greatest effort on leadership.
It is a quietly spoken issue in military leadership circles that units can never be better than their officers, particularly the commanding officer. The dedication, courage, and professional performance of the soldiers notwithstanding, officers make a defining difference that cannot be overcome in the long run.
In his latest book, “Born Fighting,” author and former Navy Secretary James Webb, himself a decorated Marine Officer, notes the critical contribution made by the Scots-Irish tradition born north of Hadrian’s Wall many centuries ago. In a large emigration to North America in the 1700s, these people brought with them a tradition of warrior leadership that colors our military to this day.
The essence of Webb’s book is that the obligation of the leaders to their warriors is greater than that of the warriors to their leaders.
In Iraq, the ghost of Saddam Hussein still pervades the Iraqi Army. He infused a leadership based on privilege with little obligation and even less responsibility. Creating an officer corps that does not take leave just prior to a major battle (as observed by Maj. Lechner) but instead one that understands the value of a spirited non-commissioned officer cadre, and one who is willing to make decisions accepting the responsibility that comes with power and privilege, is critical to Iraq’s future against the terrorist insurgents.
Lechner observed that the Iraqi soldiers themselves are capable of all the skills necessary to success on the battlefield, but effective leadership from the Iraqi officers is a far more ephemeral thing, and critical in the end.
An article in The Wall Street Journal this week by Greg Jaffe, “A Marine Captain Trains Iraqi Colonel To Take Over Fight,” illustrates just as crystal clear the changes that Iraqi Officers must sustain. Just as clear is that they are capable of doing so. But vanquishing ghosts can be a long and tough battle.
In his recent book “Washington’s Crossing,” author David Hackett Fisher describes George Washington weeping as he observed from the Palisades of New Jersey, the slaughter without quarter of his troops in Brooklyn as he evacuated his tattered forces from New York City.
Later, as the fortunes of the Revolutionary Army turned for the better, Washington made a seemingly small decision to treat British and Hessian prisoners humanely. Given the inhumanity visited on his own troops, it would have seemed justified had he not done so. Yet he recognized the value to the nation and importance to the service of hewing to a high ethical standard. This decision also infuses our military to this day.
As we train the nascent Iraqi Army, we cannot instill such thinking directly. We can only lay the groundwork so that their officer corps can make similar choices when faced with them. This just takes time.
This is why the exit strategy ploy, as appealing as it is, represents either ignorance or rank sophistry. Building an army out of whole cloth takes time, people have to have the opportunity to screw up, and the culture of the nation and its expectations of the army are of great significance.
This nation has employed an effective exit strategy in the past. This is how it should be applied in Iraq:
* To be relentless in the pursuit of the insurgents;
* To establish key elements of the rule of law, particularly the secret ballot and an independent judiciary;
* To forge an effective and moral officer corps in the armed forces;
* To provide time so that the Iraqis may make these decisions for themselves.
However poorly voiced at the national level, this is our current national exit strategy in Iraq. It takes will and steadfastness. Totalitarian people will misunderstand evidence of our freedom to dissent as weakness. The bitterness of the politicking over “an exit strategy” continues to provide a glimmer of hope to the insurgents that they may yet pierce our steadfastness.
It is important that this nation recall the great value of a free people willing to face extraordinary brutality, saying, “Thus far and no farther.” Iwo Jima stands as a defining moment where a free people stood tall and outlasted brutality. The lessons of the Marines “nightmare in hell” long ago resonate throughout Iraq and wherever else our military wages war against the forces of totalitarianism and terror.
Lt. Raymond Perry USN (Ret.) is a DefenseWatch Contributing Editor. He can be reached at cos1stlt@yahoo.com. Please send Feedback responses to dwfeedback@yahoo.com.
Ellie